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Suitablility & maintainability of fraud in arbitration

The question apropos of fraud was first raised before the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin Bubere v. Madhav Prabhakar Oak, wherein the three judges’ bench held that a matter containing fraud cannot be tried for in arbitration.

Dhruv Srivastava

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INTRODUCTION:

Arbitration is a mechanism for the resolution of disputes which takes place, usually in private, pursuant to an agreement between two or more parties, under which the parties agree to be bound by the decision to be given by the arbitrator according to law or, if so agreed, other considerations, after fair hearing, such decision being enforceable at law. An arbitration agreement is an agreement to submit present or future disputes (whether they are contractual or not). An arbitration agreement is therefore a contractual undertaking by two or more parties to resolve disputes by the process of arbitration, even if the disputes themselves are not based on contractual obligations. From the aforementioned definitions, one can conclude that, an arbitrable matter can be tried for in arbitration. “Arbitrability” generally connotes the capability of a dispute or classes of disputes that can be settled by an arbitrator.

What disputes are arbitrable? This question has been raised time and again in light of Arbitration. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (The Arbitration Act) nowhere explicitly bars the adjudication of a dispute through arbitration. The liberty to deliberate on the following aspect has been bestowed to the Courts. Interalia, ‘fraud’ has been one of the contentions. The doubt of its arbitrability has been put forth to our judiciary. The Supreme Court in the Afcons case categorically laid down the cases which are not arbitrable. The judgment clearly laid down serious fraud as a ground for non-arbitrability. Keeping that in mind this article will illuminate on the concept of fraud in light of arbitration with the help of relevant landmark developments up until the recent development along with the stance of the International arbitration in terms of its arbitrability and why certain cases are considered arbitrable, despite having been held as a nonarbitrable matter.

 PROPENDARANCE ON FRAUD & ITS ARBITRABILITY

The question apropos fraud was first raised before the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin Bubere v. Madhav Prabhakar Oak, wherein the three judges’ bench held that a matter containing fraud cannot be tried for in arbitration. An arbitrator does not have the jurisdiction to entertain a matter having essence of fraud. As per them, a matter of fraud probes a judicial inquiry and examination of evidence, which is to be tried for in a Court of Law. The judgment was given under the Arbitration Act, 1940. Even the adoption of the Arbitration Act, did not change the position laid down by Abdul Kadir. The validity of the same was upheld in N. Radhakrishnan Case, which simply put, held all disputes containing fraud allegations are not arbitrable.

The judgment in N. Radhakrishnan affirmed the position of Abdul Kadir. Howbeit, the judgment was in relation to domestic arbitration. The clarification in regards to International Arbitration was provided for by the Supreme Court in World Sport Group (Mauritius) Ltd v. Msm (Singapore) Pte, wherein vis-à-vis Foreign seated Arbitration, the court held that an arbitrator is well capable and within jurisdiction to decide any allegations of fraud. Inter alia, it is pertinent to note, the aforementioned judgment failed to propound and differentiate on the distinction of fraud in domestic and international/ foreign seated arbitration. This created an anomaly between foreign seated arbitration and domestic arbitration which was well put in to perspective after the landmark judgment of A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam. The judgment upheld the validity of Swiss Timing and overruled N. Radhakrishnan, wherein, the judgment was declared per incuriam.

The A. Ayyasamy judgment was a landmark case which made a categorical segregation, which one might have to consider while probing around fraud allegations. Fraud was categorized into the following two terms:

 Fraud Simpliciter (Plain allegations) and;

 Complex Fraud (Serious allegations).

Fraud Simpliciter was held to be an arbitrable matter whereas; complex or serious fraud allegations were to be tried by the Court. This is where the anomaly arises and still exists. International or Foreign Seated Arbitration empowers an arbitrator to adjudicate on fraud allegations in toto, wherein, in domestic arbitration in India segregates the arbitrability of fraud in to two categories.

THE COMPLEX FRAUD TEST

 The Supreme Court in a recent judgment of Rashid Raza v. Sadaf Akhtar affirmed the view of A. Ayyasamy, which impliedly overruled the judgment in N. Radhakrishnan because technically Ayyasamy could not overrule the judgment as the strength of the bench was the same.

