SC HOLDS A MAJOR DAUGHTER NOT ENTITLED TO EDUCATION EXPENSES FROM FATHER AS SHE DOES NOT WANT TO MAINTAIN RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM - The Daily Guardian
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SC HOLDS A MAJOR DAUGHTER NOT ENTITLED TO EDUCATION EXPENSES FROM FATHER AS SHE DOES NOT WANT TO MAINTAIN RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM

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While passing a decree of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, the Apex Court in a cogent, composed, commendable and creditworthy judgment titled Ajay Kumar Rathee vs Seema Rathee in Civil Appeal No. 5141/2011 delivered as recently as on March 10, 2022 has refused to allow the daughter born to the couple to claim education and marriage expenses from her father as she said that she does not want to maintain relationship with him. The Court noted that the daughter who was aged 20 years of age was not intending to maintain ties with her father. The Court also noted that if that be the case, she can’t claim any amount from him for marriage and education.

To start with, this learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment authored by a Bench of Apex Court comprising of Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice MM Sundresh sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “A marriage was solemnized inter-se the parties on 29.4.1998 at Rohtak as per Hindu rites, the parties resided together and the marriage was consummated. A daughter named Jyotsana was born on 20.2.2001. It is the case of the appellant that the respondent has been residing not with the appellant but in her father’s home after he passed away on 8.12.2002. A panchayat was convened on two separate occasions but it is the case of the appellant that the respondent refused to live with him in Ganaur. The appellant thus filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 but the same was dismissed on default on 07.10.2004.”

Simply put, the Bench then states that, “We may note the case of the respondent was that the appellant had thrown her out of the matrimonial home in October 2004 after assaulting her. There was a demand of dowry by the appellant and her family, and she was harassed and tortured. The daughter has been throughout living with the respondent since birth, and thus the divorce petition.”

As we see, the Bench then brings out that, “The aforesaid respective stands are reflected from the pleadings of the parties in a divorce petition filed by the appellant under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on grounds of desertion. The petition was tried. The learned Addl. District Judge, Sonipat found that no reconsideration was possible and there was no documentary or other evidence to prove the dowry demand.”

As it turned out, the Bench then points out that, “The respondent aggrieved by the same preferred an appeal before the High Court which has been allowed by the impugned judgment dated 08.9.2009. On the appellant preferring the special leave petition, notice was issued and endeavor was made to resolve the dispute between the parties through Delhi Mediation Center in 2011 but nothing worked out and leave was granted on 04.7.2011.”

Needless to say, the Bench then states that, “On the appeal being taken up for hearing on 28.9.2021, learned counsel for the parties stated that the parties are staying separately since 2002/ 2004 and that the parties will endeavor to work out a settlement and thus sought deferment of hearing.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages that, “On 05.10.2021, learned counsel for the respondent reported back stating that he had instructions that the respondent was not averse to a mutual consent divorce with the Court invoking its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, without admitting the allegations made by the appellant while filing the divorce petition. We, however, put two caveats to it:

(a) the maintenance for the last 10 months fixed by the trial Court of Rs.8,000/- per month has not been paid.

(b) the sole child-daughter, has got admission to a college and the appellant must bear expenses for her education.”

Truth be told, the Bench then points out that, “Learned counsel for the appellant assured that the arrears would be cleared and also agreed to submit his salary bills along with an affidavit setting out his assets which he owns privately, apart from his salary slip, to work out the financial terms of the separation. The respondent was also asked to do the same. We flagged the issue of financial emoluments to be received by the respondent and the issue of the daughter’s education and marriage. In order to develop and encourage a rapport between the daughter who is 20 years of age and the appellant, we requested learned counsel for the respondent to arrange a meeting between the two in the meantime.”

Furthermore, the Bench then mentions that, “On the next date of hearing, i.e. 27.10.2021, we referred the matter to the Supreme Court Mediation Center to work out a formal settlement and for the daughter to join the mediation proceedings.”

Quite significantly, the Bench then pointed out that, “The mediation report, however, came from the Mediator of an unsuccessful endeavor, as recorded by us on 07.12.2021. We had observed that the daughter, who is now aged about 20 years, would have to develop some interaction with the appellant-father if she wants him to play a role in her education. At the request of parties the matter was again referred to mediation but the report was one of failure and as per the learned counsel for the appellant, it became acrimonious and unpleasant in terms of the telephonic conversations, as recorded in our order dated 22.2.2022. We, thus, directed the matter to be put on the regular board in the week commencing 08.3.2022.”

