When the emerging powers compete over semiconductors, this is not only about involvement in the market of electronics. As they aim to influence technologies that are the foundation of artificial intelligence, telecommunication, industry, military technology and digital economy. Supply of semiconductors has also become a key area of power struggle because technological access and reliable production networks can create geopolitical leverage. The conclusion of SEMICON India 2026 on September 19 brought this reality into sharper focus. Held in New Delhi under the theme “Silicon to Systems: Building the Ecosystem”, the summit brought together more than 600 exhibitors, around 300 international participants and representatives from 52 countries.
It also recorded 56 MOUs, announcements and strategic initiatives spanning design, manufacturing, packaging, materials, equipment, research, start-ups and talent. Five of the 12 semiconductor units approved under Semicon 1.0 have now commenced commercial production, marking a shift from project planning towards manufacturing. The semiconductor value chain on a global level is extremely fragmented. Designed manufacturing, equipment, materials, fabrication, assembly, testing, and advanced packaging at various technological hubs. So, India can’t recreate the entire chain within its territory. Its main challenge is to develop expertise in semiconductors domestically and to create an array of cooperation with different countries that have the necessary technologies.
This is the significance of semiconductor diplomacy. Japan serves as a significant example here. In 2023, India and Japan entered into a memorandum of cooperation to aid in strengthening the semiconductor supply chain. The cooperation deals with various fields that include investment, research work, and equipment and materials associated with semiconductors. Later, the frameworks were broadened through the India Japan Digital Partnership 2.0 initiative.
For instance, Renesas Electronics has developed a research collaboration with the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing and the Indian Institute of Technology Hyderabad. The countries have also worked together through the Semiconductor Supply Chains Contingency Network of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). At SEMICON India 2026, the India-Japan roundtable focused on commercial partnerships, technology transfer, localised supply chains and R&D. The objective should be to move beyond technology access towards technology absorption and domestic capability. The Netherlands represents a different but equally important dimension as it plays a significant role in the production of cutting edge technology.
The Dutch Semicon Competence Centre is to be associated with the India Semiconductor Mission in order to create the semiconductor “brain bridge” established with the cooperation of the technical parties, like ASML, NXP, Tata and CG Semi. At SEMICON India 2026, the India Europe roundtable also discussed advanced packaging, including 2.5D/3D packaging, chiplets and heterogeneous integration. Such cooperation matters because a domestic fabrication plant can still depend heavily on imported machinery, materials and specialised technologies. South Korea adds manufacturing and advanced packaging capabilities. Its engagement with India at SEMICON India 2026 covered manufacturing, technology, materials, advanced packaging, investment and supply chains.
This is important because the value of semiconductor production ultimately depends on its integration with downstream industries such as automobiles, telecommunications, electronics and artificial intelligence. Singapore has a distinct advantage because India and Singapore set up a Semiconductor Ecosystem Partnership in 2024. This Partnership is about supply-chain resilience, R&D, workforce development, investment and business collaboration. Considering Singapore’s ability to function as an electronics as well as an advanced-manufacturing hub, it acts as a platform for India to access larger South-East Asian production communities.
Singapore and Malaysia provide complementary Southeast Asian connections. The India-Singapore roundtable explored cooperation in manufacturing, advanced packaging, equipment and materials, R&D, investment, testing and talent. Malaysia, meanwhile, brings established back-end semiconductor capabilities that complement India’s strengths in design, engineering and manufacturing. Discussions at SEMICON India 2026 covered OSAT, advanced packaging, materials, equipment, supply chains and talent. These partnerships matter not because India needs more bilateral agreements, but because they can connect different parts of the semiconductor ecosystem. Japan can strengthen access to equipment and materials; European partners to specialised technologies and precision manufacturing; South Korea to manufacturing and packaging; Singapore to regional manufacturing, investment and research networks; and Malaysia to back-end production.
The United States also remains an important partner across commercial partnerships, joint ventures, R&D, supply chains and skills. The challenge is to make these relationships complementary rather than merely numerous. Diversification does not automatically eliminate vulnerability. Replacing dependence on one external supplier with dependence on several foreign suppliers may reduce engage Indian universities, laboratories, start-ups, and companies into a broad international research and production ecosystem. Finally, the fourth aspect is market integration. Indian semiconductor capabilities should become a part of the international automotive, telecommunications, electronics, military, space, and industry value chains. concentration risk without removing technological dependence.
Export controls, licensing restrictions, geopolitical tensions and disruptions in concentrated production centres will continue to affect the sector. India’s policy architecture is beginning to address this problem. Semicon 1.0 established the foundations for fabs and assembly unit facilities. Semicon 2.0, approved in July 2026 with an outlay of ₹1,27,500 crore, expands support across six pillars: design, machines and materials, new fabs, advanced packaging, research and talent development. The objective is to build capabilities across the semiconductor value chain rather than concentrate only on fabrication and packaging. The policy challenge is now to ensure that these investments generate a deeper domestic ecosystem rather than isolated production facilities. Semiconductor diplomacy should consequently pursue four linked objectives.
To start, we must first focus on technology availability. In this regard, collaborations should aim at providing joint research, engineering knowledge, and technology together with capital investments. The second challenge is supplier diversification. All major equipment, raw materials, and components should have their alternative sources of supply, if practical. The third challenge is workforce and research mobility. Semiconductor cooperation should This is where the idea of “Silicon Diplomacy” acquires practical significance. Prime Minister Narendra Modi had used the expression in 2024 while discussing India’s semiconductor partnerships and cooperation with countries including Japan, Singapore and the United States. SEMICON India 2026 gives the concept a more concrete policy setting by bringing foreign technology, investment and expertise together with domestic manufacturing, research and talent.
Its purpose, however, should extend beyond attracting investment. A partnership becomes strategically valuable when it improves India’s technological capabilities, diversifies critical supplies, strengthens domestic firms or opens international markets. Kanav Sharma is a researcher from Jammu & Kashmir and currently pursuing a Master’s of Business Administration at Swami Vivekanand Institute of Engineering and Technology, Chandigarh. His research interests encompass International relations, Strategic Affairs, Geopolitics, and Regional Security.
