Wife bent upon destroying husband’s career & reputation amounts to ‘mental cruelty’: Punjab and Haryana High Court - The Daily Guardian
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Wife bent upon destroying husband’s career & reputation amounts to ‘mental cruelty’: Punjab and Haryana High Court

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Without mincing any words whatsoever and without beating about the bush, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in an extremely learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Devesh Yadav v. Smt. Meenal in FAO-M-208 of 2013 that was reserved on 30.03.2022 and then finally pronounced on 08.04.2022 has observed explicitly, eloquently and elegantly that if the wife is bent upon destroying the career and reputation of her husband by making complaints against him to his senior officers, then it would amount to mental cruelty and the same would entitle the man to divorce. It must be mentioned that the Bench of Justice Ritu Bahri and Justice Ashok Kumar Verma observed thus, while hearing a plea that was filed by an Indian Air Force (IAF) personnel who sought a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion. Consequently, we thus see that the Court very rightly granted a decree of divorce and allowed the plea while noting specifically that the marriage between the parties had broken down irretrievably and there is no chance of their coming together, or living together again.

To start with, this extremely commendable, cogent, composed and creditworthy judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Ashok Kumar Verma for a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Ms Justice Ritu Bahri sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The appellant-husband has come up in appeal before this Court seeking setting aside of judgment and decree dated 26.02.2013 passed by the District Judge, Rohtak, whereby petition filed by him under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short ‘the HMA’) for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce, has been dismissed.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then while elaborating on the facts of the case envisages in para 2 that, “Brief facts of the case are that appellant-husband filed a petition under Section 13 of the HMA for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce pleading therein that marriage between the parties was solemnized on 19.11.1998 and the same was registered on 23.11.1998 at Rohtak. At the time of marriage, appellant-husband was posted at Srinagar and they lived there upto March, 2000. Respondent-wife insisted that delivery of the child should take place at Rohtak, therefore, appellant acceded to her request and they went to Rohtak, where they were blessed with a son, namely, Jalaj on 24.08.1999. Thereafter, appellant was transferred to Jammu and parties lived together there upto April, 2002. The appellant remained posted at Jammu upto September, 2002 and then was transferred to Lucknow. It is alleged by the appellant-husband that from the beginning of the marriage, conduct, behaviour and attitude of the respondent-wife had been cruel, unwarranted and harsh and she used to pick up quarrels over trifles without any justifiable cause. The respondent deserted the appellant in April, 2002 and since then she had not returned to matrimonial home, whereas appellant had always been giving love and affection to the respondent and his son. In the beginning of December, 1999 appellant had taken the respondent along with his son to his place of posting at Srinagar and at the request of respondent her mother was also taken there and appellant provided proper food, clothing and every good lodging facility to the respondent, her mother and the son. In mid December, 1999, respondent suffered with breast abscess and she was got treated and operated at Army Hospital, Srinagar. In December, 1999, respondent was again operated at PGIMS, Rohtak, as the said ailment had re-developed. In April, 2002, respondent went to the house of her parents at Rohtak and thereafter in spite of best efforts of the appellant, she did not return to her matrimonial home. Appellant had also written several letters from the place of his posting requesting respondent and her parents to send the respondent and his son to him but in vain. Whenever, appellant came on leave at Rohtak and tried to meet his wife and the child, respondent’s parents did not allow him to meet them. Rather, Pawan, brother of the respondent, misbehaved with the appellant whenever appellant visited the house of his in-laws. Appellant also met the respondent in April, 2006 and requested her to accompany him and apprised her that he had booked seats for journey but she flatly refused to accompany him and threatened that if he tried to take her with him, she would commit suicide. It is further alleged that respondent failed to discharge her matrimonial duties and obligations and rather she ill-treated and mal-treated the appellant, caused physical and mental cruelty upon him, did not cooperate in married life and made his life hell. The respondent even failed to give any respect and regard to the parents of the appellant. When respondent expressed her desire to do a job, appellant agreed to her request and she had worked at Army Public School, Jammu, from July, 2001 to March, 2002. As in spite of best efforts made by the appellant, respondent did not join the matrimonial home, he was compelled to institute a divorce petition bearing No.58 of 2006. The matter was referred to Lok Adalat/mediation. During the course of these proceedings, respondent agreed to withdraw her complaint made to the Air Force authorities as well as the application for maintenance filed before the Senior Air Force Officer, on withdrawal of said petition by the appellant. The matter was compromised on the basis of separate statements dated 21.12.2008 and the petition filed by the appellant was dismissed as withdrawn. Appellant further alleged that respondent was working as lecturer in mathematics in Matu Ram Institute of Engineering and Management at Rohtak. Even during vacations she never joined the company of the appellant. Despite having given undertaking before the Court in her statement dated 21.12.2008, she had not withdrawn her complaint and maintenance application filed before the Senior Air Force Officer and did not join the company of the appellant at the matrimonial home at the place of his posting i.e. at M.E.T. Flight Air Force Station, Sirsa (Haryana). Therefore, appellant sought decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion.”

