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Shri Ram janmabhoomi: Reconciling truth & secularism

When the ASI’s report revealed that the demolished temple’s pillars were used for the construction of the disputed structure in the 1500s, the new argument that was set up was that of ‘architectural reuse’, i.e. it was contended that the temple was not demolished to build the disputed structure in its place, instead it was merely an established practice to use the debris of pre-existing religious structures to construct new places of worship.

J. Sai Deepak

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The Bhoomi Pujan ceremony performed at the Shri Ramjanmabhoomi in Ayodhya two days ago has predictably evoked diametrically opposite reactions from various quarters. These reactions include celebrations by those who succeeded in proving their case before the Allahabad High Court as well as the highest Court of the land after struggling for half a millennium to secure justice in their civilizational homeland, and scurrilous allegations being hurled against the watchdog of the Constitution by those who failed to prove their case at every level. Ironically, the ideals personified by Lord Ram and valued by the Indic Civilization are being cited by those who are opposed to the construction of the Temple dedicated to Lord Ram even after the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the case of the Temple’s proponents.

 As expected, secularism has been conveniently pressed into service by the usual dramatis personae to contend that the Bhoomi Pujan marks the death of secular ethos of India. To add to this, the demolition of the disputed structure in December 1992 has also been marshalled to question the validity of the Supreme Court’s judgement and the legitimacy of the construction of the Temple in Ayodhya.

In this author’s view, this is a textbook case of conflation of several issues to present a narrative which is factually, legally and civilizationally untenable. First, the legal proceedings with respect to ownership of the Site at Ayodhya which culminated into the judgement of the Supreme Court in November 2019 were initiated in 1950 i.e. 42 years before the demolition of the disputed structure in 1992. Also, legally speaking, the issue of demolition of the structure has no bearing whatsoever on the question of ownership of the Site. At best, it gives rise to a separate proceeding, which is currently pending, for interference with the Site and for violation of judicial orders which directed status quo during the pendency of the dispute over ownership. Therefore, to conflate the question of ownership which was initiated in 1950, with the demolition of the disputed structure in 1992 is to conveniently mispresent the timeline as well as the legal position.

Second, those who raise the issue of demolition of the structure in 1992 must also come clean on the constant shifting of goalposts which the case saw- from dismissing the existence of a Temple underneath the disputed structure prior to the excavation of the Site by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) under the directions of the Allahabad High Court in 2003, to questioning the historicity of Lord Ram after the ASI’s findings revealed the existence of a Temple underneath the disputed structure, every possible attempt was made to change the narrative and to deny irrefutable facts.

 In fact, when the ASI’s report revealed that the demolished Temple’s pillars were used for the construction of the disputed structure in the 1500s, the new argument that was set up was that of “architectural reuse” i.e. it was contended that the Temple was not demolished to build the disputed structure in its place, instead it was merely an established practice to use the debris of pre-existing religious structures to construct new places of worship. Not only was this specious argument sought to be applied to the Site in Ayodhya, it was also extended to the thousands of other similarly placed religious Sites which are proof of occupation of indigenous places of worship, Kashi and Mathura being glaring cases in point.

 What must also be placed before the Court of public opinion is the intense opposition to the Allahabad High Court’s direction to the ASI to excavate the Site in Ayodhya to examine if there was indeed any Hindu Temple or Hindu religious structure underneath the disputed non-Hindu structure. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court originally directed the ASI on August 1, 2002 to survey the Site. However, questions were raised as to the impartiality and integrity of the ASI by those opposed to the Temple, and therefore, the High Court directed representation by both communities in the functioning of the ASI at the Site as well as in the engagement of workforce for excavation. In the interest of transparency, the High Court further permitted the representatives of both parties and their lawyers to be present during the course of excavation by the ASI, and the ASI was directed to photograph and videograph the excavation. The High Court went to the extent of appointing two experienced Judicial Officers to observe the entire process and to ensure compliance of the Court’s orders.

