India doesn’t have a Uniform Civil Code, which means the law in matters pertaining to inheritance and sharing of property differs for people from different faiths. The two important laws in regard to property share are the Hindu Succession Act, 2005 and the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Before getting into the nuances of these acts, we must understand two legal terms: testamentary and intestate. A registered will plays a significant role in testamentary succession; it supersedes all laws. For example, if a father legally bequeaths the whole of his property to his son through a will, that is final. Just like in the 2019 mystery film Knives Out, the owner of the property can leave it to a complete stranger, who is not his kin and kith. An intestate person is one who dies without writing a will. In that case, the property is divided equally between all his children irrespective of gender, according to the above-mentioned laws. Do Christians and Muslim women also have an equal share in the property of the father? Yes. A daughter is entitled to inherit an equal share as a son in the Christian law. But there is a need to re-examine the Muslim woman’s right to property. A daughter receives only half of the share of a son. Even if the father wants to give her an equal share through a will, existing laws do not permit it. There is strong opposition to it, and Muslim women are filing PILs asking for an amendment in the law. What rights do women have over their husbands’ property? Hindu, Buddhist, Jain and Sikh women: The property of the husband is equally divided between the wife and the children. Widowed women also have equal rights to their predeceased husbands’ property, as their children. If alimony and maintenance are settled, divorced women will have no claim over the property of the former husband, even though their children do. Muslim women are entitled to 1/8th of the share of the predeceased husband if they have children and 1/4th if they have no children. Christian, Paris and Jew women receive 1/3rd share of the predeceased husband if they have children and half of the share if they have no children. There is a popular sentiment in society that since women anyway receive valuable gifts from their parents during festivals, besides her share of dowry, she should not claim property from the paternal home. How does one address this? That is just a patriarchal strategy. Parents or brothers shower her with gifts at her marriage and exclude her from the big picture. But a woman is entitled to the properties of both her husband and her father. It is ironic how men expect their wives to bring property from paternal homes but are not willing to give the legitimate share to their sisters!
Now coming directly to the point I’ve been addressing through this article is that it is very often said “Once a Daughter, Always a Daughter”. One of the most important authorities and highest court of law in the hierarchy upheld the judgement in 2020 wherein a judge bench of Justice Arun Mishra, Justice S Abdul Nazeer and Justice MR Shah of the Supreme Court of India removed all the ambiguities arising in the 2005 Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In Hindu Law, for the purpose of inheritance, Property is classified into two types: (1) Joint Family Property and (2) Self-Acquired Property. Essentially, all Property inherited by a son from their father, paternal grandfather, and paternal great-grandfather is considered Joint Family Property. All other Property is considered Self-Acquired Property. Depending on where you reside in India, the character of these types of properties is either the same or different. In regions where this distinction is followed: Joint Family Property is inherited differently (compared to Self-Acquired Property). Multiple persons have rights over the Joint Family Property by birth. This is unlike Self-Acquired Property, over which rights can be acquired only if you have acquired them yourself. The rights of both sons, and daughters, to inherit, acquire, hold, and dispose of the Self-Acquired Property of their ancestors is essentially the same everywhere. However, in regions where this distinction is maintained, daughters did not enjoy the same rights as sons in Joint Family Property for a long time. Daughters were at a disadvantage compared to sons in terms of both their rights to control the property and their rights to inherit it. Legislation after legislation has gradually diluted this inequality over the past century. Finally, with the enactment of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, sons and daughters now have equal rights to inherit the Joint Family Property of their ancestors. In Phulavati Case, the Supreme Court held that Sec. 6 would apply only when the coparcener (person who acquires interest in the joint family property by birth) and his daughter, both were alive on the date of commencement of the 2005 Amendment. In Danamma Case, while the Supreme