S.195 CrPC: No FIR can be registered for forgery/conspiracy committed before court on the basis of private complaint, says Chhattisgarh High Court - The Daily Guardian
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S.195 CrPC: No FIR can be registered for forgery/conspiracy committed before court on the basis of private complaint, says Chhattisgarh High Court

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In a notable judgment titled Nand Kumar Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. in CRMP No. 424 of 2018 and 2022 LiveLaw (Chh) 13 that was delivered finally on February 15, 2022, the Chhattisgarh High Court has held that in terms of Section 195 CrPC, no FIR can be registered for forging of documents or conspiracy committed before the Court, on the basis of a private complaint. All Judges must always bear this in mind while ruling on similar such judgments. It also noted that it is crystal clear that the registration of FIR against the petitioner on the basis of complaints made by the respondents and other complainants is not tenable.

To start with, this cogent, commendable, and convincing judgment authored by a single Judge Bench comprising of Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas of Chhattisgarh High Court sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The petitioner has filed the instant petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing the FIR bearing Crime No. 124/2017 (Annexure P/1) registered against the petitioner on 30.03.2017 on the basis of complaint made by respondent No. 2 along with other complainants at Police Station- Baloda, District- Baloda-Bazar (C.G.) for committing offence punishable under Section 420 of I.P.C.”

While elaborating on the facts, the Bench then observes in para 2 that, “The brief facts, as projected by the petitioner, are that on 30.03.2017, Police Station- Baloda, District- Baloda-BazarBhatapara registered offence bearing FIR No. 124/2017 on the basis of written report dated 28.06.2016 by respondent No. 2/Nandlal Verma, Kalindri, Kaushal, Santram Mantram & Gopal alleging that the petitioner in a revenue case for mutation of land filed before Tahsildar had submitted fabricated false documents of Panchayat proceedings dated 03.04.2013 and got his name mutated in revenue records of the ancestral property on the basis of this fabricated document. After completion of preliminary enquiry, the Police have registered the FIR against the petitioner on 30.03.2017, which has been assailed by the petitioner in this petition.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then points out in para 13 that, “This Court while hearing this petition on 28.02.2018 granted interim protection in favour of the petitioner directing that the investigation may go on but no coercive steps shall be taken against the petitioner till the next date of hearing.”

Be it noted, the Bench then envisages in para 19 that, “From bare perusal of the FIR and considering the contents of the complaint, it is crystal clear that it has been alleged the petitioner has given false documentary evidence relating to resolution of Gram Panchyat dated 03.10.2003 before Tahsildar in revenue case and on that basis, the Tahsildar has mutated the property in the name of the petitioner, therefore, the provisions of Sections 195 & 340 of the Cr.P.C. will be attracted and it is perjury which amount to forgery, as such, as per the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Narendra Kumar Shrivastava Vs. State of Bihar (2019) 3 SCC 318, wherein it has been clearly held that a prosecution under this Section can be initiated only by the sanction of the court under whose proceedings an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) has allegedly been committed.”

It would be instructive to note that the Bench then mentions in para 20 that, “Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai (Supra) while examining the purpose and object of the Legislature in creating the bar against cognizance of private complaints in regard to the offences mentioned in Section 195(1) (b) & (c) is both to save the accused person from vexatious or baseless prosecutions inspired by feelings of vindictiveness on the part of the private complainants to harass their opponents and also to avoid confusion which is likely to arise on account of conflicts between findings of the courts in which forged documents are produced or false evidence is led and the conclusions of the criminal courts dealing with the private complaint. It is for this reason as suggested earlier, that the Legislature has entrusted the court, whose proceedings had been the target of the offence of perjury to consider the expediency in the larger public interest, of a criminal trial of the guilty party.”

