WIFE FILED UNSUBSTANTIATED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AGAINST HUSBAND, HIS FAMILY CAUSING IMMENSE MENTAL CRUELTY: DELHI HC DISSOLVES MARRIAGE - The Daily Guardian
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WIFE FILED UNSUBSTANTIATED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AGAINST HUSBAND, HIS FAMILY CAUSING IMMENSE MENTAL CRUELTY: DELHI HC DISSOLVES MARRIAGE

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Delhi HC

While taking a very strong, sensible and principled stand on wife filing unsubstantiated criminal complaint against husband thus thereby causing endless mental and physical trauma to him, the Delhi High Court has most commendably, courageously, correctly and convincingly in a recent, remarkably, refreshing and robust judgment titled X v Y in MAT.APP.(F.C.) 247/2019 and cited in 2022 LiveLaw (Del) 92 that was delivered as recently as on March 10, 2022 has dissolved marriage between a couple living separately for 12 years taking note of the fact that the wife had filed an unsubstantiated criminal complaint against the husband and his family members which caused them immense mental cruelty and agony. The Bench of Delhi High Court comprising of Justice Vipin Sanghi and Justice Jasmeet Singh dissolved the marriage by decree of divorce under Sections 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Bench was of the view that there was no chance of reconciliation between the parties and that the marriage was irretrievably broken down.

To start with, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Justice Jasmeet Singh for a Bench of Delhi High Court comprising of Justice Vipin Sanghi and himself sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The present appeal has been filed under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 read with Section 28 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 challenging the judgment and decree dated 14.08.2019 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in H.M.A. No. 309/2017, whereby the petition seeking divorce under Sections 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 filed by the appellant, was dismissed.”

In short, the Bench then states in para 2 that, “Briefly stated the facts are that marriage of the parties was solemnized on 02.05.2008. On 30.06.2009, a son, was born out of the wedlock.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 3 that, “The case of the appellant is that on 04.01.2010, the respondent unilaterally left their matrimonial home with the child, without informing or seeking the appellant’s consent. On the same day, the appellant along with his brother and mother went to his in-law’s residence at Vaishali, Ghaziabad, with the aim to bring the respondent back. However, she flatly refused to come back to the matrimonial home. Following this, there was a physical altercation between the appellant and his brother on one side, and the respondent’s brothers on the other side. These experiences have led to immense bitterness in the relationship between the parties.”

Furthermore, the Bench then states in para 4 that, “It has further been submitted that for more than one and a half years from 04.01.2010, there was no direct communication or contact between the appellant and the respondent, or even their families. On 06.07.2011, the appellant sent a legal notice, demanding the respondent to rejoin her matrimonial home, and resume their conjugal relationship. However, the respondent neither rejoined her matrimonial home, nor responded to the legal notice. Troubled by this, on 20.08.2011, the appellant filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking restitution of conjugal rights, in Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.”

Going ahead, the Bench then states in para 5 that, “The appellant further submitted that after receiving the notice of the appellant’s petition seeking restitution of conjugal rights, rather than joining the appellant back, the respondent filed a complaint dated 10.10.2011 before the Crime Against Women (hereinafter referred to as CAW) Cell, Krishna Nagar, Delhi alleging harassment due to dowry demand and domestic violence, amongst others. As per the appellant, the complaint before the CAW Cell was a counterblast to the appellant’s petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.”

Still ahead, the Bench then mentions in para 6 that, “On 17.04.2012, the respondent filed a reply to the appellant’s petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, wherein she had sought dismissal of the said petition, and also filed a copy of her CAW Cell complaint as an annexure to reiterate her allegations. On 13.07.2012, the respondent filed a petition under Section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as Cr. P.C.) seeking maintenance from the Appellant.”

As it turned out, the Bench then enunciates in para 7 that, “The appellant submits that after noting the conduct of the respondent i.e. filing complaint before the CAW cell; opposing the appellant’s petition filed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and; on account of her adamance to not rejoin her matrimonial home, the appellant withdrew his petition filed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on 13.12.2012. On 27.02.2013, the appellant filed a divorce petition under Sections 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on grounds of cruelty and desertion.”

In para 8, it is then stated that, “On 07.10.2013, the respondent filed her written statement, reiterating her stand in her complaint filed before the CAW Cell. Another application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was also filed by the respondent on the same day, seeking maintenance from the appellant.”