Court agreed with the principles laid down in Phulavati Case, it held that the 2005 amendment confers upon the daughter of the coparcener, the status of coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son and accordingly, the female coparcener was given a share upon partition even if the father had died before the 2005 Amendment came in force. The principle arguments made by the Union of India (UOI) were that the exclusion of a daughter from coparcenary was discriminatory and led to oppression and negation of fundamental rights. Further the conferment of rights on the daughter does not disturb the rights which got crystallised by partition before 20 December 2004. The decision in Phulavati Case failed to appreciate that coparcenary rights accrued by birth by operation of law, and death of a coparcener was only relevant for the succession of his coparcenary interest at the time of partition. Thus, the daughter of a coparcener had herself become a coparcener on her birth and her father need not have been alive on the commencement of the 2005 Amendment. UOI also argued that the purpose of inserting explanation to Sec.6(5) necessitating the partition to be registered was to avoid any bogus or sham transactions. The requirement of registration was directory and not mandatory. Any family arrangement or oral partition relied upon would have to be proved by leading documentary evidence. On the other hand, the Amici Curiae submitted that there was no conflict between the decisions in Phulavati Case and Danamma Case as both held that Sec.6 was prospective in application. The scheme of Sec.6 was future and forward-looking. Thus, only the daughter, whose coparcener father was alive on the commencement of 2005 amendment, would be treated as a coparcener. The Court while reaching to the conclusion historically analysed the Hindu Law, the concept of Joint Hindu Family and formation of coparcenary to arrive at its decision. The Court opined that unobstructed heritage takes place by birth while obstructed heritage takes place after the death of the owner. Under Sec.6, rights are given by birth, which is unobstructed heritage, independent of the owner’s death. Thus, the coparcener father need not be alive on the date of substitution of Sec.6 that is on 9 September 2005. The provisions of Section 6 are retroactive in nature and not retrospective as even though the right of a coparcener accrued to the daughter by birth, it could be claimed only from the date of the 2005 Amendment. The coparcenary right to be claimed by a daughter with effect from commencement of 2005 Amendment is subject to any disposition or alienation, testamentary disposition of the property or partition which had taken place before 20 December 2004. The finding in Phulavati Case that the rights under Sec.6 accrue to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9 September 2005 irrespective of when such daughters were born, was misconceived. Phulvati Case overlooked the concept of creation of a coparcenary at birth and was accordingly overruled. The decision in Mangammal v. T.B. Raju which followed Phulavati was also overruled while the decision in Danamma Case was partly overruled. The Court categorially opined that mere filing of a suit for partition does not bring about partition. In fact, any subsequent change in law from the time of filing the suit, could also be taken into consideration before passing of the final decree. Although, the Explanation to Sec.6(5) contemplates partition only by the virtue of registered partition deed or partition effected by a decree of court, the Courts could recognize oral partition in exceptional cases based upon long standing evidences in the form of contemporaneous public documents. At the end, the Court has directed that since significant delay is caused due to these conflicting decisions, all the High Courts and subordinate courts will dispose of cases involving this issue, as far as possible, within six months. To encapsulate, this case operates on the premise that the intent of Section 6 of the Act as amended by the 2005 amendment was to neither confer its benefits to female successors prospectively nor for that matter retrospectively, but it was to confer benefits retroactively. A legislation applies retroactively when it prescribes benefits conditional upon an eligibility, that may arise even prior to the passing of such legislation. While explaining the concept of retroactive application in relation to 2005 amendment, it was held that the 2005 amendment makes available to female successors, the benefit of succession on par with that of her male counter parts based on an antecedent event, that is her birth. In so far as the self-acquired property is concerned, daughters are class I heirs and entitled to an equal share as that of a son in every intestate succession. As an outcome of this decision, the daughters will now also have an equal right in ancestral property and their father’s Joint Family property.