While mentioning another relevant case law, the Bench then hastens to add in para 21 that, “Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Gopalakrishna Menon (Supra) has held at paragraph 7 as under:-

“7. In view of what we have said above, the prosecution in the instant case on the basis of a private complaint and in the absence of a complaint from the appropriate civil court where the alleged fraudulent receipt has been produced, would not be sustainable. As we are of the view that if the prosecution is allowed to continue serious prejudice would be caused to the appellants and they would be called upon to face a trial which would not be sustainable, we allow this appeal and set aside the decision of the High Court and quash the complaint case filed against the appellants.””

Adding more to it, the Bench then enunciates in para 22 that, “Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Narendra Kumar Shrivastava (Supra) has held that perjury on the basis of private cognizable offence under this Section can be initiated only by the sanction of the court under whose proceedings an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) has allegedly been committed. Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held at paragraph 22 to 24 as under:-

“22. In Sachida Nand Singh {2000) 1 SCC 278] relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, this Court was considering the question as to whether the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C. is applicable to a case where forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a court. It was held:

“6. A reading of the clause reveals two main postulates for operation of the bar mentioned there. First is, there must be allegation that an offence (it should be either an offence described in Section 463 or any other offence punishable under Sections 471, 475, 476 of the IPC) has been committed. Second is that such offence should have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court. There is no dispute before us that if forgery has been committed while the document was in the custody of a court, then prosecution can be launched only with a complaint made by that court. There is also no dispute that if forgery was committed with a document which has not been produced in a court then the prosecution would lie at the instance of any person. If so, will its production in a court make all the difference?

23. The sequitur of the above discussion is that the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b) (ii) of the Code is not applicable to a case where forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a court. Accordingly we dismiss this appeal.”

23. In Sachida Nand Singh (supra), this Court had dealt with Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C unlike the present case which is covered by the preceding clause of the Section. The category of offences which fall under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C. refer to the offence of giving false evidence and offences against public justice which is distinctly different from those offences under Section 195(1) (b)(ii) of Cr.P.C, where a dispute could arise whether the offence of forging a document was committed outside the court or when it was in the custody of the court. Hence, this decision has no application to the facts of the present case.

24. The case in hand squarely falls within the category of cases falling under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C. as the offence is punishable under Section 193 of the IPC. Therefore, the Magistrate has erred in taking cognizance of the offence on the basis of a private complaint. The High Court, in our view, has rightly set aside the order of the Magistrate. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we deem it proper to set aside the costs imposed by the High Court.””

Most forthrightly, the Bench then holds in para 25 that, “Considering the rival submission of the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, the petitioner has assailed the registration of FIR and authority of the police to register a private complaint and one of the complainants has already been made party in this case.

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In a notable judgment titled Nand Kumar Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. in CRMP No. 424 of 2018 and 2022 LiveLaw (Chh) 13 that was delivered finally on February 15, 2022, the Chhattisgarh High Court has held that in terms of Section 195 CrPC, no FIR can be registered for forging of documents or conspiracy committed before the Court, on the basis of a private complaint. All Judges must always bear this in mind while ruling on similar such judgments. It also noted that it is crystal clear that the registration of FIR against the petitioner on the basis of complaints made by the respondents and other complainants is not tenable.

To start with, this cogent, commendable, and convincing judgment authored by a single Judge Bench comprising of Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas of Chhattisgarh High Court sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The petitioner has filed the instant petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing the FIR bearing Crime No. 124/2017 (Annexure P/1) registered against the petitioner on 30.03.2017 on the basis of complaint made by respondent No. 2 along with other complainants at Police Station- Baloda, District- Baloda-Bazar (C.G.) for committing offence punishable under Section 420 of I.P.C.”

While elaborating on the facts, the Bench then observes in para 2 that, “The brief facts, as projected by the petitioner, are that on 30.03.2017, Police Station- Baloda, District- Baloda-BazarBhatapara registered offence bearing FIR No. 124/2017 on the basis of written report dated 28.06.2016 by respondent No. 2/Nandlal Verma, Kalindri, Kaushal, Santram Mantram & Gopal alleging that the petitioner in a revenue case for mutation of land filed before Tahsildar had submitted fabricated false documents of Panchayat proceedings dated 03.04.2013 and got his name mutated in revenue records of the ancestral property on the basis of this fabricated document. After completion of preliminary enquiry, the Police have registered the FIR against the petitioner on 30.03.2017, which has been assailed by the petitioner in this petition.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then points out in para 13 that, “This Court while hearing this petition on 28.02.2018 granted interim protection in favour of the petitioner directing that the investigation may go on but no coercive steps shall be taken against the petitioner till the next date of hearing.”