Needless to say, the Bench then observes in para 13 that, “It is undisputed fact that the marriage between the appellant and respondent was solemnized on 19.11.1998 and the same was registered on 23.11.1998. On 24.08.1999 a child, namely, Jalaj was born out of the wedlock. According to the appellant, in the month of April, 2002, the respondent left the company of the appellant and went to her parents’ house and the efforts made by the appellant to bring her back went in vain. It is the specific case of the respondent-wife that she never deserted the appellant nor caused any cruelty to him. The Family Court, considering the averments of both the parties, dismissed the petition filed by the husband under Section 13 of the HMA.”

As we see, the Bench then notes in para 14 that, “In view of the above circumstances, before proceeding with the appeal on merits, taking into consideration the fact that the parties were residing separately for about 12 years, vide order dated 28.04.2014, the parties were directed to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court on 19.05.2014. However, on several occasions parties did not appear before the mediator. Therefore, due to lackadaisical approach of both the parties to settle the matter and due to expiry of the stipulated period, mediator referred back the matter to this Court on 14.08.2014. Thus, the appeal was admitted on 20.02.2015.”

In hindsight, the Bench then recalls in para 15 that, “Being fed up of the behavior of the respondent-wife, earlier also appellant had instituted a petition for divorce bearing No.58 of 2006, which was referred to the Lok Adalat. The matter was compromised on 21.12.2008 and on assurance of the respondent to withdraw her complaint made to the Air Force authorities and the application for maintenance filed by her before the senior Air Force officer, appellant had withdrawn the said petition for divorce.”

To be sure, the Bench notes in para 21 that, “Respondent wife also bent upon destroying the career and reputation of the appellant-husband as she made complaints against him to his senior officers in the Air Force.”

Briefly stated, the Bench mentions in para 22 that, “At this juncture, it is important to make reference to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Talreja vs. Kavita Talreja, Civil Appeal No.10719 of 2013, decided on 24.04.2017, wherein, it was held that a false complaint was registered against the husband by the wife, after wife herself inflicted injuries on her person. In criminal proceedings, the husband had been acquitted and thereafter, proceedings against the wife were launched. On this account, the husband was held entitled to decree of divorce, on the ground of cruelty.”

Likewise, the Bench then also points out in para 23 that, “Likewise in Joydeep Majumdar vs. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, Civil Appeal Nos.3786-3787 of 2020, decided on 26.02.2021 (Law Finder Doc Id #1813316), where defamatory complaints had been made by wife to husband’s superior officers and the complaint so made by the wife was held to have affected the career progress of the husband, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that it amounted to ‘mental cruelty’ as the husband had suffered adverse consequences, in his life and career, on account of allegations, made by wife. The Family Court, had granted divorce to the husband, on the ground of cruelty. However, the High Court had reversed the finding of the Family Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while deciding the matter, referred to another judgment passed in Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh, 2007 (4) SCC 511, wherein, it was observed that in order to make out a case of mental cruelty, no uniform standard can be laid down and each case will have to be decided, on its own facts. Further, in Joydeep Majumdar’s case (supra), it was observed as herein given:-

“11. The materials in the present case reveal that the respondent had made several defamatory complaints to the appellant’s superiors in the Army for which, a Court of inquiry was held by the Army authorities against the appellant. Primarily for those, the appellant’s career progress got affected. The Respondent was also making complaints to other authorities, such as, the State Commission for Women and has posted defamatory materials on other platforms. The net outcome of above is that the appellant’s career and reputation had suffered.

