Long standing domestic dispute constitutes ‘mental cruelty’ to spouse who intends to live in peace: MP HC - The Daily Guardian
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Long standing domestic dispute constitutes ‘mental cruelty’ to spouse who intends to live in peace: MP HC

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While dissolving a marriage on an appeal that was filed by the husband alleging cruelty at the hands of his wife, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in a recent, remarkable, refreshing, robust and rational judgment titled Rajesh Bhoyale vs Smt Mahadevi in First Appeal No. 1172/2019 that was delivered finally on March 29, 2022, observed clearly, cogently and convincingly that a long-standing dispute itself is mental cruelty to a party who intends to live in a domestic relationship and peace. The Bench of Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Anand Pathak observed thus as it allowed the appeal filed by the appellant-husband against the judgment of the Family Court, Gwalior rejecting his application under Section 13 (1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 seeking a divorce. Very rightly so!

To start with, this learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment authored by Justice Anand Pathak for a Division Bench of Gwalior Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court for himself and Justice Sheel Nagu sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The present appeal is preferred under Section 19 of the Family Court Act, 1984 against the judgment and decree dated 27-03- 2019 passed by the Link Family Court, Gwalior whereby the application preferred by the appellant/applicant/husband under Section 13(1)(iA) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) has been rejected.”

While elaborating the facts of the case, the Bench then states in para 2 that, “Precisely stated facts of the case are that marriage of appellant and respondent was solemnized on 22-02-2004 according to Hindu Rites and Rituals. After marriage, respondent/wife insisted to live separately and in order to maintain domestic peace, after 6 months of marriage, appellant and respondent started living separately. Despite living separately, respondent/wife used to quarrel with appellant and left for her maternal home without any information. She did not take any interest in household work. Out of their wedlock two children born but due to negligence on part of wife, one child died and only one survived. Respondent/wife used to talk on mobile for hours together and used to move with unknown persons during late night in city. Thus, domestic incompatibility prevailed between the parties which led to filing of application under Section 13 of the Act seeking divorce.”

It deserves mentioning that the Bench then notes in para 3 that, “One fact deserves mention is that respondent/wife did not appear in the trial Court and remained ex parte. That fact has been mentioned in para 5 of the judgment. Before this Court also, notice was issued for service of respondent through RAD mode earlier vide order dated 05-07-2019, but same returned unserved. Thereafter vide order dated 26-08-2019 process fee by RAD mode was directed to be given for service and same was received by the respondent but she did not prefer to appear, therefore, matter was heard in absence of respondent.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then after hearing the learned counsel for the appellant at length and perusing the record as mentioned in para 4 then envisages in para 5 stating that, “In the instant case as per pleadings it appears that appellant filed application under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act with specific allegations that his marriage was solemnized on 22-02- 2004 at Gwalior and at relevant time appellant was living along with his parent but soon after his marriage, his wife compelled him to change his house and therefore, appellant has to part his ways with his parents and had to live with his wife in nuclear family for domestic peace. From their wedlock, two sons were born, out of which one was 14 years of age at the time of filing of application and another son passed away at the age of 3 years due to alleged negligence of respondent/wife.”

Needless to say, the Bench then states in para 6 that, “Submissions meandered through different allegations wherein neither she cooperated in performance of daily household work, taking care of children or in respect of maintaining domestic peace.”

Simply put, the Bench then reveals in para 7 that, “According to appellant, she used to converse on mobile for hours together and whenever intercepted, reacted sharply and indulged into verbal spat. Allegations further move in respect of her movement along with some unknown persons in the city but same has not been established by the appellant through cogent evidence. It was also the allegation of appellant that she does not cooperate in cohabitation with the appellant and she always avoided him.”

To be sure, the Bench then discloses in para 8 that, “Appellant referred certain mediation proceedings also pertaining to year 2009 to 2015 at Police Station Inderganj and from the pleadings and evidence it appears that reconciliation proceedings have been held but of no avail. Even in earlier case services of mediation center of this Court were also availed and settlement was struck on 01-12-2015 in case No.857/2015 but soon thereafter things turned ugly.”