Be it noted, the Bench then envisages in para 19 that, “From bare perusal of the FIR and considering the contents of the complaint, it is crystal clear that it has been alleged the petitioner has given false documentary evidence relating to resolution of Gram Panchyat dated 03.10.2003 before Tahsildar in revenue case and on that basis, the Tahsildar has mutated the property in the name of the petitioner, therefore, the provisions of Sections 195 & 340 of the Cr.P.C. will be attracted and it is perjury which amount to forgery, as such, as per the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Narendra Kumar Shrivastava Vs. State of Bihar (2019) 3 SCC 318, wherein it has been clearly held that a prosecution under this Section can be initiated only by the sanction of the court under whose proceedings an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) has allegedly been committed.”

It would be instructive to note that the Bench then mentions in para 20 that, “Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai (Supra) while examining the purpose and object of the Legislature in creating the bar against cognizance of private complaints in regard to the offences mentioned in Section 195(1) (b) & (c) is both to save the accused person from vexatious or baseless prosecutions inspired by feelings of vindictiveness on the part of the private complainants to harass their opponents and also to avoid confusion which is likely to arise on account of conflicts between findings of the courts in which forged documents are produced or false evidence is led and the conclusions of the criminal courts dealing with the private complaint. It is for this reason as suggested earlier, that the Legislature has entrusted the court, whose proceedings had been the target of the offence of perjury to consider the expediency in the larger public interest, of a criminal trial of the guilty party.”

While mentioning another relevant case law, the Bench then hastens to add in para 21 that, “Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Gopalakrishna Menon (Supra) has held at paragraph 7 as under:-

“7. In view of what we have said above, the prosecution in the instant case on the basis of a private complaint and in the absence of a complaint from the appropriate civil court where the alleged fraudulent receipt has been produced, would not be sustainable. As we are of the view that if the prosecution is allowed to continue serious prejudice would be caused to the appellants and they would be called upon to face a trial which would not be sustainable, we allow this appeal and set aside the decision of the High Court and quash the complaint case filed against the appellants.””

Adding more to it, the Bench then enunciates in para 22 that, “Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Narendra Kumar Shrivastava (Supra) has held that perjury on the basis of private cognizable offence under this Section can be initiated only by the sanction of the court under whose proceedings an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) has allegedly been committed. Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held at paragraph 22 to 24 as under:-

“22. In Sachida Nand Singh {2000) 1 SCC 278] relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, this Court was considering the question as to whether the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C. is applicable to a case where forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a court. It was held:

“6. A reading of the clause reveals two main postulates for operation of the bar mentioned there. First is, there must be allegation that an offence (it should be either an offence described in Section 463 or any other offence punishable under Sections 471, 475, 476 of the IPC) has been committed. Second is that such offence should have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court. There is no dispute before us that if forgery has been committed while the document was in the custody of a court, then prosecution can be launched only with a complaint made by that court. There is also no dispute that if forgery was committed with a document which has not been produced in a court then the prosecution would lie at the instance of any person. If so, will its production in a court make all the difference?

23. The sequitur of the above discussion is that the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b) (ii) of the Code is not applicable to a case where forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a court. Accordingly we dismiss this appeal.”

23. In Sachida Nand Singh (supra), this Court had dealt with Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C unlike the present case which is covered by the preceding clause of the Section. The category of offences which fall under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C. refer to the offence of giving false evidence and offences against public justice which is distinctly different from those offences under Section 195(1) (b)(ii) of Cr.P.C, where a dispute could arise whether the offence of forging a document was committed outside the court or when it was in the custody of the court. Hence, this decision has no application to the facts of the present case.

