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An overview of the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act, 1956

In a recent judgement pronounced on 24 September 2020, the Bombay High Court has expressly reiterated that ‘prostitution is not an offence and an adult woman has a right to choose her vocation’, thereby upholding the fundamental rights of prostitutes as citizens enshrined in Part III of the Constitution of India.

Feroz Pathan

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Prostitution is one of the worst forms of woman subjugation and exploitation in twenty first century. Every society is plagued with it. Almost every country in the world is affected by trafficking in general and prostitution in particular as a country of origin, transit or destination for victims.

Since time immemorial, every civilized society and Government has put efforts to curb it, if not to eliminate it completely. A plethora of legislations are in place to prevent the abuse of women for prostitution. Efforts are made to regulate the profession by providing penal measures by protecting prostitutes as ‘victims.’

According to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime(UNODC), human trafficking is inherently judged through three elements namely- The Act(What is done), The Means(How it’s done) and The purpose(Why it’s done).

It’s defined as- “An activity of recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons by threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or vulnerability, or giving payments or benefits to a person in control of the victim for the purpose of exploitation, which includes exploiting the prostitution of others, sexual exploitation, forced labour, slavery or similar practices and the removal of organs.”

UNODC and its protocols assist states in their efforts to implement the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (Trafficking in Persons Protocol). In addition, domestic legislations of countries also control and suppress immoral trafficking. In India, its Immoral Traffic Prevention Act,1956 that legislates upon human trafficking.

According to NCRB report, a total 5264 cases of human trafficking were reported in India in 2018. Amongst this, a total 64 percent were women and 48 percent were below 18 years old. The worst affected states are West Bengal, Bihar, Maharashtra, Telangana, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Assam, and Orissa. Women from socially and economically disadvantaged classes especially those belonging to SC, ST, and OBC are more vulnerable to human trafficking.

In a recent judgment pronounced on 24th September,2020 , the Bombay High Court has expressly reiterated that ‘Prostitution is not an offence and an adult woman has a right to choose her vocation’ thereby upholding the fundamental rights of prostitutes as citizens enshrined in Part III of the Constitution of India.

It thus becomes imperative to analyze the entire gamut of some important provisions of SITA (‘The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act) and now referred as ‘The Immoral Traffic Prevention Act,1956’.

The Act was passed by parliament in pursuance of ‘The Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others’ which was approved by the United Nations General Assembly and came into force on 25 July 1951.

After fathoming the provisions of both SITA and the aforesaid UN Convention , one can comprehend that human dignity, welfare of individual, especially women as citizens, the institution of family and interests of community at large were the primary concerns before the legislators while enacting these laws on prostitution. The Act also attempts to check the capricious actions of law enforcement agencies while dealing with prostitutes as ‘offenders’ instead as ‘victims.’

While ordering to set free three sex workers from corrective homes where they were detained for almost a year against their willingness and wish, the Bombay High Court has also quashed the impugned order of Metropolitan Magistrate and held it to be in bad light of provisions of prostitution legislation.

The case was pertaining to three prostitutes belonging to ‘Bediya’ community that has immoral customary practice of sending girls for prostitution after attaining puberty. The parents of the victim were aware that their girls were indulging in prostitution and they were privy to the profession taken up by their daughters.

The metropolitan magistrate had therefore ordered to send the three victims to a state run protective home at UP for a year starting from 19th October,2019. The correction home was to extend care, protection, shelter and vocational training to the three victims. The impugned order was challenged in High Court after being confirmed by sessions judge in the appeal No.284 of 2019.

Zealously guarding the rights of the prostitutes as ‘victims’, the court has reiterated that ‘The Immoral Traffic Prevention Act,1956 does not empower the magistrate to hold the custody of victims beyond a period of three weeks without there being any final order to that effect after following the due process of law’.

The High Court also emphatically observed that ‘There is no provision under the law which makes prostitution per se a criminal offence or punishes a person because he indulges in prostitution. What is punishable under the Act is sexual exploitation or abuse of a person for commercial purpose and to earn the bread thereby, except where a person is carrying on prostitution in a public place as provided in section 7 or when a person is found soliciting or seducing another person in view of section 8 of the said act.

It added that record does not reveal that the three victims were indulged in prostitution and there is no material to substantiate this charge.

The court also emphasized on the fact that victims were major and therefore have a right to reside at a place of their choice, to move freely throughout the territory of India and to choose their vocation as enshrined in part III -the fundamental rights under Indian Constitution.

The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 defines ‘prostitution’ under Sec 2(f) as “the act of a female offering her body for promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire, whether in money or in kind” The definition of ‘prostitute’ is also construed accordingly under Section 2(e).

The Act also makes an explicit distinction between a ‘Girl’ and ‘Woman’ for the purpose of definition. According to Sec 2 (b) , a “girl” means a female who has not completed the age of twenty-one years, while a “woman” means a female who has completed the age of twenty-one years as per Sec 2(j).

A cursory reading of the entire Act can amply infer that prostitution has not been banned under the Act. Only certain activities related with prostitution have been expressly prohibited. Further prostitution in certain places has been banned. Some important provisions of the Act and landmark judgments are discussed below-

Keeping a Brothel – Section 3 of the Act prohibits the keeping and management of the brothel. Any person who renders assistance for this purpose also violates the provisions of this section and is liable to be punished. A minimum sentence of one year’s rigorous imprisonment and not more than 3 years and a fine upto 2 thousand rupees has been prescribed for the first conviction. It has been raised to minimum two years and not more than five years and also with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees on subsequent conviction.

In Kamalabai Jethamal vs The State Of Maharashtra1962 AIR 1189, 1962 SCR Supl. (2) 632, the apex court in an appeal challenging the eviction of prostitute from the house and disputing her conviction as bad in law because search was not conducted in accordance with provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 held that High Court had powers to order her eviction under section 18 of SITA after she was convicted under section 3 of the Act.

It was argued by defence counsel that the High Court in appeal could not order the appellant’s eviction because that power lies with only a Magistrate under Sec. 18 of the Act. It was added that the powers of the appeal court under Criminal Procedure Code are to reverse the order of acquittal or to order a fresh enquiry or a retrial et cetera, but not to order eviction from house.

This argument was also held untenable as the Act has a specific provision in Section 18(Closure of brothels and eviction of offenders from the premises) authorizing the making of such an order by a court convicting a person of offences under Section 3 or Section 7 of the Act.

Prostitution at Public Places- Section 7 prohibits carrying on prostitution in any premises which are within a distance of two hundred yards of any place of public religious worship, educational institution, hostel, hospital, nursing home or such other public place shall attract imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both, and in the event of a subsequent conviction with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months and also with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees.

Closure of brothel – Section 18 provides that if the house, room, place is used as brothel at a public place , the occupier of the house can be given directions by the magistrate to vacate it within seven days. The owner , landlord or lessor can further be directed that he will have to obtain previous permission of the magistrate before house can be let out during period of one year from date of passing of order. Any failure to comply with the orders by the occupier renders him liable to conviction and punishment.

Living on the earnings of prostitution – Section 4 has prohibited living on earnings of a prostitute by a person over the age of 18 years. Such a person shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Not only express pimps and touts come under the sweep of this provisions , but also those exercising control, direction, or influence over movement of prostitutes in such a manner as to show that he/she is acting, abetting or compelling her to prostitution.

In Radhakrishnan v. State of Kerala – 2008 (2) KLT 521, it was held that the activity carried on in a given premises will amount to “prostitution” within the meaning of Section 2 (f) of the Act only if sexual abuse or exploitation of a person is done for a commercial purpose. For the activity to become one with a commercial purpose, it should partake the character of a business or one carried on for profit.

Procuring Girl or Woman for Prostitution- Section 5 : Procurement , inducement or taking away of a woman or a girl for prostitution has been prohibited under this section. Any person guilty of the offence shall be punishable on first conviction with rigorous imprisonment for a term of not less than one year and not more than two years and also with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees. On subsequent convictions, the minimum punishment should not be less than two years and not more than five years and also with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees.

In Naseem Bano@Naseem vs The State Of Nct Of Delhi, Crl. Appeal No. 121/2004, Delhi High Court held that Section 5 does not talk of ‘forcible prostitution’.

It talks of carrying on prostitution and of procuring girls for prostitution or inducing a person to become an inmate of a brothel or to take person for the purpose of prostitution.

The appellant in this case had contended that the said woman was initially carrying on prostitution at kotha of Luxmi situated in the same building and she was later taken for prostitution by the appellant at her kotha.

The Court verdict emphasized that from testimonies of all witnesses of prosecution, it was apparent that the appellant was ‘causing’ carrying on of prostitution at her brothel and was guilty of offence under Section 5 of Immoral Traffic Prevention Act. She was rightly convicted under Section 5 of the Act.

Seducing or soliciting in a Public Place- Section 8 : Seducing or soliciting in a public place for purpose of prostitution has been prohibited under this section. Even making of words or gestures for this purpose from a building or a house which can be seen from a public place is prohibited.

A person found guilty shall be punishable on first conviction with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both, and in the event of a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, and also with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees.

In addition to these provisions of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, Procuration of minor girls (Section 366-A IPC), Importation of girls from foreign country (Section 366-B IPC), Selling of girls for prostitution (Section-372 IPC), Buying of girls for prostitution (Section -373 IPC) also pave way for suppression of immoral trafficking.

Article 23 of Indian constitution also provides for prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour which laid important thrust for legislation of SITA,1956. In pursuance of this Article, the parliament has passed the legislation for punishing acts which result in traffic in human beings.

It’s imperative to understand that the protection of Article 23 is available to both citizens as well as non-citizens. It protects individual not only against state but also private citizens. It casts a positive obligation on the state to take steps to abolish evils of traffic in human beings.

As per NCRB report 2018, some of the important causes of trafficking in India are poverty, social or cultural practice, migration, porous nature of borders, bureaucratic red tapism and corruption, and operation of international organized criminal networks. It’s incumbent upon individual, society and state to undertake collective efforts to curb the growing menace of human trafficking as it’s a flagrant violation of fundamental rights of individual.

Prostitution at Public Places: Section 7 prohibits prostitution in any premises which are within a distance of two hundred yards of any place of public religious worship, educational institution, hostel, hospital, nursing home or such other public place; it shall attract imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with fine which may extend to Rs 200, or with both, and in the event of a subsequent conviction with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months and also with fine which may extend to Rs 200.

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MP HIGH COURT SEEKS DGP’S REPLY: DOES POLICE’S FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE FULL CRIMINAL ANTECEDENTS OF ACCUSED AMOUNTS TO MISCONDUCT, INTERFERENCE WITH JUSTICE?

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The Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case Kuldeep Dohare Versus the State of Madhya Pradesh observed, recently the Gwalior bench directed the Director General of Police, State of Madhya Pradesh to file an affidavit explaining as to whether non-communication of criminal antecedents of an Applicant or Accused to the Court is a minor misconduct or if it amounts to interference with the criminal justice dispensation system. Before the next date of hearing, the affidavit is to be filled.

The bench comprising of Justice G.S. Ahluwalia observed and remarked that the court was frequently finding that the police authorities were not sending the complete criminal antecedents, in spite of the circular issued by Police Headquarters.

It was observed that the police authorities did not send the criminal antecedents of the applicant. Furthermore, it is clear that it is a clear attempt to facilitate the applicant to obtain bail by projecting that he has no criminal antecedents. The issue raised is weather the conduct of police officers can be said to be a minor negligence or it is an interference with the criminal justice dispensation system?

In the present case, the court was dealing with a bail application moved by the accused applicant for offences punishable under section 307, Section 149, section 148, section 147, section 506, section 294, section 201. On an earlier hearing, the court had observed that even though the case diary did not reflect any criminal antecedents on the part of the Applicant. The impugned order passed by the lower court rejecting his bail application mentioned otherwise.

