Without mincing any words, the Orissa High Court has as recently as on March 4, 2022 in a learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Pidika Sambaru v. State of Odisha & Anr. in CRLREV No. 490 of 2021 and 2022 LiveLaw (Ori) 21 ruled very clearly that the right of an accused to recall witnesses under Section 311 CrPC cannot be denied only because there exists a right of prosecutrix under Section 33(5) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”). The said provision requires the Special Court to ensure that the child (prosecutrix) is not called repeatedly to testify in the court. It merits no reiteration that the rights of prosecutrix are paramount but the rights of accused also cannot be kept in cold storage and have to be made available as and when required in any given case and in any given sets of circumstances.
To start with, this simple, short and straightforward judgment authored by a single Judge Bench comprising of Justice SK Panigrahi of Orissa High Court at Cuttack sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The Petitioner, who is the accused in T.R. Case No.80 of 2018, arising out of Narayanpatna P.S. Case No.72 of 2018, pending in the court of the learned Ad hoc Additional District and Sessions Judge, (FTSC), Jepore instituted by the Opposite Party No.2 for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(n)/ 450/ 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “the Penal Code” for brevity) read with Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 ((hereinafter referred to as “POCSO Act” for brevity), has made a prayer in this CRLREV under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code” for brevity) to set aside the impugned order dated 01.11.2021 passed by the learned Ad hoc Additional District and Sessions Judge, (FTSC), Jeypore in the aforesaid case rejecting his petition filed on 27.10.2021 under Section 311 of the Code to recall P.Ws.1, 2 and 3 for their cross-examination.”
While elaborating briefly on the prosecution case, the Bench then envisages in para 2 that, “Prosecution case in brief is that: On 15.09.2018 at 05.14 P.M. the opposite party no.2/complainant presented a written report before the Inspector-In-Charge, Narayanpatna Police Station, Narayanpatna alleging that the present petitioner who is resident of his village has committed rape on his daughter seven months ago in his cottage. While his daughter resisted, the present petitioner threatened her to kill. She narrated her daughter’s ordeal to the villagers. By that time, her daughter impregnated with about 7 months. The accused also threatened to the complainant and his family members to kill, if they disclose the matter to anybody or report to police. Hence, they remain silent. On 14.09.2018, there was a village panch meeting at their village for amicable settlement. The village gentries, namely Suba Pidika, Chinaya Pidika, Uttara Tadingi, Narsana Pidika, Kate Pidika, Sasai Pidika, Waralu Huika and others were present in the meeting. They called Sambaru Pidika to the meeting, but he did not attend the meeting. The panch members told him to report the matter at police station. Hence, he made a report before the police on 15.09.2018. Based on which, Narayanpatna P.S. Case No.72 of 2018 was registered for commission of offences under Sections 376(3)/ 450/ 506 of the Penal Code read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act and investigation was initiated. The victim girl was sent to CHC, Narayanpatna for medical examination and subsequently, the Medical Officer, CHC, Narayanpatna referred the victim girl to S.L.N. Medical College and Hospital, Koraput, as there was no lady Medical Officer at CHC, Narayanpatna. After completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet against the present petitioner.
Keeping in view the nature of offences and detention of the accused in custody, the hearing of the case has been started. On 09.01.2020, the trial court examined five persons including the victim girl as P.W.2. On 11.02.2020, the medical officer was also examined by the prosecution, while there was no counsel to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on behalf of the accused, as the accused-petitioner was in custody during that period. After released on bail, the petitioner engaged his lawyer and moved an application under Section 311 of the Code on 27.10.2021 to recall P.Ws.1 to 3. Having heard both the parties, the trial court vide order dated 01.11.2021 rejected the application of the petitioner on the ground that the discretion under Section 311 of the Code cannot be exercised as there is bar under Section 33(5) of the POCSO Act under which there is clear prescribed limitations recalling witnesses more particularly the victim of crime. Hence, this revision Application has been filed.”
To be sure, the Bench then mentions in para 5 that, “Section 311 of the Code provides:
“Power to summon material witness, or examine person present. Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re- examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and reexamine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case.”
