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SUSPICION, HOWEVER STRONG, CAN’T TAKE THE PLACE OF PROOF: SC

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It is really remarkable, refreshing, rejuvenating and reasonable to learn that the Supreme Court has just recently on February 12, 2021 in a latest, learned, landmark and laudable judgment titled State of Odisha vs. Banabihari Mohapatra in Special Leave Petition (Cri) No. 1156/2021 has reiterated that suspicion, however strong cannot take the place of proof. This was held so while upholding the acquittal in a murder case. All the Courts must always bear this in mind while dealing with criminal cases especially where the evidentiary value of proof matters most in deciding conviction or acquittal.

To start with, this commendable judgment authored by Justice Indira Banerjee for herself and Justice Hemant Gupta sets the ball rolling by first and foremost observing in para 1 that, “This Special Leave Petition filed by the State of Odisha is against a final judgment and order dated 2nd November, 2020 passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack dismissing an application for leave to appeal being CRLLP No.14 of 2020 filed by the Petitioner State, against a judgment dated 14th January, 2020 passed by the Sessions Judge, Bhadrak in S.T. Case No.182/392 of 2014, acquitting the Respondents from charges under Sections 302/201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).”

To be sure, it is then stated in para 2 that, “Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner State forcefully contended that the High Court committed gross error in dismissing the application for leave to appeal filed by the Petitioner State on the ground of delay of 41 days, even though, there were serious charges against the Accused Respondents, including charges of murder under Section 302 of the IPC.”

Truth be told, it is then pointed out in para 3 that, “It is true that the appeal has, by the impugned judgment and order dated 2nd November 2020, been dismissed on the ground of delay of only 41 days in filing the CRLLP.”

While stating the ostensible, the Bench then acknowledges in para 4 that, “In a criminal case involving the serious offence of murder, the Courts do not ordinarily dismiss an appeal against a judgment and order of the Trial Court, whether of conviction or of acquittal, on the sole ground of some delay. This is to prevent miscarriage of justice.”

Simply put, it is then conceded in para 5 that, “However, in this case the application of the Petitioner State, for leave to appeal against the judgment and order of acquittal of the Respondent Accused, has been rejected on the ground of delay, but after considering the merits of application for leave to appeal.”

Needless to say, the Bench then points out in para 6 that, “We have considered the contentions of the State of Odisha being the petitioner before us. As per an FIR lodged with the police by one Gitanjali Tadu, hereinafter referred to as the “Complainant”, her husband Bijay Kumar Tadu, hereinafter referred to as the “deceased”, had been working in the Home Guard, Chandabali and deputed at Chandabali Police Station.”

For the sake of information, the Bench then reveals in para 7 that, “According to the Complainant, the deceased used to move around with the first accused, Banabihari Mohapatra, who had an electric sales and repairing shop styled “Raja Electricals” at the Ferry Ghat area near the Chandabali bus stand.”

Be it noted, it is then made known in para 8 that, “In the FIR, it is alleged that the first accused came to the residence of the deceased at around 7.30 a.m. on 23rd June, 2014 and told the Complainant that the deceased had been lying motionless and still, not responding to calls. Later his younger son Luja alias Smruti Ranjan Mohapatra being the second Respondent also came and informed the complainant that the deceased was lying motionless.”

While continuing in a similar vein, the Bench then observes in para 9 that, “On hearing this, the Complainant along with her family members went to the Ferry Ghat near the Chandabali Bus Stand and found her husband lying dead inside a room which was locked, with a swollen belly and a deep burn injury on his right foot which was apparently caused by electric shock. The body of the deceased appeared black and blood was oozing out from the mouth and nostril of the deceased.”

It would be pertinent to mention that it is then disclosed in para 10 that, “In the FIR, the complainant has alleged that on 22nd June, 2016, the deceased had left the house to go to the house of a relative. He had been wearing a gold chain on his neck and two gold rings on his fingers, and had been carrying Rs.800 for purchase of a new pair of pants and shirt and Rs.5,000/- for purchase of articles for a marriage.”

It has to be borne in mind that para 11 then brings out that, “On making enquiries the complainant learnt that the deceased had not visited the house of the relative on that day. The complainant has alleged that the Accused No.1 Banabihari Mohapatra, his son Luja alias Smruti Ranjan Mohapatra, being the Accused No.2, and other accomplices committed murder of her husband by applying electric shock to him after administering some poisonous substances to him.”

What also has to be noted is then stated in para 12 that, “The Sessions Judge Bhadrak framed charges against the Accused Respondents Banabihari Mohapatra and Luja @ Smruti Ranjan Mohapatra alleging that, together they had intentionally caused the death of the deceased, thereby committing murder and had caused disappearance of evidence and thus been guilty of offences under Sections 302/201 read with Section 34 of the IPC.”

No doubt, the Bench then rightly mentions in para 13 that, “We have carefully gone through the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Bhadrak, holding that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges against the Accused Respondents or either of them under Section 302, or Section 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC, and acquitting them under Section 235(1) of the Cr.P.C.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then elaborates in para 14 that, “The prosecution appears to have examined 9 witnesses. There are no eye witnesses to the incident. The deceased had apparently died in a room held by the Accused Respondent No.1. The Accused Respondents did not abscond. The Accused Respondents themselves informed the complainant that the deceased was lying still and motionless, not responding to calls.”

It is worth noting that it is then enunciated in para 15 that, “The post mortem Report of the deceased reveals that the cause of death was electric shock, suffered by the deceased within 24 hours from the time of examination. On post mortem examination, the Doctor found food particles including meat in the stomach of the deceased, and also detected smell of alcohol. The post mortem doctor opined that the deceased was intoxicated with alcohol and the death was either accidental, or homicidal, but not suicidal. There is no conclusive evidence that the death was homicidal.”

No less crucial is what is then mentioned in para 16 that, “The complaint lodged by the complainant is apparently based on suspicion. Since the Accused Respondents had informed the complainant that the deceased was lying still and motionless, not responding to calls and the body of the deceased was found at the premises of the Accused Respondent No.1, the complainant has assumed that the Accused Respondents killed the deceased.”

More damningly, the Bench then observes in para 17 that, “In evidence, the complainant said that the Accused Respondent No.1, Banabihari, had taken a loan of Rs.20,000/- from the deceased which he had not repaid even though the deceased had asked him to repay the amount. Significantly, there is no whisper in the FIR, of any loan taken by the Accused Respondent No.1 from the deceased. The reference to the alleged loan appears to be an afterthought, in an attempt to insinuate a motive for killing the deceased.”

It cannot be denied that it is then conceded in para 18 that, “The mere fact that the deceased was lying dead at a room held by the the Accused Respondent No.1 and that the Accused Respondents had informed the complainant that the deceased had been lying motionless and still and not responding to shouts and calls, does not establish that the Accused Respondents murdered the deceased. At the cost of repetition it is reiterated that the post mortem report suggests that the death could have been accidental.”

Significantly, the Bench then makes it clear in para 19 that, “We have perused the evidence of the nine Prosecution Witnesses, namely, the first Prosecution Witness Dhanjaya Tadu, younger brother of the deceased, the second Prosecution Witness Gitanjali Tadu, wife of the deceased, the third Prosecution Witness, Ajay Sahoo, a Shop Keeper at the locality where dead body of the deceased was found, the fourth Prosecution Witness, Smt. Bijayalaxmi Tadu, sister of the deceased, the fifth Prosecution Witness, Bailochan Bej, a Barber by profession who knew the complainant and the deceased as also the accused persons who resided in the Chandabali Police Station area, the sixth Prosecution Witness, Manmohan Sutar, an auto driver, the seventh Prosecution Witness, Aswini Kumar Nayak, a cultivator residing at Nayahat in the Chandabali Police Station area of Bhadrak, the 8th Prosecution Witness, Dr. Bhisma Parida, being the Doctor who conducted the autopsy/ post mortem examination of the deceased and the ninth Prosecution Witness Smt. Kumari Behera, Sub Inspector of Police, who was the Investigating Officer.”

We need to pay attention here that para 20 then states that, “Of the nine Prosecution Witnesses, three witnesses namely, the third Prosecution Witness, Ajay Sahoo, the fifth Prosecution Witness, Bailochan Bej and the seventh Prosecution Witness, Durga Charan Nayak were declared hostile by the Prosecution.”

It cannot be glossed over that it is then stated in para 21 that, “The third Prosecution Witness said that he had only seen the police shifting the dead body of the deceased and knew nothing more about the case. Nothing has emerged from his cross-examination by the Public Prosecutor. In his cross-examination by the defence, he said there was no electric connection in the house from which the body of the deceased was brought out. He even said that the Accused Respondents did not own any shop dealing with electric appliances. No credence can be given to this witness.”

It also cannot be glossed over that para 22 then reveals that, “The fifth Prosecution Witness, Bailochan Bej, denied knowledge of the case. He said that the police had not examined him, nor recorded any statement made by him. In cross-examination by the prosecution, he only said that he had a saloon at Chandabali Police Station, Bhadrak. He categorically denied having made the statements attributed to him by the police.”