Be it noted, the Bench then remarks that, “None appeared for the respondent in the pre-lunch session or in the post-lunch session. We have thus heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the records. On analysis of the impugned judgment what transpires is that the High Court has reversed the findings of the trial Court predicated on a reasoning that the only reliable evidence was of the appellant as PW-1 against that of the respondent.”

In hindsight, the Bench then candidly concedes that, “We are faced with the scenario of failed marriage at least since 2004, if not since 2002 i.e., 18 years have passed and thus the chances of any reconciliation are impossible, more so in view of what has recently transpired during the mediation process.”

It is worth noting that the Bench then observes that, “We have also taken note of Sukhendu Das V. Rita Mukherjee (2017) 9 SCC 632, (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 714, in which it is concluded that it is not open for the wife to contend that unless both parties consent, the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India for dissolving a marriage may not be appropriate.”

Most significantly, what forms the real cornerstone of this learned judgment is then stated holding thus that, “In so far as the daughter’s expenses for education and marriage are concerned, it appears from her approach that she does not want to maintain any relationship with the appellant and is about 20 years of age. She is entitled to choose her own path but then cannot demand from the appellant the amount towards the education. We, thus, hold that the daughter is not entitled to any amount but while determining the amount to be paid as permanent alimony to the respondent, we are still taking care to see that if the respondent so desires to support the daughter, funds are available.”

It deserves to be mentioned that the Bench then clearly states that, “In view of the aforesaid factual matrix, we consider it appropriate to fix the permanent alimony of the respondent, at present being paid at Rs.8,000/- per month as interim maintenance, at Rs.10,00,000/- in full and final settlement of all claims. The amount be deposited in this Court within two months from today and would be released to the respondent. If the amount is not sought for a period of one month from the date of deposit, it will be kept in FDR earning interest for a period of 91 days to be kept renewed.”

Quite ostensibly, the Bench then finds no difficulty in holding that, “In the conspectus of the aforesaid, we grant decree of divorce on account of irretrievable breakdown of marriage between the parties exercising our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, subject to the deposit of costs of Rs.10,00,000/- by the appellant. A decree of divorce be accordingly drawn up and be released to the appellant on the deposit of the amount.”

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding that, “Civil appeal stands allowed, leaving parties to bear their own costs.”

To conclude, this brief, balanced and bold judgment by the Apex Court comprising of Bench of Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice MM Sundresh has sent a loud and clear message to all major daughters who seek maintenance from their fathers that they are not entitled to education expenses from father if they don’t want to maintain any relationship with their father. All major daughters must always now bear this into account and then approach the court with clean hands. This is what forms the essence of this notable judgment!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate

Most significantly, what forms the real cornerstone of this learned judgment is then stated holding thus that, “In so far as the daughter’s expenses for education and marriage are concerned, it appears from her approach that she does not want to maintain any relationship with the appellant and is about 20 years of age. She is entitled to choose her own path but then cannot demand from the appellant the amount towards the education. We, thus, hold that the daughter is not entitled to any amount but while determining the amount to be paid as permanent alimony to the respondent, we are still taking care to see that if the respondent so desires to support the daughter, funds are available.”

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ONCE CIRP IS ADMITTED AND MORATORIUM IS ORDERED THE SARFAESI PROCEEDINGS CANNOT BE CONTINUED AGAINST CORPORATE DEBTOR: SC

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The Supreme Court in the case Indian Overseas Bank vs RCM Infrastructure Ltd observed that once the CIRP is initiated and the moratorium is ordered, the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act cannot be continued.

the appellant Bank could not have continued the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act once the CIRP was initiated and the moratorium was ordered as Section 14(1)(c) of the IBC has an overriding effect interest created by the Corporate Debtor in respect of its property including any action under the SARFAESI Act is prohibited with respect to any other law, any action to foreclose, to recover or to enforce any security, the court observed in view of this provision.

It was further being observed and was stated clearly that once the CIRP is commenced, there is complete prohibition for any action created by the Corporate Debtor to foreclose, recover or enforce any security interest are prohibited with respect of its property. All the actions including any action under the SARFAESI Act to foreclose, to recover or to enforce any security interest are prohibited, after the CIRP initiate, the legislative point is clear at this, the bench observed while referring to Section 14 and Section 238 of the IBC.