Truth be told, the Bench then enunciates in para 9 that, “All these allegations as referred above are being narrated in the divorce application and affidavit filed under Order XVIII Rule 4 of CPC by the appellant. His examination-in-chief was also duly recorded by the Family Court but since the respondent did not appear and remained ex parte, therefore, those allegations were not rebutted in any manner because nobody rebutted and cross-examined the witness on behalf of respondent/wife. Beside oral evidence, appellant filed copy of complaint dated 29-04-2011 Ex-P/2 addressed to Station House Officer, Police Station Inderganj in which he referred about the conduct of his wife. In the said complaint, it is surfaced that wife is extending threat to the appellant regularly and at times she indulged into physical violence also, intimidating him for dire consequences as well as for false implication etc.”

As we see, the Bench then observes in para 10 that, “Notice Ex-P/3 has also been exhibited by the appellant by which he issued legal notice on dated 08-10-2015 to his wife for seeking divorce, therefore, in all probabilities, respondent was well aware of the fact regarding domestic incompatibility shared by the couple and respondent knew the fact that appellant would file divorce proceedings against the respondent.”

As it turned out, the Bench then mentions in para 11 that, “Notice for mediation dated 15-10-2015 has also been exhibited by the appellant as Ex-P/5 in which he was directed to appear on 28-10-2015 at Mediation Center, High Court as pre-litigation mediation case. Appellant also referred the compromise deed Sulahnama (dated 01-12-2015) in which respondent was advised to live with her husband at Gwalior with further undertaking that she would not quarrel with her mother and father-in-law and if she goes to her maternal home on religious occasions then said arrangement shall be done by the appellant. It was also agreed upon that appellant would not have any objection if she talks on mobile to her parent.”

Of course, the Bench then states in para 12 that, “Vide Ex-P/7 appellant also exhibited the complaint sent to Station House Officer, Police Station, Inderganj and copy endorsed to Superintendent of Police on dated 15-05-2017. All these documents were exhibited by the appellant in support of his submission.”

Most damningly, the Bench then clearly states in para 13 that, “From perusal of these documents and allegations as contained in appeal, divorce application and affidavit, it appears that for a considerable period of time appellant and respondent shared domestic incompatibility and conduct of the respondent wherein she constantly for more than fifteen years or since 2004, caused irritation, threat, intimidation and avoiding cohabitation on the pretext or the other collectively entitled the appellant to get the decree of divorce.”

Furthermore, the Bench then states in para 14 that, “When appellant specifically pleaded about the behaviour of respondent for last more than 15 years and different stages of dispute, reconciliation and complaints from time to time were referred which indicate that both shared domestic incompatibility.”

While citing the relevant case law, the Bench then observes in para 15 that, “So far as mental cruelty is concerned judgment of Apex Court in the case of Dr. N.G. Dastane Vs. Mrs. S. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534 is worth consideration. The relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced as under:

“The question whether the misconduct complained of constitutes cruelty and the like for divorce purposes is determined primarily by its effect upon the particular person complaining of the acts. The question is not whether the conduct would be cruel to a reasonable person or a person of average or normal sensibilities, but whether it would have that effect upon the aggrieved spouse,. That which may be cruel to one person may be laughed off by another, and what may not be cruel to an individual under one set of circumstances may be extreme cruelty under another set of circumstances.”(1) The Court has to deal, not with an ideal husband and ideal wife (assuming any such exist) but with the particular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or a nearideal one will probably have no occasion to go to a matrimonial court for, even if they may not be able to drown their differences, their ideal attitudes may help them over- look or gloss over mutual faults and failures. As said by Lord Reid in his speech in Gollins v. Gollins (2) ALL ER 966

“In matrimonial cases we are not concerned with the reasonable man, as we are in cases of negligence. We are dealing with this man and this woman and the fewer a priori assumptions we make about them the better. In cruelty cases one can hardly ever even start with a presumption that the parties are reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruelty case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people.”

The said judgment still holds the field and is source of wisdom time and again in respect of mental cruelty.”