12. When the appellant has suffered adverse consequences in his life and career on account of the allegations made by the respondent, the legal consequences must follow and those cannot be prevented only because, no Court has determined that the allegations were false. The High Court however felt that without any definite finding on the credibility of the wife’s allegation, the wronged spouse would be disentitled to relief. This is not found to be the correct way to deal with the issue.

13. Proceeding with the above understanding, the question which requires to be answered here is whether the conduct of the respondent would fall within the realm of mental cruelty. Here the allegations are levelled by a highly educated spouse and they do have the propensity to irreparably damage the character and reputation of the appellant. When the reputation of the spouse is sullied amongst his colleagues, his superiors and the society at large, it would be difficult to expect condonation of such conduct by the affected party.””

Be it noted, the Bench then minces no words to state in para 26 that, “The conduct of the respondent-wife in filing a complaint making unfounded, indecent and defamatory allegations against her husband and parents-in-law indicates that she made all attempts to ensure that appellant and his parents are put in jail and the appellant is removed from his job. We have no manner of doubt that this conduct of respondent-wife has caused mental cruelty to the appellant-husband.”

Quite forthrightly, the Bench then holds in para 30 that, “In the present case, the marriage between the parties had broken down irretrievably and there is no chance of their coming together, or living together again. Further, not to grant decree of divorce would be disastrous for the parties.”

In retrospect, the Bench then recalls in para 31 that, “The three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in a case of Samar Ghosh (supra) passed the decree on the ground of mental cruelty but the concept of irretrievable breakdown of marriage has been discussed in detail referring the 71st report of the Law Commission of India.”

While referring to a relevant case law, the Bench then points out in para 32 that, “Hon’ble the Supreme Court in a case of K. Srinivas Rao vs. D.A. Deepa (supra) has observed that though irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, however, marriage which is dead for all purposes, cannot be revived by Court’s verdict, if parties are not willing since marriage involves human sentiments and emotions and if they have dried up, there is hardly any chance of their springing back to life on account of artificial reunion created by court decree.”

Adding more to it, the Bench then remarks in para 33 that, “Now, once the respondent-wife who is not staying with the appellant for the last about 20 years and is not ready to give mutual divorce to the appellant-husband, reference at this stage can be made to Naveen Kohli’s case (supra), which was a case of cruelty (physical and mental) where Hon’ble the Supreme Court considered the concept of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. In this case as well, the parties were living separately for the last 10 years and the wife was not ready to give divorce to the husband. Hon’ble the Supreme Court granted decree of divorce but directed the husband to pay a sum of Rs.25 lacs towards permanent maintenance. In para 58, it has been observed as under:-

“58. The High Court ought to have considered the repercussions, consequences, impact and ramifications of all the criminal and other proceedings initiated by the parties against each other in proper perspective. For illustration, the High Court has mentioned that so far as the publication of the news item is concerned, the status of husband in a registered company was only that of an employee and if any news item is published, in such a situation, it could not, by any stretch of imagination be taken to have lowered the prestige of the husband. In the next para 69 of the judgment that in one of the news item what has been indicated was that in the company, Nikhil Rubber (P) Ltd., the appellant was only a Director along with Mrs. Neelu Kohli whom held 94.5% share of Rs.100/- each in the company. The news item further indicated that Naveen Kohli was acting against the spirit of the Article of the Association of Nikhil Rubber (P) Ltd., had caused immense loss of business and goodwill. He has stealthily removed produce of the company, besides diverted orders of foreign buyers to his proprietorship firm M/s Navneet Elastomers. He had opened bank account with forged signatures of Mrs. Neelu Kohli and fabricated resolution of the Board of Directors of the company. Statutory authorityCompanies Act had refused to register documents filed by Mr. Naveen Kolhi and had issued show cause notice. All business associates were cautioned to avoid dealing with him alone. Neither the company nor Mrs. Neelu Kohli shall be liable for the acts of Mr. Naveen Kohli. Despite the aforementioned finding that the news item was intended to caution business associates to avoid dealing with the appellant then to come to this finding in the next para that it will by no stretch of imagination result in mental cruelty is wholly untenable.””