The judgment in Rashid Raza gave a new dimension to determine a complex fraud. The test is reiterated down below:

Does this plea permeate the entire contract and above all, the agreement of arbitration, rendering it void, or

 Whether the allegations of fraud touch upon the internal affairs of the parties inter se having no implication in the public domain.

The test clearly lays down that serious allegations of fraud arises if the allegations satisfy the two grounds, if it fails, then the allegation falls under Fraud Simpliciter, which can be adjudicated in arbitration. In the case, the court held the matter to have failed the test and as a result can be tried for in arbitration.

 THE AVITEL CLARIFICATION:

 The most recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Avitel Post Studioz Limited v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited has further reignited the spark of arbitrability of fraud, wherein, the Avitel Post studioz (appellant) through fraud asked the HSBC (respondent) to invest 60 Million USD into the company under false pretences. Respondent under suspicion asked two audit firms to do an inquiry into the matter. On the basis of the findings, HSBC moved to Arbitration under SIAC rules in Singapore as mentioned in the agreement, wherein an award was passed in their favor. The appellant in response filed various applications and appeals which were either against them or were denied. The division bench of Bombay HC, however, passed an order reducing the amount of compensation to be paid. The respondent aggrieved by this fact, moved to Supreme Court under Article 136 by the way of special leave petition.

The case shed clarity on why certain cases of fraud are arbitrable. The Court propounded on the matter using right in rem and right in personem along with the aforementioned test. Right in rem are rights available against public and whereas right in personem are enforceable against a private person. The court related this aspect to fraud and observed, those cases are fraud are arbitrable which are against a person in individual capacity. A right in rem is a right exercisable against the world at large, as contrasted from right in personem which is an interest protected solely against specific individuals as held in Booz Allen Case. Any allegations which affect the public morality or public at large in any capacity are to be tried for in a Court of Law.

The Court in this case held separate criminal proceedings have no bearing on a civil suit. It further held that the matter was arbitrable, as the matter in question was of personal obligation between parties. The respondent followed proper rules and procedure. No question of the matter being tried arises. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Bombay High Court Division Bench, returning the compensation to its original position.

CONCLUSION

The Avitel Jugdment has illuminated with some much needed clarity in terms of arbitrability of fraud. Lack of description of matters not arbitrable has caused some problems in this regard. Both the Amendments which undertook in 2015 and 2019 did not incorporate any heads outlining the same. The judgment has put a boost in the pro arbitration regime, moving step by step in right direction. It affirmed the view of World Sport. The bare-bones analysis and insight provided for by the Supreme Court in matters of fraud being arbitrable is commendable.

 Inter alia, there is a situation which might hamper and increase the judicial intervention in an arbitration matter. A pro-arbitration judge might refer the matter to arbitration if the agreement provides for an arbitration clause or an agreement in light of section 8 of the Arbitration Act. However, on the contrary a judge who is not a big supporter of arbitration might inquire deeply into the validity of the fraud allegations, wherein, the speedy justice of the parties will be affected.

 I am of the opinion, our arbitration tribunals should be allowed to stand on the same footing as that of courts when it comes to examination of a claim or evidences. As proarbitration India is right now, we could still use some deliberations on the gray areas of arbitration in order to be a global arbitration hub for dispute adjudication.

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KERALA HC: BAIL GRANTED TO A DOCTOR ACCUSED OF POSTING DEFAMATORY ARTICLES AGAINST LAKSHADWEEP ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS

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The Kerala High Court in the case Dr K P Hamsakoya vs Union Territory of Lakshadweep observed and granted an anticipatory bail to a senior doctor who has been accused of posting on facebook defamatory articles against officers of the Administration of Lakshadweep.

The bench comprising of Justice Viju Abraham observed and was essentially dealing with the pre-arrest bail plea of Dr. K P Hamsakoya, who is one of the senior-most doctors serving the Lakshadweep Administration and that presently, he is under suspension.

The Court observed that Dr. Hamsakoya has been accused of posting defamatory articles on Facebook against officers of the Administration of Lakshadweep, thus causing a negative effect amongst the public against the Administration. He has been booked under Sections 505 (1) (b), 505 (2) and 500 of the IPC and Section 66 (A) (b) of the Information Technology Act.

Before the Court, the Counsels Ajit G Anjarlekar, G.P.Shinod, Govind Padmanaabhan, and Atul Mathews appearing argued that he has been falsely implicated in the case and has been booked under the offence punishable under Section 66 (A) (b) of the IT Act (a provision which has been struck down in its entirety by the Apex Court).

It was contended by the court that the offences under Section 500 IPC cannot be registered without a complaint being filed by a person who has been defamed.

The Court while considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the allegations, the pre-arrest bail was granted by the court to the petitioner and the court dismissed his plea with the following directions:

On August 29, 2022, the petitioner shall surrender before the investigating officer and shall co-operate with the investigation.

The court stated that in the event of the petitioner, he shall be produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate and shall be released on bail on his executing a bond for Rs.50,000/- with two solvent sureties each for the like sum as per the satisfaction of the jurisdictional Court.

It was stated by the court that if any of the aforesaid conditions are violated, the Investigating Officer of Minicoy Police Station, Union Territory of Lakshadweep has been given the liberty to file an application for cancellation of bail before the jurisdictional court.

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GUJARAT HC GRANTS RELIEF TO DIPLOMA HOLDERS: STUDENTS CAN’T BE FAULTED FOR PHARMACY COUNCIL’S FAILURE TO APPROVE MEDICAL STORES FOR IMPARTING TRAINING.

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The Gujarat High Court in the case Oza Nikun Dashrathbhai v/s State Of Gujarat observed and has come to the rescue of D.Pharm students who were denied registration as ‘Pharmacist’ by the State Pharmacy Council on the ground that they have not undertaken training from medical stores approved the Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015.

The Single bench comprising of Justice AS Supehia observed and noted that the Pharmacy Council of India has not approved any medical store under the Regulation for the purpose of imparting practical training of Diploma to the students in Pharmacy Course like the present petitioners.

Court Observations:

It was observed that the petitioners cannot be faulted for the action of the respondent authorities in not approving the medical stores under regulation 4.4 of the Regulation of 2015 and hence, no option was there to the petitioner to take their training from the respective medical stores.

It was claimed by the petitioner’s student that the State Council was not registering them as Pharmacists despite having undertaken the necessary training of 500 hours for three months from the respective medical stores.

Further, it was observed that the State had admitted that all documents of the Petitioners were genuine, however, the registration was denied solely for the aforesaid reason. Further, one of the governmental circulars had clarified that the process for granting approval of Chemist/ Pharmacy and Druggist will be notified through the online mode. But the same was targeted only at “prospective students” .

It was noted by the High Court that in order to avoid hardship to current students, who had already undergone or undergoing the D.Pharm course while taking the practical training under the Pharmacy, Chemist and Druggist licensed under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, as per precedence students will be considered for the registration, provided the students had undergone the D.Pharm course in an institution approved under PCI under section 12 of the Act.

Accordingly, the High Court directed the State Council to register the Petitioners as Pharmacists within three months.

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UTTARAKHAND HC SAYS UTTARKASHI’S BAN ON “MEAT SHOPS” WITHIN 500 METRES OF “RIVER GANGA” IN LINE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME

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It is interesting to note that while fully, firmly and finally very rightly and commendably upholding the ban that was imposed on meat shops that was enacted by the Zila Panchayat of Uttarkashi District, the Uttarakhand High Court in an extremely remarkable, robust, refreshing and rational judgment titled Naved Qureshi vs State of Uttarakhand & Ors in Writ Petition (MS) No. 2073 of 2016 that was pronounced recently on July 20, 2022 has expressed its consonance with a bye-law of Zila Panchayat, Uttarkashi to the effect that no shop for butchering animals and selling meat within 500m from the bank of river Ganga shall be permitted. It must be noticed here that the Single Judge Bench of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjaya Kumar Mishra said quite clearly that keeping in view the “special status” of Uttarakhand and the river Ganga that emerges from District Uttarkashi and the sanctity attached with the river Ganga by majority of population of Uttarakhand, the decision taken by the Zila Panchayat by making the said bye-laws is in line with the scheme of Constitution of India, as envisaged in Part IX. It very rightly ruled that the District Magistrate had not committed any error in not issuing a no objection certificate to the petitioner to run a mutton shop, at a premises situated at 105 metres distance from the bank of Ganga.