It is under such rigorous and transparent conditions that the excavation was undertaken by the ASI from March 12, 2003 to August 7, 2003 and the final report was filed on August 22, 2003. In all, 90 trenches were excavated which revealed pillar bases, structures, floors and foundation. Following are a few excerpts from the ASI Report which established the existence of Temple underneath the disputed structure:

 “The aforesaid pillars and other decorative architectural members of this site like fragment of broken jamb with semicircular pilaster (Pl.85), fragment of lotus medallion motif (Pls.89-90) emphatically speak about their association with the temple architecture. Stylistically, these architectural members in general and pillars in particular may be placed in a time bracket of tenth-twelfth Century A.D. It is also pertinent to note that there are a few architectural members (Pls.92-94), which can clearly be associated with the Islamic architecture on stylistic ground, which might belong to sixteenth century A.D. onwards.. …Now, viewing in totality and taking into account the archaeological evidence of massive structure just below the disputed structure and evidence of continuity in structural phases from the tenth century onwards upto the construction of the disputed structure along with the yield of stone and decorated bricks as well as mutilated sculpture of divine couple and carved architectural members including foliage patterns, amalaka, kapotapali doorjamb with semi-circular pilaster, broken octagonal shaft of black schist pillar, lotus motif, circular shrine having pranala (waterchute) in the north, fifty pillar bases in association of the huge structure, are indicative of remains which are distinctive features found associated with the temples of north India.

 It is quite apparent that in due course of time the height of the Ram chabutra was further raised in two phases first having three levels of calcrete blocks mixed with brick-bats, terracotta objects and potsherds of earlier period set in like-surkhi mortar, each level divided by well plastered surface. Finally, on the top, four courses of lakhauri bricks, brick-bats of earlier bricks set in like- surkhi mortar, were laid, probably during the late Mughal period over which cement plaster was done at a later date in which were fixed memorial or decorative slabs as evident from the impressions available over the plaster (Pl.19). Thus the minimum height of the structure was found to be no less than 7.40 m. In the extended part of the Ram Chabutra in the west its retaining wall has damaged the pillar bases 30, 33, 36, 39 and 42 of the Period VII. (Fig.3B)

 During the excavation 62 human and 131 animal figurines were found. In the consonance with the prevailing practice in the Gangetic valley, these figurines are the products of both handmade as well as moulding techniques. These terracottas are assignable from the preMauryan to the previous century. They are both religious as well as secular, the former being represented as cult objects viz. mother-goddess.

 In the ASI’s report Vol. II Plate 67 is photograph of “Garud- dhwaj” Plate No. 88 is photograph of “Srivatsa”. These religious symbols of the Hindu Temple have been found during excavation at disputed site in Ayodhya. In Sri Bhagawat-Puran. 1.18.16; Sri Mahabharat Anushasan Parva.149. 51 & Shanti-parva Garuddhwaj have been mentioned as one of the thousand names of the Lord of Universe Sri Vishnu which means in the Flag of Lord Vishnu emblem of Garud finds place. In Sri Valmiki Ramayana Yuddh-Kanda.111.13 & 132; Sri Mahabharat| Anushasan Parva.149.77; Sri Ramcharitamanas Balkanda.146.6 Sri Vatsa has been mentioned as a holy mark on the chest of the Lord of Universe Sri Vishnu. Finding of these holy religious symbols related to the Lord of Universe Sri Vishnu leaves no doubt that the structure in question was a Vaishnav Temple.”

 Against such clear findings of the ASI’s comprehensive report, the Sunni Waqf Board filed its objections through its experts, which was responded to by the experts of the Temple side. Following was the sum and substance of the objection raised by the Sunni Waqf Board, as captured in the judgement of the High Court:

“The ASI department is under the control of Central Government. At that time the then Prime Minister Shri Atal Behari Bajpayee, Deputy Prima Minister Sri L.K. Advani and HRD Minister Sri M.M. Joshi all were of the BJP as such the ASI excavation team acted under their instruction and behest. As such said report being biased and mala fide is liable to be rejected.”