On the other hand, Section 33 (5) of the POCSO Act reads as under:
“Procedure and powers of Special Court: (5) The Special Court shall ensure that the child is not called repeatedly to testify in the Court.””
Be it noted, the Bench then points out in para 7 that, “It is mandatory for a Court to recall witness for further cross-examination if his evidence appears to be essential for just decision of the case. There is no bar for a court to recall a witness for further cross-examination. In Godrej Pacific Tech. Ltd. –v– Computer Joint India Ltd. (2008) 11 SCC 108, which has rightly by referring to Section 311 of the Code, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held:
“The section is manifestly in two parts. Whereas the word used in the first part is “may”, the second part uses “shall”. In consequence, the first part gives purely discretionary authority to a criminal court and enables it at any stage of an enquiry, trial or proceeding under the Code (a) to summon anyone as a witness, or (b) to examine any person present in the court, or (c) to recall and re-examine any person whose evidence has already been recorded. On the other hand, the second part is mandatory and compels the court to take any of the aforementioned steps if the new evidence appears to it essential to the just decision of the case. This is a supplementary provision enabling, and in certain circumstances imposing on the court the duty of examining a material witness who would not be otherwise brought before it. It is couched in the widest possible terms and calls for no limitation, either with regard to the stage at which the powers of the court should be exercised, or with regard to the manner in which it should be exercised. It is not only the prerogative but also the plain duty of a court to examine such of those witnesses as it considers absolutely necessary for doing justice between the State and the subject. There is a duty cast upon the court to arrive at the truth by all lawful means and one of such means is the examination of witnesses of its own accord when for certain obvious reasons either party is not prepared to call witnesses who are known to be in a position to speak important relevant facts.””
Quite pertinently, the Bench then hastens to add in para 8 envisaging that, “In Vimal Khanna vs. State 2018 SCC Online Del 11796 (DHC) the Court has held that denial of opportunity to cross examine the witnesses violates the Constitutional guarantee to an accused and vitiates the trial. Vimal Khanna (Supra) has been followed in Mohd. Gulzar v. The State (GNCTD) 2018 (4) JCC 2291 (DHC), wherein after recording that the counsel for the accused was not present on three consecutive dates to cross examine the witness, the Court held that since the right of cross examination is a valuable right, the child’s right under Section 33 (5) of POCSO Act has to be balanced with the aforesaid rights of the accused and thus permitted one more opportunity to the accused to cross examine the alleged victim. In B. C. Deva @ Dyava vs. State Of Karnataka the Court C.A. (Crl.) No. 205 of 2001 (S.C.) was clearly of the view that the power to recall a witness at the instance of either party to ensure justice is done is greater than the provisions set out in Section 33 POCSO Act. The provisions of Section 33 laid down a general principle which must guide the trial Court and is similar to Section 309 Cr.P.C, being in the nature of laws to ensure speedy trial. However, by virtue of Sections 4 and 5 of Cr.P.C, Section 311 Cr.P.C shall prevail as no specific procedure is provided under POCSO Act for recall of a witness. Section 42A of POCSO Act clarifies that the Act is not in derogation of any other Law.”
As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 9 that, “In that view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses being an essential right of the accused, it is evident that non-cross-examination of the said witnesses will put the petitioner to prejudice. In such circumstances, it is not unjust to afford an opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine P.Ws.1 to 3 by recalling them.”
Quite forthrightly, the Bench then holds in para 10 that, “In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, the CRLREV is disposed of directing that the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTSC), Jeypore shall recall P.Ws.1 to 3 and the department shall make all endeavours to produce P.Ws.1 to 3 as early as possible for cross-examination by the petitioner preferably within a period of one month from the date of production of certified copy of this order. After giving the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine P.Ws.1 to 3, the trial court shall proceed for expeditious disposal of the case. It is further clarified that the Court shall take steps to recall the child witness at one go without disturbing him/her again and again.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 11 that, “Accordingly, this CRLREV is disposed of.”
