The Russo-Ukraine conflict not only tells us about the grave challenges to the liberal international order, but tellingly indicates the weaknesses inherent in the nation-state system that has become the standard model of state formation since the post-War era. Born out of the Westphalian treaty of 1648 signed at the aftermath of a thirty-year conflict between the Catholics and Protestants, the nation-state model is not only a product of the Western modular form unsuited for universal application but having roots in the principles of power politics and competition, it is also unequipped to address the problems of security and identity. In other words, the roots of the present Russo-Ukraine conflict are entrenched in the nation-state system that exacerbates power competition and at the same time fails to address the deep-seated security issues that embeds a country’s identity. What Russia is doing today is simply redrawing its national boundaries to address the problems of security posed by the West and NATO but that which is challenging the sovereign equality based international order. In fact, Russia is behaving typically like an empire. Tellingly, Russian aggression suggests the failure of nation-state based international order in safeguarding the territorial boundaries and securing global stability. It is in this context, India’s neutral position to the Russo-Ukraine war should be understood.
India’s primary security threat emanates from its northern periphery where China is posing the greatest challenge. It must be noted that China has always behaved like an imperial state and has nationalised its periphery in Xinjiang and Mongolia well before the conclusion of the Second World War. With the foundation of the Communist China in 1949, it appropriated the Westphalian sovereign state system to formalize its national boundaries by invading and occupying Tibet in 1950. This brought India face to face with China on its border for the first time in history. And thus, began the protracted dispute on the India-China border which today has become a principal threat to India’s national security and territorial integrity. The border settlement has remained elusive not simply because of Chinese irredentism but more so because of the nature of the Westphalian state system that measures power of a state in terms of strictly demarcated borders. Clearly then, for India, standing up to China is not simply a matter of national security but also of identity and power.
When territorial integrity is the essential basis of national power in the Westphalian based nation-state system, then the national interest of a country demands that its policies should be squarely based on addressing the threats posing to its national borders. Arguably, it is the China factor which has principally led India to pursue neutrality instead of aligning with the liberal world order led by the US. It, however, does not mean that New Delhi has the guarantee of Moscow’s support in the event of a plausible Chinese aggression on the border. In fact, a mutual hatred for the West has brought Russia- China much closer to each other than it had been in any time in history. But given the predictiveness of India-Russia relations which has had a long saga of relationship based on mutual trust and support and given the underlying deep-seated mutual mistrust and clash of interests that has historically characterized Russia-China relations and that which has brought them into a collision in 1969, Russia’s neutrality, if not support, in any India-China war can be reasonably expected. Regarding the question of Western support for India, there is clearly a consensus in the West in the post-pandemic era of a rising China threat. And that should be enough ground for sustaining the Indo-Pacific security architecture.
But beyond the simple logic of realism that prompts India to adopt a neutral position, there is a deeper rationale premised on the civilizational value of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam. This concept basically means viewing the world as one family, making no distinction between the self and the other (abheda). It means then a clear absence of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ binary in India’s philosophical tradition which otherwise defines the Western perceptions and thoughts and that which also undergirds the nation-state narrative. Prime Minister Modi has alluded to the concept of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakamright from the time he assumed leadership of this country in 2014. One may brush it aside by calling it a utopian concept untenable in the international system characterised by realism and power-politics and the presence of a military threat from across the borders.
Arguably, Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam points to the notion of a non-bifurcated world view, where one has an independent space not tied to any binaries. In this context, India is neither comfortable in identifying itself squarely with the liberal order defined by the West because first, universalism and pluralism embedded in the notion of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam are not same as Western liberalism, and second, Western liberalism is embedded in the binary of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ which naturally views the world as a divisive and conflictual arena. Nor India is comfortable with Russia or China whose world view is largely imperialistic and hegemonistic. Russia’s invasion was clearly to pre-empt the loss of Ukraine as a buffer against NATO. The same is with the Chinese whose irredentist approach is aimed at expansion and encroachment upon the territories of the ‘other’. Therefore, India whose territories are not secure in the sovereign state based international order, the best policy option is found in the concept of neutrality.
Seen in this perspective, the neutrality option is not a continuation of the non-alignment approach. Nehru’s non-alignment was formulated when India was weak and confronted grave security challenges domestically. Therefore, he advocated distance from power-politics which was indeed a façade of freedom of action in the realm of foreign policy. Prime Minister Modi’s neutrality opens doors for a multi-alignment and proactive foreign policy approach that imparts greater maneuverability and leadership capability. This explains the Prime Minister’s just concluded tour to the European continent. This allows India’s criticism of the massacre in Bucha. This gels with India’s abstention on votes at the United Nations condemning Russia. This also, and quite significantly, explains India’s disapproval of the use of force in unilaterally changing the status quo. And above all, this allows a greater security option for India to operate in the nation-state based international order. Neutrality then, clearly flows from the position of strength and the belief in the ideal of a non-bifurcated world order embedded in Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam as an alternative vision for global order and peace.
Abanti Bhattacharya is a professor in the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi.