SECOND FIR CAN BE QUASHED IF FIRST FIR IN RESPECT TO SAME INCIDENT HAS ALREADY BEEN REGISTERED: PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT - The Daily Guardian
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SECOND FIR CAN BE QUASHED IF FIRST FIR IN RESPECT TO SAME INCIDENT HAS ALREADY BEEN REGISTERED: PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT

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In a very significant observation, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in a learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Mr Monishankar Hazra and another v. State of Haryana and others and a connected petition in CRM-M-6692-2022(O&M) and CRM-M-6698-2022(O&M) have observed that in case an FIR with respect to an incident has already been registered, then a second FIR with respect to the same incident cannot be registered and in case, the same is registered then the High Court is well within its power to quash the second FIR. It must be noted that the single Judge Bench of Justice Vikas Bahl observed thus as it quashed an FIR against the Optum Global Solutions (India) Private Limited and its officials over cheating and forgery charges. The Court also observed that if an FIR does not disclose the essential requirements of the penal provision or does not disclose the essential requirements of the penal provision or does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the same can be quashed at the initial stage.

To start with, this notable judgment authored by a single Judge bench comprising of Justice Vikas Bahl of the Punjab and Haryana High Court first and foremost points out in para 1 and here we shall state only key point that, “This order will dispose of the two petitions filed under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) to set aside/quash the order dated 15.12.2021 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panchkula, in case bearing no. COMI/63/2021 titled as “Sharad Kothari vs. United Health Group Information Services &Ors.”, registered on 31.08.2021 and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom, including FIR bearing no.508 dated 23.12.2021 registered under Sections 120-B, 406, 409, 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) at Police Station Sector 5, Panchkula. The first petition, i.e. CRM-M-6692-2022 has been filed by Monishankar Hazra and Sameer Bansal and the second petition, i.e. CRMM-6698-2022 has been filed by seven petitioners namely Optum Global Solutions (India) Private Limited through its authorised representative Mr.Prashant Sinha, Anurag Khosla, Tim Trujillo, Rajat Bansal, Gayatri Varma, John Santelli and Partha Sarathi Mishra. Since the impugned order in both the cases is the same and the issues involved and questions of law are also common, thus, both the cases are being taken up together and with the consent of all the parties, CRM-M-6692-2022 is taken up as the lead case and facts have been taken from the said petition.”

BACKGROUND/ FACTS OF THE CASE

While elaborating on background/facts of case, the Bench envisages in para 2 that, “Respondent no.2 had filed a complaint dated 27.08.2021 under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. (Annexure P-28 page 539) against ten accused persons, including 9 petitioners in both the petitions, collectively. A prayer was made in the said complaint for issuance of directions as envisaged under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. to the concerned Police Station for registration of an FIR under Sections 406, 409, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC, on the allegations that the accused persons committed illegalities in order to procure a tender, floated by Haryana State Health Resource Centre (hereinafter referred to as “HSHRC”) for implementation of Hospital Information System (HIS) in favour of M/s United Health Group Information Services Pvt. Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as “UHGIS”). It had been alleged in the complaint that the complainant / respondent no.2 was an ex-employee of accused no.1-company and was appointed as DirectorBusiness Development vide appointment letter dated 09.12.2013 in accused no.1-company, which came to be known as M/s Optum Global Solutions India Limited after passing of the amalgamation order by the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal, Hyderabad on 20.03.2017. It has further been alleged that in the month of December, 2013, the Government of Haryana through HSHRC floated a tender/Request for Proposal (hereinafter referred to as (“RFP”) for implementation of HIS. As per the said tender, the bidders were required to be highly specialized in the field of ‘System Integration’ with minimum qualifications / requirements as prescribed under para 4.3 of Volume II of tender /RFP. Specific reference had been made to serial nos. 7 and 8 of said para 4.3. It has also been alleged that the award of contract was dependent upon the fulfillment of the qualifications as prescribed and in pursuance of the said tender, five companies submitted their cost bids to the HSHRC. The companies who had given their bid are as follows:-

S. No. Company name

1 IL & FS Technologies Limited

2 Hewlett-Packard India Sale Private Limited

3 Accenture Services Pvt Ltd.

4 United Health Group Information Systems Pvt. Ltd. (Accused no.1)

5 EY/NDSL

It had further been alleged that accused no.1-UHGIS was the 4th lowest bidder and by fabricating documents, managed to procure the tender. The same was procured by all the accused persons in connivance with each other and in collusion with some officials from HSHRC and accused no.1 had submitted its bid very cleverly, without the extracts of the audited balance sheet and profit and loss statement, as was required by HSHRC and without furnishing any certificate from its statutory auditor certifying that the company had a turnover of INR 100 crore from system integration services etc. and for reasons best known to the HSHRC, it still accepted the said tender. It has further been alleged that accused no.1 was incompetent to participate in the tender inasmuch as, the services which were required to be carried out, were never done by accused no.1 and even the same did not form a part of the Memorandum of Association of accused no.1-company and the said Memorandum of Association was amended vide resolution dated 29.04.2014, incorporating clauses 1B and 1C in the Objects Clause to include activities / services which were required to be carried out by the bidders. It had further been submitted that the tender bid was submitted on 13.03.2014 and the amendment in the Memorandum of Association was carried out subsequent to the same, i.e., on 29.04.2014. It had also been alleged that in order to fulfill the condition listed at serial no.8 of para 4.3 Volume II (supra) of the tender, which required the bidder to have experience demonstrated in networks of hospitals and not one / single hospital, the accused persons in collusion with each other, manipulated this requirement by preparing false documents, including two experience certificates, which were stated to be clearly fake and forged document as they were issued by M/s Optum Inc. USA (hereinafter referred to as “Optum US”) and the said experience certificate showed that UHGIS (accused no.1- company) had rendered service to M/s Optum Inc, USA in the year 2008 and 2009 whereas, Optum US itself came into existence on 17.09.2009.It has further been alleged that accused no.1 had not submitted any document to show that it had fulfilled the requirement of the HSHRC to the effect that it should have Rs.100 crore turnover for each year, i.e. 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11 and that respondent no.2 came to know about the entire scam/incident on 01.10.2015 when accused no.2-Sandeep Khurana in a drunken state disclosed to him the whole episode/incident in a restaurant. It has further been alleged that thereafter, respondent no.2 got an FIR no.419/2017 dated 18.08.2017 under Sections 66/66C of the IT Act lodged at Police Station Prashant Vihar, Rohini, New Delhi, regarding invasion of privacy of respondent no.2 and a complaint was also filed before the Director General of Police, Haryana which was marked to the Economic Offences Wing for enquiry/ investigation regarding which, a report was made by the ASI Prakash Chand from which, it was clear that the accused persons have repeatedly tried to thwart the investigation by not appearing on many occasions. It has also been alleged that the cause of action arose to the complainant on 13.03.2014 firstly, when the forged documents were supplied by the accused persons to the office of HSHRC Panchkula and then, again on 01.10.2015 and then, on 08.04.2016,as well as on 29.04.2016, cause of action continued as the complainant was made to resign from the accused-company. It had been stated that it is the Court in Panchkula which has the jurisdiction to entertain this matter and no such or similar petition except mentioned in the petition was filed or pending.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then enunciates in para 3 that, “The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panchkula, vide impugned order dated 15.12.2021 allowed the said application and directed the SHO, Sector 5 Panchkula to lodge the FIR. In the said order, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panchkula, had considered the interim report dated 22.07.2020 which was submitted by the Director General Health Services Haryana, Panchkula in which Sanjay Sethi, Assistant General Manager, HARTRON and Puneet Brar, Senior Consultant, HARTRON had made observations against the accused persons. Reliance was also placed upon the interim report of the Investigating Officer dated 01.09.2020. It was further observed that since respondent no.2 was also involved in bidding process on behalf of accused no.1 company, the Court was taking cognizance on the report filed by above said Sanjay Sethi and Puneet Brar. In pursuance of the same, above said FIR no.508 dated 23.12.2021 was registered and above said Sanjay Sethi and Puneet Brar were made as complainant. It is the above said order dated 15.12.2021, FIR dated 23.12.2021 and the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom which have been challenged by 9 accused persons by filing two separate petitions.”