Before the amendment in 2005, an oral partition was permissible, with the burden of proof on the person who claims there was an verbal division. But the amended Section 6(5) of the Hindu Succession Act says a “partition” can be effected by any registered deed or a court decree. It was argued in the top court that the need for a registered partition deed was not mandatory. But the court noted that section 6 intends to ensure daughters are not deprived of their rights of obtaining their share on becoming a coparcener. “The court has to keep in mind the possibility that a plea of oral partition may be set up, fraudulently or in collusion, or based on an unregistered memorandum of partition which may also be created at any point of time. Such a partition is not recognised under section 6(5),” it observed. The court, therefore, ruled that a plea of oral partition cannot be legally accepted. However, it may be accepted in exceptional circumstances if it is supported by public documents. Although the verdict deserves appreciation for achieving the necessary objective of gender equality and gender justice, the fact that it almost took 15 years to be finally settled reflects the long journey towards justice. In this meantime, many women would have been left without their legitimate coparcenary share who were otherwise entitled to claim their rights under Section 6 of the Amended Act. Now coming back to judgements made in this respect recently, Earlier the 2005 Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, recognised and provided an equal share to the daughter, whether married or not, in parental property, with the condition that the father and the daughter, both should be alive as on September 9, 2005, the day when the said amendment was made. The amendment, though relevant, left a lot of ambiguity and provided loopholes to many to suit their purpose. It failed to cover all women in its ambit. ruled out all ambiguities and stated that a daughter has equal right to property, thus recognizing her as a coparcener equal to a son, irrespective of her status or whether her father had been alive as on September 9, 2005, hence making the Amendment more open and its applicability without any conditions. Thus it has ensured that the scope of its implementation should reach all women in essence. The decision by the Apex Court of India is historic in itself. It gives daughters unequivocal inheritance rights to parental property. So a son and a daughter are both deemed equal. That’s now the law, and it leaves no ambiguity for its application. The earlier Amendment was historic too, but did not recognise the absolute rights of a daughter as was the case of a son, and thus the enforceability defeated its basic purpose and intent. The son’s right to property has always been considered absolute and there are still no questions about it. The recent judgement this year which came on an appeal against the Madras High Court verdict, dealt with the property rights of Hindu women and widows under the Hindu Succession Act. “If a property of a male Hindu dying intestate (without a will) is a self-acquired property or obtained in the partition of a coparcenary or a family property, the same would devolve by inheritance and not by survivorship, and a daughter of such a male Hindu would be entitled to inherit such property in preference to other collaterals (such as sons/daughters of brothers of deceased father),” a bench of justices S Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari said. The bench was dealing with the legal issue concerning the right of the daughter to inherit the self-acquired property of her father, in the absence of any other legal heir. It also dealt with also dealt with the question of whether such property will devolve on to the daughter upon the death of her father, who died without a will, by inheritance or shall devolve on to “father’s brother’s son by survivorship”. Right of a widow or daughter to inherit the self-acquired property or share received in the partition of a coparcenary property of a Hindu male dying intestate is well recognized not only under the old customary Hindu Law but also by various judicial pronouncements,” the verdict said. Referring to the legal provision, it said the legislative intent was to remedy the limitation of a Hindu woman who could not claim an absolute interest in the properties inherited by her but only had a life interest in the estate so inherited. “The basic aim of the legislature in enacting Section 15(2) (of the Hindu Succession Act) is to ensure that inherited property of a female Hindu dying issueless and intestate, goes back to the source,” it said. Dealing with the facts of the case, the bench set aside the trial court and the high court’s findings dismissing the partition suit of the daughters. The apex court said since the property in question was admittedly the self-acquired property of a father despite the family being in a state of jointness upon his death intestate, his sole surviving daughter will inherit the same by inheritance and the property shall not devolve by survivorship. Thus, the impugned judgement and decree dated March 01, 1994, passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated January 21, 2009, are not liable to be sustained and was hereby set aside, the court stated. Referring to the ancient texts and Smritis, Justice Murari said, “It is clear that ancient text as also the Smritis, the commentaries written by various renowned learned persons and even judicial pronouncements have recognized the rights of several female heirs, the wives and the daughter’s being the foremost of them.” This could potentially open up disputes over properties partitioned prior to 1956 in which the daughters were not given any share and could result in the daughter’s heirs seeking to reclaim their rights over the properties. Accepting arguments of advocate P V Yogeswaran, counsel for the woman petitioner, the bench said succession of properties prior to 1956 would also include the daughter’s right. “If a property of a male Hindu dying intestate is a self acquired property or obtained in partition of a coparcenary or a family property, the same would devolve by inheritance and not by survivorship, and a daughter of such a male Hindu would be entitled to inherit such property in preference to other collaterals.” It said, “The rights of women in the family to maintenance were in every case very substantial rights and on whole, it would seem that some of the commentators erred in drawing adverse inferences from the vague references to women’s succession in the earlier Smritis. The views of the Mitakshara on the matter are unmistakable.”
A law in writing does not ensure an end to discrimination. For equality to become a practice, society needs to accept it. And going by the norms of the society it’s still a stigma to seek equal rights in the property. Society by its pressures and rules denies daughters their inheritance rights. The earlier amendment to the law too, by its various loopholes discriminated against daughters of the family. And for those women struggling and stranded in abusive and difficult marriages, where the parents also refuse to accept them, this amendment would ensure that they get their rightful share as recognised by law.
