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Teacher should be one of the highest paid employees: MP HC

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It cannot be just glossed over or dismissed lightly that none other than the Gwalior Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court itself has as recently as on August 24, 2021 in a learned, latest, laudable and landmark judgment titled Seema Shakya and others Vs The Board of Secondary Education thr. And others in WP-12834-2018 while expressing concern over the steep decline in the standard of education in primary schools in Government Sector has observed that salaries, allowances, and perquisites attached to the post of a primary teacher in the Government Sector should be attractive. The two Judge Bench of Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Deepak Kumar Agarwal further very commendably, cogently and convincingly observed that, “In fact, a primary teacher should be one of the highest-paid employees under the government so that the most meritorious available in the society is attracted and the best out of them have sterling qualities are ultimately picked up to be appointed as teachers.” Who can deny or dispute this?

To start with, the Bench comprising of Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Deepak Kumar Agarwal of Gwalior Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court who authored this brief, brilliant, balanced and bold judgment sets the ball rolling by first and foremost stating the purpose of the petition by putting forth that, “Present petition invoking u/A.226 of the Constitution was filed by four petitioners praying for following reliefs;

“7.1 That, the respondent Board kindly directed to permit the petitioners to appear in the D.El.Ed./D.Ed. Second Year Course as a second chance student in the upcoming examination and also kindly directed to declare their result.

7.2 That, it may kindly held that three years duration provided under the NCTE Regulation 2014 shall not be applicable in the case of petitioners.

7.3 That the respondent board may kindly directed to declare the fresh mark sheet of the petitioners after including the marks of internal examinations which are with the respondent No. 4 institution.

7.4 That, other relief doing justice including cost be ordered.””

Adding more to it, the Bench then points out in the next para that, “During pendency of this petition due to certain subsequent events, additional pleadings were incorporated by way of amendments which was allowed by order dated 09.07.2021 and amended petition was brought on record. However, the prayer clause as quoted above, remained unchanged.”

To be sure, the Bench then envisages in the next para that, “This petition has a chequered history which has been succinctly highlighted in the interim order passed in this case on 31.03.2021 which is reproduced below for ready reference and convenience;

“The factual matrix attending the instant case reveals that while serving as Samvida Shala Shikshak GradeIII the petitioners took admission in two year D.El.Ed. course in 2013-2014. In the first year examination of this Course was held in July 2014 petitioners appeared (with the intervention of judicial interim order by this Court in W.P. No.4279/2014). The said W.P. No.4279/2014 was finally disposed of on 05.11.2014 by the Division Bench of this Court directing the petitioners to furnish migration certificate within two weeks. Aggrieved by said order, the respondent-Board approached the Apex Court by preferring SLP No.2549-2568/2015 which was decided on 22.11.2016 vide P/2 upholding the order of this Court dated 05.11.2014 with the direction that as and when the requisite documents are submitted, the results of the said examination be declared.

During the interregnum period due to non-declaration of result of the first year examination, the petitioners were prevented from appearing in the second year examination which was held in 2015-16. This impelled the petitioners alongwith two others to prefer W.P. No.3557/2017 wherein interim order dated 15.06.2017 vide P/5 was passed directing the respondent Board to allow the petitioners to appear in forthcoming second year D.El.Ed examination scheduled to commence from 20th June, 2017 with the condition that the result of the examination shall not be declared without leave of the Court. Pursuant to the interim order, petitioners appeared in second year examination with examination Center at Bhopal.

Thereafter, W.P. No.3557/2017 was finally disposed of on 24.11.2017 with direction to declare the result of petitioners within fifteen days vide P/8. Consequently, vide P/9 results were declared of the Second Year Examination wherein petitioners were shown absent in all the internal examination and thus, declared as fail.

The Principal of DIET, District Morena (M.P.) by letter dated 28.03.2018 (at page 68 of writ petition) informed that the petitioners had appeared in internal examination but due to concerned institution having not forwarded the marks obtained in the internal examination the Board could not be informed about the same.

In the aforesaid factual background, a prayer is made in this petition to provide the second chance to the petitioners to appear in second year D.El.Ed examination.

From the aforesaid and in particular the letter of Principal DIET, District Morena dated 28.03.2018 (at page 68 of this writ petition), it appears that petitioners had appeared in the internal examination.

Accordingly, this Court directs that the original record of the internal examination qua the petitioners including the marks obtained by them in the internal examination be produced by the respondents.