CONCLUSION

Most remarkably, the Bench hastens to add in para 67 that, “That on the basis of above-said factors, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order as well as the subsequent FIR arising therefrom, deserve to be quashed. Apart from the judgments which have been noticed hereinabove, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India as well as various High Courts have repeatedly held that where the grounds, as are there in the present case, are made out then, the High Court can exercise its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the proceedings as well as to set aside the impugned order. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others (supra) has held as under:-

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under section 482of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

5. Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

In the above said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had enumerated categories of various cases, by way of illustrations, wherein power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is held that the present case would fall within the said parameters moreso, category 1, 2, 3 and 7.”

Most significantly, the Bench minces no words to hold in para 68 that, “The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “T.T. Antony’s case (supra) has observed as under: –

“However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 It would clearly be beyond the purview of sections 154 and 156 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of a fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is underway or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

The course adopted in this case, namely, the registration of the information as the second FIR in regard to the same incident and making a fresh investigation is not permissible under the scheme of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code as pointed out above, therefore, the investigation undertaken and the report thereof cannot but be invalid. We have, therefore, no option except to quash the same leaving it open of the investigating agency to seek permission in Crime No. 353/94 or 354/94 of the Magistrate to make further investigation, forward further report or reports and thus proceed in accordance with law.”

A perusal of the above-reproduced judgment would show that it had been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that in case, with respect to one incident an FIR already stands registered, then a second FIR with respect to the same incident cannot be registered and in case the same is registered then, the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C, would be well within its rights to quash the second FIR. The same principle has been followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Amitbhai Anil Chandra Shah’s case (supra). Thus, in a situation where a second FIR is registered with respect to the same incident on which an FIR has already been registered as in the present case, the petition for quashing of the second FIR should not be thrown out on the ground that the report under Section 173 CrPC has not been submitted.”

Relief:

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 71 that, “Keeping in view the eight grounds, as have been detailed in the preceding paragraphs and the facts and circumstances of the present case and the ratio of law laid down in the plethora of judgments referred to hereinabove, both the petitions i.e., CRM-M-6692/2022 and CRM-M 6698/ 2022 are allowed and the impugned order dated 15.12.2021 is set aside and FIR no.508/2021 dated 23.12.2021 registered under Sections 120B, 406, 409, 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC at Police Station Sector 5, Panchkula and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed.

It is, however, clarified that the setting aside of the impugned order and quashing of the FIR and the subsequent proceedings as well as the observations made in the present case would not affect the proceedings / complaint which is pending before the Lokayukta, Haryana and also the proceedings pending before the Rohini Courts in New Delhi arising out of the FIR no.419 dated 18.08.2017 registered at Police Station Prashant Vihar, Delhi which had been registered in pursuance of the application dated 07.06.2017 filed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. by Respondent no.2 in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Rohini Courts, New Delhi.”

In conclusion, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has made it indisputably clear that the second FIR can be quashed if first FIR in respect to same incident has already been registered. The relevant case laws have already been discussed hereinabove. It merits no reiteration that Justice Vikas Bahl has painstakingly dwelt on a number of relevant cases and we have discussed here only the most important ones to make it abundantly clear that when can the second FIR be quashed.

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A PLEA IN SUPREME COURT CHALLENGES THE CHANGED NEET-SS 2022 EXAM PATTERN

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The Supreme Court in the case Dr Richa Verma v. National Board of Examination observed the changed examination pattern which would now be comprising of 150 questions from the general i.e., the basic component of the primary feeder broad specialty subject and from all sub- specialty/systems/component of that primary feeder broad specialty subject. A plea filled in the Supreme Court by MD Radiation Oncologists and MD Anaesthesiologists NEET SS 2022 aspirant.

the petitioners have sought issuance of directions to restrain the NBE from excluding / MD Radiotherapy from the eligible feeder specialties for the super specialty course of DM Medical Oncology for NEET SS 2022 and have further sought for restoring the scheme/pattern for the exam further the petitioner deleting the MD Radiation Oncology, against this backdrop.