In a nutshell, the single Judge Bench of Justice SK Panigrahi of Orissa High Court has minced absolutely no words to hold unequivocally that the right of accused to recall witness under Section 311 of CrPC can’t always be denied in lieu of prosecutrix’s right under Section 33(5) of POCSO Act. It certainly merits no reiteration that all the trial court Judges and so also all the other Judges before whom such cases are heard must adhere to what has been laid down so unambiguously! No denying it!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate
The single Judge Bench of Justice SK Panigrahi of Orissa High Court has minced absolutely no words to hold unequivocally that the right of accused to recall witness under Section 311 of CrPC can’t always be denied in lieu of prosecutrix’s right under Section 33(5) of POCSO Act. It certainly merits no reiteration that all the trial court Judges and so also all the other Judges before whom such cases are heard must adhere to what has been laid down so unambiguously.
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A PLEA IN SUPREME COURT CHALLENGES THE CHANGED NEET-SS 2022 EXAM PATTERN
The Supreme Court in the case Dr Richa Verma v. National Board of Examination observed the changed examination pattern which would now be comprising of 150 questions from the general i.e., the basic component of the primary feeder broad specialty subject and from all sub- specialty/systems/component of that primary feeder broad specialty subject. A plea filled in the Supreme Court by MD Radiation Oncologists and MD Anaesthesiologists NEET SS 2022 aspirant.
the petitioners have sought issuance of directions to restrain the NBE from excluding / MD Radiotherapy from the eligible feeder specialties for the super specialty course of DM Medical Oncology for NEET SS 2022 and have further sought for restoring the scheme/pattern for the exam further the petitioner deleting the MD Radiation Oncology, against this backdrop.
On 05.10.2021 the Central Government had told the Court that the revised pattern will be implemented only from next year and it may be noted that over the eleventh-hour changes brought to the NEET-SS 2021 pattern after facing the harsh criticism from the Supreme Court.
The petition further states that they will have to compete with candidates who have 100% questions from their postgraduate syllabus/ broad specialty as the new examination scheme is making some candidates write a paper which has no questions from their postgraduate broad specialty.
particularly in favor of MD Medicine in so far as the choice of options is far greater vis-a-vis the choices available to either MD Radiation Oncology or MD Anaesthesia, the pattern is not just a waste of time and effort for all those who have prepared for Critical Care but also grossly biased against few broad specialties and of the other four post-graduate branches there will be no questions from broad specialties.
This is complete waste of time, resources and effort put by the candidates who have been preparing for a super speciality subject for years as it is arbitrarily, illogical, highly partial and unreasonable, while terming the change in pattern, the contentions made by the petitioner.
the new pattern was forcing all the candidates from the broad specialties to write a single paper which will have 100% questions from General Medicine, stated by the petitioner. Furthermore, contending that the erstwhile pattern had a paper with 40% mixed questions from all the broad specialties and 60% questions from Critical Care (i.e., the super-specialty subject) which had ensured a level playing field.
THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 482 OF THE CRPC CANNOT BE QUASHED MERELY ON THE GROUND THAT NO USEFUL PURPOSE WILL BE SERVED: SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court in the case Satish Kumar Jatav vs State of Uttar Pradesh observed that while by prolonging the proceedings of the case, the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed. As when a clear case is made for the offence alleged on the ground that no useful purpose will be served.
under Sections 307, 504, 506 of the IPC and 9 Section 3(10)(15) of the Act, the serious allegations for the offences were made and while considering the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and quashing the criminal proceedings for the aforesaid offences, the High Court ought to have been more cautious and circumspect. on how the order passed by the learned Magistrate summoning the accused was wrong and/or erroneous, has not at all being allowed by the High Court. the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and has quashed the criminal proceedings is deprecated in the manner in which the High Court has disposed of further the High Court has observed in the proceedings of the case that no useful purpose will be served. The aforesaid cannot be a good ground and/or a ground at all to quash the criminal proceedings when a clear case was made out for the offences alleged, appeared while quashing the criminal proceedings by the High Court even for the impugned order passed, the bench overserved while allowing the appeal.
The application under Section 482 Cr.P.C The manner in which the High Court has disposed and quashed the criminal proceedings is not appreciated at all Furthermore the Court has emphasized that the High Court must pass a speaking and reasoned order in such matters. The same has been set aside by the High Court in a most cursory and casual manner.
