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The Wagner mutiny: Implications for Russia, Putin and the Ukraine war

The Wagner Group, a private armed force run by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close ally of President Putin, opened a mutiny against the Russian government and the latter was all set to tackle the mutiny. On 23 June, Prigozhin launched an armed rebellion after accusing the Russian military of killing Wagner forces. Wagner units were withdrawn […]

The Wagner Group, a private armed force run by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close ally of President Putin, opened a mutiny against the Russian government and the latter was all set to tackle the mutiny. On 23 June, Prigozhin launched an armed rebellion after accusing the Russian military of killing Wagner forces. Wagner units were withdrawn from Ukraine and seized the city of Rostov-on-don in Russia. A convoy of Wagner forces then headed towards Moscow, attempting to reach the capital before it could be intercepted by regular forces loyal to the government. But surprisingly Prigozhin reported that while his men were only 200 km from Moscow, he chose to turn them back to keep away from “shedding Russian blood”.

History of Wagner group and its role in Ukraine War
Established by Prigozhin in 2014, Wagner at its pinnacle had around 50,000 recruits, a large number of them ex-detainees battling in Ukraine. The leader of the Wagner mercenary group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, is expected to go to Belarus under a deal brokered by the Belarusian president, putting an end to a shocking, albeit short-lived, challenge to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authority. Prigozhin will not be prosecuted, a Kremlin spokesman said, adding that Wagner forces who did not join what Putin called a “rebellion” would be absorbed into the Russian Defense Ministry.
The Wagner Group first appeared in Ukraine in 2014, where it participated in the annexation of Crimea. The group was also active in 2014, fighting with Russia-backed separatists in the Luhansk region of Ukraine. During the ongoing Ukraine war, the Wagner Group had a strong role in seizing the eastern city of Bakhmut, a region where the bloodiest and longest fights have occurred. However, Prigozhin had progressively reprimanded the military brass, blaming it for ineptitude and of keeping his soldiers from weapons.

Impact of Wagner’s mutiny on
Putin’s rule and the Ukraine War
Vladimir Putin has administered Russia with an inexorably more tight hold on power; however, his choice to attack Ukraine in February 2022 set a progression of occasions into movement that have had ramifications for Russia and its leader. However, even with the evident finish to the quick danger presented by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed force, it can be seen that Putin’s hang on power is more dubious than whenever since he took office over 20 years prior. Prigozhin’s mutiny can be seen as a turning point for Russia and Putin. It is a remarkable test to Putin’s position and his own arrangement of semi-authoritarian state control. It is exceptionally far-fetched that Prigozhin and his Wagner troopers have limited military hardware to oust the Russian armed force actually.
Regardless, the ongoing danger that Prigozhin’s stance to Putin’s framework was in the pictures of tanks moving through the southern Russian city of Rostov and uncountable questions of “chto proiskhodit?” (what’s happening?). To what extent Prigozhin has planned it all, how much power he is ready to utilise, is yet to be figured out. Wagner has minimal possibility of key achievement, yet the group has proactively made huge strategic additions in exposure and public opinion. No matter what the result of the disobedience, the Kremlin will slightly have to accept that it failed to keep a grip on the circumstance. As tanks have been moving through the roads of Russia and Putin is tending to the country about an endeavoured overthrow, it should not be failed to remember that as of not long ago, the Kremlin’s position was that everything was taken care of. That is an advertising catastrophe for the Kremlin, and it undermines both public steadiness and the conflict exertion. It will likewise influence public opinion. Notwithstanding proof of Russian military disappointments, numerous Russians wouldn’t recognise that the conflict was a misstep and that the military was out-battled. Most of Russians have either aimlessly upheld the activities of their administration or ignored the awkward real factors produced by the military’s lacklustre showing in the conflict.
Prigozhin’s defiance isn’t just an assault on the Russian armed forces, it is an assault on Putin himself: a definitive offence that anybody can commit in Russia. Putin, in his discourse to the country on 24 June to address what is happening, considered it a “treason” and “stab in the back.” These could never have been simple words for Putin to express freely, as they are an implicit confirmation of his own disappointment. In past months, Putin has attempted to stay far off from the military’s failures, Ukrainian drone attacks within Russia’s borders, generally moving the fault on the military. However, a mutiny on Russian roads goes far beyond military disappointments in Russia’s conflict against Ukraine. It is an assault on the whole framework over which Putin by and by rules. Censuring the conflict has become regular business for Prigozhin, yet bringing tanks out into the road and laying out steps to arrive at Moscow shows that Putin is as of now not in full control.

Sharanpreet Kaur in an expert on international relations and foreign policy. She writes on issues related to India’s foreign policy, diplomacy, and the politics of South, Central and West Asia.

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