It was observed that a reply was sought by the court from the Superintendent of Police, District Bhind as to why the important information with regard to the criminal antecedents of the Applicant were withheld by the respective SHO. The SP informed the Court on the subsequent hearing that the SHO concerned as well as the Investigating Officer in the case were found guilty of misconduct and were fined with Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 5,000, respectively.

The Court observed that since the problem was stemming from different police stations. However, the DGP should file his reply regarding the prevailing situation-

Since in different police station, this situation is prevailing. Therefore, an affidavit is directed to be filled by the DGP, State of Madhya Pradesh as to whether non- communication of criminal antecedents of an applicant is a minor misconduct or it amounts to interfere with the criminal antecedents of justice dispensation system.

Accordingly, the affidavit needs to be filled within a period of 1 week, the matter would be heard next on 08.07.2022.

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HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH: SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT APPLIES TO ARBITRATION REFERENCE UNDER NATIONAL HIGHWAY ACT, 1956

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The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case Ghanshyam Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors observed and stated that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to reference to arbitration under the National Highways Act, 1956.

The Division Bench comprising of Justice Ravi Malimath and Justice Purushiandra Kumar Kaurav observed and reiterated that since no limitation is provided under Section 3G (5) of the National Highways Act. The bench stated that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to such proceedings.

Therefore, the court held that the limitation period for filing an appeal against the decision of the competent authority before the arbitrator from the date of expiry of 90 days is three years from the decision of the competent authority.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The petitioner, Mr. Ghanshyam Gupta was the landowner of the land which was acquired by the Respondent, Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation. Thereafter, the competent authority determined the quantum of compensation payable to the petitioner and passed an award to that effect on 30.07.2015.

The petitioner being dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation determined by the competent authority. On 04.12.2019, an appeal was filled by the petitioner before the arbitrator. The appeal was dismissed by the arbitrator as time-barred filed after the expiry of three years limitation period.

the petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court, Aggrieved by the decision of the arbitrator.

Contentions Raised by the Parties:

It is stated that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to arbitration reference under Section 3G (5) of the National Highways Act, 1956.

It was observed that the petitioner was unaware of the availability of the remedy of appeal against the decision of the competent authority, the petitioner only after consulting his lawyer, that the petitioner came to know that he could seek enhancement. Further, there is a valid ground to condone the delay.

The submissions of the petitioner were countered by the Respondent on the following grounds:

Though, in the absence of a period of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 3G (5) of the Act of 1956, it was construed that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act would stand applicable.

It was stated that Article 137 provides for 3 years period, and the petitioner filed the appeal after a delay of 4 years.

COURT ANALYSIS:

The court observed and stated that since no limitation is provided under Section 3G (5) of the National Highways Act, the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act would apply to such proceedings.

Therefore, the court held that the limitation period for filing an appeal against the decision of the competent authority before the arbitrator from the date of expiry of 90 days is three years from the decision of the competent authority.

The court observed that there is nothing in the National Highways Act that excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to reference to arbitration under the National Highways Act, 1956 and the arbitrator has the power to condone the delay against the award, in filing an appeal by the competent authority.

The court noted that the petitioner was not aware that an appeal could be filed against the decision of the Competent Authority and it is only after consulting his lawyer that the petitioner came aware of any such right, therefore, there is sufficient reason to condone the delay.

Accordingly, the application was allowed by the court and the court directed the arbitrator to decide the case of the petitioner on merit.

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KERALA HIGH COURT APPOINTS AMICUS CURIAE IN SARITHA NAIR’S PLEA; IS A STATEMENT RECORDED U/S 164 CRPC A PUBLIC DOCUMENT?

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The Kerala High Court in the case Saritha S. Nair v. Union of India & Anr observed and appointed an amicus curia to assist the court to decide the legal question of whether a statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC is a public document.