 After discussing the report of the ASI and its findings in detail, the High Court dismissed the allegations of bias as baseless. Following are a few excerpts from the High Court’s judgement:

“There is nothing on record to show that the report was biased. The massive structure theory was not based on imagination. Evidence of bones found from different levels postulate the fact that Hindus also used to perform sacrifices of animals to please the Gods. About pillar bases there is nothing on record to suggest as to how the construction can be disbelieved. The main thrust of the plaintiffs (the Sunni Waqf Board in Suit No. 4) is that there was a structure which was not a Hindu religious structure is not believable for the reasons that certain images were found on the spot were there. Hundreds of artefacts which find mention in the report were recovered during the excavation that denote the existence of Hindu religious structure.

The only objection that has come prominently from the side of plaintiff (Sunni Waqf Board) is that A.S.I. team has worked under the pressure of the Central Government. It has nowhere been mentioned that who was the person in Central Government exercising any influence over 14 members team that excavated the site. The bald allegations cannot be accepted.

 Sri Haji Mahboob Ahmad, D.W. 6/1-1 has failed to substantiate his allegations. He has not adduced any evidence in support of his contention as to who was the person interested in the Central Government and exercising influence over A.S.I. team.

Thus, on conjectures and on false allegations a scientific report submitted by a team which was working under the direct control of this Court, cannot be supposed to act under the influence of any Government or any person. It is a databased report. Videography and photograph were also conducted during excavation. On behalf of the plaintiffs, it has not been suggested that the report is against any of the videography film or photography film. These films are preserved. Thus, without any material on record, it cannot be said, at this stage, that the version of Sri Hazi Mahboob Ahmad, DW-6/1-1 may be accepted as truthful.

 The excavation report of the ASI is a scientific report of experts against whom bias and malafide has not been proved. Accordingly, it has been relied upon as a piece of evidence on the basis of the case law referred to above.

..on the basis of the report, it can conclusively be held that the disputed structure was constructed on the site of old structure after the demolition of the same. There is sufficient evidence to this effect that the structure was a Hindu massive religious structure.”

 A reading of the judgement of the High Court makes it abundantly clear that allegation after allegation of bias was levelled against even expert statutory bodies without any shred of evidence despite every procedure laid down by the High Court in the interest of transparency being observed by everyone under the supervision of judicial officers. In a nutshell, allegation, evasion and obfuscation exemplify the history of the Ayodhya dispute, which ought to have been long resolved, at least after the judgement of the High Court in 2010. Similar allegations are now being levelled after the verdict of the Supreme Court despite the Court granting 5 acres of land i.e. almost twice the size of the disputed area, to the losing party which is unprecedented in any property matter.

This warrants a few questions. While every party to a legal proceeding has the right to express its displeasure with a verdict within the bounds of the law, what remains of the moral authority of a party which has constantly shifted its positions, to now grandstand from the tried and tested soapbox of secularism? Is secularism the be-all and end-all of the Constitution? Or are facts, truth and justice to be valued more than the slippery slope and trope of secularism which acquires a new definition and hue with each passing day? What exactly is the nature of this brand of secularism and what are its limits? Is it secular to label one particular outcome in a legal proceeding as unsecular? If so, should Courts forego rules of evidence and commitment to facts, and instead rely on such skewed definitions of secularism to decide such disputes?

 Bharat has civilizationally valued secularism in its own way, which enables people of different faith systems to practice their faiths, and even atheists to profess their conscience without hindrance. Independent Bharat is a successor to this tradition. After all, it cannot be any reasonable person’s case that Bharat, which provided refuge and shelter to persecuted Jews and Parsis even before it became a Republic, was less secular until the insertion of the word in the Preamble pursuant to the 42nd amendment to the Constitution in 1976. If that were not the case, should the framers of the Constitution and all dispensations between 1947 and 1976, including the Nehruvian, be deemed unsecular and antisecular merely because the Preamble did not contain the word secular?

