Arbitration proceedings in India were primarily governed by three main legislations namely the Indian Arbitration Act 1940, the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 1937 and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act 1961. The purpose of enacting the mentioned legislations was to comply with international standards of recognition and enforcement. This would ensure that India progressed in its goal towards becoming a pro-arbitration regime. Having ratified the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 as well as the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1927, it was incumbent upon India to enact appropriate legislation to implement the provisions of these Conventions in letter and spirit. This resulted in the enactment of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter the Arbitration Act) – the sole statutory instrument governing the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in the Indian subcontinent. The comprehensive 1996 Act replaced the previous three legislations and bolstered India’s strategic position as a hub for International Commercial Arbitration (hereinafter ICA).
Arbitration proceedings can often be mired with a number of issues brought about by a conflict in jurisdiction, thereby making unlikely for parties to resort to litigation owing to the complexity of such disputes. The impact of the arbitration proceedings is also determined by the agreement, mutually agreed to by the parties, governing the dispute as well as the powers vested with the tribunal to settle issues related to jurisdiction – where the awards may be recognised and subsequently enforced. Parties to such a dispute are often reluctant to rope in the judiciary of their respective domestic jurisdictions as it would result in a loss of autonomy of the arbitration tribunal to the judiciary. The very purpose of creating such an alternate dispute resolution mechanism was to prevent intrusion by the judiciary. Arbitration was to serve as a forum for the fast-tracked settlement of commercial transactions between (mostly) private parties.
In this article, I shall examine whether the intention of reducing judicial interference in the enforcement stage, of arbitral awards, has remained intact. I shall specifically limit my piece to the 1996 Act that deals with the enforcement of foreign awards in India.
Analysing the scope of International Commercial Arbitration in India
Before delving into judicial trends regarding the enforcement of foreign awards, it is important to mention that Part II of the 1996 Act is following the prescribed guidelines of the New York and Geneva Conventions, thereby effectuating the same. India is not a signatory to any treaty that mandates that the country recognise the enforcement of foreign awards. Had India been a party to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States [(Washington, 1965) hereinafter ICSID Convention], the circumstances would have been different as it would have to adhere to its provisions and ensure that foreign arbitral awards are recognised and enforced by its domestic statutes.
It is of utmost importance to lay down the purview of ICA and what proceedings and substantial laws can be brought within its scope. ICA refers to arbitral proceedings pertaining to issues emerging out of legal alliances – contractual or otherwise, that are deemed commercial within Indian law or in which at least one of the disputing parties is a person who is now a citizen of, or continually resides in, any nation apart from India; or a corporate entity that is established in any nation apart from India. The Supreme Court, in the case of R. M. Investment Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Boeing Co, dealt with the parameters defining a commercial transaction. In its judgment, the Court went on to highlight the practice that influences the framework of business relationships, emphasizing that international commerce is more than just the movement of commodities with contemporary complexities. The Supreme Court decided, in accordance with the same reasoning, that a commercial purchase is deemed to be the advisory service for advertising sales and therefore any conflict of this sort arises.
One of the significant benefits of ICA is its cross-border enforceability. In other terms, an award made in one nation can be easily transferred to others and executed. The predominant cause of this convenience of compliance is the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, that has over one hundred ratified states as of today. The New York Convention requires all international arbitral awards to be recognized if they follow such minimum prerequisites.
The term “intervention” may never seem to be sufficient because arbitration is a legal process founded on the sovereignty of the stakeholders and is accepted by statute as an acceptable method of settling conflicts. As a result, the function of the judiciary must be confined to assisting the arbitral tribunal in achieving the goal of resolution. The sovereignty of the stakeholders to consent on the “laws of the proceedings” is perhaps the main basic concept guiding the Model law. This appreciation of the stakeholders’ rights is the culmination of public policy tailored to international practice, as well as the acknowledgement that arbitration is based upon on stakeholders’ arrangement. While it has been identified that judiciary have all the authority to overturn arbitral awards if they violate any constitutional clause, are patently unconstitutional, or violate India’s policy decisions.
Recognition & Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in India
There have been primarily two main distinctions among enforcing an international award and enforcing a domestic award. As previously mentioned, a domestic award would not necessitate a request for compliance. Once the challenges (if any) are overruled, the grant will be executed as a decree of its own. An international award, on the other hand, must go via a compliance process. The group demanding enforcement must submit an appeal for the same. If the court determines that the international award is enforceable, this becomes a court order which is effective as such. Another distinction among the domestic and international regimes is that contrary to domestic awards, there is no allowance for reserving a foreign award. Where it comes to international awards, courts in India can only impose them or fail to implement them; they cannot leave them away. An attempt was made by the Supreme Court to fill this ‘gap’ in the latest decision of Venture Global where the court ruled that it is lawful to set aside an international award in India using the terms of Section 34 of Part I of the Act.
Two conditions must be met in preparation for an international award to be recognized (for the purposes of the Act). First, it should comply with disagreements resulting from a contractual arrangement (whether contractual or not) that is deemed commercial under Indian law. The second scenario is more important: the nation at which the award was granted should be one that the Government of India has designated as a state to which New York Convention extends. Thus far, only just few nations have indeed been told, and so only awards made in those countries are recognized as international awards and legally binding in India.
