The Supreme Court in the case Subramanya vs State of Karnataka observed that the extra judicial confession of a co-accused could not be relied on as substantive evidence.
The bench comprising of CJI UU Lalit and Justice JB Pardiwala observed that the confession made by co accused could be used only in support of the evidence and the same could not be made a foundation for a conviction.
It was observed by the bench while allowing the appeal filed by a murder convict. In the present case, the Trial Court acquitted the murder accused, but the appeal filed by the State was allowed by the Karnataka High Court and has convicted the accused. Thus, the High Court had relied on an extra judicial confession made by one co-accused for convicting the accused.
Before the Apex Court, one of the contentions raised in appeal was that the High Court committed a serious error in making of the extra judicial confession as the basis and thereafter going in search for corroboration. It was contended that his confession made by the co-accused, even if proved, the same cannot be the basis of a conviction and although it is evidence in the generic sense, yet it is not being the evidence in the specific sense and it could afford corroboration to other evidence and the same cannot be the supporting point or the sole basis of the conviction. On the other hand, it was contended by the State that the extra judicial confession alleging to have been made by the co-accused is admissible against the accused.
While referring to Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and earlier decisions of the Supreme court.
The bench observed that the court find that the view was affirmed that confession of a coaccused could only be considered but could not be relied on as substantive evidence… The case in hand is being one of a confession recorded under Section 15 of the TADA Act. As stated under subsection (1) of Section 15, a confession made by an accused is made admissible evidence as against all those tried jointly with him. So, it is implicit that the same can be considered against all those, tried together and in view of the matter, the Section 30 of the Evidence Act need not be invoked for consideration of confession of an accused against the coaccused, conspirator or abettor charged and has tried in the same case along with the accused. Thus, the accepted principle in law is that the confessional statement of an accused recorded under Section 15 of the TADA Act is a substantive piece of evidence against his coaccused, provided by the concerned accused are tried together. There is a very fine distinction between an extra judicial confession being a corroborative piece of evidence and a confession recorded under Section 15 of the TADA Act being treated as a substantive piece of evidence.
The court observed that the evidence of discovery of the weapon, clothes and dead body of the deceased at the instance of the accused can hardly be treated as legal evidence, the court stated while restoring and allowing the acquittal of the accused.