24. The case in hand squarely falls within the category of cases falling under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C. as the offence is punishable under Section 193 of the IPC. Therefore, the Magistrate has erred in taking cognizance of the offence on the basis of a private complaint. The High Court, in our view, has rightly set aside the order of the Magistrate. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we deem it proper to set aside the costs imposed by the High Court.””

Most forthrightly, the Bench then holds in para 25 that, “Considering the rival submission of the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, the petitioner has assailed the registration of FIR and authority of the police to register a private complaint and one of the complainants has already been made party in this case.

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AN ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE BODIES CAN ESTABLISH A CAPTIVE POWER PLANT PRIMARILY FOR THEIR OWN USE UNDER THE ELECTRICITY ACT: SUPREME COURT

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The Supreme Court in the case Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd. vs Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission observed that a captive power plant primarily for their own use can be established by an association of corporate bodies.

The requirement would be that the consumption of SBIPL and SBMPL together should not be less than 51% of the power generated. Admittedly, the joint consumption by SBIPL and SBMPL is more than 51% and under the provisions of the said Act, the use of electricity by it would be for captive use only even an association of corporate bodies can establish a power plant. Since SBMPL holds 27.6% of the ownership, the requirement of not less than 26% of shares is fulfilled by SBMPL as SBMPL holds 27.6% equity shares in SBPIL.

The fourth proviso to sub­section (2) of Section 42 of the said Act would also reveal that surcharge would not be leviable in case open access is provided to a person who has established a captive generating plant for carrying the electricity to the destination of his own use and under Section 9 of the said Act, could be an individual or a body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, it is clear that the person will get benefit even an association of corporate bodies can establish a captive power plant it has been seen. The definition of “person” is wide enough to include any company or body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or artificial juridical person it should be primarily for the use of the members of such co­operative society or association is the requirement, the Bench observed while referring to the provisions of the Electricity Act.

The BPIL, the respondent contended and supported the impugned judgment that no permission is required from the Commission for supply of electricity for its own use. Thereafter the appellant Company contended that unless SBPIL consumes 51% of the aggregate electricity generated by it, it will not be entitled to get the benefit under Section 9 of the said Act, in an appeal filled before the Apex Court.

An appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity filed by the Company further The Commission held that SBPIL was entitled to supply electricity to its sister concern SBMPL and the same would qualify to be treating as own consumption and within the ambit of Section 9 read with Section 2(8) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Rule 3 of the Electricity Rules, 2005 SBPIL submitted a petition for providing open access and wheeling of power through the transmission system of the Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd (Company) for captive use by SBMPL to the Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission, the commission. A Captive Generation Plant is established by SBPIL, and is a sister concern of SBPIL Shri Bajrang Power and I spat Ltd and Shri Bajrang Metallics and Power Ltd, SBMPL.

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Where the crime was committed the remission or premature release policy of the state has to be considered: Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court in the case Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, Lala Vakil vs State of Gujarat observed that where the crime was committed has to be considered in the remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State.

While allowing the writ petition the court observed and contended that Once the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat, after the trial been concluded and judgment of conviction came to be passed, all further proceedings have to be 6 considered including remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred and concluded for exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court, as the case may be. The court further stated that under Section 432(7) CrPC the appropriate Government can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments.

the appropriate Government in the ordinary course would be the State of Gujarat. But the case was transferred in exceptional circumstances by this Court for limited purpose for trial and disposal to the neighboring State i.e., the State of Maharashtra by an order dated 06.08.2004. ordinarily, the trial was to be concluded in the same State and in terms of Section 432(7) CrPC as the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed in the State of Gujarat, observed by the Apex Court.

he application for pre­mature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat, as prayed by the petitioner by judgment impugned dated 17.07.2009 As His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra. Thereafter He had filed his petition for pre­mature release under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating that he had undergone more than 15 years 4 months of custody.

The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed and noted that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of the appropriate Government.