Truth be told, the Bench then states in para 9 that, “On 09.01.2014, an order of interim maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was passed, directing the payment of Rs. 21,000/- per month for respondent and her minor son, along with the litigation expenses of Rs. 11,000/-. The said amount was later enhanced to Rs. 30,000 per month, which the appellant continues to regularly pay.”

While narrating further the sequence of events, the Bench then mentions in para 10 that, “The parties led their evidence before the Family Court, and after hearing the arguments on both sides, the Family Court dismissed the Appellant’s petition. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred the present appeal.”

It must be noted that the Bench then states in para 11 that, “This Court issued notice to the Respondent-wife on 23.09.2019. Further, vide order dated 27.02.2020, this Court, referred the parties to the Delhi High Court Mediation and Conciliation Centre to explore the possibility of reaching a settlement. Thereafter on 22.10.2021, the Court ordered both parties to remain present in Court to explore the possibility of a mediated settlement. On 13.12.2021, the Court noted that the respondent was not present, and presumably she was not interested in a settlement. Accordingly, we listed the appeal for hearing on 05.01.2022.”

Be it also noted, the Bench then stipulates in para 29 that, “A bare perusal of cross examination of the respondent shows that she could not establish any demand of dowry, either prior to the marriage, or at the time of marriage by the appellant. It was only two years after leaving the matrimonial home, did the Respondent file the CAW cell complaint. This itself puts the credibility of the said complaint in doubt. It is, in fact, admitted that the Respondent only filed the CAW Cell complaint after the Section 9 petition was filed, and there were no complaints lodged by the Respondent-wife prior to that. Pertinently, even her parents/ brother never filed any complaints in that respect at any earlier point of time.”

It also deserves to be noticed that the Bench then holds in para 32 that, “We are unable to agree with this view of the Family Court. The approach of the Family Court that it was for the appellant to prove in negative – that he and his family had not subjected the respondent to harassment or cruelty the dowry, is palpably wrong and against all cannons of justice and fairplay. Unless there is a statutory presumption created in respect of a state of affairs, the initial onus to prove ones case cannot be shifted by requiring the other party to prove the reverse. We may also rely upon the decision of this court in KB v SS (2016 SCC Online Del 3288) which reads:

“46. It is not only when such allegations are made in judicial proceedings that the person – against whom they are made may have valid grievance. The damage to the matrimonial bond had been done by the appellant when she made such serious and scandalous allegations against the respondent in her complaint to the CAW cell vide Ex. RW-1/5.

47. It is a settled position that leveling of unsubstantiated allegations in the pleadings or otherwise amount to mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act (See AS v. SNS 226 (2016) DLT 565 Manisha Sandeep Gade v. Sandeep Vinayak Gade AIR 2005 Bom. 180). Vimla Balani (supra) Mahendra Kumar Sharma (supra) and Jayanta Nandi (supra).

48. Thus the writing of the complaint to the CAW cell (Ex. RW1/5) tantamounted to causing grave mental agony and cruelty to the respondent as it contained serious and baseless allegations against the respondent and his family members of demanding dowry from the appellant and her parents and also of the respondent maintaining illicit relations with other women. The said allegations were nothing short of character assassination of the respondent. The making of such serious allegations must have caused grave mental agony to the respondent and his claim that the matrimonial bond has been destroyed on that account cannot be negated. The respondent has a reasonable ground to believe that living with the appellant may again lead to serious injury to his name and reputation and to that of his family. The finding of the learned ADJ on this aspect is therefore affirmed.

49. Turning to the aspect of desertion the appellant did not deny the fact that the parties remained separated from one another for a period of two years from March 2004 to March 2006. She sought to put the blame for the same at the door of the respondent by alleging that she had to leave the matrimonial home on account of cruelty caused by the respondent.

50. However other than her averments in the pleadings and her own examination in chief there is not a shred of evidence to suggest that the respondent had treated her with cruelty. In fact the respondent in his cross examination had specifically denied the suggestions alleging harassment and cruelty by him upon the appellant.

52. The parties have lived apart for approximately 10 years. Various police complaints/CAW Cell complaints were filed by the appellant and the family members of the respondent. There appears to be no possibility of the revival of the matrimonial relationship between the parties and the relationship between the parties has irretrievably broken down. The marriage is as good as dead. The irretrievable breakdown is the result of the conduct of the appellant and the respondent/husband is entitled to a decree of divorce under Sections 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the Act.””