At the outset, this extremely laudable, learned, landmark and latest judgment authored by a Single Judge Bench of the Uttarakhand High Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjaya Kumar Mishra sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth lucidly in para 1 that, “By filing this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:

“i. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari calling for the original record and pleased to quash the impugned order dated 08.06.2016 (Annexure – 2) passed by the respondent no. 2 i.e. District Magistrate, Uttarkashi, District Uttarkashi.

ii. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus directing and commanding the respondents that they shall not interfere in the peaceful business activities i.e. in running the mutton shop in his house situated at the roadside of Gangotri National Highway without any valid reason.

iii. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Prohibition making declaration to the effect that after central enactment of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 the bye-laws no. 3 framed by the respondent Zila Panchayat became illusionary and same are not applicable for the purpose of regulating food safety activities in rural area, therefore, no license from respondent Zila Panchayat is required to do business.””

To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 2 that, “The facts of the case, not disputed at this stage, are that petitioner is a resident of village Hina Gaon, Police Station – Maneri, District – Uttarkashi. His father was recorded tenure holder having bhumidhari land bearing Khasra Nos. 1555 and 15556, situated in the aforesaid village. He was running a mutton shop since 2006 in a rented accommodation in village – Hina Gaon, after getting license from Zila Panchayat. Though, according to him, license was not required after enforcement of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “FSS Act, 2006” for brevity). In the year 2012, he also obtained a license from the designated authority under the FSS Act, 2006. Till the year, 2015, he ran his shop at aforesaid rented premises and after construction of his own shop over the bhumidhari land, he shifted his business of butchering and selling mutton into it. On 27.02.2016, respondent no. 3 – Zila Panchayat, Uttarkashi, through Additional Mukhya Adhikari, issued a notice to the petitioner to shift his mutton shop, within 7 days to another place, as his shop is situated 105 metre away from the bank of river Ganga, which is violative of the existing by-laws. As per the by-laws, operation of mutton/chicken shop within 500 metres from the bank of river Ganga is prohibited. On 15.03.2016, petitioner being aggrieved by the notice, preferred a Writ Petition (MS) No. 651 of 2016, which was disposed of, in limine, by this Court by giving opportunity to the petitioner to file a representation before the Authorities and with a direction to the Authorities to dispose of the same. Thereafter, on 09.05.2016, the petitioner served a copy of the aforesaid order on respondents no. 2 and 3 and prayed for issuance of license for the next financial year 2016-17 but the respondent no. 2 – District Magistrate, Uttarkashi vide order dated 09.05.2016 rejected the representation of the petitioner on the basis of the Resolutions of meeting held on 04.05.2016.”

In this same para 2, it is then further mentioned that, “Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 09.05.2016 and minutes of meeting dated 04.05.2016, the petitioner preferred a Writ Petition (MS) No. 1383 of 2016 wherein respondents were directed to file counter affidavit within four weeks and the said writ petition is still pending. In the meantime, petitioner again represented before respondent no. 2 – District Magistrate, Uttarkashi to grant him no objection certificate, which was again rejected. The said order of the learned District Magistrate, Uttarkashi is assailed in this writ petition.”

On the one hand, the Bench then points out in para 3 that, “Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the only ground on which his application for grant of no objection certificate has been rejected by the District Magistrate, Uttarkashi is that his shop is situated within 500 metre from the bank of river Ganga. According to the petitioner, after passing of the FSS Act, 2006, the jurisdiction of Zila Panchayat is ceased to operate and it is only the Designated Authority, under the FSS Act, 2006 has authority to grant license or reject it in favour of the petitioner for running a shop for selling and butchering the animals. Therefore, he prayed that annexure no. 2 to the writ petition be quashed and it be declared that FSS Act, 2006 shall have overriding effect on the by-laws issued by the Zila Panchayat.”

On the other hand, the Bench then mentions in para 4 that, “Learned counsel for the State would submit that petitioner was granted license by the Designated Authority to run the shop at a particular place but he shifted his shop, after getting the license from the Designated Authority under the FSS Act, 2006, to another place, which came within 500 metre from the bank of river Ganga, therefore, no objection certificate was not granted to him and order passed by District Magistrate, Uttarkashi does not have any infirmity or perversity and requires no interference.”