No version of secularism offers a carte blanche to play footsie with facts, nor can it ever be the basis to deny history and justice. Bharat’s commitment is above all to Dharma, which, to the extent the English language can accommodate the concept, translates to righteous and moral conduct, not religion. And by patiently awaiting the verdict of the Supreme Court after struggling to have their voices heard for over 500 years to reclaim one of their Holiest Sites, the adherents of this civilization have abundantly demonstrated their commitment to truth, justice and secularism.

J. Sai Deepak is an Advocate practising as an arguing counsel before the Supreme Court of Indian and the High Court of Delhi.

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AN ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE BODIES CAN ESTABLISH A CAPTIVE POWER PLANT PRIMARILY FOR THEIR OWN USE UNDER THE ELECTRICITY ACT: SUPREME COURT

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The Supreme Court in the case Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd. vs Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission observed that a captive power plant primarily for their own use can be established by an association of corporate bodies.

The requirement would be that the consumption of SBIPL and SBMPL together should not be less than 51% of the power generated. Admittedly, the joint consumption by SBIPL and SBMPL is more than 51% and under the provisions of the said Act, the use of electricity by it would be for captive use only even an association of corporate bodies can establish a power plant. Since SBMPL holds 27.6% of the ownership, the requirement of not less than 26% of shares is fulfilled by SBMPL as SBMPL holds 27.6% equity shares in SBPIL.

The fourth proviso to sub­section (2) of Section 42 of the said Act would also reveal that surcharge would not be leviable in case open access is provided to a person who has established a captive generating plant for carrying the electricity to the destination of his own use and under Section 9 of the said Act, could be an individual or a body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, it is clear that the person will get benefit even an association of corporate bodies can establish a captive power plant it has been seen. The definition of “person” is wide enough to include any company or body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or artificial juridical person it should be primarily for the use of the members of such co­operative society or association is the requirement, the Bench observed while referring to the provisions of the Electricity Act.

The BPIL, the respondent contended and supported the impugned judgment that no permission is required from the Commission for supply of electricity for its own use. Thereafter the appellant Company contended that unless SBPIL consumes 51% of the aggregate electricity generated by it, it will not be entitled to get the benefit under Section 9 of the said Act, in an appeal filled before the Apex Court.

An appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity filed by the Company further The Commission held that SBPIL was entitled to supply electricity to its sister concern SBMPL and the same would qualify to be treating as own consumption and within the ambit of Section 9 read with Section 2(8) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Rule 3 of the Electricity Rules, 2005 SBPIL submitted a petition for providing open access and wheeling of power through the transmission system of the Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd (Company) for captive use by SBMPL to the Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission, the commission. A Captive Generation Plant is established by SBPIL, and is a sister concern of SBPIL Shri Bajrang Power and I spat Ltd and Shri Bajrang Metallics and Power Ltd, SBMPL.

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Where the crime was committed the remission or premature release policy of the state has to be considered: Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court in the case Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, Lala Vakil vs State of Gujarat observed that where the crime was committed has to be considered in the remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State.

While allowing the writ petition the court observed and contended that Once the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat, after the trial been concluded and judgment of conviction came to be passed, all further proceedings have to be 6 considered including remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred and concluded for exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court, as the case may be. The court further stated that under Section 432(7) CrPC the appropriate Government can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments.

the appropriate Government in the ordinary course would be the State of Gujarat. But the case was transferred in exceptional circumstances by this Court for limited purpose for trial and disposal to the neighboring State i.e., the State of Maharashtra by an order dated 06.08.2004. ordinarily, the trial was to be concluded in the same State and in terms of Section 432(7) CrPC as the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed in the State of Gujarat, observed by the Apex Court.

he application for pre­mature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat, as prayed by the petitioner by judgment impugned dated 17.07.2009 As His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra. Thereafter He had filed his petition for pre­mature release under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating that he had undergone more than 15 years 4 months of custody.

The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed and noted that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of the appropriate Government.