While citing the relevant case law, the Bench then states in para 33 that, “It has been held by the Supreme Court in Mangayakarasi v. M. Yuvaraj (2020) 3 SCC 786 :

“14. It cannot be in doubt that in an appropriate case the unsubstantiated allegation of dowry demand or such other allegation has been made and the husband and his family members are exposed to criminal litigation and ultimately if it is found that such allegation is unwarranted and without basis and if that act of the wife itself forms the basis for the husband to allege that mental cruelty has been inflicted on him, certainly, in such circumstance, if a petition for dissolution of marriage is filed on that ground and evidence is tendered before the original court to allege mental cruelty it could well be appreciated for the purpose of dissolving the marriage on that ground….””

While citing yet another relevant case law, the Bench then states in para 34 that, “The Supreme Court in the case of K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa (2013) 5 SCC 226 has held that making unfounded allegations against the spouse or his relatives in the pleadings, filing of complaints etc. which may have adverse impact on the job of the spouse in the facts of a case, amounts to causing mental cruelty to the other spouse. The same view was expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of K. Srinivas v. K. Suneetha (2014) 16 SCC 34.”

It is worth noting that the Bench then notes in para 35 that, “The allegations made in the CAW Cell, reiterated in the reply to the section 9 petition are of a serious nature, and in contradiction to the cross-examination and evidence by way of affidavit of the Respondent-wife. These allegations were as follows:-

“3. That my parents financial status is not much sound yet the gifts that were given as much of good value as possible but my in-laws side seemed to be all cheap and often I had to listen from my husband, mother-in-law, and brother-in-law that “the sloppy girl from the slum colony should tell her parents that we are respectable people that such inferior goods are not even given to beggars here and come with branded gifts. Does anyone marry like this; bring at least 10 lakh rupees or die somewhere otherwise no need to come to this house.

4. That after the marriage of my first month when I have been harassing and beaten up by the my in- laws, I had objected to use abusing language and indecent words against my parents and my brothers then my brother-in -law said to me that if you have problem then tell your family come with 10 lakh rupees we will treat you like princes otherwise it will remain as it is. If you want to stay here then stay here otherwise go somewhere else and darken your face, if you said something upside down to the family members or even mention these things to any one we will burn you alive. I was too scared about the threat of my life that I have never told or mention these things or incidents to my parents. I was quietly tolerated their oppression and torture to maintain peace in my matrimonial home.

7. That I and my child became ill after coming to my mother’s home, entire expenses of the treatment were borne by my father and my brothers. My in-laws even did not turn up to ask about us. My in-laws remained adamant about demanding 10 lakhs rupees even after my parents request and brothers apologized for holding their feet. After much persuasion, I came back to my in-laws, but all went vain and they continue to misbehave, using abusing language and beaten up me and also disrespecting my parents. I am not given enough food nor is any attention given to raising my child.

9. That on 4.01.2010 my husband, brother -in-law and mother in law came along with other 3-4 persons at my parents home and during the talking suddenly my mother- in- law and brother-in-law started abusing me, my husband and brother-in-law have fought with my parents , during this incident my father got some injuries by my in-laws.

11. That by this complaint against my husband Sh. Ritesh Babbar brother-in-law Sh. Manish Babbar S/o Late Sunil Babbar and Mother-in-law Smt. Chandra Mani w/o Late. Sunil Babbar illegally demanding 10 lakh rupees in the name of dowry and not meeting the demand abused me, beaten up, and threat to kill to me, complainant facing physical and mental torture by this. This complaint being given with the intention of taking legal action against the culprits.””

Quite damningly, the Bench then held in para 36 that, “The allegations have not been established and amount to a clear and categorical character assassination of the appellant as well as his family members. The Family Court has ignored the said aspect of the matter. Moreover, the appellant had to make 30-40 visits to the police station in connection with the said complaint. A police station is not the best of places for anyone to visit. It must have caused mental harassment and trauma each time he was required to visit the police station, with the Damocles Sword hanging over his head, and he not knowing when a case would be registered against him and he would be arrested. So far as the respondent is concerned, she had done everything to get the appellant and his family entrapped in the criminal case. That was also her prayer in her complaint.”