Most remarkably, the Bench then while taking a pragmatic stand minces no words to state in para 34 that, “It is well settled that once the parties have separated and separation has continued for a sufficient length of time and anyone of them presented a petition for divorce, it can well be presumed that the marriage has broken down. The Court, no doubt, should seriously make an endeavour to reconcile the parties; yet, if it is found that the breakdown is irreparable, then divorce should not be withheld. The consequences of preservation in law of the unworkable marriage which has long ceased to be effective are bound to be a source of greater misery for the parties.”

Simply put, the Bench then recollects in para 35 that, “In the present case, the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife are living separately since April, 2002. Firstly, efforts were made to resolve the matrimonial dispute through the process of mediation, which is one of the effective mode of alternative mechanism in resolving the personal dispute but in vain.”

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 36 that, “Applying the ratio of the above-mentioned judgments to the facts of the present case and keeping in view the extraordinary facts and circumstances of the case, the appeal is allowed, judgment dated 26.02.2013 passed by the District Judge, Rohtak, is set aside and decree of divorce is granted accordingly in favour of the appellant-husband. Decreesheet be prepared accordingly. However, we direct the appellant-husband to make an F.D. of Rs 20 lakhs as permanent alimony in the name of the respondent-wife.”

In sum, the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court comprising of Hon’ble Ms Justice Ritu Bahri and Hon’ble Mr Justice Ashok Kumar Verma have taken a very balanced, bold and brilliant stand in this notable judgment. It has rightly, rationally and remarkably directed the husband to make an F.D. of Rs 20 lakhs as permanent alimony in the name of the respondent-wife so that she does not face financial distress. But it also simultaneously ensures that it allows the appeal of husband for being granted divorce by stipulating that if the wife is bent upon destroying the career and reputation of her husband by making complaints against him to his senior officers, then it would amount to mental cruelty and the same would entitle the man to divorce. Very rightly so!

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IN MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE COMPENSATION CLAIMS, MCI FINDINGS REGARDING DOCTORS’ PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT HAVE GREAT RELEVANCE: SC

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The Supreme Court in the case Harnek Singh vs Gurmit Singh observed while considering medical negligence compensation claims that the findings of the report of Medical Council of India on professional conduct of doctors are relevant.

from the date of SCDRC order as compensation thereafter the court directed the Respondents to pay to the complainants a total amount of Rs. 25,00,000 with interest @ 6% per annum. the complainants have made out a case of medical negligence against Respondents 1 and 2 and are entitled to seek compensation on the ground of deficiency of service and the court hold that the decision of the NCDRC deserves to be set aside. in reversing the findings of the SCDRC and not adverting to the evidence on record including the report of the MCI, the court is of the opinion that the NCDRC has committed an error. The case of medical negligence leading to deficiency in his services, the above-referred findings of the MCI on the conduct of Respondent 1 leave no doubt in our mind that this is certainly, observed by the bench.

The bench further observed that he opinion and findings of the MCI regarding the professional conduct of Respondent 1 have great relevance while referring to the contents in the report of MCI.

The issue raises in the above-mentioned case is weather a professional negligence is established by the complainant as per the standards governing the duty to care of a medical practitioner on the part of Respondent As the NCDRC gave its decision without referring to the MCI finding the complainants/appellants submitted, in an appeal submitted by the Apex Court. this complaint got summarily disposed of and they filed appeals before Medical Council Of India The Ethics Committee of MCI held one doctor medically negligent and issued a strict warning to be more careful during the procedure and to be more diligent in treating and monitoring his patients during and after the operation he complainants had also made a complaint to the Punjab State Medical Council against the professional misconduct of the doctors, hospitals, surgeons, While the proceedings were pending before the SCDRC.

the complaint and two among the opposite parties were allowed by SCDRC to directly pay Rs. 15,44,000 jointly and severally and Rs. 10,000 as costs as the appeal was allowed by The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission of these opposite parties and set aside the order of the SCDRC holding that negligence was not proved by the complainants.