The bench comprising of Justice Kauser Edappagath appointed the amicus curiae, in the petition filled by Saritha S. Nair, the prime accused in the infamous solar panel scam seeking a direction to provide her with copies of the Section 164 statement given by Swapna Suresh, the accused in the gold smuggling case.

The court appointed Advocate K.K. Dheerendrakrishnan, as the amicus curiae in the case.

In the present case, it was observed that Saritha Nair is accused of having duped several influential people to the tune of 70 lakhs, by offering to install solar power units for them or by making them business partners and by receiving advance payments for the same.

Moreover, Swapna Suresh is accused of smuggling 30 kilograms of gold through diplomatic cargo dispatched to UAE Consulate at Thiruvananthapuram.

It was observed that when the petition came up for hearing, the counsel appearing for the petitioner, Advocate B.A Aloor appearing that the statement given by Swapna was a public document and therefore the petitioner was entitled to get a copy.

Further, Nair approached the Court apprehending that certain allegation may have been brought on record against her in the statement given by Suresh. It was prayed by Nair, that the c court allow her plea, directing the production of certified copies of the said document to her, failing which she would sustain an irreparable injury, the hardship and as well as physical and mental agony.

It was observed that the Nair had had initially moved the Principal District and Sessions Court of Ernakulam, with the same request, but this was denied. The court noted and adjourned the matter to July 11, while on a petition filed by the accuse, Saritha S. Nair in the solar scam cases, for seeking a directive to provide a copy of the statement given by Swapna Suresh, accused in the diplomatic gold smuggling case before a subordinate court.

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Supreme Court issues notice in an SLP; can section 156 (3) CRPC be invoked after failing to get desired relief in a civil suit?

It was observed that before the Calcutta High Court, it was contended by the accused that the allegations made in the application under Section 156(3) CrPC fails to make out any offence against them. Further, it was submitted that a frustrated unsuccessful litigant before the Civil Court has approached the Criminal Court and the Criminal Investigation.

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The Supreme Court in the case Usha Chakraborty vs State of West Bengal observed and issued a notice in a Special Leave Petition filled, raising an issue whether in a dispute essentially in a dispute of civil nature that can a person, after having failed to get the desired relief from a civil suit, invoke Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure?

In the present case, an FIR was registered against the accused under Sections 323, Section 384, Section 406, Section 423, Section 467, Section 468, Section 420 and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 following an order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC.

It was observed that before the Calcutta High Court, it was contended by the accused that the allegations made in the application under Section 156(3) CrPC fails to make out any offence against them. Further, it was submitted that a frustrated unsuccessful litigant before the Civil Court has approached the Criminal Court and the Criminal Investigation, which has commenced, is for the purposes of throttling them. The petition was dismissed by the High Court observing that the materials which have already been collected by the Investigating Agency, prima facie, make out a case for investigation. The issue raised before the court was weather the same would make out an offence after the investigation is concluded is absolutely at the end of the investigation to be analysed.

Therefore, challenging this order, one of the accused approached the Apex Court. However, It was submitted that the dispute is essentially of civil nature, for which the applicant in Section 156(3) CrPC petition filed a civil suit but having failed to get the desired relief, he invoked Section 156(3) CrPC.

The bench comprising of Justice Surya Kant and the Justice JB Pardiwala, while issuing notice also stayed further proceedings in FIR lodged against the accused.

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GAUHATI HIGH COURT QUASHES NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION AGAINST GRAM PANCHAYAT PRESIDENT CITING PARTICIPATION OF MEMBER DISQUALIFIED FOR HAVING THREE CHILDREN

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The Gauhati High Court in the case Jugitawali Pawe v State of Assam and 15 ors observed and quashed a resolution expressing no-confidence in the petitioner – the President of a Gram Panchayat, as a result of which she as removed from office. It was stated that it is as per the citing no compliance with Assam Panchayat Act, 1994, reading with Rule 62 of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995.