Truth be told, the Bench then holds in para 37 that, “As regard to the ground of desertion is concerned, the Family Court has held:

“38. Record would show that the parties separated on 04.01.2010. The petitioner has not given any specific reason or circumstance in which the respondent went to her parental house. The respondent has alleged that she was driven out of her matrimonial house on that day with the child in her wearing clothes and all her belongings remained in the house of the petitioner. Separation by itself would not constitute desertion. Separation would transform into desertion only from the date of formation of animus deserendi by the respondent. It cannot be assumed that on the day, the respondent left her home, she did so with an intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end.

40. In view of above facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that the petitioner has failed to establish that the separation between the parties was accompanied by animus deserendi on the part of the respondent for two years prior to the date of filing of the present petition. Thus, the statutory condition for applicability of section 13(l)(ib) is not satisfied.””

It cannot be lost on us that the Bench then notes in para 38 that, “On the said aspect of desertion under section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, we note that the while there is a debate as to whether the Respondent-wife left her on her own volition, or whether she was thrown out of the matrimonial home, it is an admitted fact that she did not return to the matrimonial home despite the appellant going to bring her back with his brother and mother, despite the notice requisitioning the respondent to rejoin the appellant, and; despite the petition under section 9 being filed by the appellant.”

It also cannot be glossed over that the Bench then notes in para 39 that, “The respondent could not justify not returning to the matrimonial home, and her refusal to cohabitate with the Appellant, to us, is sufficient to establish desertion by her.”

As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 40 that, “In this view of the matter, we are of the view that the appellant has been able to make out a case of being subjected to cruelty and desertion at the hands of the respondent. We are unable to agree with the findings of the Family Court. That the appellant is entitled to succeed on both the grounds i.e. Sections 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(ib). The facts and circumstances that lead us to the following conclusion are:-

i. The respondent-wife filed an unsubstantiated criminal complaint against the Appellant and his family members which caused them immense mental cruelty and agony.

ii. The Respondent-wife made several contradictory and unsubstantiated allegations in her written statements, complaint before the CAW Cell, and her evidence by way of affidavit. The Respondent failed to prove and establish the averments she made, which itself amounts to mental cruelty. In respect of her testimony, she stood discredited in the light of the said contradictions.

iii. As far as the relations between the parties are concerned, they are sufficiently beyond repair. Both the Appellant and the Respondent allege acts of cruelty against each other.”

Most notably, the Bench then holds in para 45 that, “In the facts of the present case:-

i. The parties have lived separately for 12 years now.

ii. There is no chance of reconciliation between the parties and the marriage has irretrievably broken down.

iii. No useful purpose would be served by maintaining this matrimonial bond. The insistence to continue this relationship would only be inflicting further cruelty upon both the parties.

iv. The marital discord between the parties at present is such that there is a complete loss of faith, trust, understanding and love between the parties. The conduct of the Respondent has been such as to cause great mental anguish to the Appellant, and the parties cannot be reasonably expected to live with each other anymore.”

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 46 that, “For the above reasons, the appeal is accordingly allowed, the marriage between the appellant and the respondent is dissolved by decree of divorce under Sections 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Parties to bear their own costs.”

In conclusion, the Delhi High Court has not wavered even slightly in squarely blaming the wife for filing unsubstantiated criminal complaint against husband and his family causing immense mental cruelty. So it was but natural that Delhi High Court was left with no option but to allow the appeal of the husband and dissolving the marriage by grant of decree of divorce. Rightly so!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate

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Supreme Court seeks response of Union and states on plea for guidelines to prevent sexual harassment of students in schools

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The Supreme Court in the case Nakkheeran Gopal v UOI & Or’s observed that any kind of harassment including the sexual harassment being carried out at educational institutions The Court while allowing the writ petition issued a notice seeking protection of children.

The plea stated that there is a vicarious liability upon the State Government to implement any law for the well-being and also for the protection of the children in their respective states.

the petition states that to implement any law for the well-being of children and also for the protection of the children in their respective states, it is the responsibility of the State Government and the plea further mentioned that it the vicarious liability of the State Government and It will be considered the lapse on the part of the State Government if there is Any lapse on the part of the educational institution as it remains a crucial department in the State Government With respect to the relevant organization, including Educational Institution, stated in the plea before the court.

The petitioner argued that till date no specific mandate or the law or the guidelines have been issued by the respective States and inspire of alarming rate in the offence against the children especially at school premises.