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A PLEA IN SUPREME COURT CHALLENGES THE CHANGED NEET-SS 2022 EXAM PATTERN
The Supreme Court in the case Dr Richa Verma v. National Board of Examination observed the changed examination pattern which would now be comprising of 150 questions from the general i.e., the basic component of the primary feeder broad specialty subject and from all sub- specialty/systems/component of that primary feeder broad specialty subject. A plea filled in the Supreme Court by MD Radiation Oncologists and MD Anaesthesiologists NEET SS 2022 aspirant.
the petitioners have sought issuance of directions to restrain the NBE from excluding / MD Radiotherapy from the eligible feeder specialties for the super specialty course of DM Medical Oncology for NEET SS 2022 and have further sought for restoring the scheme/pattern for the exam further the petitioner deleting the MD Radiation Oncology, against this backdrop.
On 05.10.2021 the Central Government had told the Court that the revised pattern will be implemented only from next year and it may be noted that over the eleventh-hour changes brought to the NEET-SS 2021 pattern after facing the harsh criticism from the Supreme Court.
The petition further states that they will have to compete with candidates who have 100% questions from their postgraduate syllabus/ broad specialty as the new examination scheme is making some candidates write a paper which has no questions from their postgraduate broad specialty.
particularly in favor of MD Medicine in so far as the choice of options is far greater vis-a-vis the choices available to either MD Radiation Oncology or MD Anaesthesia, the pattern is not just a waste of time and effort for all those who have prepared for Critical Care but also grossly biased against few broad specialties and of the other four post-graduate branches there will be no questions from broad specialties.
This is complete waste of time, resources and effort put by the candidates who have been preparing for a super speciality subject for years as it is arbitrarily, illogical, highly partial and unreasonable, while terming the change in pattern, the contentions made by the petitioner.
the new pattern was forcing all the candidates from the broad specialties to write a single paper which will have 100% questions from General Medicine, stated by the petitioner. Furthermore, contending that the erstwhile pattern had a paper with 40% mixed questions from all the broad specialties and 60% questions from Critical Care (i.e., the super-specialty subject) which had ensured a level playing field.
THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 482 OF THE CRPC CANNOT BE QUASHED MERELY ON THE GROUND THAT NO USEFUL PURPOSE WILL BE SERVED: SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court in the case Satish Kumar Jatav vs State of Uttar Pradesh observed that while by prolonging the proceedings of the case, the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed. As when a clear case is made for the offence alleged on the ground that no useful purpose will be served.
under Sections 307, 504, 506 of the IPC and 9 Section 3(10)(15) of the Act, the serious allegations for the offences were made and while considering the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and quashing the criminal proceedings for the aforesaid offences, the High Court ought to have been more cautious and circumspect. on how the order passed by the learned Magistrate summoning the accused was wrong and/or erroneous, has not at all being allowed by the High Court. the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and has quashed the criminal proceedings is deprecated in the manner in which the High Court has disposed of further the High Court has observed in the proceedings of the case that no useful purpose will be served. The aforesaid cannot be a good ground and/or a ground at all to quash the criminal proceedings when a clear case was made out for the offences alleged, appeared while quashing the criminal proceedings by the High Court even for the impugned order passed, the bench overserved while allowing the appeal.
The application under Section 482 Cr.P.C The manner in which the High Court has disposed and quashed the criminal proceedings is not appreciated at all Furthermore the Court has emphasized that the High Court must pass a speaking and reasoned order in such matters. The same has been set aside by the High Court in a most cursory and casual manner.
The allegations made against the accused persons and even on the legality and validity of the order passed by the Magistrate summoning the accused, has not been discussed by the High Court the Court noted.
The appellant contended that there are no reasons whatsoever have been assigned while quashing the criminal proceedings and further the appellant contended that there is no independent application of mind by the High Court. The respondent defended the impugned order, on the other hand before the Apex Court.
the Allahabad High Court quashed the criminal proceedings merely opining that “that no useful purpose shall be served by prolonging the proceedings of the case, while allowing the petition filled by the accused challenging this order and the offences punishable under Sections 307, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(10)(15) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, the accused to face the trial the Magistrate summoned the accused in the present case.