What deserves mentioning here is that it is then stated in para 23 that, “The seventh Prosecution Witness, Durga Charan Nayak only said that he had seen the body of the deceased in the rented place near the Chandabali bus stand with bleeding injury on his right leg and blood oozing from his mouth and nostrils. He said he did not know how the deceased suffered the injury or died. Nothing significant has emerged from his cross-examination by the Public Prosecutor.”

Same is true of para 24 which then states that, “The sixth Prosecution Witness, Manmohan Sutar deposed that he knew the informant, the deceased as also the Accused Respondents. In a nutshell, he only confirmed that the dead body was in the shop of the Accused Respondents in Home Guard uniform. Inquest of the body was conducted in his presence. He identified his signature in the Inquest Report. He also said he had noticed a bleeding injury in the right foot of the deceased and blood oozing from the mouth and nostrils.”

It is extremely relevant to note that para 25 then brings out that, “All the three witnesses related to the deceased, that is the second Prosecution Witness, being the wife of the deceased, the first Prosecution Witness, being the younger brother of the deceased and the fourth Prosecution Witness, being the sister of the deceased have more or less reiterated what has been stated in the FIR with embellishments. There are, however, apparent inconsistencies, inaccuracies and inherent improbabilities in the statements of these witnesses.”

Of course, it is then elucidated in para 26 that, “These three witnesses deposed that they suspected that the accused Respondents had killed the deceased as the deceased was asking the Accused Respondents to repay Rs.20,000/- which the deceased had advanced to the Accused Respondents by way of loan. However, as observed above, there is no whisper of the alleged loan in the FIR lodged by the complainant wife being the second Prosecution Witness.”

Adding more to it, the Bench then puts forth in para 27 that, “That apart, the first and fourth Prosecution Witnesses have admitted in cross-examination that they did not have first hand knowledge of the loan alleged to be advanced by the deceased to the Accused Respondent No.1. The first Prosecution Witness said that the complainant (PW2) had told him that the Accused Respondent No.1 had not repaid loan of Rs.20,000/- to the deceased. The fourth Respondent said she had heard about the loan from her deceased brother. Though she said that the loan was given to the Accused Respondent No.1 at the time of his daughter’s marriage she could not say how long ago the loan was given. She could not even tell the approximate date or year of marriage of the Accused Respondent No.1’s daughter.”

Furthermore, it is then also observed in para 28 that, “From the evidence of the first and the second Prosecution Witnesses it transpires that the deceased had left his house at around 10.00 a.m. on 22nd June 2014, to go to his Aunt’s house in connection with his Aunt’s daughter’s marriage. He was wearing a gold chain and two gold rings and carried Rs.800/- with him for buying a pair of trousers and shirt and Rs.5000/- for articles for the marriage. Enquiries, however, revealed that he had not gone to his Aunt’s house. It is, however, difficult to understand why the deceased should have been wearing his home guard uniform if he were going to visit his Aunt in connection with the marriage of his Aunt’s daughter. There is evidence to show that the deceased was found in his home guard uniform. The relevance of the plan of the deceased to go to his Aunt’s house or his plan to buy clothes etc. is also not clear. This is in no way linked to the incident of death of the deceased. Prosecution has failed to show a link between the proposed visit of the deceased to his Aunt’s house with the guilt, if any, of the Accused Respondents.”

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Quite forthrightly, the Bench then holds in para 29 that, “The evidence of the first Prosecution Witness Dhanjaya Tadu, brother of the deceased, that he had found the motor cycle of the deceased in front of the shop of the accused persons on the evening of the 22nd June 2014, is difficult to accept. He said he had asked the second accused about whereabouts of his brother to which the second accused had expressed ignorance, but on the next day, the second Accused Respondent and his father informed them that his brother was lying senseless. It seems rather unnatural that this witness, who was the brother of the deceased, should have chosen not to make any inquiry either in the police station or in the neighbourhood, even after seeing the motor cycle of the deceased in front of the shop, and after being told his brother was not in the shop. No attempt was made to look for the deceased even though he did not return home all night.”

What’s more, it is then stated in para 30 that, “The eighth Prosecution Witness, Dr. Bhisma Parida, who had at the time of death of the deceased been posted as Medical Officer at CHC Chandabali and had conducted the autopsy/post mortem examination of the deceased at around 1.00 p.m. on 24th June 2014, deposed that the deceased died due to electrical injury, suffered within 24 hours of the autopsy. The stomach of the deceased was full of food particles including meat and there was smell of alcohol. The deceased had been intoxicated with alcohol. The Medical Officer found electrical wounds in the leg which were sufficient to cause death. He opined that the injuries sustained by the deceased might have been due to contact with live electric wire. He opined that the contact was prolonged. The injuries were ante mortem. This witness was of the opinion that the death may have been accidental or homicidal, but not suicidal.”

Crucially, it is then pointed out in para 31 that, “Nothing significant has emerged from the oral evidence of the ninth Prosecution Witness, Smt. Kumari Behera, the Investigating Officer, to establish the guilt of the Accused Respondents. She only stated that the fifth Prosecution Witness had in course of examination stated before her that the first Accused Respondent and the deceased used one of the quarters where they regularly took tiffin and they were both present there on the date of the incident in Court. The fifth Prosecution Witness, however, denied having made any such statement to the Police and remained unshaken in cross-examination by the Public Prosecutor. He only admitted that he had a saloon in the area, but denied knowing the deceased, the Accused Respondents or the informant. The fifth Prosecution Witness said that the Police had neither examined him, nor recorded his statement.”

It is worth mentioning that para 32 then states that, “In her deposition, the Investigating Officer also said that some local persons had stated that the first Accused Respondent, Banabhihari had, out of animosity, killed the deceased by applying electric current. The oral evidence of the Investigating Officer in this regard is totally vague and devoid of particulars. The Investigating Officer (PW-9) had neither named the local persons nor enquired into the source of their information if any. The local persons have not been examined as witnesses.”

No wonder, it is then conceded in para 33 that, “The Prosecution miserably failed to establish the guilt of the Accused Respondents. The Trial Court rightly acquitted the Accused Respondents. There is no infirmity in the judgment of the Trial Court, that calls for interference.”

While citing the relevant case law, it is then observed in para 34 that, “As held by this Court in Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P. reported in 2016 (4) SCC 357, an appeal against acquittal has always been on an altogether different pedestal from an appeal against conviction. In an appeal against acquittal, where the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the appellate court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity. In this case, it cannot be said that the reasons given by the High Court to reverse the conviction of the accused are flimsy, untenable or bordering on perverse appreciation of evidence.”

More crucially, the Bench then states in para 35 that, “Before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn must fully be established and the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused. There has to be a chain of evidence so complete, as not to leave any reasonable doubt for any conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability, the act must have been done by the Accused.”

While citing another relevant case law, it is then encapsulated in para 36 that, “In Shanti Devi v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2012) 12 SCC 158, this Court held that the principles for conviction of the accused based on circumstantial evidence are:

“10.1. The circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be proved must be cogently or firmly established.

10.2. The circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused.

10.3. The circumstances taken cumulatively must form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused and none else.

10.4. The circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.””

No doubt, the Bench then hastens to add in para 37 that, “Keeping the above test in mind, we have no iota of doubt that the Trial Court rightly acquitted the Accused Respondents. There is a strong possibility that the accused, who was as per the opinion of the doctor who performed the autopsy, intoxicated with alcohol, might have accidentally touched a live electrical wire, may be while he was asleep. The impugned judgment of the High Court dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay does not call for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.”

Most crucially, the Bench then makes it clear in no uncertain terms in para 38 that, “It is well settled by a plethora of judicial pronouncement of this Court that suspicion, however strong cannot take the place of proof. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt. This proposition has been reiterated in Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam reported in AIR 2013 SC 3817.”

No less crucial is what is then stated in para 39 that, “In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in AIR 1973 SC 2773, this Court observed:-

“Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases where in the guilt of the accused is sought is to be established by circumstantial evidence.”

Finally, it is then held in the last para 40 that, “For the reasons discussed above, we find no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the Special Leave Petition is dismissed. Pending application stands disposed of.”

To conclude, the long and short of this noteworthy judgment is that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. This is the basic cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence also. It has to be strictly implemented by all the courts in India. Para 38 is the most crucial para of this commendable judgment which has already been discussed above and which again repeats what is the bottom-line of this leading case that, “Suspicion, howsoever strong, cannot take the place of proof.” All courts must strictly abide by it! There should be certainly no deviation from this fundamental principle of law as followed in India and many other countries also! No denying or disputing it!

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Legally Speaking

Poverty can be addressed through healing touch of law: MP HC issues directions for implementation of poverty alleviation schemes

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In a well-written, well-articulated, well-reasoned and well substantiated judgment titled Omnarayan Sharma Vs State of MP & Ors in W.P. No. 1930/2020 (PIL) that was delivered on July 6, 2021, the Gwalior Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court has issued directions to the District Legal Services Authorities and the State Authority for ensuring implementation of poverty alleviation schemes promulgated under provisions of Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 and NALSA (Effective Implementation of Poverty Alleviation Schemes) Scheme, 2015. It must be apprised here that a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court comprising of Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Anand Pathak have observed thus:

“Poverty, which is a Problem (Social Evil) can be addressed through Law (with its healing touch) as its solution to achieve the ultimate destination of Development.” It also must be mentioned here that the remarks came in a petition against alleged corruption and illegality committed by state authorities in construction of toilets under Swachh Bharat Mission in Bhind District.