The bench comprising of Justice UU Lalit, justice S. Ravindra Bhat and the justice PS Narasimha also observed and contended the question of intention does not arise that in the proceedings for damages due to professional negligence.

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WHERE THE CLAIMS OF EVENTS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED BY THE PROSECUTION, SECTION 106 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT APPLIES TO CASES: SUPREME COURT

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The Supreme Court in the case Sabitri Samantaray vs State of Odisha observed here chain of events has been successfully established by the prosecution, from which a reasonable inference is made out against the accused, the Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act applies to cases.

in light of Section 106 of the Evidence Act the High Court rightly observed that as how the deceased lost his life and the onus was now on the appellants to disclose further the court observed that the appellants have failed to offer any credible defense in this regard and it can be deduced that the entire sequence of events strongly point towards the guilt of the accused appellants the burden was on the appellants to prove it otherwise as once the prosecution had successfully established the chain of events.

in the light of the statements made by all the sets of witnesses, with such an intention when analyzed and the fatal injuries sustained by the deceased at the relevant place and time further the court contended while dismissing the plea that it certainly makes out a strong case that death of the deceased was indeed caused by the appellants. in establishing intention of the accused-appellants for the commission of the offence, the prosecution has succeeded, the Court notice.

whenever an incriminating question is posed to the accused and he or she either evades response, or offers a response which is not true, in a case based on circumstantial evidence then in the chain of events such a response in itself becomes an additional link, when a case is based on circumstantial evidence As Section 106 of the Evidence Act from its burden to establish the guilt of an accused is in no way aimed at relieving the prosecution. where chain of events has been successfully established by the prosecution, it only applies to those cases from which a reasonable inference is made out against the accused.

the Section 106 it merely prescribes that when an individual has done an act and in no way exonerates the prosecution from discharging its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt Thereafter the onus of proving that specific intention falls onto 9 the individual and not on the prosecution. If the accused had a different intention than the facts are specially within his knowledge which he must prove, with an intention other than that which the circumstances indicate. As the Section 106 of the Evidence Act postulates that the burden of proving things which are within the special knowledge of an individual is on that individual. Although the Section in no way exonerates the prosecution from discharging its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt, observed by the Bench as the said provisions Since it is all based upon the interpretation of Section 106 Evidence Act, the contentions of either

the bench comprising of CJI NV Ramana, Justice Krishna Murari and the justice Hima Kohli observed and contended whenever an incriminating question is posed to the accused and he or she either evades response or that which being offers a response is not true then such a response in itself becomes an additional link in the chain of event, in a case based on circumstantial evidence.

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A candidate has no legal right to insist that the recruitment process set in motion be carried to its logical end: SC

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The Supreme Court in the present case Employees State Insurance Corporation vs Dr. Vinay Kumar observed that the recruitment process set in motion be carried to its logical end as the candidate does not have a legal right to insist.

The bench directed the Corporation-appellants to take a decision regarding whether to complete the recruitment process, bearing in mind all relevant aspects within a period of two months, while allowing the appeal further it stated there is however no doubt from holding that the employer is free to act in an arbitrary manner.

A recruitment process which is set in motion be carried to its logical end candidate who has applied does not have a legal right to insist that Even in the select list may not clothe the candidate with such a right and that too even in the inclusion of a candidate.

A recruitment process carried to its logical end and the process set in motion, the candidate who applied does not have the legal right and thereafter the court further contended that the cardinal principle we must bear in mind is that this is a case of direct recruitment, observed by the bench.

The Court further said that it is quite likely that any candidate who may have being desirous of applying, may not have applied being discouraged by the fact that the advertisement has been put on hold and by agreeing with the applicant the court contended and said that the direction to conclude the proceedings within 45 days is unsupportable.

The recruitment process set in motion be carried to its logical end and the Candidate who has applied does not have a legal right to insist the recruitment process.