The bench comprising of Justice MR Shah and the justice BV Nagarathna observed and reiterated under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that a High Court must pass a speaking and reasoned order while disposing petitions.
Nexus between accused’s negligence and victim’s death has to be established under Section 304A IPC: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court in the case Nanjundappa vs State of Karnataka observed that would not apply to a criminal case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu.
when there is no report of a technical expert to corroborate the prosecution story as The Appellants therefore are entitled to be given the benefit of doubt furthermore It is even more unbelievable that Appellant no. 2 came in contact with the same voltage and managed to get away with a few abrasions.
when such current passed through the Television set, it did not blast and melt the wiring of the entire house and the court further added that it sounds completely preposterous that a telephone wire carried 11KV current without melting on contact.
While evaluating such evidence the jury should bear in mind that inference of guilt should be the only reasonable inference from the facts as In case of circumstantial evidence, there is a risk of jumping to conclusions in haste However the conviction of the accused persons seems wholly unjustified against the weight of the evidence adduced, in the present case. The Court also referred to the case of Syad Akbar Vs. State of Karnataka in which this Court proceeded on the basis that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a criminal case as its applicability in an action for injury by negligence is well known, observed by the court in the present case.
The court noted that there is no eye witness to say conclusively that the Appellants were in fact executing the work at the place alleged and further the court notice that no report or even inspection was conducted by a technical expert to assess the veracity of the averments made by the complainants to suggest that it was due to the alleged acts of the Appellants that the incident took place. the allegations against the Appellants are highly technical in nature, notice by the court on perusing the evidence on record.
On 21th November 2003 at 1.00p.m. the deceased was watching TV in his house. Noticing a sudden sound in the TV, the deceased got up to separate the dish wire, the TV connection wire and the telephone wire, which were entwined together, he felt an electric shock and his right hand was burnt and as a result of this shock he succumbed to death at that point of time it was found that the said incident took place because of the negligent act on the part of the accused, the supervisor (an employee in the telephone department ) and daily wage worker employed by him, as it was found out in the investigation. under Section 304A read with Section 34 IPC was upheld by the Karnataka High Court, the appellant is convicted.
the bench comprising of CJI NV Ramana, Justice Krishna Murari and the justice Hima Kohli observed under Section 304A of Indian Penal Code for causing death by negligence, while acquitting two persons that prosecution has to firstly prove negligence and then establish direct nexus between negligence of the accused and the death of the victim, for bringing home the guilt of the accused.
The Court also referred to the case of Syad Akbar Vs. State of Karnataka in which this Court proceeded on the basis that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a criminal case as its applicability in an action for injury by negligence is well known, observed by the court in the present case.
AN ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE BODIES CAN ESTABLISH A CAPTIVE POWER PLANT PRIMARILY FOR THEIR OWN USE UNDER THE ELECTRICITY ACT: SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court in the case Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd. vs Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission observed that a captive power plant primarily for their own use can be established by an association of corporate bodies.
The requirement would be that the consumption of SBIPL and SBMPL together should not be less than 51% of the power generated. Admittedly, the joint consumption by SBIPL and SBMPL is more than 51% and under the provisions of the said Act, the use of electricity by it would be for captive use only even an association of corporate bodies can establish a power plant. Since SBMPL holds 27.6% of the ownership, the requirement of not less than 26% of shares is fulfilled by SBMPL as SBMPL holds 27.6% equity shares in SBPIL.
The fourth proviso to subsection (2) of Section 42 of the said Act would also reveal that surcharge would not be leviable in case open access is provided to a person who has established a captive generating plant for carrying the electricity to the destination of his own use and under Section 9 of the said Act, could be an individual or a body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, it is clear that the person will get benefit even an association of corporate bodies can establish a captive power plant it has been seen. The definition of “person” is wide enough to include any company or body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or artificial juridical person it should be primarily for the use of the members of such cooperative society or association is the requirement, the Bench observed while referring to the provisions of the Electricity Act.
The BPIL, the respondent contended and supported the impugned judgment that no permission is required from the Commission for supply of electricity for its own use. Thereafter the appellant Company contended that unless SBPIL consumes 51% of the aggregate electricity generated by it, it will not be entitled to get the benefit under Section 9 of the said Act, in an appeal filled before the Apex Court.
An appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity filed by the Company further The Commission held that SBPIL was entitled to supply electricity to its sister concern SBMPL and the same would qualify to be treating as own consumption and within the ambit of Section 9 read with Section 2(8) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Rule 3 of the Electricity Rules, 2005 SBPIL submitted a petition for providing open access and wheeling of power through the transmission system of the Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd (Company) for captive use by SBMPL to the Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission, the commission. A Captive Generation Plant is established by SBPIL, and is a sister concern of SBPIL Shri Bajrang Power and I spat Ltd and Shri Bajrang Metallics and Power Ltd, SBMPL.
Where the crime was committed the remission or premature release policy of the state has to be considered: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court in the case Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, Lala Vakil vs State of Gujarat observed that where the crime was committed has to be considered in the remission or premature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State.
While allowing the writ petition the court observed and contended that Once the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat, after the trial been concluded and judgment of conviction came to be passed, all further proceedings have to be 6 considered including remission or premature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred and concluded for exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court, as the case may be. The court further stated that under Section 432(7) CrPC the appropriate Government can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments.
the appropriate Government in the ordinary course would be the State of Gujarat. But the case was transferred in exceptional circumstances by this Court for limited purpose for trial and disposal to the neighboring State i.e., the State of Maharashtra by an order dated 06.08.2004. ordinarily, the trial was to be concluded in the same State and in terms of Section 432(7) CrPC as the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed in the State of Gujarat, observed by the Apex Court.
he application for premature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat, as prayed by the petitioner by judgment impugned dated 17.07.2009 As His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra. Thereafter He had filed his petition for premature release under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating that he had undergone more than 15 years 4 months of custody.
The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed and noted that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of the appropriate Government.
Adopt roster based reservation for preferential candidates as followed by JIPMER: Supreme Court directs all AIIMS institutes
The Supreme Court in the case Students Association AIIMS Bhopal And Or’s. v. AllMS and Or’s observed and directed all AIIMS Institutes to adopt roster-based reservation followed by Jawaharlal Institute of Postgraduate Medical Education and Research, Pondicherry (JIPMER) as a plea was filled in the Court seeking direction to AIIMS to have a defined criteria for arriving at seat matrix for institutional preference candidates in INI-CET examination.
the order of the Apex Court in the case AIIMS Students’ Union v. AIIMS And Or’s, would not be applicable if It emphasized that if the roster-based system is implemented the actual roster points for AIIMS would be different from JIPMER as the same would depend on the percentage of seats decided to be allocated to the preferential candidates but It stated that the reservation would be similar to the one adopted by JIPMER AIIMS New Delhi was willing to provide a roster-point based reservation for its institutional preference candidates, by way of an affidavit 20th January 2022 the Bench was apprised that pursuant to a meeting held on 28th June 2020 as prescribed the relevancy:
It shall not be too wide with the one for the general category candidate, that the margin of difference between the qualifying marks for the Institute’s candidate.
The one who has secured marks at the common entrance PG test less than the one secured by any other candidate belonging to reserved category enjoying constitutional protection such as SC, ST etc. cannot be the AIMS graduate the last student to qualify for admission.
appearing on behalf of AIIMS, Advocate, Mr. Dushyant Parashar, New Delhi was asked to get instructions from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and Jodhpur so that the Court can pass appropriate orders on the next date of hearing. As that apart from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and AIIMS, Jodhpur, all other AIIMS before the Apex Court has agreed to implement the roster-based reservation system followed by JIPMER Puducherry for their institutional preference candidates, the Court was informed at the last date of hearing.
the petition had been filed seeking direction to AIIMS to disclose how the seats for institutional preference candidates are to be allotted in the view of the same the petitioners claim that in the INI-CET examination conducted in July, 2021, only 4 seats (1.87%) in AIIMS, New Delhi were allotted to institutional preference candidates. Rivetingly, the petitioners note that no seats were allocated to any other AIIMS for admission of institutional preference candidates.
the Bench comprising of Justice L. Nageswara Rao and the justice A.S. Bopanna observed and noted that to record in the order that the roaster system would be applicable from this year. Mr. Parashar informed it that since new software is to be put in place for counselling, it might cause some delay. The bench further stated that the court will order it to apply this year but in case of delay AIMS can come later.
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