To start with, a Division Bench of Gwalior Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court comprising of Justice Anand Pathak who has authored this learned, laudable, latest and landmark judgment for himself and Justice Sheel Nagu first and foremost points out in para 1 that, “The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred by the petitioner as Pro Bono Publico projecting himself to be a public spirited citizen and has raised the grievance regarding illegality and irregularity committed by the respondents, especially respondents No. 6 to 13 who according to petitioner have not undertaken any enquiry over the complaint of petitioner regarding corruption / illegality committed in construction of toilets under Swachh Bharat Mission.”

To put things in perspective, the Division Bench then puts forth in para 3 that, “Precisely stated facts of the case are that on 31/12/2019, one Ramu Chaudhary, resident of village Etahar, District Bhind registered a complaint on Chief Minister Helpline Portal that Sarpanch, Secretary and other officers of the Gram Panchayat Ater, District Bhind have embezzled public fund in the name of construction of toilets but neither toilets have been constructed nor any amount for construction has been received by 93 beneficiaries. Despite making complaint by the petitioner on behalf of the beneficiaries to Collector, District Bhind no affirmative steps have been taken.”

While dwelling on the petitioner’s grievance, the Division Bench then enunciates in para 4 that, “It is the grievance of the petitioner that in other blocks of District Bhind also corruption and illegality have been conducted in construction of toilets under Swachh Bharat Mission. Petitioner placed the list of beneficiaries (94 in number) vide Annexure P/3, who did not receive the benefits of toilets nor any amount. Petitioner also referred the screen shot of app. (Pandit Deendayal Shram Seva App) to demonstrate that allegedly amount has been received by the beneficiaries but in fact bogus papers have been prepared and amount has been siphoned off.”

As we see, the Bench then puts forth in para 5 that, “Learned counsel for the respondents/State opposed the prayer and placed certain documents on record. It is the submission of learned counsel for the State that immediately after issuance of notice in this writ petition (on 27/8/2020), CEO, Zila Panchayat, Bhind vide order dated 14/1/2021 (Annexure R/1) constituted a committee to look into the complaint made by petitioner. He also

referred the show cause notice issued by same authority to then Panchayat Secretary, Gram Rojgar Sahayak and other Secretaries, who worked at the relevant point of time including the then Supervisor.

Therefore, as per respondents, enquiry is under process. Learned Government counsel assured this Court that due enquiry would be conducted and if any illegality or irregularity is found then same shall be taken care of earnestly and consequent action shall be taken as per enquiry report.”

Needless to say, after hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record as stated in para 7, the Division Bench then lays bare in para 8 that, “This is a case by way of Pro Bone Publico; whereby, petitioner as public interest litigant raised the question of alleged illegality and corruption brewing in the Gram Panchayat Etahar, Tasil Ater, District Bhind regarding implementation of Swachh Bharat Mission Scheme, which is a flagship scheme of Government of India to solve problems of sanitation and waste management in India by ensuring hygiene across the country. Primary object of this scheme is to eliminate open defecation and improve solid waste management. In the challenging period of COVID-19 Pandemic cleanliness and public hygiene assumed much significance. Therefore, it is the solemn duty of the District and Local Administration as well as local self government to look into the effective implementation of this scheme.”

Simply put, the Division Bench then envisages in para 9 that, “National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) under the provisions of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 has framed certain schemes encompassing wide range of subjects and the compendium of the said schemes reflects one such scheme namely NALSA (Effective Implementation of Poverty Alleviation Schemes) Scheme, 2015. This scheme is built on the foundation that poverty is a multi dimensional experience and is not limited to the issues of income. Multi dimensional poverty includes issues like health (including

mental health), access to water, education, sanitation, subsidies and basic services, social exclusion, discrimination etc.”

Furthermore, the Division Bench then makes it clear in para 10 that, “Further, in identifying the specific scheme for implementation at the State and District Level, Legal Services Authorities as per NALSA are expected to be cognizant of the fact that various vulnerable and marginalized groups experience poverty in myriad and unique ways.”

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Be it noted, the Division Bench then points out in para 11 that, “To address this exigency faced by people the Scheme of 2015 as referred above has been conceptualized.

In the scheme, following topics have been discussed: Clause 4.-Objectives of the Scheme:-,

Clause 5.-Identification of Poverty Alleviation Schemes:-,

Clause 6.-Organization of Awareness Programmes:-,

Clause 7.- Legal Services Officers and Para-legal Volunteers:-,

1) Every District Authority and Taluka Legal Services Authority shall designate at least three panel lawyers as Legal Services Officers for

the purpose of this Scheme. 2) District Authorities shall constitute teams of PLVs under a Legal Services Officer to implement this Scheme and the Legal Services Officer will supervise and mentor the PLVs in his team to help the beneficiaries access the various schemes of the Govt.

3) District Authorities shall conduct specialised training programs for panel of lawyers, members working in legal services clinics, members of panchayats, law students and other para-legal volunteers to assist in the implementation of the Scheme, to sensitise them regarding the needs of persons belonging to socially and economically weaker sections and the benefits that they can avail through Poverty

Alleviation Schemes.

Clause 8.- Legal Assistance for Access to Poverty Alleviation Schemes

Legal assistance must be provided to all the Scheme Beneficiaries seeking access to Poverty Alleviation Schemes. Legal Services to be provided by Legal Services Officers or volunteers under this Scheme includes, inter alia:

1) Informing the Scheme Beneficiaries about each of the Poverty

Alleviation Scheme to which they are entitled, and the benefits

thereunder

2) Assisting the Scheme Beneficiary in procuring the documents

required for availing the benefits under any of the Poverty

Alleviation Scheme

3) Informing the Scheme Beneficiary of the name and address of the

designated authority or the officer to be approached for registration

under any of the Poverty Alleviation Schemes

4) Offering to send para-legal volunteers including from the legal

services clinics with Scheme Beneficiaries to the office of the

designated authority or the officer to be approached under any of the

Poverty Alleviation Schemes

5) Informing the Scheme Beneficiary of her option to register a

complaint with the Legal Services Officer or para-legal volunteer,

about any designated authority or officer under any of the Poverty

Alleviation Schemes who refuses to cooperate with the Scheme

Beneficiary in providing her access to the benefits that she is

entitled to under the Poverty Alleviation Scheme.

6) Maintaining a record of all the complaints received under sub-clause(5).

7) Providing Scheme Beneficiaries with the contact number, if

available, of the Legal Services Officer, and availability of the

Legal Services Officer on call during working hours for such Scheme

Beneficiaries to whom contact number is provided.

Clause 9.-Action by Legal Services Officers on complaints;

1) On receiving complaints under sub-clause (5) of clause 8, each

Legal Services Officer shall herself personally accompany the

Complainant Beneficiary to the office of the designated authority or

officer, and assist the Complainant Beneficiary in availing the

benefit that she is entitled to under the Poverty Alleviation Scheme.

2) In case the designated authority or officer fails to register the

Complainant Beneficiary in the Poverty Alleviation Scheme, the Legal

Services Officer shall submit a complaint to the District Authority.

The letter of complaint shall describe the conduct of the designated

authority or officer who refused to register the Complainant

Beneficiary under the Poverty Alleviation Scheme, and circumstances of

such refusal and whether refusal was despite submission of all

necessary documents.

Clause 10.- Action by District Authority and State Authority on complaints:-

1) On receiving a complaint regarding the designated authority or

officer, the District Authority shall seek a report from the concerned

officer regarding the reason for denying the benefits under the

Poverty Alleviation Scheme to the complainant Beneficiary. In the

event that sufficient reason is not provided by the concerned officer

for refusal to register the Complainant Beneficiary in the Poverty

Alleviation Scheme or to provide benefits under the Poverty

Alleviation Scheme, the District Authority shall immediately

communicate to the superior officer in the department the details of

the refusal to provide access to the Poverty Alleviation Scheme.

2) If the superior officer, in the opinion of the District Authority,

also withholds the benefits under the Poverty Alleviation Scheme

without sufficient cause, the District Authority shall then

communicate the same to the State Authority.

3) On receiving such communication from the District Authority, the

State Authority may choose to further pursue the matter with the

concerned department or file appropriate legal proceedings to ensure

that the Complainant Beneficiary receives the benefit under the

Poverty Alleviation Scheme.

4) The District Authority, through para-legal volunteers or legal

services clinics, shall provide regular updates to the Complainant

Beneficiary about the status of the complaint.

Clause 11.-Evaluation of the Scheme:-

1)Every Legal Services Officer shall follow-up with each Scheme

Beneficiary who sought legal assistance under this Scheme and record:

a. if such person was able to register under the Poverty Alleviation

Scheme sought to be registered under and whether such benefits were

being received

b. any grievances experienced by the Scheme Beneficiaries in getting

registered and availing benefits under the various Poverty Alleviation

Schemes.

2) The District Authority shall compile the observations made under

sub-clause (1) for all the Legal Services Officers working under the

Scheme in the district and shall send a copy of such observations in a

complied document to the State Authority every six months.