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Adopt roster based reservation for preferential candidates as followed by JIPMER: Supreme Court directs all AIIMS institutes

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The Supreme Court in the case Students Association AIIMS Bhopal And Or’s. v. AllMS and Or’s observed and directed all AIIMS Institutes to adopt roster-based reservation followed by Jawaharlal Institute of Postgraduate Medical Education and Research, Pondicherry (JIPMER) as a plea was filled in the Court seeking direction to AIIMS to have a defined criteria for arriving at seat matrix for institutional preference candidates in INI-CET examination.

the order of the Apex Court in the case AIIMS Students’ Union v. AIIMS And Or’s, would not be applicable if It emphasized that if the roster-based system is implemented the actual roster points for AIIMS would be different from JIPMER as the same would depend on the percentage of seats decided to be allocated to the preferential candidates but It stated that the reservation would be similar to the one adopted by JIPMER AIIMS New Delhi was willing to provide a roster-point based reservation for its institutional preference candidates, by way of an affidavit 20th January 2022 the Bench was apprised that pursuant to a meeting held on 28th June 2020 as prescribed the relevancy:

It shall not be too wide with the one for the general category candidate, that the margin of difference between the qualifying marks for the Institute’s candidate.

The one who has secured marks at the common entrance PG test less than the one secured by any other candidate belonging to reserved category enjoying constitutional protection such as SC, ST etc. cannot be the AIMS graduate the last student to qualify for admission.

appearing on behalf of AIIMS, Advocate, Mr. Dushyant Parashar, New Delhi was asked to get instructions from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and Jodhpur so that the Court can pass appropriate orders on the next date of hearing. As that apart from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and AIIMS, Jodhpur, all other AIIMS before the Apex Court has agreed to implement the roster-based reservation system followed by JIPMER Puducherry for their institutional preference candidates, the Court was informed at the last date of hearing.

the petition had been filed seeking direction to AIIMS to disclose how the seats for institutional preference candidates are to be allotted in the view of the same the petitioners claim that in the INI-CET examination conducted in July, 2021, only 4 seats (1.87%) in AIIMS, New Delhi were allotted to institutional preference candidates. Rivetingly, the petitioners note that no seats were allocated to any other AIIMS for admission of institutional preference candidates.

the Bench comprising of Justice L. Nageswara Rao and the justice A.S. Bopanna observed and noted that to record in the order that the roaster system would be applicable from this year. Mr. Parashar informed it that since new software is to be put in place for counselling, it might cause some delay. The bench further stated that the court will order it to apply this year but in case of delay AIMS can come later.

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‘The crime committed has to be considered in the remission or premature policy of the state’

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The Supreme Court in the case Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, Lala Vakil vs State of Gujarat observed that where the crime was committed has to be considered in the remission which is applicable in the State and the pre­mature release in terms of the policy

The Court noted while hearing the writ petition that in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred and concluded for exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court once the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat, after the trial been concluded and judgment of conviction came to be passed, all further proceedings have to be 6 considered including remission or pre­mature release, as the case may be, in the instance case. under Section 432(7) CrPC, there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments, can be either the Central or the State Government of the appropriate government.

in terms of Section 432(7) CrPC, the trial was to be concluded in the same State and ordinarily in the State of Gujrat the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed. by an order 06.08.2004., the case was transferred in exceptional circumstances by this Court for limited purpose for trial and disposal to the neighbouring State i.e., the State of Maharashtra, observed by the bench of Apex Court.

As mentioned by the petitioner in the plea that by judgment impugned dated 17.07.2019., the application for pre­mature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat and His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra. under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the petition was filled by the petitioner for premature release further the petitioner stated that that he had undergone under the custody of more than 15 years 4 months.

Section 302, 376(2) (e) (g) and reading it with Section 149 IPC, Shah was found guilty for the offence, the offence committed by him in the State of Gujrat.

The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of that appropriate government.

The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of that appropriate government.