The contentions made by bank: on 13th December 2018 and as such, and on 3rd January 2019 the admission of the petition by the learned NCLT would not affect the said sale as the sale in question was complete on its confirmation and further stated that it will not deprive the Bank from receiving the said money in pursuance to the sale which has already been completed, merely because a part of the payment was received subsequently after initiation of CIRP.

under Section 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, an application was filled by the Corporate Debtor before NCLT. On 03.01.2019, the NCLT admitted the petition and a moratorium was also notified the auction was continued by the bank the auction proceedings and accepted the balance 75% of the bid amount and completed the sale, even after that. The NCLT passed an order setting aside the sale, while allowing the application filled by the Corporate Debtor and the appeal filled by the Bank was dismissed by the Bank and thereafter the bank approached the Apex Court. As to recover the public money availed by the Corporate Debtor, an E-­auction notice came to be issued by the Bank.

The bench comprising of Justice L. Nageswara Rao and the justice B R Gavai observed that in respect of its property including any action under the SARFAESI Act is prohibited in such a situation, any action to foreclose, to recover or to enforce any security interest created by the Corporate Debtor.

The contentions made by bank: on 13th December 2018 and as such, and on 3rd January 2019 the admission of the petition by the learned NCLT would not affect the said sale as the sale in question was complete on its confirmation and further stated that it will not deprive the Bank from receiving the said money in pursuance to the sale which has already been completed, merely because a part of the payment was received subsequently after initiation of CIRP.

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Supreme Court pulls up the state of Kerala for challenging the seniority of upper division clerk

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The Supreme Court in the case The State of Kerala and Or’s. V. Subeer N.S. And Anr observed assailing the Kerala High Court’s order of affirming the seniority of an upper division clerk for filling a Special Leave Petition pulled up the State of Kerala.

The Government lost sight of these aspects while issuing Annexure-A13 order ratifying Annexure-A10 decision of the Director of Public Instruction on Annexure-A5 complaint was undertaken by the Director of Public Instruction, who has no authority to take a decision invoking Rule 27B of Part II KS & SSR based on the review of the Seniority the Director of Public Instruction and the Government while issuing the impugned orders, none of these aspects wee considered to Annexure-A3 final seniority list also by any of the aggrieved persons except a bogus complaint submitted as Annexure A5, that too almost 3 years after the finalization of the seniority list and there was no objection and further there was no objections to the rank and seniority assigned to the applicant in the provisional seniority list. the said seniority is finalized after publishing a provisional seniority list and inviting objections if any to the same as early as on 8th March 2009., the bench observed While affirming the view by KAT.

The said mistake was brought to the notice of the authorities, necessary corrective action was taken and the applicant’s seniority was reassigned based on his eligibility on the part of the controlling officer it is only by a mistake that he was granted promotion and was assigned the rank in the seniority list, the counsel said to further persuade the bench.

The Bench of Justice Chandrachud remarked that if the counsel feels there is an error you must rectify the error correctly and there was no fraud on his part and all this must be due on a reasonable dispatch.

The bench comprising of Justice DY Chandrachud further observed and noted when the matter was called upon hearing before the bench that the State is here challenging it the bench further remarked by saying that why don’t you do something better? Build schools, roads or infrastructure as one upper division clerk has got seniority.

respondent’s seniority was revised to the date on which he rejoined duty after the leave and the respondent was on leave without allowance at the time of his promotion as U.D Clerk, the counsel appearing for the State contended before the Court.

The Bench comprising of Justice DY Chandrachud and the justice Surya Kant orally remarked while dismissing the SLP against the order dated 01.17.2022., We are not a court of law but a court of justice as well.

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A PLEA IN SUPREME COURT CHALLENGES THE CHANGED NEET-SS 2022 EXAM PATTERN

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The Supreme Court in the case Dr Richa Verma v. National Board of Examination observed the changed examination pattern which would now be comprising of 150 questions from the general i.e., the basic component of the primary feeder broad specialty subject and from all sub- specialty/systems/component of that primary feeder broad specialty subject. A plea filled in the Supreme Court by MD Radiation Oncologists and MD Anaesthesiologists NEET SS 2022 aspirant.

the petitioners have sought issuance of directions to restrain the NBE from excluding / MD Radiotherapy from the eligible feeder specialties for the super specialty course of DM Medical Oncology for NEET SS 2022 and have further sought for restoring the scheme/pattern for the exam further the petitioner deleting the MD Radiation Oncology, against this backdrop.