3) The State Authority shall consolidate the compiled documents

received from all the District Authorities under sub-clause (2) and

hold a meeting every 6 months to review the functioning and

effectiveness of this Scheme. The minutes of such meeting shall be

recorded and published as a public document.

4) If in the meeting under sub-clause (3) the State Authority finds a

substantive or procedural defect in any of the Poverty Alleviation

Schemes which makes seeking benefits under the scheme a problem for

the Scheme Beneficiaries, such defect must be brought to the notice of

the Central Government or the State Government as the case may be for

improving the specific Poverty Alleviation Scheme and / or its

effective implementation.””

To be sure, the Division Bench

then observes in para 12 that, “Perusal of the whole scheme indicates

that certain responsibilities have been bestowed upon the State and

District Legal Services Authorities to train the legal and para-legal

volunteers for providing legal assistance for giving access to

beneficiaries to Poverty Alleviation Scheme and to act upon the

complaints if the benefits have not been extended to him/her or if any

authority refuses to cooperate with the scheme beneficiaries in

providing access to the benefits.”

As it turned out, the Division

Bench then states in para 13 that, “As referred in the Scheme of 2015,

poverty is a multi dimensional experience and it includes basic

services including sanitation etc. and when a duty has been cast upon

Legal Services Authority as per the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987

and Scheme of 2015 then if any complaint is received by the Legal

Services Officer from complainant / Scheme Beneficiary then such

complaint like the present one can be taken care of by the District

Authority as per Clause (9), (10) and (11) of the Scheme of 2015 by

the District Authority and even by the State Authority.”

Quite damningly, the Division

Bench then minces no words to state in para 14 that, “It is being

experienced by this Court that many complaints come regarding poor

implementation, corruption and / or irregularities in Schemes like

MGNREGA and Swachh Bharat Mission regarding construction of toilets or

non-grant of amount to the beneficiaries for construction of toilets,

etc. and by way of Public Interest Litigation, people seek Continuing

Mandamus from this Court, whereas, provisions of Act of 1987 and

Scheme of 2015 are apparently also available to address such

problems.”

Notably, the Division Bench then brings

out in para 15 that, “Clause 10(3) of Scheme of 2015 gives option to

choose between the Persuasion (with the concerned Department) or

Petition (to file appropriate legal proceedings). Here, appropriate

legal proceedings may include complaint before the Lokayukt, if it

comes under the purview of said Authority or private complaint against

the erring persons or to file a Petition on behalf of complainant

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as Public Interest

Litigation. It can club cause of more than one beneficiaries also.”

In the present context, the

Division Bench then brings out in para 16 that, “Recently, Ministry of

Panchayati Raj, Government of India has undertaken steps in respect of

Online Audit and Social Audit of 20% Gram Panchayats’ in every Janpad

Panchayat and therefore, it appears that Government also intends to

make these Institutions more accountable which are having direct

bearing over day to day welfare of people at large. In pursuance

thereof, a circular has also been issued by Panchayat Raj Directorate,

Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal dated 17/2/2021 to all CEOs of Zila Panchayats

/ Janpad Panchayats to organize camps in this regard.”

Of course, the Division Bench then hastens to

add in para 17 that, “State Authority may contemplate about

preparation of one Software and Mobile Application ( Mobile App.) for

keeping a tab over the complaints received and their outcome. This

Software / Mobile App. may coordinate amongst the concern departments

so that complaints received over the said application (App.) would be

displayed all over. Concerned stakeholders and State Authority /

District Authority would be in a better position to proceed as per the

spirit of Act of 1987 and Scheme of 2015. State Authority even has

power to make regulations as per Section 29-A of the Act 1987 to

provide for all matters for which provision is necessary or expedient

for the purposes of giving effect to the provisions of Act.”

Quite scandalously, the Division

Bench then puts forth in para 18 in simple, suave and straight

language that, “Here, in the case in hand, it appears that certain

beneficiaries allegedly did not receive the benefits under Swachh

Bharat Mission about construction of toilets. As per the allegations,

neither toilets have been constructed by the concern authorities nor

amount has been transferred in their accounts and it is the

allegations that amount of 93 beneficiaries (or may be 94) has been

siphoned off by Sarpanch / Panchayat Secretary / Gram Rojgar Sahayak

etc. Allegations are prima facie serious in nature.”

Quite categorically, the Division Bench then

puts forth in para 19 that, “This Court cannot go into the

authenticity or otherwise of the allegations at this juncture

especially when CEO, Zila Panchayat is seized of the matter vide show

cause notices issued to erring officers / authorities in this regard.

Therefore, at this juncture, any observation would pre-empt the

controversy. However, Collector and CEO, Zila Panchayat, Bhind are

directed to look into the allegations with utmost promptitude and role

of concerned Sarpanch, Panchayat Secretary, Gram Rojgar Sahayak,

Supervisor and any other person involved in the transaction / or

having any responsibility under the Swachh Bharat Mission Scheme

failed or acted mischievously be enquired into in accordance with law.

If any conclusion has not been drawn in the enquiry up till now then

enquiry be conducted expeditiously within two months from the date of

passing of this order and outcome of the enquiry be intimated to the

office of this Court and office shall place the matter under the

caption “Direction” for perusal of this Court and even if conclusion

is drawn then consequential follow up action be informed to office of

this Court.”

Significantly, the Division Bench then

directs in para 20 that, “Before parting, this Court feels it

appropriate to give direction to the District Legal Services Authority

to update the contents of different schemes promulgated under the

different provisions of Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 including

the Scheme in hand i.e. NALSA (Effective Implementation of Poverty

Alleviation Schemes) Scheme, 2015 and ensure that in their respective

jurisdiction (District) Poverty Alleviation Scheme especially Swachh

Bharat Mission Scheme and Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment

Guarantee Act, 2005 (MGNREGA), etc. are being properly executed and

intended beneficiaries get the benefits of the scheme and if any

authority refuses to cooperate with the beneficiary in providing him /

her access to the benefits that she is entitled to under any Poverty

Alleviation Scheme, then the responsible authority under District

Legal Services Authority (DALSA) shall proactively take care of the

situation by proceeding as per Clause 9, 10 and 11 of the Scheme,

2015.”

More significantly, the Division Bench then further directs in

para 21 that, “It is further expected from the Authority and its

Office Bearers that they shall constantly organize awareness

programmes as well as training programmes for Panel Lawyers / Legal

Volunteers / Para-legal Volunteers as the case may be in a

constructive and proactive manner. The training must sensitize the

volunteers / activists to the notion that they have to act as Healers

of the Society looking to the great responsibility bestowed upon them

of Poverty Alleviation. Poverty, which is a Problem (Social Evil) can

be addressed through Law (with its healing touch) as its solution to

achieve the ultimate destination of Development.”

Most significantly, the Division

Bench then also directs in para 22 that, “In view of aforesaid

discussion, this Court summarizes the following directions:-

(i) If, any complaint is received regarding inaction, inappropriate

execution, corruption or any matter related thereto which comes under

the purview of Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 and NALSA (Effective

Implementation of Poverty Alleviation Schemes) Scheme, 2015 then

District Legal Service Authority (DALSA) shall proactively take care

of the situation by proceeding as per Clause 9,10 and 11 of the Scheme

of 2015;;

(ii) State Authority / District Authority may file appropriate legal

proceedings as per Clause 10 (3) of Scheme of 2015 by way of complaint

before the Office of Lokayukt as per relevant provisions or may file

Private Complaint against the erring persons or may file a petition if

subject matter requires so by way of a Public Interest Litigation

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India;

(iii) State Authority is requested to contemplate for framing of

suitable regulations as per the provisions of Act of 1987, especially

under Section 29-A for effective implementation of different schemes

of Government of India / State Government fall under NALSA (Effective

Implementation of Poverty Alleviation Schemes) Scheme, 2015. A further

request is made to contemplate about preparation of a Software /

Mobile Application (Mobile App.) for keeping a tab over the complaints

received and their outcome; and

(iv) District Authority and its Office Bearers are expected to

regularly organize awareness / training programmes for Panel Lawyers /

Para-legal Volunteers in a constructive and proactive manner to

sensitize them with the notion that they have to act as Healers of the

Society, looking to the great responsibilities bestowed upon them.

Secretary, SALSA shall coordinate and guide all such awareness /

training programmes.

Moving on, the Division Bench then

holds in para 23 that, “Consequently, petition is disposed of with a

direction to the respondents especially Collector and CEO, Zila

Panchayat Bhind to look into the matter and complete the enquiry, if

not already completed within two months from the date of passing of

this order and if any person is found guilty then consequential follow

up action shall be ensured in accordance with law. If the enquiry is

already concluded then Collector and CEO are directed to place the

enquiry report before the office of this Court so that same can be

placed before this Court for perusal.”

On a final note, the Division Bench while disposing of the petition as stated in para 24 then holds

in para 25 that, “A copy of this order be sent to Principal Secretary,

Panchayat Raj, Government of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal as well as to

Member Secretary, SALSA, Jabalpur for circulation to all District

Legal Service Authorities (DALSA) for sensitization and implementation

of the concept as referred above by this Court.”