The ground raised by the appellants for not proceeding with the procedure of direct recruitment is untenable, the respondent contended before the court and on the other hand on account of certain developments which took place, there may really be no need to fill up the post of Associate Professor and the respondent may not have a right as such, the appellant contended before the Apex Court.

The High Court which dismissed the writ petition filled by the Corporation and it directed the Corporation to conclude the process positively within a period of 45 day. the Corporation filed appeal before the Apex Court, Aggrieved with this direction.

The bench comprising of Justice KM Joseph and the justice Hrishikesh Roy observed that Even inclusion of a candidate in the select list may not clothe the candidate with such a right and it does not mean that the employer is free to act in an arbitrary manner, the bench clarified.

The recruitment process set in motion be carried to its logical end and the Candidate who has applied does not have a legal right to insist the recruitment process.

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ON THE PLEA TO STAY THE RETIREMENT OF EXISTING MEMBERS UNTIL THE ACTUAL JOINING OF NEW MEMBERS, SUPREME COURT ISSUES NOTICE

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The Supreme Court in the case Central Administrative Tribunal (Principal Bench) Bar Association, New Delhi v Union of India & Or’s observed in a petition till all the vacancies which arose from 2019-2022 are filled by actual joining of candidates by putting a stay on the impending retirement of all the existing Judicial/ Administrative Members of CAT the court further issued the notice.

In the plea it was stated in the petition that although 35 Judicial Members including the Chairman and 35 Administrative Members cater to 19 benches and 8 circuit benches, many benches of the Tribunals have become non functional because of the retirement of members at regular intervals as it was Preferred by Central Administrative Tribunal (Principal Bench) Bar Association, New Delhi.

Furthermore, the petition stated the Jabalpur Bench, Cuttack Bench, Lucknow Bench, Jammu and Srinagar Bench are left with only one member either Judicial or Administrative because of which no division bench can be constituted there. As on 31st March, 2022, the Guwahati Bench has become totally non-functional as no Member is available there.

Justice Chandrachud stated by taking a note of the above submissions:

A bench can’t be constituted with one member.

Justice Chandrachud further asked to submit an up-to-date chart with regards to the number of members who are present in the various benches of CAT and ordered the counsel for the Central Administrative Tribunal (Principal Bench) Bar Association, New Delhi to do the same.

Justice Kant further added by taking a note of the above submissions:

The members whose term is likely now to expire in Future, give the details of those members.

The benches of the Central Administrative Tribunal will become non-functional if the aforesaid situation continues for a couple of more months, more than half of the sanctioned stated in the plea.

AOR Amita Singh Kalkal, has filled a plea before the Supreme Court.

The bench of comprising of Justice DY Chandrachud and the justice Surya Kant by making a note of the above submissions ordered to issue a notice and in addition the liberty to serve the Central Agency.

The bench ordered to comply with the same and listed the matter on 13th May.

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Supreme Court upholds disciplinary action against judicial officers for showing undue favour to a party in the worst kind of judicial dishonesty

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The Supreme Court in the case Muzaffar Hussain versus State of Uttar Pradesh observed a judicial officer in Uttar Pradesh for passing orders to unduly favour certain parties for taking against the disciplinary action.

The High Court reduced the punishment as curtailment of pensionary benefits by 70% and refused to interfere with the findings and the officer approached the Supreme Court for Challenging the High Court’s verdict.

A writ petition was filed before the High Court challenging the punishment by the officer. In 2005, the Allahabad High Court initiated disciplinary enquiry against him for misconduct and found the charges to be proved. On the recommendation made by the Full Court, the State of Uttar Pradesh imposed a punishment of curtailment of his pensionary benefits by 90% to join the Central Administrative Tribunal as a judicial member in 2003, the officer took Voluntary Retirement from Service.

Supreme Court observed while dismissing the appeal that the appellant had misconducted himself while discharging his duties as a judicial officer and there was enough material and evidence to show that. to unduly favour the subsequent purchasers of the acquired lands who had no right to claim compensation, and that such orders were actuated by corrupt motive, and had passed the judicial orders in utter disregard of the specific provisions of law.