Furthermore, the Bench then succinctly discloses in para 5 that, “Learned counsel for the State further submits that as per Section 106 (1) of the Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016, the Zila Panchayats have powers to make by-laws. Section 106 of the Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016 is quoted as under:

“106 Powers of Zila Panchayat to make bye-laws (1) A Zila Panchayat may, and where required by the State Government shall, make bye-laws for its own purposes and for the purposes of {Kshettra Panchayats}, applicable to the whole or any part of the rural area of the district, consistent with this Act and with any rule, in respect of matters required by this Act to be governed by bye-laws and for the purposes of promoting or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants of the rural area of the district and for the furtherance of the administration of this Act in the Khand and the district.””

Needless to state, the Bench then notes explicitly in para 6 that, “Article 243 (Part IX) of the Constitution of India provides for formation of Gram Sabha and Gram Panchayat. Article 243 G provides for the powers, authority and responsibilities of Panchayats. For better appreciation of the matter, it is quoted below:

“243G. Powers, authority and responsibilities of Panchayats – Subject to the provisions of this Constitution the Legislature of a State may, by law, endow the Panchayats with such powers and authority and may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Panchayats, at the appropriate level, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, with respect to –

(a) the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice;

(b) the implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule.””

Quite ostensibly, the Bench then enunciates in para 7 that, “Thus, it is apparent from the aforesaid Article that the Constitution recognises the Zila Panchayats, as sovereign authorities, having powers to plan for economic development and social justice, as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule. Article 243 G also provides that the Legislature of a State, may by law, endow the Panchayats with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self government. Entry 4 in the Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution of India provides for animal husbandry, dairying and poultry. Entry 22 provides for markets and fairs. Thus, it is clear that as far as markets and fairs and animal husbandry, dairying and poultry are concerned, the Zila Panchayat, as an institution of self government, may function to regulate animal husbandry etc. as mentioned above.”

Be it noted, the Bench then quite forthrightly holds in para 8 that, “Therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that after passing of the FSS Act, 2006, the powers of Zila Panchayat ceased to operate with respect to food items does not appears to be correct. Since, the Zila Panchayats have been granted powers to act as institutions of self government, the provisions made by Zila Panchayat has to be harmoniously constructed with the provisions of the FSS Act, 2006.”

Most significantly, what truly constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment is then encapsulated in para 9 wherein it is held that, “In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that no objection certificate is mandatory to be obtained from the Zila Panchayat or the District Magistrate for running a mutton shop in the present matter. At the same time, keeping in view the special status of State of Uttarakhand and the river Ganga that emerges from District Uttarkashi and the sanctity attached with the river Ganga by majority of population of Uttarakhand, the decision taken by the Zila Panchayat by making by-laws to the effect that no shop for butchering the animals and selling the meat within 500 metres from the bank of river Ganga appears in line with the scheme of Constitution of India, as envisaged in Part IX. Hence, this Court is of the view that respondent no. 2, District Magistrate, Uttarkashi has not committed any error in not issuing no objection certificate to the petitioner to run a mutton shop within 500 metres from the bank of river Ganga.”

Finally, the Bench then concludes aptly by directing in para 10 that, “Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. It is observed that any person, who runs a meat shop for selling and butchering the animals in District Uttarkashi, shall obtain no objection certificate from the concerned authority, in the light of by-laws made by the Zila Panchayat and also obtain license from the designated authority.”

In sum, the Uttarakhand High Court has very rightly held that Uttarkashi’s ban on meat shops within 500 meters of the river Ganga is in line with constitutional scheme. So it definitely merits no reiteration of any kind that the same has to be complied with accordingly in its entirety! No denying it!

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GUJARAT HC GRANTS RELIEF TO PHARMACY DIPLOMA HOLDERS

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The Gujarat High Court in the case Oza Nikun Dashrathbhai v/s State Of Gujarat observed and has come to the rescue of D.Pharm students who were denied registration as ‘Pharmacist’ by the State Pharmacy Council on the ground that they have not undertaken training from medical stores approved the Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015.

The Single bench comprising of Justice AS Supehia observed and noted that the Pharmacy Council of India has not approved any medical store under the Regulation for the purpose of imparting practical training of Diploma to the students in Pharmacy Course like the present petitioners.