Registry is directed to serve a copy of this order to counsel for Board as well as the State.

List this case in second week of April, 2021.””

To put things in perspective, the Bench then enunciates in the next para that, “Pursuant to the aforesaid interim order passed by this Court on 31.03.2021, the response filed by the State revealed that though the petitioners appeared in the internal examination, but information in that regard was not forwarded by the Examination Centre to the Board and, therefore, the Board presumed the petitioners to be absent in internal exam and thus, marked them absent in all internal examinations leading to the final result being “fail” in the second year Exam of D.El.Ed.”

Be it noted, the Bench then observes that, “However, what is noticeable in this case is that in the second year examination, petitioners have failed in more than one theory subjects as is evident from Annexure P/11, therefore, the exercise of adjudicating the issue of non-forwarding of intimation regarding appearance of the petitioner in the internal examination, would be an exercise in futility. The petitioners having failed in their first attempt in the second year D.El.Ed Examination are claiming second chance to reappear and pass the second year D.El.Ed Examination. It is not disputed by petitioners that NCTE (Recognition Norms and Procedure) Regulations, 2014 which came into effect from November, 2014, Appendix-2 in particular, restricted the maximum period for completing two year D.El.Ed programme, to three years from the date of admission.”

Of course, the Bench then states that, “The petitioners were admitted to D.El.Ed programme in July-August, 2013.”

As it turned out, the Bench then holds that, “The three year period to complete the D.El.Ed programme is long over. However, without going into issue of applicability/non-applicability of the 2014 Regulations to the petitioners, this Court is not inclined to grant relief to the petitioners who have failed in more than one theory subjects in the second year.”

As a corollary, the Bench then holds that, “From the above, this Court is of the considered view that no case for interference is made out not only because the three years is long over but also that this Court cannot become a party to enable non-meritorious persons to be admitted to a teacher training programme, especially when this Court is conscious of the fact that allowing said non-meritorious persons to become teachers would be disastrous for the future of innocent children in primary schools in Government Sector. Accordingly, this Court decline interference and dismisses this petition.”

Quite lamentably, the Bench then remarked that, “Before parting this Court is moved by the steep decline in the standard of education in primary schools in Government Sector. After incorporation of Article 21-A in the Constitution, the State is obliged to leave no stone unturned to instill life, vitality, morality, human values, skill, merit and the power to think, understand and live life of dignity in sync with nature.”

Worse still, the Bench then also hastens to add in the next para that, “This Court is aware of the rapidly falling standards of Primary Education, especially in Government Sector. The Teacher Training Programme like D.El.Ed prescribes very low passing marks thereby enabling persons of average and below average academic qualifications and competence to become teachers. It is common knowledge that a non- meritorious and ill-equipped teacher would be an obstacle for betterment of standards of Primary Education in Government Sector. Less meritorious and incompetent teachers would breed incompetent students.”

Quite forthrightly, the Bench then concedes in the next para that, “Teachers were a revered class of celebrated citizens in ancient times and were treated with great respect and reverence by one and all. The reason was that the teachers used to instill morality, competence, discipline and merit, especially in the primary schools.”

Quite candidly, the Bench then concedes that, “It is well known that primary schools build the foundations of the nation. Conscious of aforesaid, the law makers incorporated Article 21-A making free and compulsory education for all children from the age of 06 to 14 years a fundamental right w.e.f. 2002. This led to enactment of Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009. This was closely followed by framing of Rights of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2010 which in Part-VI provided for minimum qualifications, salary, allowance and conditions for service for teachers which were required to be maintained at a particular standards so as to ensure minimum requisite merit in teachers.”

Strictly speaking, the Bench then does not shy away from pointing that, “The State Government, in particular, The State of Madhya Pradesh has prescribed very low minimum standards in Teacher Training Programme which have led to influx of average and below average persons becoming teachers in Primary Schools in the Government Sector.”

Honestly speaking, the Bench then also concedes quite clearly that, “In view of aforesaid, the ultimate loser is the innocent child who on being admitted to a primary school in a Government Sector hopes and expects of being taught good quality education which not only teaches the child reading, writing & arithmetic, but also the ability to distinguish between right and wrong, moral and immoral and above all to learn discipline in life to become useful for the Society and nation. These foundational traits can be instilled in a child only when the teachers teaching the child are of sterling quality, in character, conduct, behaviour and human values.”