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Adopt roster based reservation for preferential candidates as followed by JIPMER: Supreme Court directs all AIIMS institutes

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The Supreme Court in the case Students Association AIIMS Bhopal And Or’s. v. AllMS and Or’s observed and directed all AIIMS Institutes to adopt roster-based reservation followed by Jawaharlal Institute of Postgraduate Medical Education and Research, Pondicherry (JIPMER) as a plea was filled in the Court seeking direction to AIIMS to have a defined criteria for arriving at seat matrix for institutional preference candidates in INI-CET examination.

the order of the Apex Court in the case AIIMS Students’ Union v. AIIMS And Or’s, would not be applicable if It emphasized that if the roster-based system is implemented the actual roster points for AIIMS would be different from JIPMER as the same would depend on the percentage of seats decided to be allocated to the preferential candidates but It stated that the reservation would be similar to the one adopted by JIPMER AIIMS New Delhi was willing to provide a roster-point based reservation for its institutional preference candidates, by way of an affidavit 20th January 2022 the Bench was apprised that pursuant to a meeting held on 28th June 2020 as prescribed the relevancy:

It shall not be too wide with the one for the general category candidate, that the margin of difference between the qualifying marks for the Institute’s candidate.

The one who has secured marks at the common entrance PG test less than the one secured by any other candidate belonging to reserved category enjoying constitutional protection such as SC, ST etc. cannot be the AIMS graduate the last student to qualify for admission.

appearing on behalf of AIIMS, Advocate, Mr. Dushyant Parashar, New Delhi was asked to get instructions from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and Jodhpur so that the Court can pass appropriate orders on the next date of hearing. As that apart from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and AIIMS, Jodhpur, all other AIIMS before the Apex Court has agreed to implement the roster-based reservation system followed by JIPMER Puducherry for their institutional preference candidates, the Court was informed at the last date of hearing.

the petition had been filed seeking direction to AIIMS to disclose how the seats for institutional preference candidates are to be allotted in the view of the same the petitioners claim that in the INI-CET examination conducted in July, 2021, only 4 seats (1.87%) in AIIMS, New Delhi were allotted to institutional preference candidates. Rivetingly, the petitioners note that no seats were allocated to any other AIIMS for admission of institutional preference candidates.

the Bench comprising of Justice L. Nageswara Rao and the justice A.S. Bopanna observed and noted that to record in the order that the roaster system would be applicable from this year. Mr. Parashar informed it that since new software is to be put in place for counselling, it might cause some delay. The bench further stated that the court will order it to apply this year but in case of delay AIMS can come later.

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‘The crime committed has to be considered in the remission or premature policy of the state’

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The Supreme Court in the case Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, Lala Vakil vs State of Gujarat observed that where the crime was committed has to be considered in the remission which is applicable in the State and the pre­mature release in terms of the policy

The Court noted while hearing the writ petition that in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred and concluded for exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court once the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat, after the trial been concluded and judgment of conviction came to be passed, all further proceedings have to be 6 considered including remission or pre­mature release, as the case may be, in the instance case. under Section 432(7) CrPC, there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments, can be either the Central or the State Government of the appropriate government.

in terms of Section 432(7) CrPC, the trial was to be concluded in the same State and ordinarily in the State of Gujrat the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed. by an order 06.08.2004., the case was transferred in exceptional circumstances by this Court for limited purpose for trial and disposal to the neighbouring State i.e., the State of Maharashtra, observed by the bench of Apex Court.

As mentioned by the petitioner in the plea that by judgment impugned dated 17.07.2019., the application for pre­mature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat and His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra. under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the petition was filled by the petitioner for premature release further the petitioner stated that that he had undergone under the custody of more than 15 years 4 months.

Section 302, 376(2) (e) (g) and reading it with Section 149 IPC, Shah was found guilty for the offence, the offence committed by him in the State of Gujrat.

The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of that appropriate government.

The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of that appropriate government.