The petition further states with this regard that children can also themselves be coerced into becoming tools in furtherance of illegal and dangerous activities and under this circumstance the Increased online time can lead to grooming and both online and offline exploitation.

It is essential to ensure the constitutional right to dignity of children provided under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, while protecting children against sexual abuse when they are exposed to predators, which is compromised, stated by the petitioner in the plea.

The petition states that it indicates immediate concerns and measures for intervention are of paramount significance and further the court stated that this calls for the implementation of legislative actions and community-based interventions through virtual media to prevent a further rise in the statistics and to ensure child protection and when the safety of the children is at stake especially at educational institutions which is supposedly to be the safest shelter, and that too during this tough time. As it is necessary to Protecting the basic rights of children and is of utmost concern as otherwise there will be a posting of a substantial threat to the future and this would leave a regressive impression.

It is the fundamental right of the children under Constitution of India to engage and study in an environment when he/ she feels safe from any kind of emotional or physical abuse and is free, further being argued in the petition.

The bench comprising of Justice Indira Banerjee and the Justice CT Ravikumar observed and sought responses of the Union and the States for guidelines for the educational institutions for the protection of the children and also for the enforcement of the fundamental rights of Children at the educational institutions.

It is essential to ensure the constitutional right to dignity of children provided under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, while protecting children against sexual abuse when they are exposed to predators, which is compromised, stated by the petitioner in the plea.

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IN MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE COMPENSATION CLAIMS, MCI FINDINGS REGARDING DOCTORS’ PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT HAVE GREAT RELEVANCE: SC

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The Supreme Court in the case Harnek Singh vs Gurmit Singh observed while considering medical negligence compensation claims that the findings of the report of Medical Council of India on professional conduct of doctors are relevant.

from the date of SCDRC order as compensation thereafter the court directed the Respondents to pay to the complainants a total amount of Rs. 25,00,000 with interest @ 6% per annum. the complainants have made out a case of medical negligence against Respondents 1 and 2 and are entitled to seek compensation on the ground of deficiency of service and the court hold that the decision of the NCDRC deserves to be set aside. in reversing the findings of the SCDRC and not adverting to the evidence on record including the report of the MCI, the court is of the opinion that the NCDRC has committed an error. The case of medical negligence leading to deficiency in his services, the above-referred findings of the MCI on the conduct of Respondent 1 leave no doubt in our mind that this is certainly, observed by the bench.

The bench further observed that he opinion and findings of the MCI regarding the professional conduct of Respondent 1 have great relevance while referring to the contents in the report of MCI.

The issue raises in the above-mentioned case is weather a professional negligence is established by the complainant as per the standards governing the duty to care of a medical practitioner on the part of Respondent As the NCDRC gave its decision without referring to the MCI finding the complainants/appellants submitted, in an appeal submitted by the Apex Court. this complaint got summarily disposed of and they filed appeals before Medical Council Of India The Ethics Committee of MCI held one doctor medically negligent and issued a strict warning to be more careful during the procedure and to be more diligent in treating and monitoring his patients during and after the operation he complainants had also made a complaint to the Punjab State Medical Council against the professional misconduct of the doctors, hospitals, surgeons, While the proceedings were pending before the SCDRC.

the complaint and two among the opposite parties were allowed by SCDRC to directly pay Rs. 15,44,000 jointly and severally and Rs. 10,000 as costs as the appeal was allowed by The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission of these opposite parties and set aside the order of the SCDRC holding that negligence was not proved by the complainants.

The bench comprising of Justice UU Lalit, justice S. Ravindra Bhat and the justice PS Narasimha also observed and contended the question of intention does not arise that in the proceedings for damages due to professional negligence.

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WHERE THE CLAIMS OF EVENTS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED BY THE PROSECUTION, SECTION 106 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT APPLIES TO CASES: SUPREME COURT

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The Supreme Court in the case Sabitri Samantaray vs State of Odisha observed here chain of events has been successfully established by the prosecution, from which a reasonable inference is made out against the accused, the Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act applies to cases.

in light of Section 106 of the Evidence Act the High Court rightly observed that as how the deceased lost his life and the onus was now on the appellants to disclose further the court observed that the appellants have failed to offer any credible defense in this regard and it can be deduced that the entire sequence of events strongly point towards the guilt of the accused appellants the burden was on the appellants to prove it otherwise as once the prosecution had successfully established the chain of events.