More significantly, the Bench then candidly remarks that, “Conspectus of the above discussions leads this Court to make earnest request from the Government and its functionaries including law makers that by way of statutory or other provisions incorporate exceptionally high standards of minimum qualification and merit as requisites eligibility criteria for a person seeking admission to any Teacher Training Programme. Besides high quality of merits, the persons seeking induction into Teacher Training Programme ought to possess very high moral and human values.

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This will undoubtedly help in imparting education of highest standards and not merely literacy to children in primary schools in Government Sector.”

Most significantly, the Bench then underscores in the next para that, “The aforesaid is possible only when salaries, allowances and perquisites attached to the post of a primary teacher in the Government Sector are attractive. In fact, a primary teacher should be one of the highest paid employees under the government so that the most meritorious available in the society is attracted and the best out of them have sterling qualities are ultimately picked up to be appointed as teachers.”

Equally significant is what the Bench then hastens to add and emphasize upon that, “This Court hopes and prays that if effort is made by the State and its functionaries and law making bodies in this direction, the rapidly falling standards of education in Primary Schools in Government Sector can not only be halted but reversed.”

Finally, the Bench then holds that, “Registry is directed to communicate a copy of this order to the Principal Secretary Law & Legislative Affairs and Principal Secretary General Administration Department. No cost.”

In conclusion, what the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held in this case merits prompt attention not just in Madhya Pradesh where this notable judgment is applicable but also all over the country. We all know too very well that in most of the states in our country the standard of primary education is not very good and the prime reason for it is primary teachers are paid very miserly which ensures that the best talent does not come in the field of teaching. This has to be reversed as has been underscored by the two Judge Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Gwalior Bench comprising of Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Deepak Kumar Agarwal in this noteworthy case also which can be possible only if all the state governments as also the Centre ensures that the primary teachers are one of the highest paid employees under the government!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

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AN ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE BODIES CAN ESTABLISH A CAPTIVE POWER PLANT PRIMARILY FOR THEIR OWN USE UNDER THE ELECTRICITY ACT: SUPREME COURT

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The Supreme Court in the case Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd. vs Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission observed that a captive power plant primarily for their own use can be established by an association of corporate bodies.

The requirement would be that the consumption of SBIPL and SBMPL together should not be less than 51% of the power generated. Admittedly, the joint consumption by SBIPL and SBMPL is more than 51% and under the provisions of the said Act, the use of electricity by it would be for captive use only even an association of corporate bodies can establish a power plant. Since SBMPL holds 27.6% of the ownership, the requirement of not less than 26% of shares is fulfilled by SBMPL as SBMPL holds 27.6% equity shares in SBPIL.

The fourth proviso to sub­section (2) of Section 42 of the said Act would also reveal that surcharge would not be leviable in case open access is provided to a person who has established a captive generating plant for carrying the electricity to the destination of his own use and under Section 9 of the said Act, could be an individual or a body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, it is clear that the person will get benefit even an association of corporate bodies can establish a captive power plant it has been seen. The definition of “person” is wide enough to include any company or body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or artificial juridical person it should be primarily for the use of the members of such co­operative society or association is the requirement, the Bench observed while referring to the provisions of the Electricity Act.

The BPIL, the respondent contended and supported the impugned judgment that no permission is required from the Commission for supply of electricity for its own use. Thereafter the appellant Company contended that unless SBPIL consumes 51% of the aggregate electricity generated by it, it will not be entitled to get the benefit under Section 9 of the said Act, in an appeal filled before the Apex Court.

An appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity filed by the Company further The Commission held that SBPIL was entitled to supply electricity to its sister concern SBMPL and the same would qualify to be treating as own consumption and within the ambit of Section 9 read with Section 2(8) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Rule 3 of the Electricity Rules, 2005 SBPIL submitted a petition for providing open access and wheeling of power through the transmission system of the Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd (Company) for captive use by SBMPL to the Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission, the commission. A Captive Generation Plant is established by SBPIL, and is a sister concern of SBPIL Shri Bajrang Power and I spat Ltd and Shri Bajrang Metallics and Power Ltd, SBMPL.

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Where the crime was committed the remission or premature release policy of the state has to be considered: Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court in the case Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, Lala Vakil vs State of Gujarat observed that where the crime was committed has to be considered in the remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State.