The reasons for contesting an arbitral award can vary amongst nations. Nevertheless, this does not grant judges in the administering territories concurrent authority. A straightforward interpretation of the Act’s scheme and rules leads to the presumption that such concurrent authority is prohibited in the case of Convention Awards. In the landmark judgment of Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. and Anr, the parties to a multi-jurisdictional agreement agreed to resolve the disagreement by arbitration under the laws of the International Chambers of Commerce, Paris, with Paris as the lex arbitri. Concerned about the enforceability of Non-Convention Awards, that is, awards that are not recognised for compliance under Section II of the Act, the international party appealed to Indian courts for temporary steps dependent on a provisional award to protect the assets of the Indian applicant to the Arbitration.
In conclusion, the Indian Supreme Court ruled that Part I of the 1996 Act, that provides validity to the UNCITRAL Model Law by granting authority to an Indian judiciary to administer temporary steps notwithstanding the fact that the arbitration was conducted out beyond India, was unconstitutional. Academics and theoretical stalwarts have been outraged by the Supreme Court’s ruling. It has also been asserted that perhaps the Bhatia declaration of court did not provide Convention Awards under Part I. This renders the decision in the Bhatia dispute much more daunting to align with a straightforward interpretation of the law. If national awards are known as non-international awards and international awards are not national awards, the definitions of both domestic and international awards are inadequate. The system of compliance under the Act’s two Parts necessitates a difference among the two awards. Domestic awards which are rendered the focus of proceedings in India pursuant to Section 34 of the Act may be applied as if they were a decision of an Indian Court pursuant to Section 36 of the Act. International Awards should be carried out as a decision by an overseas judge.
It is worth noting that in many recent cases involving an international party, the Supreme Court has reiterated the decision of the Court in Bhatia and maintained that “the requirements of Part-I of the 1996 Act will be equally relevant to enforcement of foreign arbitral awards held beyond India, except some of the said requirements are specifically exempted by arrangement.” These proceedings show the Indian courts’ proclivity to intervene with both national and international arbitral awards. Although this contingency can be avoided, it is likely to incorporate arbitration clauses in the arrangement. Therefore, it is also not relevant if the conditions of dispute there under section 34 of the Act as well as section 48 of the Act are all the same. This debate is important to the legitimate assumption that an international award is legitimate and obligatory upon acceptance by the appropriate agency in India.
Furthermore, Section 48 (1) (e) of the Act states unequivocally that international awards must be binding under the constitution of the country where even the ‘challenging jurisdiction’ is asserted. This simply indicates a distinction among ‘challenging jurisdiction’ and ‘enforcement jurisdiction’. The regulations pertaining to the legal enforcement of foreign arbitral should address dual public policy objectives: first, restricting the judiciary’s review of the substance of the case and the arbitral tribunal’s decision thereunder in giving effect to the shareholders’ preference of dispute resolution; and the second, indicating the judiciary’s intrinsic supervisory preferences in modifying the arbitral tribunal’s ruling. In the field of multinational business transactions, the former takes precedence over the latter.
The underlying cause of all difficulties in enforcing/challenging awards has resulted from the judiciary’s ever-expanding authority to examine the awards, whether domestic or foreign. Increased judicial intervention, that results in the acceptance of a vast number of claims which could never be heard in the first instance, is another vice which impedes the resolution of business conflicts, thus slowing the country’s economic learning and expansion. Another major drawback that has been raised as a result of the Act’s reading would be that the time frame for enforcing the arbitral award is not specified. By not imposing a deadline on the execution of awards, one discovers that the excessive irregularities in arbitral proceedings are no special from those countless awaiting legal proceedings, thereby undermining the Act’s very clauses. Arbitration is seen as a lengthy legal procedure by the stakeholders and adjudicators, who are often former judges, who rely on lengthy and regular continuances to prolong the process entirely.
Conclusion
The aspects of efficiency and expense are the distinguishing features of the process and are frequently cited as the chief factors of why arbitration significantly outperforms litigation as a viable option for resolving disputes, notably in commercial matters. It should be noted that these flaws have the potential to thwart the advancement of foreign trade and economic arbitration, but with the increasing influx of foreign of industry, this may have a negative impact on our economy. Another way to reduce the chance of judicial interference is to arrange for an approving body, which restricts the participants’ right to appeal to the court system for the nomination under Section I of the Act.
The current era of globalization has resulted in the economy’s market and operational circumstances highlight the benefit of arbitration as a conflict settlement mechanism over lawsuits, particularly in terms of multinational conflicts. The 1996 Act was passed in order to facilitate rapid and premium dispute settlement. A review of how this mechanism works in India shows that arbitration as an entity is still emerging and has not yet been successful in meeting the ever demands of the global market that are essential to commercial growth. A world trade and trade arbitration scheme has been proposed that promotes foreign trade and commerce by decreasing the possibility of future economic conflicts being resolved by national courts. Regardless of the unanswered issues that haunt the proposed model organisation, sensible individuals do not want the hassle of seeing future conflicts resulting from their dealings challenged in court before several rather separate upper ranks, including the arbitral entity, the courts at the seat of the arbitration, and the court at the position of compliance.
It is worth noting that in many recent cases involving an international party, the Supreme Court has reiterated the decision of the Court in Bhatia and maintained that “the requirements of Part-I of the 1996 Act will be equally relevant to enforcement of foreign arbitral awards held beyond India, except some of the said requirements are specifically exempted by arrangement.” These proceedings show the Indian courts’ proclivity to intervene with both national and international arbitral awards. Although this contingency can be avoided, it is likely to incorporate arbitration clauses in the arrangement. Therefore, it is also not relevant if the conditions of dispute there under Section 34 of the Act as well as Section 48 of the Act are all the same. This debate is important to the legitimate assumption that an international award is legitimate and obligatory upon acceptance by the appropriate agency in India.