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Seeking reduction of qualifying the percentile for admission in ayurveda course: A plea in Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court in the Case Amit Kumar v UOI & Or’s observed in Ayurveda course in view of large number of vacancies and for seeking reduction of qualifying percentile for admission, an ayurveda aspirant who appeared in NEET 2021 has approached the Court.

the court had observed that lowering the minimum marks and reducing the percentile for admission to first year BDS Course would not amount to lowing the standards of Education and further the Court directed to lower the percentile mark by 10 percentiles for admission in first year of BDS Course for academic year 2020-2021, with regards to substantive the contentions made by the petitioner by referring the judgement passed in the case in Harshit Agarwal & Or’s v Union of India.

the percentile may also be reduced for Ayurveda programme enabling the Petitioner to take admissions then If percentile is being reduced/considered for reduction for BDS course was further stated by the petitioner in the plea, while referring to an order dated 04.29.2022. Thereafter the top Court had asked Centre to consider lowering the percentile for BDS Courses.

Seeking the Centre’s response in a plea by filing a counter affidavit, noted by the Top Court specifying the above-mentioned information:

after deducting the admission granted for MBBS Courses (BDS Courses), the total number of Candidates.

in All India Quota and State Quota, the totals number of vacant seats.

in government colleges on one hand & private/deemed colleges on the other hand, the number of seats which are remaining.

the petition was filed through AOR Neeraj Shekhar and for the petitioner Advocate Shivam Singh appeared.

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Bank case rejected by Supreme Court against farmer

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The Supreme Court in the case Bank of Maharashtra & Or’s v Mohanlal Patidar observed an order given by the High Courts of directing the bank the OTS proposal given by a farmer who had availed a loan from the bank, the court further pulled up the Bank of Maharashtra for challenging the order.

The Bank shall complete remaining formalities and provide all consequential benefits flowing therefrom to the petitioners, the court further stated that it is needless to emphasize The OTS proposal given by the petitioners in both the cases shall be accepted by the Bank and ‘sanction letters’ be issued forthwith, the court allowed the petitioner plea.

The petitioner not only promptly challenged the said order, it is noteworthy that petitioner never acceded to the unilateral decision dated 25th August 2021 and even otherwise the letter dated 25th August 2021 is held to be illegal by us, clause-7 of policy cannot take away the fruits of OTS benefits, within two months from the date of issuance of order dated 22th September 2021, the petitioner filled the instant petition and further the court directed we are unable to give stamp of approval to the impugned orders and action of the Bank, observed by the bench comprising of Justice Sujoy Paul and the justice Dwarka Dhish Bansal while setting aside the impugned orders of the bank.

In an order dated 03.09.2021 it was stated and it showed that the petitioner was required to pay minimum 10% of the OTS amount within stipulated time and that he had deposited Rs.35,00,000/- out of Rs.36,50,000/- within the stipulated time, it was argued before the court by the counsel.

As full and final settlement of the dues, he will be required to deposit Rs.50.50 lakhs as he was informed by the Asset Recovery Branch of the Bank.

Whole law comes into place when a matter of farmers come as the down payment were also accepted and it was further stated by the bench in an oral remark You don’t file cases against the ones who loot 1000s of crores.

The respondent had obtained a loan and intended to pay it in terms of a One Time Settlement which was quantified as Rs 3650000/-. in furtherance thereof the respondent had deposited Rs 35,00,000 with the bank, in the above-mentioned matter.

The bank had miserably failed to accept the same and on the contrary, decided to enhance the compromise amount to Rs.50.50 lakhs unilaterally which was contrary to the OTS scheme, contended by the counsel further the counsel stated that the bank had miserably failed to accept the same and on the contrary, decided to enhance the compromise amount to Rs.50.50 lakhs unilaterally which was contrary to the OTS scheme.

The bench comprising of Justice DY Chandrachud and the justice Surya Kant observed and remarked while dismissing the plea assailing Madhya Pradesh High Court’s order dated 02.21.2022 Such a litigation in Supreme Court will spoil the families of farmers financially, Go after bigger fish.

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