The bench of Justice Bela Trivedi, an judgement authored noted:

the public servants are like fish in the water, none can say when and how a fish drank the water”. A judge must decide the case on the basis of the facts on record and the law applicable to the case and if he decides a case for extraneous reasons, then he is not performing his duties in accordance with law. As often quoted, a judge, like Caesar’s wife, must be above suspicion. The extraneous consideration for showing favour need not always be a monetary consideration further she said that In our opinion, showing undue favour to a party under the guise of passing judicial orders is the worst kind of judicial dishonesty and misconduct.

while being the Additional District Judge at Agra during 2001 to 2003, the officer named Muzaffar Hussain and the charge was that in a batch of land acquisition matters in violation of settled principles in order to unduly favour certain subsequent purchasers had exorbitantly enhanced the compensation.

Thereafter the Apex Court added that under Article 235 of the Constitution of India the High Court had perfectly justified in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, under these circumstances.

The division bench comprising of justice DY Chandrachud and the justice Bela M Trivedi observed under the guise of passing judicial orders is the worst kind of judicial dishonesty and misconduct and that showing undue favour to a party.

The Court stated, the case must be decided by the Judge on the basis of the law applicable to the case and the facts on record. He is not performing his duties in accordance with law if he decides the case or extraneous reasons.

Supreme Court observed while dismissing the appeal that the appellant had misconducted himself while discharging his duties as a judicial officer and there was enough material and evidence to show that. to unduly favour the subsequent purchasers of the acquired lands who had no right to claim compensation, and that such orders were actuated by corrupt motive, and had passed the judicial orders in utter disregard of the specific provisions of law.

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ONCE CIRP IS ADMITTED AND MORATORIUM IS ORDERED THE SARFAESI PROCEEDINGS CANNOT BE CONTINUED AGAINST CORPORATE DEBTOR: SC

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The Supreme Court in the case Indian Overseas Bank vs RCM Infrastructure Ltd observed that once the CIRP is initiated and the moratorium is ordered, the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act cannot be continued.

the appellant Bank could not have continued the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act once the CIRP was initiated and the moratorium was ordered as Section 14(1)(c) of the IBC has an overriding effect interest created by the Corporate Debtor in respect of its property including any action under the SARFAESI Act is prohibited with respect to any other law, any action to foreclose, to recover or to enforce any security, the court observed in view of this provision.

It was further being observed and was stated clearly that once the CIRP is commenced, there is complete prohibition for any action created by the Corporate Debtor to foreclose, recover or enforce any security interest are prohibited with respect of its property. All the actions including any action under the SARFAESI Act to foreclose, to recover or to enforce any security interest are prohibited, after the CIRP initiate, the legislative point is clear at this, the bench observed while referring to Section 14 and Section 238 of the IBC.

The contentions made by bank: on 13th December 2018 and as such, and on 3rd January 2019 the admission of the petition by the learned NCLT would not affect the said sale as the sale in question was complete on its confirmation and further stated that it will not deprive the Bank from receiving the said money in pursuance to the sale which has already been completed, merely because a part of the payment was received subsequently after initiation of CIRP.

under Section 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, an application was filled by the Corporate Debtor before NCLT. On 03.01.2019, the NCLT admitted the petition and a moratorium was also notified the auction was continued by the bank the auction proceedings and accepted the balance 75% of the bid amount and completed the sale, even after that. The NCLT passed an order setting aside the sale, while allowing the application filled by the Corporate Debtor and the appeal filled by the Bank was dismissed by the Bank and thereafter the bank approached the Apex Court. As to recover the public money availed by the Corporate Debtor, an E-­auction notice came to be issued by the Bank.

The bench comprising of Justice L. Nageswara Rao and the justice B R Gavai observed that in respect of its property including any action under the SARFAESI Act is prohibited in such a situation, any action to foreclose, to recover or to enforce any security interest created by the Corporate Debtor.

The contentions made by bank: on 13th December 2018 and as such, and on 3rd January 2019 the admission of the petition by the learned NCLT would not affect the said sale as the sale in question was complete on its confirmation and further stated that it will not deprive the Bank from receiving the said money in pursuance to the sale which has already been completed, merely because a part of the payment was received subsequently after initiation of CIRP.

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