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Supreme Court Acquitted Woman In 23-Year-Old Murder Case After Finding Her To Be A Juvenile At The Time Of Offence

The Supreme Court in the case Pramila versus State Of Chhattisgarh observed and has acquitted a woman who was sentenced to suffer life-imprisonment for committing an offence of murder, after finding that she was a juvenile in 2000 when the said offence took place. The bench comprising of Justice Abhay Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan […]

The Supreme Court in the case Pramila versus State Of Chhattisgarh observed and has acquitted a woman who was sentenced to suffer life-imprisonment for committing an offence of murder, after finding that she was a juvenile in 2000 when the said offence took place.

The bench comprising of Justice Abhay Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan in the case observed and has noted that at the time of occurrence of the offence, the accused was juvenile, and therefore, no punishment could be imposed on the accused in view of the Juvenile Justice Act.

The court in the case observed and has set aside the concurring finding of the High Court and the Trial Court.
The court stated that on the date of occurrence of the offence, the appellant was a juvenile and the maximum action which could have been taken against the appellant was of sending her to a special home.
The court observed that the accused in the case had already undergone incarceration for a period of more than eight years as a juvenile.

In the present case, one Pramila-accused was convicted for committing an offence of murder i.e., the date of offence being June 15, 2000 and was sentenced to undergo life-imprisonment by the trial court. Thus, while challenging the decision of the trial court, the accused preferred an appeal before the High Court that maintained the sentence of the accused while dismissing the appeal.
Therefore, the present criminal appeal was preferred by the accused before the Supreme Court.

The accused took a plea of ‘juvenility’ at the time of occurrence of the offence and after perusing the record of documents proving the date of birth of the accused, the court found that the accused was juvenile at the time of occurrence of offence.
The court stated that this court have to proceed on the footing that on the date on which the incident constituting the offence took place, the age of the appellant was less than 18 years.

It has also been noted by the said court that the accused case squarely falls under the old Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 which defines the juvenile girl as someone who has not attained the age of eighteen years.

The court stated that the Juvenile Justice, the Care and Protection of Children Act, 2000 for short, ‘the 2000 JJ Act’ was admittedly not in force when the incident occurred. Thus, the said case will be governed by the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, for short, ‘the 1986 JJ Act’.
The court stated that Under clause (h) of Section 2 of the 1986 JJ Act, a ‘juvenile’ has been defined to mean a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years. The appellant was a juvenile, on the occurrence of the offence.

The court stated that the age of the appellant was 17 years, 09 months and 14 days on the date of the offence.
Further, the court in the case noted that the imposition of the sentence of life-imprisonment upon the accused is not justified as maximum punishment under the JJ Act is to send her to a special home for up to three years.

The court stated that in the case of a girl of sixteen years of age, she could have been sent to a special home for a period of not less than three years. Thus, as per Section 22(1) of the 1986 JJ Act, there was a prohibition on sentencing a juvenile to undergo imprisonment and there is similar provision under Section 16 of the 2000 JJ Act.
The court in the case declined to send the accused before the Juvenile Justice Board, while taking note of the eight-year incarceration suffered by the accused.

The court in its order stated that the present Appeal must succeed and the impugned judgment and order dated May, 03, 2010 passed by the High Court and the impugned judgment and order dated June 30, 2003 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ramanujganj, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh, are hereby quashed and set aside only insofar as the appellant i.e., the accused no.2 is concerned.

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