Court Observations

It was observed that the petitioners cannot be faulted for the action of the respondent authorities in not approving the medical stores under regulation 4.4 of the Regulation of 2015 and hence, no option was there to the petitioner to take their training from the respective medical stores.

It was claimed by the petitioner’s student that the State Council was not registering them as Pharmacists despite having undertaken the necessary training of 500 hours for three months from the respective medical stores.

Further, it was observed that the State had admitted that all documents of the Petitioners were genuine, however, the registration was denied solely for the aforesaid reason. Further, one of the governmental circulars had clarified that the process for granting approval of Chemist/ Pharmacy and Druggist will be notified through the online mode. But the same was targeted only at “prospective students” .

It was noted by the High Court that in order to avoid hardship to current students, who had already undergone or undergoing the D.Pharm course while taking the practical training under the Pharmacy, Chemist and Druggist licensed under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, as per precedence students will be considered for the registration, provided the students had undergone the D.Pharm course in an institution approved under PCI under section 12 of the Act.

Accordingly, the High Court directed the State Council to register the Petitioners as Pharmacists within three months.

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BASICS, LEGISLATIONS AND NEED FOR A NEW LAW TO DEAL WITH 5G SPECTRUM TECHNOLOGY

Satyajeet A. Desai

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Much like the evolution of humankind over the millennia, the inventions by humans have also evolved with the progress and advances in technology. Right from the invention of the telephone by Graham Bell to the present day wonder phone ; the cellular or mobile phone.

Cellular mobile technology has also benefited greatly from such advances, Think back to the first generation of mobile phones and connectivity options offered and you think of large phone instruments and only voice enabled phones.

Segue to the present day and we have now arrived at the threshold of a major revolution in cellular technology: the 5G network.

What is the 5G network technology? Simply expressed, it is an advancement of technology, but to put it in better terms, what this means is that with higher usage of mobile phones, which have morphed into office equipment or entertainment consoles due to their ease of usage and accessibility, this new technology has the capability of transmitting data at higher speeds, without any perceptible delay ( which is known as low latency in technical terms), which even the current 4G network could not perhaps address.

What are the laws governing 5G network technology? At present, there are no specific regulations or laws that govern this technological advance and it would thus be governed by the existing bouquet of legislations and rules, which are;

Indian Telegraph Act, 1885: This legislation regulates the telecommunication sector, empowering the government to put up infrastructure and licensing of infrastructure.

The Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933: This legislation regulates the usage of wireless telegraphs in the country.

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997: This act was put into place in order to regulate and settle telecom disputes and an authority know as Telecom Regulatory Authority of India was setup under the legislation . The initial role of the authority was to look into disputes in the sector , its scope was however, expanded to regulate the sector in the country, which in the context of the mobile or cellular technology also includes the grant of licences.

Information Technology Act, 2000: As the name suggests, this act governed information technology, but was later amended in 2008 to include telecom service industry.

Apart from this the guidelines issued by the Government under these enactments would hold the field. Allocation of spectrum would be based upon technical evaluations carried out before granting licences.

What are the requirements to be fulfilled by the applicant telecom companies to obtain 5G spectrum licence? The company must hold a Cellular Mobile Telephone Service Licence or Unified Access Service Licence , Unified Licence with permission/authorisation for access services for the service area for which it has bid for (the region that it has bid for).

Apart from this, the additional or subsidiary conditions that have to be met are:

The company that bids for licenses must have a net worth of Rs. 100 crores for the service area that it has bid for amongst other ancillary requirements.

The stance of the Government: The stance of the Government as reflected on its website https://dot.gov.in/5g-india-2020 is that “ The 5G technology has been conceived as a foundation for expanding the potential of the Networked Society. A digital transformation brought about through the power of connectivity is taking place in almost every industry. The landscape is expanding to include massive scale of “smart things” to be interconnected. Therefore, the manner in which future networks will cope with massively varied demands and a business landscape will be significantly different from today. 

The economic benefits from the 5G technology are also quite immense. As per the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) Committee on Digital Economic Policy, it has been stated that 5G technologies rollout will help in Increasing GDP, Creating Employment, Digitizing the economy.

For India, 5G provides an opportunity for industry to reach out to global markets, and consumers to gain with the economies of scale. Worldwide countries have launched similar Forums and thus, India has joined the race in 5G technologies.