in the light of the statements made by all the sets of witnesses, with such an intention when analyzed and the fatal injuries sustained by the deceased at the relevant place and time further the court contended while dismissing the plea that it certainly makes out a strong case that death of the deceased was indeed caused by the appellants. in establishing intention of the accused-appellants for the commission of the offence, the prosecution has succeeded, the Court notice.

whenever an incriminating question is posed to the accused and he or she either evades response, or offers a response which is not true, in a case based on circumstantial evidence then in the chain of events such a response in itself becomes an additional link, when a case is based on circumstantial evidence As Section 106 of the Evidence Act from its burden to establish the guilt of an accused is in no way aimed at relieving the prosecution. where chain of events has been successfully established by the prosecution, it only applies to those cases from which a reasonable inference is made out against the accused.

the Section 106 it merely prescribes that when an individual has done an act and in no way exonerates the prosecution from discharging its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt Thereafter the onus of proving that specific intention falls onto 9 the individual and not on the prosecution. If the accused had a different intention than the facts are specially within his knowledge which he must prove, with an intention other than that which the circumstances indicate. As the Section 106 of the Evidence Act postulates that the burden of proving things which are within the special knowledge of an individual is on that individual. Although the Section in no way exonerates the prosecution from discharging its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt, observed by the Bench as the said provisions Since it is all based upon the interpretation of Section 106 Evidence Act, the contentions of either

the bench comprising of CJI NV Ramana, Justice Krishna Murari and the justice Hima Kohli observed and contended whenever an incriminating question is posed to the accused and he or she either evades response or that which being offers a response is not true then such a response in itself becomes an additional link in the chain of event, in a case based on circumstantial evidence.

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A candidate has no legal right to insist that the recruitment process set in motion be carried to its logical end: SC

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The Supreme Court in the present case Employees State Insurance Corporation vs Dr. Vinay Kumar observed that the recruitment process set in motion be carried to its logical end as the candidate does not have a legal right to insist.

The bench directed the Corporation-appellants to take a decision regarding whether to complete the recruitment process, bearing in mind all relevant aspects within a period of two months, while allowing the appeal further it stated there is however no doubt from holding that the employer is free to act in an arbitrary manner.

A recruitment process which is set in motion be carried to its logical end candidate who has applied does not have a legal right to insist that Even in the select list may not clothe the candidate with such a right and that too even in the inclusion of a candidate.

A recruitment process carried to its logical end and the process set in motion, the candidate who applied does not have the legal right and thereafter the court further contended that the cardinal principle we must bear in mind is that this is a case of direct recruitment, observed by the bench.

The Court further said that it is quite likely that any candidate who may have being desirous of applying, may not have applied being discouraged by the fact that the advertisement has been put on hold and by agreeing with the applicant the court contended and said that the direction to conclude the proceedings within 45 days is unsupportable.

The recruitment process set in motion be carried to its logical end and the Candidate who has applied does not have a legal right to insist the recruitment process.

The ground raised by the appellants for not proceeding with the procedure of direct recruitment is untenable, the respondent contended before the court and on the other hand on account of certain developments which took place, there may really be no need to fill up the post of Associate Professor and the respondent may not have a right as such, the appellant contended before the Apex Court.

The High Court which dismissed the writ petition filled by the Corporation and it directed the Corporation to conclude the process positively within a period of 45 day. the Corporation filed appeal before the Apex Court, Aggrieved with this direction.

The bench comprising of Justice KM Joseph and the justice Hrishikesh Roy observed that Even inclusion of a candidate in the select list may not clothe the candidate with such a right and it does not mean that the employer is free to act in an arbitrary manner, the bench clarified.

The recruitment process set in motion be carried to its logical end and the Candidate who has applied does not have a legal right to insist the recruitment process.

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ON THE PLEA TO STAY THE RETIREMENT OF EXISTING MEMBERS UNTIL THE ACTUAL JOINING OF NEW MEMBERS, SUPREME COURT ISSUES NOTICE

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The Supreme Court in the case Central Administrative Tribunal (Principal Bench) Bar Association, New Delhi v Union of India & Or’s observed in a petition till all the vacancies which arose from 2019-2022 are filled by actual joining of candidates by putting a stay on the impending retirement of all the existing Judicial/ Administrative Members of CAT the court further issued the notice.