Adding more to it, the Bench then points out in para 16 that, “The aforesaid decision was referred to with approval in AIR 2002 SC 2582 (Praveen Mehta Vs. Inderjit Mehta), (2007) 4 SCC 511 {Samar Ghosh Vs. Jaya Ghosh}, (2010) 4 SCC 339 {Manisha Tyagi Vs. Deepak Kumar}, (2012) 7 SCC 288 {Vishwanath Agrawal Vs. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal}, (2013) 2 SCC 114 {U. Sree Vs. U. Srinivas}. In all these cases, the judgment rendered in the case of Dr. N.G. Dastane (supra) is relied upon. In the case of Samar Ghosh (supra), the Supreme Court has enumerated the illustrative instances of human behaviour which may be relevant for dealing with the cases of mental cruelty:

“No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of ‘mental cruelty’. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive.

(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty.

(ii) ** ** **

(iii) ** ** **

(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty.

(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse.

(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty.

(vii) ** ** **

(viii) ** ** **

(ix) ** ** **

(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty.

(xi) ** ** **

(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty.

(xiii) ** ** **

(xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.”

It cannot be glossed over that the Bench then minces no words to state unequivocally in para 17 that, “It is equally well settled in law that lodging of false complaint amounts to cruelty {See: (2014) 7 SCC Malathi Vs. B.B. Ravi, (2013) 5 SCC 226 K. Shrinivas Rao Vs. D.A. Deepa, (2014) 16 SCC 34 K. Shrinivas Vs. Ku. Sunita and AIR 2003 MP 271 Johnson M. Joseph alias Shajoo Vs. Smt. Aneeta Johnson)}.”

It is worth noting that the Bench then remarks in para 18 that, “If the aforesaid pronouncements are tested on the anvil of present factual setup then it appears that for very long time parties shared domestic dispute and irritability and mental cruelty inflicted by the wife over her husband through her conduct and through her denial for cohabitation. In absence of any cross-examination or rebuttal, allegations of appellant assume importance.”

For sake of clarity, the Bench specifies in para 19 that, “Although maintenance amount/alimony is not subject matter in the present case but since respondent/wife is not before the Court, therefore, question of maintenance amount/alimony is left open and it is made clear that she may be at liberty to seek maintenance amount/alimony in accordance with law.”

Resultantly, the Bench then hastens to add in para 20 that, “Cumulatively, it appears that Family Court erred in rejecting the application for divorce preferred by the appellant whereas divorce decree ought to have been passed in the case. Long standing dispute itself is a mental cruelty to a party who intends to live in domestic relationship and peace.”

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 21 that, “Resultantly, the appeal stands allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 27-03-2019 passed by the Link Family Court, Gwalior is set aside. Application under Section 13 of the Act stands allowed. Appellant is entitled to get divorce from his wife, respondent herein. Decree be drawn accordingly.”

In a nutshell, the Gwalior Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court comprising of Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Anand Pathak who delivered this extremely commendable judgment have made it crystal clear that long standing domestic dispute constitutes ‘mental cruelty’ to spouse who intends to live in a domestic relationship and peace. So it is a good ground for obtaining divorce. Accordingly the divorce is granted thus to the appellant-husband by allowing his appeal which he had filed against the Family Court, Gwalior which had rejected his application under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 seeking a divorce. Very rightly so!

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A PLEA IN SUPREME COURT CHALLENGES THE CHANGED NEET-SS 2022 EXAM PATTERN

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The Supreme Court in the case Dr Richa Verma v. National Board of Examination observed the changed examination pattern which would now be comprising of 150 questions from the general i.e., the basic component of the primary feeder broad specialty subject and from all sub- specialty/systems/component of that primary feeder broad specialty subject. A plea filled in the Supreme Court by MD Radiation Oncologists and MD Anaesthesiologists NEET SS 2022 aspirant.

the petitioners have sought issuance of directions to restrain the NBE from excluding / MD Radiotherapy from the eligible feeder specialties for the super specialty course of DM Medical Oncology for NEET SS 2022 and have further sought for restoring the scheme/pattern for the exam further the petitioner deleting the MD Radiation Oncology, against this backdrop.