It merits no reiteration that the District Legal Services Authorities and the State Authority must

comply with this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment by a

Division Bench of Gwalior Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court

comprising of Justice Anand Pathak and Justice Sheel Nagu so that

poverty can be addressed through healing touch of law as has been

directed also. All such measures if implemented honestly in letter and

spirit then it will certainly go a long way in emancipating the

‘poorest of the poor’ which is the crying need of the hour also! There

is no reason why they should not be implemented at the earliest. It

certainly brooks no more delay anymore!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

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TWAIL: Historical approach to understanding international law

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INTRODUCTION

Today, the ‘Third World’ country is the term first used by Alfred Sauvy in 1952 which now has come to denote a country which can be categorized as a ‘developing’ country. However, the origins of this term can be traced to the World War/Cold War period when Third World signified the countries who were non-aligned; neither part of the ‘free world’ nor of the ‘communist world’. Scholars vouching for the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) have stressed on the importance of using the original terminology of ‘Third World Countries’. Global South is another term frequently used as a synonym for Third World countries. The terms North and South emerged during the 1970s but till today no strict definition thereby questioning geographical preciseness of this term.

The Asian-African Conference held in Bandung organised by Egypt, Indonesia, Burma, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka in 1955 was where Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru rejected both sides in the ongoing cold war and propounded a principle of ‘non-alignment’. This led to the birth of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. This along with the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Group 77 shows the building momentum among the Third world countries against the supremacy of the First and Second world countries. Further a rebellious attitude was also shown by the Third World reflected in its calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

TWAIL has undertaken study of international law, its global history, role of international lawyers within the international order, importance of social movements, indigenous people, migrants etc. with a background of such previous organisations who came together with a common agenda. TWAIL has stood as a check to the Eurocentric approach taken by international law over the years. And accelerated efforts to balance out the asymmetries of power. According to Gathii, “TWAIL is a discipline in transition, expansion, definition and internal contestation about the varied agendas of its scholars, all at the same time.” Balakrishnan Rajagopal’s work brings light to the resistance that TWAIL projects to safeguard interests of the third world.

TWAIL was born in 1996 at Harvard Law School when group of students came together to discuss whether if taken a third world approach to international law what might be the major obstacles. The group consisting of Celestine Nyamu, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Hani Sayed, Vasuki Nesiah, Elchi Nowrojee, Bhupinder Chimni and James Thuo Gathii coined the name of the group as ‘Third World Approaches to International Law’ (TWAIL). Antony Anghie and Chimni coined the terms ‘TWAIL I’ and ‘TWAIL II’: the former consisting of first generation post-colonial and the latter taking cues and developing further scholarship. The struggle of TWAILers II, III, IV and beyond – is to deal with the vestiges of ‘formal’ empire and expanding multi-dimensional forms of ‘informal imperialism’.

APPROACHES TO TWAIL

While discussing about the approaches within TWAIL, Gathii mentions critical, feminist, post-modern, Lat-Crit Theory (Latina and Latina Critical Theory Inc.), postcolonial theory, literary theory, modernist, Marxist, critical race theory among others. With these approaches what is studied is hegemony of dominant narratives along many axes– race, class, gender, sex, ethnicity, economics, trade, etc – and in inter-disciplinary ways – social, theoretical, epistemological, ontological and so on. Gathii discusses some coordinates; strictly refraining from calling them as principles as TWAIL scholarship has always been proposing for an ever-changing methodology and international order. It terms the coordinates as:

History matters: Importance here is given to how history has shaped the current geo-politics. Taking into account history, TWAIL scholars envision to build a south oriented framework for international order.

Empire moves: Imperialism cannot be only located in the country of the British. From local to national, public to private, ideological to material; Empire is traced in each of the components of nation and human life. This coordinate helps the TWAIL scholars to trace the colonial power and its fangs.

South moves: As the North moves, the South also is a term which is dynamic according to local specificities, regional trends, and larger changes to the global economic and political system.

Struggle is multiple: TWAIL is engaged is one fought on multiple fronts and on a diverse and shifting terrain. Thus, TWAIL is a discipline in transition, expansion, definition and internal contestation about the varied agendas of its scholars, all at the same time.

Struggle is here: TWAIL scholars, therefore, the struggle remains, and must remain, always there, and always here. It is, and must always be, about present ‘tactics’, and about a longer ‘strategy’.

CENTRAL THEMES OF TWAIL

As Karin Mickelson argues, history is the most fundamental element of a third world approach to international law. What is important to note here for TWAIL scholarship is the emphasis on seeing international legal history ‘as something alive than dead.’ Makau Mutua’s provocative thesis about redrawing the map of Africa because of the colonial illegitimacy of current borders is yet another example of seeing international legal history as relevant to and constitutive of the present rather than as a relic of the past. Antony Anghie’s book Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, (2005) is the leading TWAIL text revising mainstream international legal history tracing of continuities of coloniality in modern international law.

According to Vikrant Dayanand Shetty, “the ‘post’ in ‘postcolonial’ does not refer to ‘after period of colonialism’ or ‘triumphing over colonialism’ but to the ‘continuation of colonialism in the consciousness of formerly colonized peoples and in institutions imposed in the process of colonization.’” Examples of colonial continuities include, the composition of the UN Security Council, with five veto-wielding Permanent members; the weighted system of voting in the Bretton Woods institutions that gives the world’s richest economies the power to set the economic agenda of the former colonial countries; the rules of customary international law such as pacta sund servanda that bind former colonialized countries to comply with treaties even though they took no part in their formulation or formation; and the fact that self-determination retained the subordinate and dependent position of third world elites to their former colonial powers and to multinational capital interests.

Chimni analyses that, “Today, international law prescribes rules that deliberately ignore the phenomena of uneven development in favor of prescribing uniform global standards.” TWAIL recognises that the domination that US and Europe had over former colonies is in practice till date. In India, it can be seen in the fact that since the British left, we haven’t yet let go of the legal structure that the empire had built for us. India is also still in grips of the Macaulay’s system of Education. She has adopted the foreign terms like ‘secular’ in her constitution, ‘English’ as the official language, morals as per the Christian teachings. As India westernized, she also inherited such institutions which today can be called as the ghosts of the Empire. This has led to many TWAIL and other Indic scholars to question whether since independence has India ever been free. Chimni reiterates that the civilizing mission that the colonisers were on is the same mission with which they are using international law to rehabilitate and govern third world countries especially Africa; thus, legitimizing and justifying both the forms of colonial attitudes. He says, “humanitarianism is the ideology of hegemonic states in the era of globalization marked by the end of the Cold War and a growing North South divide.” This concept of the ‘civilizing mission’ has provided the moral basis of exploitation of the Third World. However, this exploitation, when administered by the colonial power, is legitimate because it is inflicted in self-defence, or because it is humanitarian in character and indeed seeks to save the non-European peoples from themselves. Less is discussed in mainstream international forum on the holocaust that the Victorian Empire committed on the citizens of India. Indian soldiers fought for the British in both World wars; 60,000 sacrificed their lives in world war I itself; she was the second largest contributor to Empire’s War in the 1940s; she bore the brunt of Churchill’s horrifying war policies which aggravated the already existing famine conditions. 5.4 million Indians according to Madhushree Mukherjee were killed amounting to war crimes justified under the garb of colonialism. She writes in her book ‘Churchill’s Secret War’, “if provisions protecting civilians had been in place before the war, the denial policy and the failure of His Majesty’s Government to relieve the famine could conceivably have been prosecuted as war crimes.”

CRITIQUES

TWAIL has failed to produce a single authority but has stirred the waters of international law with the ladle of colonial history. James Thuo Gathii also acknowledges the criticisms levelled against TWAIL on the basis of it being anachronistic, nihilistic and lacking methodological clarity. Secondly, its own critical attitude has been accused of being baseless. The absence of hierarchy and authority has given rise to flexible and fluid ways but has also proved as a disadvantage to organize the movement effectively. However, TWAIL is not a mere deconstructive and oppositional movement or network of scholars, but rather one that sees the potential of reforming if not remaking international law for the greater good. It also questions some third world countries and hence cannot be alleged to have been assuming innocence of these countries.

CONCLUSION

For the first time in history, emerging economies are counterparts on more than half of global trade flows, and south–south trade is the fastest-growing type of connection. South–south and China–south trade jumped from 8 percent of the global total in 1995 to 20 percent in 2016. Emerging economies, led by China and India, have accounted for almost two-thirds of global GDP growth and more than half of new consumption in the past 15 years. The founder of TWAIL Gathii has expressed that TWAIL-ers have transcended boundaries. There have been efforts from non-third world living scholars along with third world living scholars. He calls it a decentralized network which has been given exposure across not only in academies but also as course leaders, council members, etc. Some suggestions toward a new economic world order on the basis of TWAIL are to increase transparency and accountability of international institutions; increasing sensitivity towards problems of the third world; accepting that the solutions applied to western countries aren’t the exact solutions for third world problems; indigenous culture to be used to maximise the reach of international principles; Human Rights should be interpreted by keeping an account of the conditions of the third world countries; accepting that other than minority and acknowledged class there can be oppression of majority in such countries too; Ensuring Sustainable Development With Equity. Such suggestions to make international law more sensitive, equitable and far-reaching can be done only with the help of TWAIL. TWAIL scholars from and outside third world countries need to undertake this task and make the other side of the narrative aware of their side. Ramping up needs to take place since the third world countries are the future of tomorrow.