In the plea it was stated in the petition that although 35 Judicial Members including the Chairman and 35 Administrative Members cater to 19 benches and 8 circuit benches, many benches of the Tribunals have become non functional because of the retirement of members at regular intervals as it was Preferred by Central Administrative Tribunal (Principal Bench) Bar Association, New Delhi.

Furthermore, the petition stated the Jabalpur Bench, Cuttack Bench, Lucknow Bench, Jammu and Srinagar Bench are left with only one member either Judicial or Administrative because of which no division bench can be constituted there. As on 31st March, 2022, the Guwahati Bench has become totally non-functional as no Member is available there.

Justice Chandrachud stated by taking a note of the above submissions:

A bench can’t be constituted with one member.

Justice Chandrachud further asked to submit an up-to-date chart with regards to the number of members who are present in the various benches of CAT and ordered the counsel for the Central Administrative Tribunal (Principal Bench) Bar Association, New Delhi to do the same.

Justice Kant further added by taking a note of the above submissions:

The members whose term is likely now to expire in Future, give the details of those members.

The benches of the Central Administrative Tribunal will become non-functional if the aforesaid situation continues for a couple of more months, more than half of the sanctioned stated in the plea.

AOR Amita Singh Kalkal, has filled a plea before the Supreme Court.

The bench of comprising of Justice DY Chandrachud and the justice Surya Kant by making a note of the above submissions ordered to issue a notice and in addition the liberty to serve the Central Agency.

The bench ordered to comply with the same and listed the matter on 13th May.

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Supreme Court upholds disciplinary action against judicial officers for showing undue favour to a party in the worst kind of judicial dishonesty

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The Supreme Court in the case Muzaffar Hussain versus State of Uttar Pradesh observed a judicial officer in Uttar Pradesh for passing orders to unduly favour certain parties for taking against the disciplinary action.

The High Court reduced the punishment as curtailment of pensionary benefits by 70% and refused to interfere with the findings and the officer approached the Supreme Court for Challenging the High Court’s verdict.

A writ petition was filed before the High Court challenging the punishment by the officer. In 2005, the Allahabad High Court initiated disciplinary enquiry against him for misconduct and found the charges to be proved. On the recommendation made by the Full Court, the State of Uttar Pradesh imposed a punishment of curtailment of his pensionary benefits by 90% to join the Central Administrative Tribunal as a judicial member in 2003, the officer took Voluntary Retirement from Service.

Supreme Court observed while dismissing the appeal that the appellant had misconducted himself while discharging his duties as a judicial officer and there was enough material and evidence to show that. to unduly favour the subsequent purchasers of the acquired lands who had no right to claim compensation, and that such orders were actuated by corrupt motive, and had passed the judicial orders in utter disregard of the specific provisions of law.

The bench of Justice Bela Trivedi, an judgement authored noted:

the public servants are like fish in the water, none can say when and how a fish drank the water”. A judge must decide the case on the basis of the facts on record and the law applicable to the case and if he decides a case for extraneous reasons, then he is not performing his duties in accordance with law. As often quoted, a judge, like Caesar’s wife, must be above suspicion. The extraneous consideration for showing favour need not always be a monetary consideration further she said that In our opinion, showing undue favour to a party under the guise of passing judicial orders is the worst kind of judicial dishonesty and misconduct.

while being the Additional District Judge at Agra during 2001 to 2003, the officer named Muzaffar Hussain and the charge was that in a batch of land acquisition matters in violation of settled principles in order to unduly favour certain subsequent purchasers had exorbitantly enhanced the compensation.

Thereafter the Apex Court added that under Article 235 of the Constitution of India the High Court had perfectly justified in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, under these circumstances.

The division bench comprising of justice DY Chandrachud and the justice Bela M Trivedi observed under the guise of passing judicial orders is the worst kind of judicial dishonesty and misconduct and that showing undue favour to a party.

The Court stated, the case must be decided by the Judge on the basis of the law applicable to the case and the facts on record. He is not performing his duties in accordance with law if he decides the case or extraneous reasons.

Supreme Court observed while dismissing the appeal that the appellant had misconducted himself while discharging his duties as a judicial officer and there was enough material and evidence to show that. to unduly favour the subsequent purchasers of the acquired lands who had no right to claim compensation, and that such orders were actuated by corrupt motive, and had passed the judicial orders in utter disregard of the specific provisions of law.

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