On 05.10.2021 the Central Government had told the Court that the revised pattern will be implemented only from next year and it may be noted that over the eleventh-hour changes brought to the NEET-SS 2021 pattern after facing the harsh criticism from the Supreme Court.

The petition further states that they will have to compete with candidates who have 100% questions from their postgraduate syllabus/ broad specialty as the new examination scheme is making some candidates write a paper which has no questions from their postgraduate broad specialty.

particularly in favor of MD Medicine in so far as the choice of options is far greater vis-a-vis the choices available to either MD Radiation Oncology or MD Anaesthesia, the pattern is not just a waste of time and effort for all those who have prepared for Critical Care but also grossly biased against few broad specialties and of the other four post-graduate branches there will be no questions from broad specialties.

This is complete waste of time, resources and effort put by the candidates who have been preparing for a super speciality subject for years as it is arbitrarily, illogical, highly partial and unreasonable, while terming the change in pattern, the contentions made by the petitioner.

the new pattern was forcing all the candidates from the broad specialties to write a single paper which will have 100% questions from General Medicine, stated by the petitioner. Furthermore, contending that the erstwhile pattern had a paper with 40% mixed questions from all the broad specialties and 60% questions from Critical Care (i.e., the super-specialty subject) which had ensured a level playing field.

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THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 482 OF THE CRPC CANNOT BE QUASHED MERELY ON THE GROUND THAT NO USEFUL PURPOSE WILL BE SERVED: SUPREME COURT

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The Supreme Court in the case Satish Kumar Jatav vs State of Uttar Pradesh observed that while by prolonging the proceedings of the case, the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed. As when a clear case is made for the offence alleged on the ground that no useful purpose will be served.

under Sections 307, 504, 506 of the IPC and 9 Section 3(10)(15) of the Act, the serious allegations for the offences were made and while considering the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and quashing the criminal proceedings for the aforesaid offences, the High Court ought to have been more cautious and circumspect. on how the order passed by the learned Magistrate summoning the accused was wrong and/or erroneous, has not at all being allowed by the High Court. the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and has quashed the criminal proceedings is deprecated in the manner in which the High Court has disposed of further the High Court has observed in the proceedings of the case that no useful purpose will be served. The aforesaid cannot be a good ground and/or a ground at all to quash the criminal proceedings when a clear case was made out for the offences alleged, appeared while quashing the criminal proceedings by the High Court even for the impugned order passed, the bench overserved while allowing the appeal.

The application under Section 482 Cr.P.C The manner in which the High Court has disposed and quashed the criminal proceedings is not appreciated at all Furthermore the Court has emphasized that the High Court must pass a speaking and reasoned order in such matters. The same has been set aside by the High Court in a most cursory and casual manner.

The allegations made against the accused persons and even on the legality and validity of the order passed by the Magistrate summoning the accused, has not been discussed by the High Court the Court noted.

The appellant contended that there are no reasons whatsoever have been assigned while quashing the criminal proceedings and further the appellant contended that there is no independent application of mind by the High Court. The respondent defended the impugned order, on the other hand before the Apex Court.

the Allahabad High Court quashed the criminal proceedings merely opining that “that no useful purpose shall be served by prolonging the proceedings of the case, while allowing the petition filled by the accused challenging this order and the offences punishable under Sections 307, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(10)(15) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, the accused to face the trial the Magistrate summoned the accused in the present case.

The bench comprising of Justice MR Shah and the justice BV Nagarathna observed and reiterated under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that a High Court must pass a speaking and reasoned order while disposing petitions.

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Nexus between accused’s negligence and victim’s death has to be established under Section 304A IPC: Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court in the case Nanjundappa vs State of Karnataka observed that would not apply to a criminal case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu.

when there is no report of a technical expert to corroborate the prosecution story as The Appellants therefore are entitled to be given the benefit of doubt furthermore It is even more unbelievable that Appellant no. 2 came in contact with the same voltage and managed to get away with a few abrasions.

when such current passed through the Television set, it did not blast and melt the wiring of the entire house and the court further added that it sounds completely preposterous that a telephone wire carried 11KV current without melting on contact.