The Government gave the go ahead for 5G spectrum trials as reported on the website,https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1715927,which stated that-The Department of Telecommunications (DoT), Government of India, approved permissions to Telecom Service Providers (TSPs) for conducting trials for use and applications of 5G technology.  The applicant TSPs include Bharti Airtel Ltd., Reliance JioInfocomm Ltd., Vodafone Idea Ltd. and MTNL.  These TSPs have tied up with original equipment manufacturers and technology providers which are Ericsson, Nokia, Samsung and C-DOT.  In addition, Reliance Jio Infocomm Ltd. will also be conducting trials using its own indigenous technology.

The permissions have been given by DoT as per the priorities and technology partners identified by TSPs themselves.  The experimental spectrum is being given in various bands which include the mid-band (3.2 GHz to 3.67 GHz), millimetre wave band (24.25 GHz to 28.5 GHz) and in Sub-Gigahertz band (700 GHz).  TSPs will also be permitted to use their existing spectrum owned by them (800 MHz, 900 MHz, 1800 MHz and 2500 MHz) for conduct of 5G trials.

The duration of the trials, at present, was for a period of 6 months. This includes a time period of 2 months for procurement and setting up of the equipment.

The permission letters specify that each TSP will have to conduct trials in rural and semi-urban settings also in addition to urban settings so that the benefit of 5G Technology proliferates across the country and is not confined only to urban areas.

The TSPs are encouraged to conduct trials using 5Gi technology in addition to the already known 5G Technology.  It will be recalled that International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has also approved the 5Gi technology, which was advocated by India, as it facilitates much larger reach of the 5G towers and Radio networks .The 5Gi technology has been developed by IIT Madras, Centre of Excellence in Wireless Technology (CEWiT) and IIT Hyderabad.

The objectives of conducting 5G trials include testing 5G spectrum propagation characteristics especially in the Indian context; model tuning and evaluation of chosen equipment and vendors; testing of indigenous technology; testing of applications (such as tele-medicine, tele-education, augmented/ virtual reality, drone-based agricultural monitoring, etc.);and to test 5G phones and devices.

5G technology is expected to deliver improved user experience in terms of data download rates (expected to be 10 times that of 4G), up to three times greater spectrum efficiency, and ultra low latency to enable Industry 4.0. Applications are across a wide range of sectors such as agriculture, education, health, transport, traffic management, smart cities, smart homes, and multiple applications of IOT (Internet of Things).

DoT has specified that the trials will be isolated and not connected with the existing networks of TSPs.  Trials will be on non-commercial basis.  The data generated during the trials shall be stored in India.  TSPs are also expected to facilitate the testing of the indigenously developed use cases and equipment as part of the trials. One hundred applications/ use cases selected by DoT after conducting the recent Hackathon on 5G applications can also be facilitated in these trials. 

Pursuant to the above, trials were carried out successfully, and ultimately, the spectrum auction took place recently and the 5G network is set to be rolled out soon. This is of course, the offering of the network to subscribers for their usage as provided by telecom operators.

Captive usage of 5G spectrum: With huge interest being shown by some business entities for captive consumption of the spectrum, the Government has on 10th August,2022 undertaken to examine the demand for the same. Captive Non-Public Network (CNPN), or in other words, in-house network, in layman terms will help those entities who wish to avail of the same, to have easier and faster in- house capability, thus boosting its efficiency while providing a dedicated platform, different from the one provided to telecom operators. Different as a result of one customer or subscriber who will avail the same directly from the Department of Telecommunications.

Litigatin on 5G- A litigation against the rollout of the 5G spectrum was initiated before the Delhi High Court on the possible environmental hazards , which came to be dismissed.

At present, there is possibly no other litigation pending or initiated as regards the 5G spectrum rollout, maybe due to the freshness or infancy of the same. If there is any future litigation as regards the same, it would in all probablity be in the realm of awarding of spectrum as a larger issue. Another aspect of any probable litigation would be as regards awarding of Captive Non Public Network (CNPN) or captive usage, but that is likely to be litigation almost like the one that we see in the realm of contracts.