While allowing the writ petition the court observed and contended that Once the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat, after the trial been concluded and judgment of conviction came to be passed, all further proceedings have to be 6 considered including remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred and concluded for exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court, as the case may be. The court further stated that under Section 432(7) CrPC the appropriate Government can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments.

the appropriate Government in the ordinary course would be the State of Gujarat. But the case was transferred in exceptional circumstances by this Court for limited purpose for trial and disposal to the neighboring State i.e., the State of Maharashtra by an order dated 06.08.2004. ordinarily, the trial was to be concluded in the same State and in terms of Section 432(7) CrPC as the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed in the State of Gujarat, observed by the Apex Court.

he application for pre­mature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat, as prayed by the petitioner by judgment impugned dated 17.07.2009 As His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra. Thereafter He had filed his petition for pre­mature release under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating that he had undergone more than 15 years 4 months of custody.

The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed and noted that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of the appropriate Government.

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Adopt roster based reservation for preferential candidates as followed by JIPMER: Supreme Court directs all AIIMS institutes

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The Supreme Court in the case Students Association AIIMS Bhopal And Or’s. v. AllMS and Or’s observed and directed all AIIMS Institutes to adopt roster-based reservation followed by Jawaharlal Institute of Postgraduate Medical Education and Research, Pondicherry (JIPMER) as a plea was filled in the Court seeking direction to AIIMS to have a defined criteria for arriving at seat matrix for institutional preference candidates in INI-CET examination.

the order of the Apex Court in the case AIIMS Students’ Union v. AIIMS And Or’s, would not be applicable if It emphasized that if the roster-based system is implemented the actual roster points for AIIMS would be different from JIPMER as the same would depend on the percentage of seats decided to be allocated to the preferential candidates but It stated that the reservation would be similar to the one adopted by JIPMER AIIMS New Delhi was willing to provide a roster-point based reservation for its institutional preference candidates, by way of an affidavit 20th January 2022 the Bench was apprised that pursuant to a meeting held on 28th June 2020 as prescribed the relevancy:

It shall not be too wide with the one for the general category candidate, that the margin of difference between the qualifying marks for the Institute’s candidate.

The one who has secured marks at the common entrance PG test less than the one secured by any other candidate belonging to reserved category enjoying constitutional protection such as SC, ST etc. cannot be the AIMS graduate the last student to qualify for admission.

appearing on behalf of AIIMS, Advocate, Mr. Dushyant Parashar, New Delhi was asked to get instructions from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and Jodhpur so that the Court can pass appropriate orders on the next date of hearing. As that apart from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and AIIMS, Jodhpur, all other AIIMS before the Apex Court has agreed to implement the roster-based reservation system followed by JIPMER Puducherry for their institutional preference candidates, the Court was informed at the last date of hearing.

the petition had been filed seeking direction to AIIMS to disclose how the seats for institutional preference candidates are to be allotted in the view of the same the petitioners claim that in the INI-CET examination conducted in July, 2021, only 4 seats (1.87%) in AIIMS, New Delhi were allotted to institutional preference candidates. Rivetingly, the petitioners note that no seats were allocated to any other AIIMS for admission of institutional preference candidates.

the Bench comprising of Justice L. Nageswara Rao and the justice A.S. Bopanna observed and noted that to record in the order that the roaster system would be applicable from this year. Mr. Parashar informed it that since new software is to be put in place for counselling, it might cause some delay. The bench further stated that the court will order it to apply this year but in case of delay AIMS can come later.

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‘The crime committed has to be considered in the remission or premature policy of the state’

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The Supreme Court in the case Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, Lala Vakil vs State of Gujarat observed that where the crime was committed has to be considered in the remission which is applicable in the State and the pre­mature release in terms of the policy

The Court noted while hearing the writ petition that in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred and concluded for exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court once the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat, after the trial been concluded and judgment of conviction came to be passed, all further proceedings have to be 6 considered including remission or pre­mature release, as the case may be, in the instance case. under Section 432(7) CrPC, there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments, can be either the Central or the State Government of the appropriate government.

in terms of Section 432(7) CrPC, the trial was to be concluded in the same State and ordinarily in the State of Gujrat the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed. by an order 06.08.2004., the case was transferred in exceptional circumstances by this Court for limited purpose for trial and disposal to the neighbouring State i.e., the State of Maharashtra, observed by the bench of Apex Court.

As mentioned by the petitioner in the plea that by judgment impugned dated 17.07.2019., the application for pre­mature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat and His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra. under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the petition was filled by the petitioner for premature release further the petitioner stated that that he had undergone under the custody of more than 15 years 4 months.

Section 302, 376(2) (e) (g) and reading it with Section 149 IPC, Shah was found guilty for the offence, the offence committed by him in the State of Gujrat.

The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of that appropriate government.

The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of that appropriate government.

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Seeking reduction of qualifying the percentile for admission in ayurveda course: A plea in Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court in the Case Amit Kumar v UOI & Or’s observed in Ayurveda course in view of large number of vacancies and for seeking reduction of qualifying percentile for admission, an ayurveda aspirant who appeared in NEET 2021 has approached the Court.

the court had observed that lowering the minimum marks and reducing the percentile for admission to first year BDS Course would not amount to lowing the standards of Education and further the Court directed to lower the percentile mark by 10 percentiles for admission in first year of BDS Course for academic year 2020-2021, with regards to substantive the contentions made by the petitioner by referring the judgement passed in the case in Harshit Agarwal & Or’s v Union of India.

the percentile may also be reduced for Ayurveda programme enabling the Petitioner to take admissions then If percentile is being reduced/considered for reduction for BDS course was further stated by the petitioner in the plea, while referring to an order dated 04.29.2022. Thereafter the top Court had asked Centre to consider lowering the percentile for BDS Courses.

Seeking the Centre’s response in a plea by filing a counter affidavit, noted by the Top Court specifying the above-mentioned information:

after deducting the admission granted for MBBS Courses (BDS Courses), the total number of Candidates.

in All India Quota and State Quota, the totals number of vacant seats.

in government colleges on one hand & private/deemed colleges on the other hand, the number of seats which are remaining.

the petition was filed through AOR Neeraj Shekhar and for the petitioner Advocate Shivam Singh appeared.

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Bank case rejected by Supreme Court against farmer

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The Supreme Court in the case Bank of Maharashtra & Or’s v Mohanlal Patidar observed an order given by the High Courts of directing the bank the OTS proposal given by a farmer who had availed a loan from the bank, the court further pulled up the Bank of Maharashtra for challenging the order.

The Bank shall complete remaining formalities and provide all consequential benefits flowing therefrom to the petitioners, the court further stated that it is needless to emphasize The OTS proposal given by the petitioners in both the cases shall be accepted by the Bank and ‘sanction letters’ be issued forthwith, the court allowed the petitioner plea.

The petitioner not only promptly challenged the said order, it is noteworthy that petitioner never acceded to the unilateral decision dated 25th August 2021 and even otherwise the letter dated 25th August 2021 is held to be illegal by us, clause-7 of policy cannot take away the fruits of OTS benefits, within two months from the date of issuance of order dated 22th September 2021, the petitioner filled the instant petition and further the court directed we are unable to give stamp of approval to the impugned orders and action of the Bank, observed by the bench comprising of Justice Sujoy Paul and the justice Dwarka Dhish Bansal while setting aside the impugned orders of the bank.

In an order dated 03.09.2021 it was stated and it showed that the petitioner was required to pay minimum 10% of the OTS amount within stipulated time and that he had deposited Rs.35,00,000/- out of Rs.36,50,000/- within the stipulated time, it was argued before the court by the counsel.

As full and final settlement of the dues, he will be required to deposit Rs.50.50 lakhs as he was informed by the Asset Recovery Branch of the Bank.

Whole law comes into place when a matter of farmers come as the down payment were also accepted and it was further stated by the bench in an oral remark You don’t file cases against the ones who loot 1000s of crores.

The respondent had obtained a loan and intended to pay it in terms of a One Time Settlement which was quantified as Rs 3650000/-. in furtherance thereof the respondent had deposited Rs 35,00,000 with the bank, in the above-mentioned matter.

The bank had miserably failed to accept the same and on the contrary, decided to enhance the compromise amount to Rs.50.50 lakhs unilaterally which was contrary to the OTS scheme, contended by the counsel further the counsel stated that the bank had miserably failed to accept the same and on the contrary, decided to enhance the compromise amount to Rs.50.50 lakhs unilaterally which was contrary to the OTS scheme.

The bench comprising of Justice DY Chandrachud and the justice Surya Kant observed and remarked while dismissing the plea assailing Madhya Pradesh High Court’s order dated 02.21.2022 Such a litigation in Supreme Court will spoil the families of farmers financially, Go after bigger fish.

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