While evaluating such evidence the jury should bear in mind that inference of guilt should be the only reasonable inference from the facts as In case of circumstantial evidence, there is a risk of jumping to conclusions in haste However the conviction of the accused persons seems wholly unjustified against the weight of the evidence adduced, in the present case. The Court also referred to the case of Syad Akbar Vs. State of Karnataka in which this Court proceeded on the basis that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a criminal case as its applicability in an action for injury by negligence is well known, observed by the court in the present case.

The court noted that there is no eye witness to say conclusively that the Appellants were in fact executing the work at the place alleged and further the court notice that no report or even inspection was conducted by a technical expert to assess the veracity of the averments made by the complainants to suggest that it was due to the alleged acts of the Appellants that the incident took place. the allegations against the Appellants are highly technical in nature, notice by the court on perusing the evidence on record.

On 21th November 2003 at 1.00p.m. the deceased was watching TV in his house. Noticing a sudden sound in the TV, the deceased got up to separate the dish wire, the TV connection wire and the telephone wire, which were entwined together, he felt an electric shock and his right hand was burnt and as a result of this shock he succumbed to death at that point of time it was found that the said incident took place because of the negligent act on the part of the accused, the supervisor (an employee in the telephone department ) and daily wage worker employed by him, as it was found out in the investigation. under Section 304A read with Section 34 IPC was upheld by the Karnataka High Court, the appellant is convicted.

the bench comprising of CJI NV Ramana, Justice Krishna Murari and the justice Hima Kohli observed under Section 304A of Indian Penal Code for causing death by negligence, while acquitting two persons that prosecution has to firstly prove negligence and then establish direct nexus between negligence of the accused and the death of the victim, for bringing home the guilt of the accused.

The Court also referred to the case of Syad Akbar Vs. State of Karnataka in which this Court proceeded on the basis that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a criminal case as its applicability in an action for injury by negligence is well known, observed by the court in the present case.

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AN ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE BODIES CAN ESTABLISH A CAPTIVE POWER PLANT PRIMARILY FOR THEIR OWN USE UNDER THE ELECTRICITY ACT: SUPREME COURT

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The Supreme Court in the case Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd. vs Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission observed that a captive power plant primarily for their own use can be established by an association of corporate bodies.

The requirement would be that the consumption of SBIPL and SBMPL together should not be less than 51% of the power generated. Admittedly, the joint consumption by SBIPL and SBMPL is more than 51% and under the provisions of the said Act, the use of electricity by it would be for captive use only even an association of corporate bodies can establish a power plant. Since SBMPL holds 27.6% of the ownership, the requirement of not less than 26% of shares is fulfilled by SBMPL as SBMPL holds 27.6% equity shares in SBPIL.

The fourth proviso to sub­section (2) of Section 42 of the said Act would also reveal that surcharge would not be leviable in case open access is provided to a person who has established a captive generating plant for carrying the electricity to the destination of his own use and under Section 9 of the said Act, could be an individual or a body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, it is clear that the person will get benefit even an association of corporate bodies can establish a captive power plant it has been seen. The definition of “person” is wide enough to include any company or body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or artificial juridical person it should be primarily for the use of the members of such co­operative society or association is the requirement, the Bench observed while referring to the provisions of the Electricity Act.

The BPIL, the respondent contended and supported the impugned judgment that no permission is required from the Commission for supply of electricity for its own use. Thereafter the appellant Company contended that unless SBPIL consumes 51% of the aggregate electricity generated by it, it will not be entitled to get the benefit under Section 9 of the said Act, in an appeal filled before the Apex Court.

An appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity filed by the Company further The Commission held that SBPIL was entitled to supply electricity to its sister concern SBMPL and the same would qualify to be treating as own consumption and within the ambit of Section 9 read with Section 2(8) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Rule 3 of the Electricity Rules, 2005 SBPIL submitted a petition for providing open access and wheeling of power through the transmission system of the Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd (Company) for captive use by SBMPL to the Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission, the commission. A Captive Generation Plant is established by SBPIL, and is a sister concern of SBPIL Shri Bajrang Power and I spat Ltd and Shri Bajrang Metallics and Power Ltd, SBMPL.

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Where the crime was committed the remission or premature release policy of the state has to be considered: Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court in the case Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, Lala Vakil vs State of Gujarat observed that where the crime was committed has to be considered in the remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State.

While allowing the writ petition the court observed and contended that Once the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat, after the trial been concluded and judgment of conviction came to be passed, all further proceedings have to be 6 considered including remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred and concluded for exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court, as the case may be. The court further stated that under Section 432(7) CrPC the appropriate Government can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments.

the appropriate Government in the ordinary course would be the State of Gujarat. But the case was transferred in exceptional circumstances by this Court for limited purpose for trial and disposal to the neighboring State i.e., the State of Maharashtra by an order dated 06.08.2004. ordinarily, the trial was to be concluded in the same State and in terms of Section 432(7) CrPC as the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed in the State of Gujarat, observed by the Apex Court.

he application for pre­mature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat, as prayed by the petitioner by judgment impugned dated 17.07.2009 As His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra. Thereafter He had filed his petition for pre­mature release under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating that he had undergone more than 15 years 4 months of custody.

The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed and noted that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of the appropriate Government.

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Adopt roster based reservation for preferential candidates as followed by JIPMER: Supreme Court directs all AIIMS institutes

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The Supreme Court in the case Students Association AIIMS Bhopal And Or’s. v. AllMS and Or’s observed and directed all AIIMS Institutes to adopt roster-based reservation followed by Jawaharlal Institute of Postgraduate Medical Education and Research, Pondicherry (JIPMER) as a plea was filled in the Court seeking direction to AIIMS to have a defined criteria for arriving at seat matrix for institutional preference candidates in INI-CET examination.

the order of the Apex Court in the case AIIMS Students’ Union v. AIIMS And Or’s, would not be applicable if It emphasized that if the roster-based system is implemented the actual roster points for AIIMS would be different from JIPMER as the same would depend on the percentage of seats decided to be allocated to the preferential candidates but It stated that the reservation would be similar to the one adopted by JIPMER AIIMS New Delhi was willing to provide a roster-point based reservation for its institutional preference candidates, by way of an affidavit 20th January 2022 the Bench was apprised that pursuant to a meeting held on 28th June 2020 as prescribed the relevancy:

It shall not be too wide with the one for the general category candidate, that the margin of difference between the qualifying marks for the Institute’s candidate.

The one who has secured marks at the common entrance PG test less than the one secured by any other candidate belonging to reserved category enjoying constitutional protection such as SC, ST etc. cannot be the AIMS graduate the last student to qualify for admission.

appearing on behalf of AIIMS, Advocate, Mr. Dushyant Parashar, New Delhi was asked to get instructions from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and Jodhpur so that the Court can pass appropriate orders on the next date of hearing. As that apart from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and AIIMS, Jodhpur, all other AIIMS before the Apex Court has agreed to implement the roster-based reservation system followed by JIPMER Puducherry for their institutional preference candidates, the Court was informed at the last date of hearing.

the petition had been filed seeking direction to AIIMS to disclose how the seats for institutional preference candidates are to be allotted in the view of the same the petitioners claim that in the INI-CET examination conducted in July, 2021, only 4 seats (1.87%) in AIIMS, New Delhi were allotted to institutional preference candidates. Rivetingly, the petitioners note that no seats were allocated to any other AIIMS for admission of institutional preference candidates.

the Bench comprising of Justice L. Nageswara Rao and the justice A.S. Bopanna observed and noted that to record in the order that the roaster system would be applicable from this year. Mr. Parashar informed it that since new software is to be put in place for counselling, it might cause some delay. The bench further stated that the court will order it to apply this year but in case of delay AIMS can come later.

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