The Quad joint statement released post the meeting of the leaders of India, the United States, Japan and Australia was surprisingly focused and clear about what the four countries wanted to achieve. Surprising because until now the Quadrilateral Dialogue was at best a chatroom, an amorphous body, which was not sure which way it was going. It had started looking as if Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s prophecy that the Quad would dissipate like seafoam was going to come true. Even the virtual meeting of the four leaders earlier in the year did not inspire confidence, with the Quad apparently developing into a body of do-gooders, with feet not planted to the reality of the world besieged by a malign power. President Joe Biden in particular seemed focused on the Atlantic Ocean, considering the alacrity with which he signed the “New Atlantic Charter” with UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson. It was a singularly irrelevant move because the rump of Soviet Russia—the current Russia—is no longer the focus of geopolitics. In fact, in the run-up to his election, Joe Biden wouldn’t even use the phrase Indo-Pacific, but instead Asia-Pacific, in case the topic ever crossed his path. Asia-Pacific is a term favoured by the People’s Republic of China, which bristles at the very mention of Indo-Pacific. From there to stating, as the joint statement did, that “the occasion of the Quad summit is an opportunity to refocus ourselves and the world on the Indo-Pacific” is a long way to have traversed.
The joint statement has not used the word China even once, signifying reticence on the part of all the Quad members. But there is a lot to read between the lines, for example in the following sentence: “Together, we recommit to promoting the free, open, rules-based order, rooted in international law and undaunted by coercion, to bolster security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. We stand for the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity of states.” The references are too obvious to be ignored.
Broadening the focus of the “Quad charter” makes it easier for ASEAN in particular to come on board of a Quad-Plus construct. The ASEAN countries together are a formidable economic bloc and along with India and Japan form the first line of “defence” against a coercive hegemon. ASEAN—whose largest trading partner is China, but some of whose countries are also among the most bullied by China—has been searching for a “third way” outside of the US vs China binary. A Quad platform, with the presence of a “nonaligned” country such as India, makes it easier for ASEAN to be on board.
Not naming China also helps smaller countries to be a part of the Quad Plus construct, especially those that have already signed up for the BRI. The infrastructure push that the Quad is expected to give through the Blue Dot Network has the potential to wean away the smaller economies that are being “swallowed” by China in the name of bringing development through BRI, with Sri Lanka being a case in point.
As the four countries make health security one of the cornerstones of the “Quad charter”, with special emphasis being given on vaccines and pandemic-preparedness, some questions, however, are being raised about their failure to seek accountability from China for the spread of the coronavirus. Not one of the Quad members seems serious about picking up the issue, thus allowing China to get away with murder, literally. Also, can there be health security when the world’s top health body, WHO, is perceived to be compromised and serving one country’s interest?
Some questions can also be raised about the Quad lacking military teeth, even though security preparedness is at the core of its existence. But then that’s perhaps a bit too much to ask for at this “nascent” stage, even though the concept of Quad has been around for over a decade.
Democracies may be muddled in their thinking, and work in sloth speed, but they generally tend to stand up when threatened. Identifying the threat is sometimes part—if not half—the battle won. The Quad needs military teeth and an Indo-Pacific charter—a formal treaty. It’s hoped that both will happen, sooner than later. Meanwhile, there are reasons to feel relieved that the Quad has been finally institutionalized, for it signifies that a pushback has started against a hegemon which has gone rogue.