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Analysing Article 21, humans rights and individual freedom

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“Death must be beautiful. To lie on soft brown earth, with grasses waving above one’s head, and listen to the silence. To have no yesterday, no tomorrow. To forget life, to forgive life, to be departed.”

– Oscar Wilde

INTRODUCTION

The grimace compounding the affliction implicating faith & culture economizing on the despair from the clutches stands out to be a serene sojourn. The complacency in setting to work the health crisis nonetheless politics has doomed the fraternity squandering the attainment. People & their rights must be magnanimous at front & centre. Dignity in casualty is recognized around the world. The cremation of the dead bodies in Covid-19 is not an easy tribulation. The Hygiene Protocols ambling wrapping dead bodies to discerning handing over the bodies to the families increase the efficacy of transmitting body fluids. According to the World Health Organisation plebeians intimidated of their emancipations incarcerated are prone to getting tremendous exposure. The scale of devastation brought on by the second wave of Covid continues to snuff out lives, upend healthcare systems & dwindle the economy broke out with negligence, callousness evincing response as people reckoning with the grief of catastrophe that’s still unfolding.

Emotions Coexist as they aren’t linear or unitary bringing about guilt unobtrusive on some days & overbearing on others. Losing a beloved one is one of the extensively gruelling situations even under the best of episodes. Every congregation brings into the world its sermon to soothe the concussion, Hindus gathering to burn carcasses along the Ganges River to the Jewish folklore of amassing solace at shack during a seven-day mourning stint, Islamic legislation, as in many kith & kin surmises, the management of uneventful is the theme of distinct policies that strive at pledging the elegance and deference of the dead as well as for their living comrade. The disposition and swivel scale of the prevailing pandemic, however, has concocted miscellaneous qualms, asceticism, and straight rumours in Muslim-majority states as well as for Muslim communities around the realm. Oftentimes bar and the legal sorority have beefed up the liberties which are equated to dead soul from stature of the dead person to decent interment. Anticipating the incessant phenomenal pestilence “COVID 19”, the situation has become very catastrophic, and the conundrum of this dilemma makes it a more chaotic one. The horrendous and ungrammatical crisis of sufferers and dead bodies provoke the compunction of the very validity of rights that are functional to dead persons in the glimmer of the status quo.

STANDPOINT: HUMAN RIGHTS & FEDERAL LAW

Human dignity reinforces the right to life in portion the state has an optimistic obligation to insulate & respect life. The Rights are extensive, interdependent & mutually supplementary.

Humanitarian organisations especially the Red Cross (ICRC) evolved a compatriot & drudged knack in disaster supervision and tragedy riposte, catastrophe vindication, and humanitarian forensics. This experience is amassed from quite 150 years of operating in conflict zones and from an operative composure in additional 90 countries, mounting the ICRC to fetch effective recommendation and attend to state authorities & (NSAGs) in the retort to the getaway. UDHR ascribes kinsfolk subsist to be put up with autonomous and equal in dignity and rights” (Article1). These rights are “inalienable” to every person. The Human Rights Convention are for infractions of the treaties outlined in the testimony, while the assertions can be bought in by any victim of the violation a defunct person cannot do the same. The resolution 2005 on human rights & forensic science played up the primacy of distinguished human remains antidote, acclimating adequate composure & discarding similarly as of reverence for the clans’ desire. Geneva Convention 1949 certifies everyone to the dispute forthwith foster the deeds seized to patrol the annihilated – counteracting ill-treatment.” Even in modern days, international humanitarian legislation puts up to corroborate that even during the crossroads of war and conflict; the dead bodies of the combatants are not disdained out of vengeance and enmity. International Human Rights Law recognizes discretion on rights neither arbitrary nor discretionary based on scientific testimony. The convention I of Geneva (Article 17), Convention III of (Article 120), Convention IV (Article 130), Article 8 Additional Protocol II, Cairo Declaration Article 3 on Human Rights & other relevant legitimate instruments, furnish for the honourable entombment of the combatants and prisoners of war. The veneer of the lifeless person ought to be cherished even during the times of crusade & discord, there could be no justification to divest an individual who withers in the eternity of peace of the identical right of a respected burial and funeral rites, which the person would have otherwise been entitled to, if not for the pandemic.

According to Cal Health “Cremation” ensues in three strides the constriction of the core of a bygone human to its indispensable components via immolation, transferring or the body during incineration to elicit the system, processing of the remains after exile from the funeral courtyard. “In a country statute which stymies the establishment or upkeep in any one township of surplus than one crematory for the cremation of mortal cadavers cannot be bolstered as a police measure as against a cemetery association located near another crematory and in close proximity to several cemeteries and in a neighbourhood where there are, but irregular dwelling-houses and no buildings devoted to any business except that of burying the dead.”

PLUGGING GAPS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY: DIGNITY IN DEATH

The pestilence hasn’t only exemplified spirit, security and financial crisis, yet a crisis of conviction in the decisive crusade of humans. The Right to Life being an inclusive concept, affirms no soul shall be pillaged of life or liberation or property befitting mulled over the spectrum of Article 21 by insinuating the medication of cadavers in the additional terms – “The perspective of repudiation whacked by Article 21, whether such deprivation is permanent or temporary.” Life sans status is an icky debacle & verve that congregates cessation with dignity is a virtue to be yearned for and a juncture for celebration”.

Article 21, the kick pin of all other rights renders no soul ought to be knocked off of life or liberty by dint of the ‘procedure’ recounted in Article 21 has been skimmed into the ‘due procedure’ by the Supreme Court and implied treatment must be fair, just & reasonable. Over the epoch, the Supreme Court has deciphered Article 14 & 21 to entail myriad privileges within its ruffle.

The Apex Court adduced quoting that illustrated “life” in additional words: “Something more than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its forfeiture amplifies to all those limbs and faculties by which existence is relished. The overhead equally hampers the mutilation of the body by the amputation of an arm or leg, or the putting out of an eye, or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul articulates with the outer world” congruently conserving the term ‘life’ meant the freedom to dwell with grace & the analogous embargoing stalled drudgery. The Article flexures “some of the finer graces of benevolent refinement, which propels life worth living” & an intensified notion of cinch may credit “society” of the apprehensive person. Eventually, dignity isn’t the sole sleuth to a living man but after his demise was put as deposition by the Supreme Court has been overstepped in Satyama Dubey v. U.O.I.

Further, the court ratified the diverse undertakings stripped away by the Police and the local body for procuring an adequate crypt to an abandoned dead person, according to the pious morality to which he belonged. The petition was disposed of based on affidavits. The hegemonies, & culture, the indistinguishable compassion with which a living being is anticipated to be cared for, should also be magnified the ones who are dead”. Praxis and heredity stances are innate to the ultimate ceremony of an individual’s vivacity. The decent interring is sketched in Article 25 that waives for leeway of conscience & autonomous profession, practice and propagation of faith subject to civil declaration, righteousness & vigour in Part III of the Constitution. Regime edicts overriding canonical practices for lifeless torsi should in no way be deemed discriminatory but must be a commensurate standard to impede disorders and casualties on the pretext of the virus, while simultaneously assuring public protection and economic wellbeing of India.

Please read concluding on thedailyguardian.com

It is vital to think back that is ephemeral and is the modus Vivendi to steering the ragged waters of rash, individually but concurrently.

EPILOGUE

The contemporary catastrophe dissembles as a spur transgressing the rights of a lifeless person despite on fleek backing of the legal bracket. The Conclusions sound prettier than the present is as the crisis is deep & has led to reports of untold human grief. Death has taken its toll as the health system crumbles the lives could be saved however policy stiffness cropping up blazing pyres shaping the vicinity between the living & the dead. A two-pronged strategy effectuating even-handed botch vaccine allotment must be carried out & tapering off SARS COV 2 transmission whilst the vaccine is rolled out.

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Modern technology and challenges over privacy: An analysis

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INTRODUCTION

Privacy has always been concerned in this technical era. On one hand, where it has been simplified our life, on the other hand, it has always been questioned over Privacy. Once again the privacy concern has become a burning and sensational topic which is being discussed around the globe. Recently, an investigation by international media has revealed that more than 50,000 phone numbers across the globe have been targeted for hacking through the spyware called ‘Pegasus’, which has been developed by the Israeli firm NSO Group. Furthermore, Over 300 Verified phone numbers used by ministers, opposition leaders, journalists, the legal community, businessmen, government officials, scientists, rights activists, and others, were targeted using this malware. 

It has once again called the regulations for surveillance in India. In India, Communication surveillance takes place primarily under two laws one being the Telegraph Act, 1885 and the other being the Information Technology Act, 2000. On one hand, The Telegraph Act deals with the interception of calls, while on the other hand, the IT Act deals with surveillance of all electronic communication. Although, it is also notable that India still lacks a comprehensive data Protection law to fill the gaps in the existing frameworks for surveillance. 