It was preferred by the petitioner to the materials available on record to argue that one of the members of the Gaon Panchayat, the respondent. The respondent voted against the petitioner and had given birth to her third child the previous year. Moreover, by virtue of Section 111(2)(a) of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994, reading with Rule 62 of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995, the petitioner stood automatically disqualified on the date of voting. Following, which her vote was taken by passing No-confidence motion.

It was prayed by the petitioner in the plea for setting aside the impugned resolution and for issuance of a direction to restore his client back in the office. Thereafter, to initiate fresh proceedings, liberty should be granted to the respondent, following the due process.

It was agreed by the Counsel representing for the respondent that the said member of the panchayat had been disqualified but retained on the ground that the disqualification would have no bearing on the petitioner’s case, as the impugned resolution was passed before the declaration of petitioner disqualification.

In the present case, It was noticed by Justice Suman Shyam the member had voted against the petitioner and without her vote. The petitioner would not have been ousted from office. Justice Shyam also found no dispute about the fact that the member had incurred disqualification under the law prior the date of adoption of the impugned resolution. Justice Shyam found it unnecessary to delve into other aspects of the matter which includes the procedural formalities for declaring the member a disqualified candidate.

It is observed that the impugned resolution was declared to be vitiated and liable to be set aside. Further, the Court restored the petitioner to the office of the President of the Bongalmara Gaon Panchayat with immediate effect and it was stated by the court that the order will not stand in the way should the authorities or any member of the Gaon Panchayat propose a fresh motion of “no-confidence” against the petitioner and the due process of law needs to be followed.

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Halt DDA’s demolition action against jhuggis in Nizamuddin’s Gyaspur area, orders Delhi High Court

As per the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015 and the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board, the residents who can establish their residence prior to 01.01.2015 are eligible for rehabilitation under the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015.

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plea in Delhi High Court seeking repatriation of 56 pregnant nurses

The Delhi High Court in the case Manoj Gupta & Ors. v. DDA & Ors observed and has ordered status quo on the Delhi Development Authority’s proposal to demolish jhuggi clusters in city’s Gyaspur area in Hazrat Nizamuddin. The vacation bench comprising of Justice Neena Bansal Krishna observed in the petition filled by the residents and the court granted an interim relief.

It was ordered by the court status quo till July 11, the next date of hearing.

The bench orally remarked that a ten-day delay in demolition won’t make a difference but if today it is demolished and later, we come to know that they were entitled, who’s going to… the bench will consider it on July 11, 2022 but in the Meanwhile, some protections are entitled them. Adding this, Status quo be maintained. If since 1995, they have been there, heavens won’t come down if for 10 more days they are protected.

In the plea the petitioner stated that the T-Huts settlement in the area, which was stated by the authorities to vacate. It has been in existence for almost two decades and compromise of 32 jhuggis or households.

In the plea it was alleged that the bulldozers have been parked around the camp and a DDA official has orally asked them to vacate the area and it is noted that till date no proper notice have been sent to them nor has DDA conducted any survey of the area.

Furthermore, the DDA did not provide any alternate arrangement for their rehabilitation which resulted in extreme distress among the residents.

Moreover, it was admitted by the petitioner that the land in question belongs to DDA and they may seek that status-quo to be maintained at the site. It was urged that the residents should not be physically dispose or evicted from the demolition site until the survey is conducted and rehabilitation is provided to the residents as per the DUSIB policy of 2015.

As per the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015 and the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board. The residents who can establish their residence prior to 01.01.2015 are eligible for rehabilitation under the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015.

It is observed that in the case Ajay Maken v. Union of India, Reliance is placed on the Supreme Court decision and the High Court decision in the case Sudama Singh & Ors. v. Government of Delhi & Anr, it was held in the case that that removal of jhuggis without ensuring relocation would amount of gross violation of Fundamental Rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Further, it was held that the agencies conducting the demolitions ought to conduct survey before undertaking any demolition.

It is submitted that these observations would apply across the board, in the entire NCT of Delhi.

Advocates Vrinda Bhandari, Shiyaz Razaq, Kaoliangpou Kamei, Jepi Y Chisho and Paul Kumar Kalai, represented the petitioner.

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