On 05.10.2021 the Central Government had told the Court that the revised pattern will be implemented only from next year and it may be noted that over the eleventh-hour changes brought to the NEET-SS 2021 pattern after facing the harsh criticism from the Supreme Court.

The petition further states that they will have to compete with candidates who have 100% questions from their postgraduate syllabus/ broad specialty as the new examination scheme is making some candidates write a paper which has no questions from their postgraduate broad specialty.

particularly in favor of MD Medicine in so far as the choice of options is far greater vis-a-vis the choices available to either MD Radiation Oncology or MD Anaesthesia, the pattern is not just a waste of time and effort for all those who have prepared for Critical Care but also grossly biased against few broad specialties and of the other four post-graduate branches there will be no questions from broad specialties.

This is complete waste of time, resources and effort put by the candidates who have been preparing for a super speciality subject for years as it is arbitrarily, illogical, highly partial and unreasonable, while terming the change in pattern, the contentions made by the petitioner.

the new pattern was forcing all the candidates from the broad specialties to write a single paper which will have 100% questions from General Medicine, stated by the petitioner. Furthermore, contending that the erstwhile pattern had a paper with 40% mixed questions from all the broad specialties and 60% questions from Critical Care (i.e., the super-specialty subject) which had ensured a level playing field.

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THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 482 OF THE CRPC CANNOT BE QUASHED MERELY ON THE GROUND THAT NO USEFUL PURPOSE WILL BE SERVED: SUPREME COURT

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The Supreme Court in the case Satish Kumar Jatav vs State of Uttar Pradesh observed that while by prolonging the proceedings of the case, the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed. As when a clear case is made for the offence alleged on the ground that no useful purpose will be served.

under Sections 307, 504, 506 of the IPC and 9 Section 3(10)(15) of the Act, the serious allegations for the offences were made and while considering the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and quashing the criminal proceedings for the aforesaid offences, the High Court ought to have been more cautious and circumspect. on how the order passed by the learned Magistrate summoning the accused was wrong and/or erroneous, has not at all being allowed by the High Court. the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and has quashed the criminal proceedings is deprecated in the manner in which the High Court has disposed of further the High Court has observed in the proceedings of the case that no useful purpose will be served. The aforesaid cannot be a good ground and/or a ground at all to quash the criminal proceedings when a clear case was made out for the offences alleged, appeared while quashing the criminal proceedings by the High Court even for the impugned order passed, the bench overserved while allowing the appeal.

The application under Section 482 Cr.P.C The manner in which the High Court has disposed and quashed the criminal proceedings is not appreciated at all Furthermore the Court has emphasized that the High Court must pass a speaking and reasoned order in such matters. The same has been set aside by the High Court in a most cursory and casual manner.

The allegations made against the accused persons and even on the legality and validity of the order passed by the Magistrate summoning the accused, has not been discussed by the High Court the Court noted.

The appellant contended that there are no reasons whatsoever have been assigned while quashing the criminal proceedings and further the appellant contended that there is no independent application of mind by the High Court. The respondent defended the impugned order, on the other hand before the Apex Court.

the Allahabad High Court quashed the criminal proceedings merely opining that “that no useful purpose shall be served by prolonging the proceedings of the case, while allowing the petition filled by the accused challenging this order and the offences punishable under Sections 307, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(10)(15) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, the accused to face the trial the Magistrate summoned the accused in the present case.

The bench comprising of Justice MR Shah and the justice BV Nagarathna observed and reiterated under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that a High Court must pass a speaking and reasoned order while disposing petitions.

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Nexus between accused’s negligence and victim’s death has to be established under Section 304A IPC: Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court in the case Nanjundappa vs State of Karnataka observed that would not apply to a criminal case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu.

when there is no report of a technical expert to corroborate the prosecution story as The Appellants therefore are entitled to be given the benefit of doubt furthermore It is even more unbelievable that Appellant no. 2 came in contact with the same voltage and managed to get away with a few abrasions.

when such current passed through the Television set, it did not blast and melt the wiring of the entire house and the court further added that it sounds completely preposterous that a telephone wire carried 11KV current without melting on contact.