On 05.10.2021 the Central Government had told the Court that the revised pattern will be implemented only from next year and it may be noted that over the eleventh-hour changes brought to the NEET-SS 2021 pattern after facing the harsh criticism from the Supreme Court.

The petition further states that they will have to compete with candidates who have 100% questions from their postgraduate syllabus/ broad specialty as the new examination scheme is making some candidates write a paper which has no questions from their postgraduate broad specialty.

particularly in favor of MD Medicine in so far as the choice of options is far greater vis-a-vis the choices available to either MD Radiation Oncology or MD Anaesthesia, the pattern is not just a waste of time and effort for all those who have prepared for Critical Care but also grossly biased against few broad specialties and of the other four post-graduate branches there will be no questions from broad specialties.

This is complete waste of time, resources and effort put by the candidates who have been preparing for a super speciality subject for years as it is arbitrarily, illogical, highly partial and unreasonable, while terming the change in pattern, the contentions made by the petitioner.

the new pattern was forcing all the candidates from the broad specialties to write a single paper which will have 100% questions from General Medicine, stated by the petitioner. Furthermore, contending that the erstwhile pattern had a paper with 40% mixed questions from all the broad specialties and 60% questions from Critical Care (i.e., the super-specialty subject) which had ensured a level playing field.

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THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 482 OF THE CRPC CANNOT BE QUASHED MERELY ON THE GROUND THAT NO USEFUL PURPOSE WILL BE SERVED: SUPREME COURT

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The Supreme Court in the case Satish Kumar Jatav vs State of Uttar Pradesh observed that while by prolonging the proceedings of the case, the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed. As when a clear case is made for the offence alleged on the ground that no useful purpose will be served.

under Sections 307, 504, 506 of the IPC and 9 Section 3(10)(15) of the Act, the serious allegations for the offences were made and while considering the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and quashing the criminal proceedings for the aforesaid offences, the High Court ought to have been more cautious and circumspect. on how the order passed by the learned Magistrate summoning the accused was wrong and/or erroneous, has not at all being allowed by the High Court. the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and has quashed the criminal proceedings is deprecated in the manner in which the High Court has disposed of further the High Court has observed in the proceedings of the case that no useful purpose will be served. The aforesaid cannot be a good ground and/or a ground at all to quash the criminal proceedings when a clear case was made out for the offences alleged, appeared while quashing the criminal proceedings by the High Court even for the impugned order passed, the bench overserved while allowing the appeal.

The application under Section 482 Cr.P.C The manner in which the High Court has disposed and quashed the criminal proceedings is not appreciated at all Furthermore the Court has emphasized that the High Court must pass a speaking and reasoned order in such matters. The same has been set aside by the High Court in a most cursory and casual manner.

The allegations made against the accused persons and even on the legality and validity of the order passed by the Magistrate summoning the accused, has not been discussed by the High Court the Court noted.

The appellant contended that there are no reasons whatsoever have been assigned while quashing the criminal proceedings and further the appellant contended that there is no independent application of mind by the High Court. The respondent defended the impugned order, on the other hand before the Apex Court.

the Allahabad High Court quashed the criminal proceedings merely opining that “that no useful purpose shall be served by prolonging the proceedings of the case, while allowing the petition filled by the accused challenging this order and the offences punishable under Sections 307, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(10)(15) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, the accused to face the trial the Magistrate summoned the accused in the present case.

The bench comprising of Justice MR Shah and the justice BV Nagarathna observed and reiterated under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that a High Court must pass a speaking and reasoned order while disposing petitions.

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Nexus between accused’s negligence and victim’s death has to be established under Section 304A IPC: Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court in the case Nanjundappa vs State of Karnataka observed that would not apply to a criminal case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu.

when there is no report of a technical expert to corroborate the prosecution story as The Appellants therefore are entitled to be given the benefit of doubt furthermore It is even more unbelievable that Appellant no. 2 came in contact with the same voltage and managed to get away with a few abrasions.

when such current passed through the Television set, it did not blast and melt the wiring of the entire house and the court further added that it sounds completely preposterous that a telephone wire carried 11KV current without melting on contact.