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Seeking reduction of qualifying the percentile for admission in ayurveda course: A plea in Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court in the Case Amit Kumar v UOI & Or’s observed in Ayurveda course in view of large number of vacancies and for seeking reduction of qualifying percentile for admission, an ayurveda aspirant who appeared in NEET 2021 has approached the Court.

the court had observed that lowering the minimum marks and reducing the percentile for admission to first year BDS Course would not amount to lowing the standards of Education and further the Court directed to lower the percentile mark by 10 percentiles for admission in first year of BDS Course for academic year 2020-2021, with regards to substantive the contentions made by the petitioner by referring the judgement passed in the case in Harshit Agarwal & Or’s v Union of India.

the percentile may also be reduced for Ayurveda programme enabling the Petitioner to take admissions then If percentile is being reduced/considered for reduction for BDS course was further stated by the petitioner in the plea, while referring to an order dated 04.29.2022. Thereafter the top Court had asked Centre to consider lowering the percentile for BDS Courses.

Seeking the Centre’s response in a plea by filing a counter affidavit, noted by the Top Court specifying the above-mentioned information:

after deducting the admission granted for MBBS Courses (BDS Courses), the total number of Candidates.

in All India Quota and State Quota, the totals number of vacant seats.

in government colleges on one hand & private/deemed colleges on the other hand, the number of seats which are remaining.

the petition was filed through AOR Neeraj Shekhar and for the petitioner Advocate Shivam Singh appeared.

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Bank case rejected by Supreme Court against farmer

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The Supreme Court in the case Bank of Maharashtra & Or’s v Mohanlal Patidar observed an order given by the High Courts of directing the bank the OTS proposal given by a farmer who had availed a loan from the bank, the court further pulled up the Bank of Maharashtra for challenging the order.

The Bank shall complete remaining formalities and provide all consequential benefits flowing therefrom to the petitioners, the court further stated that it is needless to emphasize The OTS proposal given by the petitioners in both the cases shall be accepted by the Bank and ‘sanction letters’ be issued forthwith, the court allowed the petitioner plea.

The petitioner not only promptly challenged the said order, it is noteworthy that petitioner never acceded to the unilateral decision dated 25th August 2021 and even otherwise the letter dated 25th August 2021 is held to be illegal by us, clause-7 of policy cannot take away the fruits of OTS benefits, within two months from the date of issuance of order dated 22th September 2021, the petitioner filled the instant petition and further the court directed we are unable to give stamp of approval to the impugned orders and action of the Bank, observed by the bench comprising of Justice Sujoy Paul and the justice Dwarka Dhish Bansal while setting aside the impugned orders of the bank.

In an order dated 03.09.2021 it was stated and it showed that the petitioner was required to pay minimum 10% of the OTS amount within stipulated time and that he had deposited Rs.35,00,000/- out of Rs.36,50,000/- within the stipulated time, it was argued before the court by the counsel.

As full and final settlement of the dues, he will be required to deposit Rs.50.50 lakhs as he was informed by the Asset Recovery Branch of the Bank.

Whole law comes into place when a matter of farmers come as the down payment were also accepted and it was further stated by the bench in an oral remark You don’t file cases against the ones who loot 1000s of crores.

The respondent had obtained a loan and intended to pay it in terms of a One Time Settlement which was quantified as Rs 3650000/-. in furtherance thereof the respondent had deposited Rs 35,00,000 with the bank, in the above-mentioned matter.

The bank had miserably failed to accept the same and on the contrary, decided to enhance the compromise amount to Rs.50.50 lakhs unilaterally which was contrary to the OTS scheme, contended by the counsel further the counsel stated that the bank had miserably failed to accept the same and on the contrary, decided to enhance the compromise amount to Rs.50.50 lakhs unilaterally which was contrary to the OTS scheme.

The bench comprising of Justice DY Chandrachud and the justice Surya Kant observed and remarked while dismissing the plea assailing Madhya Pradesh High Court’s order dated 02.21.2022 Such a litigation in Supreme Court will spoil the families of farmers financially, Go after bigger fish.

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