While evaluating such evidence the jury should bear in mind that inference of guilt should be the only reasonable inference from the facts as In case of circumstantial evidence, there is a risk of jumping to conclusions in haste However the conviction of the accused persons seems wholly unjustified against the weight of the evidence adduced, in the present case. The Court also referred to the case of Syad Akbar Vs. State of Karnataka in which this Court proceeded on the basis that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a criminal case as its applicability in an action for injury by negligence is well known, observed by the court in the present case.

The court noted that there is no eye witness to say conclusively that the Appellants were in fact executing the work at the place alleged and further the court notice that no report or even inspection was conducted by a technical expert to assess the veracity of the averments made by the complainants to suggest that it was due to the alleged acts of the Appellants that the incident took place. the allegations against the Appellants are highly technical in nature, notice by the court on perusing the evidence on record.

On 21th November 2003 at 1.00p.m. the deceased was watching TV in his house. Noticing a sudden sound in the TV, the deceased got up to separate the dish wire, the TV connection wire and the telephone wire, which were entwined together, he felt an electric shock and his right hand was burnt and as a result of this shock he succumbed to death at that point of time it was found that the said incident took place because of the negligent act on the part of the accused, the supervisor (an employee in the telephone department ) and daily wage worker employed by him, as it was found out in the investigation. under Section 304A read with Section 34 IPC was upheld by the Karnataka High Court, the appellant is convicted.

the bench comprising of CJI NV Ramana, Justice Krishna Murari and the justice Hima Kohli observed under Section 304A of Indian Penal Code for causing death by negligence, while acquitting two persons that prosecution has to firstly prove negligence and then establish direct nexus between negligence of the accused and the death of the victim, for bringing home the guilt of the accused.

The Court also referred to the case of Syad Akbar Vs. State of Karnataka in which this Court proceeded on the basis that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a criminal case as its applicability in an action for injury by negligence is well known, observed by the court in the present case.

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AN ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE BODIES CAN ESTABLISH A CAPTIVE POWER PLANT PRIMARILY FOR THEIR OWN USE UNDER THE ELECTRICITY ACT: SUPREME COURT

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The Supreme Court in the case Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd. vs Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission observed that a captive power plant primarily for their own use can be established by an association of corporate bodies.

The requirement would be that the consumption of SBIPL and SBMPL together should not be less than 51% of the power generated. Admittedly, the joint consumption by SBIPL and SBMPL is more than 51% and under the provisions of the said Act, the use of electricity by it would be for captive use only even an association of corporate bodies can establish a power plant. Since SBMPL holds 27.6% of the ownership, the requirement of not less than 26% of shares is fulfilled by SBMPL as SBMPL holds 27.6% equity shares in SBPIL.

The fourth proviso to sub­section (2) of Section 42 of the said Act would also reveal that surcharge would not be leviable in case open access is provided to a person who has established a captive generating plant for carrying the electricity to the destination of his own use and under Section 9 of the said Act, could be an individual or a body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, it is clear that the person will get benefit even an association of corporate bodies can establish a captive power plant it has been seen. The definition of “person” is wide enough to include any company or body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or artificial juridical person it should be primarily for the use of the members of such co­operative society or association is the requirement, the Bench observed while referring to the provisions of the Electricity Act.

The BPIL, the respondent contended and supported the impugned judgment that no permission is required from the Commission for supply of electricity for its own use. Thereafter the appellant Company contended that unless SBPIL consumes 51% of the aggregate electricity generated by it, it will not be entitled to get the benefit under Section 9 of the said Act, in an appeal filled before the Apex Court.

An appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity filed by the Company further The Commission held that SBPIL was entitled to supply electricity to its sister concern SBMPL and the same would qualify to be treating as own consumption and within the ambit of Section 9 read with Section 2(8) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Rule 3 of the Electricity Rules, 2005 SBPIL submitted a petition for providing open access and wheeling of power through the transmission system of the Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd (Company) for captive use by SBMPL to the Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission, the commission. A Captive Generation Plant is established by SBPIL, and is a sister concern of SBPIL Shri Bajrang Power and I spat Ltd and Shri Bajrang Metallics and Power Ltd, SBMPL.

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Where the crime was committed the remission or premature release policy of the state has to be considered: Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court in the case Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, Lala Vakil vs State of Gujarat observed that where the crime was committed has to be considered in the remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State.

While allowing the writ petition the court observed and contended that Once the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat, after the trial been concluded and judgment of conviction came to be passed, all further proceedings have to be 6 considered including remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred and concluded for exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court, as the case may be. The court further stated that under Section 432(7) CrPC the appropriate Government can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments.

the appropriate Government in the ordinary course would be the State of Gujarat. But the case was transferred in exceptional circumstances by this Court for limited purpose for trial and disposal to the neighboring State i.e., the State of Maharashtra by an order dated 06.08.2004. ordinarily, the trial was to be concluded in the same State and in terms of Section 432(7) CrPC as the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed in the State of Gujarat, observed by the Apex Court.

he application for pre­mature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat, as prayed by the petitioner by judgment impugned dated 17.07.2009 As His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra. Thereafter He had filed his petition for pre­mature release under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating that he had undergone more than 15 years 4 months of custody.

The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed and noted that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of the appropriate Government.

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Adopt roster based reservation for preferential candidates as followed by JIPMER: Supreme Court directs all AIIMS institutes

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The Supreme Court in the case Students Association AIIMS Bhopal And Or’s. v. AllMS and Or’s observed and directed all AIIMS Institutes to adopt roster-based reservation followed by Jawaharlal Institute of Postgraduate Medical Education and Research, Pondicherry (JIPMER) as a plea was filled in the Court seeking direction to AIIMS to have a defined criteria for arriving at seat matrix for institutional preference candidates in INI-CET examination.

the order of the Apex Court in the case AIIMS Students’ Union v. AIIMS And Or’s, would not be applicable if It emphasized that if the roster-based system is implemented the actual roster points for AIIMS would be different from JIPMER as the same would depend on the percentage of seats decided to be allocated to the preferential candidates but It stated that the reservation would be similar to the one adopted by JIPMER AIIMS New Delhi was willing to provide a roster-point based reservation for its institutional preference candidates, by way of an affidavit 20th January 2022 the Bench was apprised that pursuant to a meeting held on 28th June 2020 as prescribed the relevancy:

It shall not be too wide with the one for the general category candidate, that the margin of difference between the qualifying marks for the Institute’s candidate.

The one who has secured marks at the common entrance PG test less than the one secured by any other candidate belonging to reserved category enjoying constitutional protection such as SC, ST etc. cannot be the AIMS graduate the last student to qualify for admission.

appearing on behalf of AIIMS, Advocate, Mr. Dushyant Parashar, New Delhi was asked to get instructions from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and Jodhpur so that the Court can pass appropriate orders on the next date of hearing. As that apart from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and AIIMS, Jodhpur, all other AIIMS before the Apex Court has agreed to implement the roster-based reservation system followed by JIPMER Puducherry for their institutional preference candidates, the Court was informed at the last date of hearing.

the petition had been filed seeking direction to AIIMS to disclose how the seats for institutional preference candidates are to be allotted in the view of the same the petitioners claim that in the INI-CET examination conducted in July, 2021, only 4 seats (1.87%) in AIIMS, New Delhi were allotted to institutional preference candidates. Rivetingly, the petitioners note that no seats were allocated to any other AIIMS for admission of institutional preference candidates.

the Bench comprising of Justice L. Nageswara Rao and the justice A.S. Bopanna observed and noted that to record in the order that the roaster system would be applicable from this year. Mr. Parashar informed it that since new software is to be put in place for counselling, it might cause some delay. The bench further stated that the court will order it to apply this year but in case of delay AIMS can come later.

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