The way forward: As mentioned midway in this article, there is no specific law dealing with spectrum technology and the same is governed by the various enactments mentioned above. The pressing requirement is possibly to have a single law dealing with this area, instead of the bouquet of laws holding the field, which will pave the way for smoothening of the sector and help both the Government and parties in the sector to have a level playing field and do away with the uncertainties associated with various laws governing the field which could result into chaos as compared to a single special legislation which would look at existing and future requirements. A specific law is indeed the need of the hour.

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Legally Speaking

AN ANALYSIS OF UNIFORM CIVIL CODE

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UNIFORM CIVIL CODE

Uniform civil code in general words means “One Nation, One Law”

Uniform civil code: The word is comprised of two words “uniform” and “civil code”

UNIFORM MEANS EQUALLY APPLICABLE ON EVERYONE

Civil code means collection of laws governing personal relationships between people. Few examples of civil code are contracts, property and marriage related laws.

The debate for uniform civil code started back in 1835 with the report of second law commission. During this time Britishers felt the need to unify various personal laws.

The concept of uniform civil code is embodied under article 44 of the Indian constitution in chapter IV (DPSP). The article states that: Uniform civil code for the citizens: The state shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.

The words incorporated in article 44 imply that the state shall make great effort to implement Uniform civil code throughout the country.

Although directive principles of state policy are not enforceable in a court of Law, it obligates the state to apply the principles in implementation of laws.

The implementation of Uniform civil code was included by the Bhartiya Janta party in its manifesto during 2019 Lok Sabha election. Removal of Article 370 from constitution of India is the major step towards this agenda. India is a diverse country with various religions and various personal laws governing these religions with implementation of UCC all the religions will be governed by one uniform civil code which will reduce the dominance of personal laws over society.

UNIFORM CIVIL CODE AND PERSONAL LAWS

Implementation of UCC has been a matter of dispute from long time because in country like India religious domination plays a crucial role and majority would prefer their dominance over others religions with its personal religious laws. The idea to integrate people of different religions under one civil law can only be possible if it’s for common good rather than for preservation of custom.

Custom as a source of law gives more importance to personal religious laws rather than one uniform law and if custom will be the focus behind this one unified civil law it will dominate one majority religion over minorities. The centre of attraction behind the uniform law should be Justice rather than antediluvian antifeminist customs.

It was contended during the debates of the constituent assembly that uniform civil code infringes the right to religion guaranteed under part III of the constitution of India.

In the case of John Vallamattom v. Union of India(MANU/SC/2003) it was held that directive principles incorporated under Article 44 do not infringe article 25 (freedom of religion) in any way. In addition to this clause (2) of article 25 saves secular activities associated with religious practices from the right available under clause (1) that empowers the state to regulate or restrict them.

Judicial pronouncements and article 25

The necessity of implementation of Unified Civil Code has been often recommended by Supreme Court. In the case of Nikhil soni v. Union of India the court stated unambiguously that trough a practice can be religious in nature but if may not constitute vital component of that religion.

UCC: THE DEBATE OF CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The speech was given against the motion by several Muslim leaders when it was enacted. It was claimed that it violates fundamental right of religion. Dr. B.R Ambedkar even mentioned, “We have a uniform and COMPLETE CRIMINAL CODE OPERATING THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. Which is contained in the penal code and the criminal procedure code. this country also has a civil code which is uniform in its content and applicable throughout the country. The only division in which civil law has not invaded is marriage and succession. It is this little corner which we have not been able to invade so far.

UNIFORM CIVIL CODE IN GOA

Uniform civil code is contained under part IV of the Indian Constitution therefore not enforceable but Goa is the only state which has implemented Uniform civil code in its territory.

The Apex court in Jose Paulo coutinho v. Maria Luiza Valentina Pareira stated that the Uniform civil code of Goa is an ideal for applicability of uniform laws on different religions. However the personal laws in Goa are not uniform in all aspects.

Uniform civil code & elimination of gender biasness

The concept of Uniform civil code is highly associated with elimination of gender bias; every personal law is strongly prejudiced against women in some way or the other. The personal laws are highly patriarchal and male dominant in nature. No personal law is ideally suited to become a model for UCC.

Personal laws are mainly derived their authority and source from customs, but the combined effort of legislature and judiciary have played a major role towards achievement of UCC through legislations and precedents.

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