While evaluating such evidence the jury should bear in mind that inference of guilt should be the only reasonable inference from the facts as In case of circumstantial evidence, there is a risk of jumping to conclusions in haste However the conviction of the accused persons seems wholly unjustified against the weight of the evidence adduced, in the present case. The Court also referred to the case of Syad Akbar Vs. State of Karnataka in which this Court proceeded on the basis that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a criminal case as its applicability in an action for injury by negligence is well known, observed by the court in the present case.

The court noted that there is no eye witness to say conclusively that the Appellants were in fact executing the work at the place alleged and further the court notice that no report or even inspection was conducted by a technical expert to assess the veracity of the averments made by the complainants to suggest that it was due to the alleged acts of the Appellants that the incident took place. the allegations against the Appellants are highly technical in nature, notice by the court on perusing the evidence on record.

On 21th November 2003 at 1.00p.m. the deceased was watching TV in his house. Noticing a sudden sound in the TV, the deceased got up to separate the dish wire, the TV connection wire and the telephone wire, which were entwined together, he felt an electric shock and his right hand was burnt and as a result of this shock he succumbed to death at that point of time it was found that the said incident took place because of the negligent act on the part of the accused, the supervisor (an employee in the telephone department ) and daily wage worker employed by him, as it was found out in the investigation. under Section 304A read with Section 34 IPC was upheld by the Karnataka High Court, the appellant is convicted.

the bench comprising of CJI NV Ramana, Justice Krishna Murari and the justice Hima Kohli observed under Section 304A of Indian Penal Code for causing death by negligence, while acquitting two persons that prosecution has to firstly prove negligence and then establish direct nexus between negligence of the accused and the death of the victim, for bringing home the guilt of the accused.

The Court also referred to the case of Syad Akbar Vs. State of Karnataka in which this Court proceeded on the basis that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a criminal case as its applicability in an action for injury by negligence is well known, observed by the court in the present case.

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AN ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE BODIES CAN ESTABLISH A CAPTIVE POWER PLANT PRIMARILY FOR THEIR OWN USE UNDER THE ELECTRICITY ACT: SUPREME COURT

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The Supreme Court in the case Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd. vs Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission observed that a captive power plant primarily for their own use can be established by an association of corporate bodies.

The requirement would be that the consumption of SBIPL and SBMPL together should not be less than 51% of the power generated. Admittedly, the joint consumption by SBIPL and SBMPL is more than 51% and under the provisions of the said Act, the use of electricity by it would be for captive use only even an association of corporate bodies can establish a power plant. Since SBMPL holds 27.6% of the ownership, the requirement of not less than 26% of shares is fulfilled by SBMPL as SBMPL holds 27.6% equity shares in SBPIL.

The fourth proviso to sub­section (2) of Section 42 of the said Act would also reveal that surcharge would not be leviable in case open access is provided to a person who has established a captive generating plant for carrying the electricity to the destination of his own use and under Section 9 of the said Act, could be an individual or a body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, it is clear that the person will get benefit even an association of corporate bodies can establish a captive power plant it has been seen. The definition of “person” is wide enough to include any company or body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or artificial juridical person it should be primarily for the use of the members of such co­operative society or association is the requirement, the Bench observed while referring to the provisions of the Electricity Act.

The BPIL, the respondent contended and supported the impugned judgment that no permission is required from the Commission for supply of electricity for its own use. Thereafter the appellant Company contended that unless SBPIL consumes 51% of the aggregate electricity generated by it, it will not be entitled to get the benefit under Section 9 of the said Act, in an appeal filled before the Apex Court.

An appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity filed by the Company further The Commission held that SBPIL was entitled to supply electricity to its sister concern SBMPL and the same would qualify to be treating as own consumption and within the ambit of Section 9 read with Section 2(8) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Rule 3 of the Electricity Rules, 2005 SBPIL submitted a petition for providing open access and wheeling of power through the transmission system of the Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd (Company) for captive use by SBMPL to the Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission, the commission. A Captive Generation Plant is established by SBPIL, and is a sister concern of SBPIL Shri Bajrang Power and I spat Ltd and Shri Bajrang Metallics and Power Ltd, SBMPL.

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