LAWS REGULATING SURVEILLANCE IN INDIA.

Telegraph Act, 1885 

Section 5 (2) of the Telegraph Act states that “On the occurrence of any public emergency, or in the interest of the public safety, the Central Government or a State Government or any officer specially authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or a State Government may, if satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence, for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order, direct that any message or class of messages to or from any person or class of persons, or relating to any particular subject, brought for transmission by or transmitted or received by any telegraph, shall not be transmitted, or shall be intercepted or detained, or shall be disclosed to the Government making the order or an officer thereof mentioned in the order….”

Under this provision, the government has been authorised to intercept calls only in certain situations like when it is in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states or public order, or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offense. Moreover, an additional proviso under section 5(2) states that this lawful interception can’t take place against journalists provided that “press messages intended to be published in India of correspondents accredited to the Central Government or a State Government shall not be intercepted or detained, unless their transmission has been prohibited under this sub-section.”

Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing in the case of Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (1996), finds the absence of procedural safeguards in the provisions of the Telegraph Act. In the same judgment, the Hon’ble court also laid down certain guidelines for interceptions. The court observed that authorities who are engaged in interception were not even maintaining adequate records and logs on the interception. Furthermore, the court also states that “Tapping is a serious invasion of an individual’s privacy. With the growth of highly sophisticated communication technology, the right to a sold telephone conversation, in the privacy of one’s home or office without interference, is increasingly susceptible to abuse. It is no doubt correct that every Government, howsoever democratic, exercises some degree of Subrosa operation as a part of its intelligence outfit but at the same time citizen’s right to privacy has to be protected from being abused by the authorities of the day”. The guidelines by the Hon’ble Supreme Court formed the basis of introducing Rule 419A in the Telegraph Rules in 2007 and later in the rules prescribed under the IT Act in the year 2009.

IT ACT, 2000

Furthermore, to address electronic surveillance, Section 69 of the Information Technology and Information Technology (Procedure for Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring, and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009 were enacted. Under the IT Act, all electronic data transmissions are permitted to be intercepted. So, in terms of the Pegasus spyware, it may be legal. Both the IT Act and the Telegraph Act would have to be invoked by the government. Furthermore, in addition to the restrictions imposed by Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act and Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution, Section 69 of the IT Act adds another dimension that broadens it — interception, monitoring, and decryption of digital information “for the investigation of an offence.”

Significantly, it does away with the condition precedent established by the Telegraph Act, which requires “the occurrence of a public emergency in the interest of public safety,” broadening the scope of powers under the law.

IMPACT OF SURVEILLANCE

There are plethoras of examples in this world where personal data are misused for many different reasons. Many people and organizations are under surveillance which is vocal and takes active participation against the criticism of the ruling political party. These things make us understand the impact of surveillance on our freedom of privacy, freedom of speech, and expression and curtail our fundamental rights. Surveillance poses threat to press freedom. The World press freedom index published by Reporters without borders ranked India 142 Out of 180 countries in the year 2021. The press needs greater liberty on privacy and speech because these two enable good reporting. They secure journalists against the threat of government reprisal against honest reporting. 

A report on Privacy rights and protection was published by Forrestor, an American company in the year 2019, In India, the laws which allow the government to conduct surveillance over its citizens are very clearly undermining the laws related to the data privacy to its citizens. In the case K S Puttaswamy v. Union of India, the Hon’ble Supreme court of India held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right that comes under the domain of articles 14, 19, and 21 of the constitution but there is a lack of data protection law in India. In absence of this kind of law, it becomes just an executive order which allows the agencies to encroach on the privacy of their citizens. Also, it is very important to note that people who are under surveillance are unaware of the fact that agencies are monitoring them. In the absence of privacy laws, the security of journalists whose work criticizes the government and their safety is jeopardized. In the case of Ritesh Sinha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Apex court held that the right to privacy is not an absolute right, it is also subject to restrictions as with other fundamental rights. It was asserted that the right to privacy is not absolute and must bow down to compelling public interest. We still need a number of judicial pronouncements to determine how the right to privacy operates in a practical scenario. Since there is a lack of Judicial pronouncement, the court relies on the German principle “test of proportionality”. This test is used by different countries for the determination of conflicting rights. The Hon’ble supreme court has applied this principle in various cases such as Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, state of Madras V. V.G. Row, etc to balance between the rights and limitations. In this principle, there are four stages to determine the balance of rights and limitations. The legitimate goal stage, suitability, necessity stage, and balancing stage that help us to strike balance between the two. But this is only effective when a particular case comes under the cognizance of court. 

The Surveillance uproar the spread of Authoritarianism in the government system because the executive uses excessive power on the citizens and impacts personal lives. When it is carried out entirely by the executive curtails article 32 and article 226 of the constitution as it happens in secret and thus affected person is unable to show their breach of rights. This not only violates the ideals of due process of law but it is also against the requirement of procedural safeguards as held in the case of K.S Puttaswamy v. Union of India. 

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 

To implement the ideals of due process of law and to satisfy the requirements of procedural safety and natural justice, there needs to be judicial observation. The judiciary is the competent body to determine whether specific instances of Surveillance are proportionate or not to balance the government’s objective and the rights of the individuals. The judicial investigation into the Pegasus hacking is important because the leaked database of targeted numbers includes the phone number of a sitting Supreme court Judges, which again raises the question of the Independence of the judiciary in India. 

In India surveillance reform is the need of the hour, the existing protections are weak and the proposed legislation related to personal data fails to consider surveillance of the citizens. We need greater transparency in our system, governmental agencies are only accountable to the government itself. For the protection of National security, the government is bound to do smaller infringements of Fundamental rights and surveillance reform should incorporate ethics of surveillance which includes the moral values of how surveillance regulates. The government of India is in process of enacting a law for the purpose of protecting of personal data of the citizens. There is an urgent need to include privacy as a fundamental right and to provide a defining mechanism to strengthen the rights of the citizens and to provide a remedy in case of violation. 

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Cinematograph Amendment Bill 2021: An analysis

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Cinematograph Act 1952 establishes Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC), commonly known as the Censor Board. The Board is responsible for issuing certificates to films and has the power to deny their certificate (Section 5A). Section 6(1) of the Act empowered the Central Government to re-examine and cancel the certificate issued by CBFC. Supreme Court in the case of K.M. Shankarappa diluted the provisions of Section 6. The court held that the provisions of Section 6 are restrictive of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

The new Cinematograph (Amendment) Bill, 2021 attempts to dilute the judgment of the Supreme Court and aims to get back its revisionary powers. This will provide extraordinary powers to the Central Government by creating one more level of Censorship. This year Central Government passed an ordinance, the Tribunals Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021 which abolished the Film Certification Appellate Tribunal (FCAT). The proposed bill also aims to convert this ordinance into regular law by placing it in legislation. FCAT was solemnly established to resolve the issues related to the certification of Films. With its abolishment, the filmmakers have to approach High Court in case the Censors Board denies providing certification or provides with some ratification. This will also increase the burden of High Courts. Ultimately, this leading to a delay in a Film release.

Article 19(1)(a) of the constitution says, “All Citizens shall have Right to freedom of Speech and Expression.” Article 19(2) of the Constitution empowers the State to restrict Freedom of Speech and Expression provided that the restrictions are legitimate. Supreme Court in K.M. Shankarappa v. Union of India held, “words contained in the main portion of Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act and in the first proviso thereto are opposed to the basic structures of the Constitution and as such the words “or has been decided by” and “or as the case may be decided by the Tribunal” contained in the main portion of Sub-section (1) of Section 6 and the words “or to whom a certificate has been granted as the case may be” as contained in the first proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act, are unconstitutional as the same are violative of the basic structures of the Constitution.”Supreme Court in many of its Judgments has discussed the importance of Movies as a medium of Freedom of Speech and Expression. Supreme Court in the Rangarajan case regarded Movies as an effective medium to raise any general concern.The proposed amendment is an attempt to overutilize the powers provided under Article 19(2) of the Constitution.

If the bill becomes an act then it will nullify the Supreme Court Judgment. The autonomy of the Censor Board will be deduced. The Central Government will have the power to strike down any certificate issued by CBFC. This also induces the concept of dual Censorship, limiting the Freedom of Speech and Expression. Justice Mudholkar in Sakal v. Union of India rightly said, “The freedom of speech and expression of opinion is of paramount importance under a democratic Constitution which envisages changes in the composition of legislatures and governments and must be preserved.” The abolishment of FCAT will further increase the backlog of High Courts and will lead to an unnecessary delay in the release of Films.

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Andhra Pradesh High Court issues guidelines for prompt transmission of bail orders

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Andhra Pradesh High Court

While granting bail to an accused under The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a cogent, composed, commendable and convincing judgment in Criminal Petition No. 3933 of 2021 delivered on July 22, 2021 has taken a very serious note of the significant delay in issuing the certified copies of the orders. A Single Judge Bench comprising of Justice Lalitha Kanneganti of Andhra Pradesh High Court minced just no words to make it pretty clear that, “Disposal of bail application without furnishing the order copy within a reasonable time will not place the accused in a better position.” Justice Lalitha also observed that despite the conscious recognition of several pending cases, it is difficult to issue the order copies within a short period due to staff shortage. She has rightly diagnosed the root problem which must be addressed now without any further delay!

