INTRODUCTION
The Comptroller and Auditor General (hereinafter referred to as CAG) of India is the Constitutional Authority in India, established under Article 148 of the Constitution of India. CAG is described as one of ensuring financial propriety as well as value for money since he is the guardian of the public purse and controls the entire financial system of the country at both the levels– the Centre and the state. It is for these reasons Dr B.R. Ambedkar, the architect of the Indian constitution, called the CAG one of the most important functionaries of the constitution, as important as the judiciary.
Dr Rajendra Prasad had observed, “He has the power to call to account any officer, howsoever highly placed, so far as state sums of money are concerned.” Although the Constitution intended to create an office of Comptroller and Auditor General in reality, it is only fulfilling the role of that of the comptroller. In other words, ‘the CAG has no control over the issue of money from the consolidated fund and many departments are authorized to draw money by issuing cheques without specific authority from the CAG, who is concerned only at the audit stage when the expenditure has already taken place’. Hence, CAG’s report is post-facto meaning thereby it has only prospective value in improving systems and procedures after the expenditure is incurred. Whereas in the UK, the name Comptroller is justified since no money can be drawn from the public exchequer without the approval of the CAG.
ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE OFFICE OF CAG
The independence of authority can be ensured if there is a well laid out criteria for its appointment. Such criteria would include required qualifications that an individual should possess to be appointed as the constitutional authority and also a procedure through which selection should be made. The procedure must be transparent. CAG is appointed by the President by a warrant under his hand and seal and his oath of office requires him to uphold the Constitution of India and the laws made thereunder. He can be removed by the President only by following the procedure mentioned in the Constitution that is the same as of a judge of the Supreme Court. Hence the selection process for the CAG is completely internal to the executive machinery of the Government. No one outside has any knowledge of what criteria is applied, how names are shortlisted and how the final selection is made. Thus, in India, there is the absence of clarity on the criterion, the definition of the field of choice, the procedures for the selection of this Constitutional authority. In other countries like the UK, CAG is jointly selected by the Chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts and the Prime Minister and thereafter ratified by the House of Common. In the USA, the Comptroller General of the United States is appointed by the President after being advised by a committee and on the consent of the Senate. India is the only democratic country in the world where the executive has acquired unfettered powers to the appointment of the CAG, rendering ‘independence of CAG from the executive’ as meaningless.
The debate on the mode of appointment of CAG was reignited in August 2020 when G.C. Murmu was appointed as the Comptroller and Auditor General, without following any transparent process of selection. His appointment came as utter dismay to citizens of India, who have faith in parliamentary democracy since he has no professional experience in audits and accounts. In 2017, Common Cause and the Indian Audit and Accounts Retired Service Officers Association submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister requesting a transparent procedure and objective criteria for the appointment of the CAG, which should ensure institutional integrity. The government didn’t accept the recommendation and went ahead to appoint Rajiv Mehrishi, a retired home secretary, without following any criteria. This appointment was also questioned and scrutinized on the ground that it was a post-retirement reward for ‘services rendered’. Mehrishi’s tenure was marked by a huge decline in the number of audit reports submitted to parliament, as well as state legislatures. Murmu’s appointment once again raised the question of why a generalist IAS officer is appointed as the CAG. How can a person with no knowledge and background of audits and accounts give leadership to the complex responsibilities of the Indian Audit and Accounts Department? In the case of N Gopalaswami & Ors vs The Union Of India & Anr, where a PIL was filed by the former Chief Election Commissioner N Gopalaswamy challenging the controversial appointment of Shashi Kant Sharma who served in key positions in the defence ministry that involved decision making powers over purchases including the Augusta Westland Chopper deal and the Tatra trucks deal, as CAG in May 2013 on the grounds of conflict of interests but the court didn’t allow the writ on the ground that judicial review must be limited to considering as to whether a person is eligible to be appointed as the CAG. The Court further observed, “of course, as the high constitutional post of a CAG is an integrity institution, an incumbent must have the qualities of competence and integrity. There are no prescribed criteria as to what qualifications a person must possess before he is considered for the post of the CAG.” There are some limitations on the CAG for example Secret service expenditure is kept outside the purview of the CAG. He cannot audit the expenditure incurred by the executive agencies but has to accept a certificate from the competent authority about how the expenditure has been so incurred. An increase in the participation of the government in the private sector through the ‘Public-Private Transfer’ and ‘Build own Transfer’ Model requires a significant change in auditing rules but the same has not been done hence the CAG does not have the power to audit Public Private Partnership investments. There is no provision for auditing of funds that are allotted to an NGO and local bodies. CAG does not have powers to audit the funds of the District Rural Development Authority who are nowadays managing large sums of money for rural development. It has also been contended that the CAG is not autonomous in the true sense. The Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service Act, 1971 provides that the CAG shall audit all expenditure of the government to ensure that the amounts disbursed were available, applicable to the said purpose, and were properly authorized. Regarding receipts, the CAG is required to verify whether the system provides for effective assessment and collection. Article 151 provides that the CAG’s reports on the accounts shall be submitted to the president or governor for being laid before the legislature. Hence, the CAG does not derive any independent accreditation directly from the Constitution. In fact, the CAG is undoubtedly mandated to carry out such tasks as Parliament may, by law, prescribe. The connotation is clear that the basic purpose of the CAG is to aid and assist the Parliament.
CONCLUSION
When it comes to ensuring the accountability of the executive, the functions of CAG become very important in parliamentary democracy to implement transparency. The most important factor which affects the functional autonomy of the CAG is its selection procedure. There is a requirement to frame a transparent selection procedure based on definite criteria and constitute an independent and impartial selection committee, which would recommend the most suitable person for appointment as CAG after calling for applications and nominations. There is also a need for an institutionalized process of selection for the post of CAG, a selection committee as seen in the appointment of CVC which involves PM, Leader of Opposition and Home Minister may be considered or it may also be laid down in the parliament as it is done in the most of the countries. To minimize the limitations imposed upon CAG and to cope with the changes in the Indian polity such as liberalization of the economy, the increasing role of civil society and NGOs and PPP mode of investments, the Duties, Power and Condition of Service Act 1971 must be reviewed and amended to ensure greater accountability and transparency in every functionary that deals with the public. CAG’s work should go beyond the auditing task and it must be entrusted with the power to ask the question of whether policies of the government ar