Needless to say, we all saw how just recently the Chief Justice of India NV Ramana too did not lag behind in a notable case titled IN RE: DELAY IN RELEASE OF CONVICTS AFTER GRANT OF BAIL in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 4/2021 while taking took serious note of this major shortcoming or lacuna. CJI led Bench of Apex Court comprising also of Justice L Nageswara Rao and Justice AS Bopanna had expressed the Court’s willingness to evolve a system to electronically transmit bail orders directly to prisons so that prison authorities will not delay the release of prisoners awaiting a certified copy of the order. Accordingly, a scheme called “FASTER” which implies “Fast and Secure Transmission of Electronic Record” is being considered which will be used to communicate all orders to concerned jail authorities without waiting. This will certainly benefit the under-trial prisoners/accused and so has to be lauded in no uncertain terms!

To start with, the ball is set rolling in para 1 of this latest, learned, laudable and landmark judgment authored by a Single Judge Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court comprising of Justice Lalitha Kanneganti wherein it is put forth that, “This petition is filed under Sections 437 and 439 of Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) seeking regular bail to the petitioner/ A-2 in connection with Crime No.38 of 2020 of Mothugudem Police Station, East Godavari District for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) r/w Section 8 (c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for brevity “NDPS Act”).”

While elaborating on the prosecution version, the Bench then lays bare in para 2 that, “The case of prosecution is that on 03.09.2020 on credible information about illegal transportation of ganja, the respondent Police rushed to Daralamma Temple, outskirts of Polluru village of Chinturu Mandal and while conducting vehicle check at about 11.00 AM, they found a Bolero pick-up van bearing registration No.AP 24 TB 1550 coming from Donkarai proceeding towards Lakkavaram Junction. On seeing the police, the inmates of the said Bolero van tried to escape from the spot, but the police apprehended them and on search, they found 300 KGs of ganja. The police seized the contraband, registered the crime, arrested the petitioner and remanded him to judicial custody on the same day.”

As we see, the Bench then mentions in para 3 that, “Heard Sri G.Venkata Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State.”

While on the one hand, the Bench enunciates in para 4 that, “Learned counsel for the petitioner/A-2 submits that the petitioner has nothing to do with the alleged offence and in fact, the petitioner was engaged by A-1 on payment of Rs.15,000/- who accompanied him. Further the officer who acted as a gazetted officer while conducting the search and seizure is a veterinary doctor and the said doctor is not a competent person to act as a gazetted officer under Sections 42, 43 and 50 of the NDPS Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the entire investigation is completed and the petitioner is languishing in jail from 03.09.2020.”

As against what is stated above, the Bench then points out in para 5 that, “On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that on 13.10.2020 charge sheet was filed.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then while taking a holistic view holds in para 6 that, “Taking into consideration the fact that the entire investigation is completed and charge sheet is filed and further the petitioner is languishing in jail from 03.09.2020, this Court deems it appropriate to grant bail to the petitioner. However, on certain conditions.”

Adding more to it, the Bench then further holds in para 7 that, “Accordingly, the petitioner/ A-2 shall be enlarged on bail on execution of self bond for Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs only) with two sureties for a like sum each to the satisfaction of the Court of the Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Rampachodavaram. On such release, the petitioner shall appear before the Station House Officer, Mothugudem Police Station, East Godavari District, once in a month till completion of trial.”

Be it noted, the Bench then envisages in para 8 that, “This Court having criminal roster from the last couple of months has noticed that in spite of best efforts by the Registry, there is significant delay in issuing the certified copies of the orders. This Court is conscious of the large number of cases pending before the Court, due to dearth of staff, it is difficult to issue the order copies within a short span of time. In cases, where the accused are entitled for statutory bail as they are languishing in jail for more than 60, 90 and 180 days, when default bail is granted, it was brought to the notice of the Court that there was considerable delay in dispatching the copy of orders. Hence, this Court feels that an alternative mechanism shall be evolved to address the plight of these undertrial prisoners/accused. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court has also taken a serious note of this issue.”

More significantly, the Bench then underscores in para 9 that, “Protection of personal liberty of an individual is undeniably a constitutional duty of this Court. Our criminal justice system always gives paramount consideration to the protection of the rights of the accused. Article 21 of the Constitution of India mandates that the personal liberty of an accused can be curtailed only after strict compliance with the procedure established by law. Sections 438 and 439 of Cr.P.C. ensures that the accused is not deprived of his personal liberty arbitrarily. The Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of cases has held that speedy adjudication process is one of the main facets that constitute the essence of access to justice and without it, access to justice as a constitutional value will be a mere illusion. Denial of this right undermines public confidence in the justice delivery system. It is also settled law that the right of an accused to have his bail application heard by the Court within a reasonable time has been entrenched as a constitutional liberty. At the same time, disposal of bail application without furnishing the order copy within a reasonable time will not place the accused in a better position. Mere emphasizing that an accused has an indefeasible fundamental right to bail itself is not sufficient without furnishing the copy of the order.”

Most significantly, what forms the cornerstone of this notable judgment is then elaborated upon in para 10 wherein it is held that, “This is high time the Courts shall address these issues with a progressive approach by adopting the innovative methods. Recently Andhra Pradesh High Court implemented a procedure whereby the concerned Court Masters are uploading the daily proceedings / orders / judgments on the same day. This Court deems it appropriate to issue the following guidelines.

(a) Parties/Advocates shall download the order copy from the High Court’s Website along with case details which are available in the case status information.

(b) While filing the memo on behalf of accused for furnishing sureties, the Advocate shall State in the memo that he/she has downloaded the order copy from the High Court’s Website. The concerned Administrative Officer / Chief Ministerial Officer of the Court shall verify the order from the High Court’s Website and make an endorsement to that effect and then shall place the same before the Court.

(c) The Public Prosecutor shall also obtain necessary instructions in this regard and assist the Court.

(d) The Presiding Officer on the same day shall dispose of the same and dispatch the release order to the concerned jail authorities forthwith through email or any other electronic mode.

(e) In cases of anticipatory bail, the burden to verify the authenticity of the copy is on the concerned Station House Officer and if necessary, he should obtain necessary instructions from the Public Prosecutor’s Office and complete the process on the same day expeditiously as per law.

(f) Registrar (Judicial) shall communicate copy of this order to (1) The Principal Secretary for Home Affairs, Andhra Pradesh; (2) The Director General of Police, Andhra Pradesh; (3) The Director of Prosecution, who in turn shall sensitize the Police Officers / Station House Officers / Public Prosecutors and ensure implementation of this order.

(g) Registrar (Judicial) shall communicate copy of this order to all the Principal District Judges in the State, who in turn shall sensitize all the Presiding Officers and ensure implementation of this order.

(h) Registrar (Judicial) is further directed to circulate the copy of this order to all the Bar Associations in the State through the Principal District Judges, so that they can effectively address their clients’ cause.

(i) Registrar (Judicial) shall also issue a separate notification in this regard and the same shall be displayed in the High Court’s Website.”

It is worth noting that the Bench then makes it clear in para 11 that, “This order shall come into force from 26.07.2021.”

Furthermore, the Bench then also directs in para 12 that, “The Judicial Officers in the State shall bring to the notice of the Registrar (Judicial), the issues / hitches, if any, in implementing the directions of this Court. In case of anticipatory bails, the Police Officials shall bring to the notice of the Public Prosecutor, High Court about their difficulties in implementing the orders of this Court and the Registrar (Judicial) and learned Public Prosecutor shall place the same before this Court by the next date of hearing i.e. 31.08.2021.”

For the sake of clarity, the Bench then sought to make it clear in para 13 that, “These directions will be in force until further orders or suitable Rules are framed in this regard.

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It is needless to mention, if any clarification or modification is required for effective implementation, they will be examined accordingly on the next date of hearing.”

While adding a word of advice, the Bench then stipulates in para 14 that, “In spite of all odds, determined efforts are required for achieving the goal. Ways and means have to be found out by constant thinking and monitoring. It is the responsibility of all the stakeholders to uphold the public confidence in the justice delivery system by giving timely justice which includes furnishing the copies of orders/judgments.”

Finally, the Bench then holds in para 15 that, “Post on 31.08.2021.”

In summary, para 10 which forms the bedrock of this noteworthy judgment dwells on the guidelines that the Andhra Pradesh High Court have issued to implement a procedure whereby the concerned Court Masters are uploading the daily proceedings / orders / judgments on the same day. This is necessary also so that the undertrial prisoners/accused don’t keep languishing in jails even after they have been granted bail as we keep seeing also due to lack of implementation of such procedures as the Andhra Pradesh High Court has elaborated upon in this case. Even Supreme Court three Judge Bench led by CJI NV Ramana has expressed its concern on prisoners languishing in jail even after they have been given bail and so this need to be implemented at the earliest!

It brooks no more delay anymore! This is exactly the crux of this notable judgment also by a Single Judge Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court comprising of Justice Lalitha Kanneganti. Copies of orders/judgments also must be furnished in time so that the faith of the people in the justice delivery system does not crumble!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate

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