The allegations made against the accused persons and even on the legality and validity of the order passed by the Magistrate summoning the accused, has not been discussed by the High Court the Court noted.
The appellant contended that there are no reasons whatsoever have been assigned while quashing the criminal proceedings and further the appellant contended that there is no independent application of mind by the High Court. The respondent defended the impugned order, on the other hand before the Apex Court.
the Allahabad High Court quashed the criminal proceedings merely opining that “that no useful purpose shall be served by prolonging the proceedings of the case, while allowing the petition filled by the accused challenging this order and the offences punishable under Sections 307, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(10)(15) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, the accused to face the trial the Magistrate summoned the accused in the present case.
The bench comprising of Justice MR Shah and the justice BV Nagarathna observed and reiterated under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that a High Court must pass a speaking and reasoned order while disposing petitions.
Nexus between accused’s negligence and victim’s death has to be established under Section 304A IPC: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court in the case Nanjundappa vs State of Karnataka observed that would not apply to a criminal case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu.
when there is no report of a technical expert to corroborate the prosecution story as The Appellants therefore are entitled to be given the benefit of doubt furthermore It is even more unbelievable that Appellant no. 2 came in contact with the same voltage and managed to get away with a few abrasions.
when such current passed through the Television set, it did not blast and melt the wiring of the entire house and the court further added that it sounds completely preposterous that a telephone wire carried 11KV current without melting on contact.
While evaluating such evidence the jury should bear in mind that inference of guilt should be the only reasonable inference from the facts as In case of circumstantial evidence, there is a risk of jumping to conclusions in haste However the conviction of the accused persons seems wholly unjustified against the weight of the evidence adduced, in the present case. The Court also referred to the case of Syad Akbar Vs. State of Karnataka in which this Court proceeded on the basis that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a criminal case as its applicability in an action for injury by negligence is well known, observed by the court in the present case.
The court noted that there is no eye witness to say conclusively that the Appellants were in fact executing the work at the place alleged and further the court notice that no report or even inspection was conducted by a technical expert to assess the veracity of the averments made by the complainants to suggest that it was due to the alleged acts of the Appellants that the incident took place. the allegations against the Appellants are highly technical in nature, notice by the court on perusing the evidence on record.
On 21th November 2003 at 1.00p.m. the deceased was watching TV in his house. Noticing a sudden sound in the TV, the deceased got up to separate the dish wire, the TV connection wire and the telephone wire, which were entwined together, he felt an electric shock and his right hand was burnt and as a result of this shock he succumbed to death at that point of time it was found that the said incident took place because of the negligent act on the part of the accused, the supervisor (an employee in the telephone department ) and daily wage worker employed by him, as it was found out in the investigation. under Section 304A read with Section 34 IPC was upheld by the Karnataka High Court, the appellant is convicted.
the bench comprising of CJI NV Ramana, Justice Krishna Murari and the justice Hima Kohli observed under Section 304A of Indian Penal Code for causing death by negligence, while acquitting two persons that prosecution has to firstly prove negligence and then establish direct nexus between negligence of the accused and the death of the victim, for bringing home the guilt of the accused.
The Court also referred to the case of Syad Akbar Vs. State of Karnataka in which this Court proceeded on the basis that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a criminal case as its applicability in an action for injury by negligence is well known, observed by the court in the present case.
AN ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE BODIES CAN ESTABLISH A CAPTIVE POWER PLANT PRIMARILY FOR THEIR OWN USE UNDER THE ELECTRICITY ACT: SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court in the case Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd. vs Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission observed that a captive power plant primarily for their own use can be established by an association of corporate bodies.
The requirement would be that the consumption of SBIPL and SBMPL together should not be less than 51% of the power generated. Admittedly, the joint consumption by SBIPL and SBMPL is more than 51% and under the provisions of the said Act, the use of electricity by it would be for captive use only even an association of corporate bodies can establish a power plant. Since SBMPL holds 27.6% of the ownership, the requirement of not less than 26% of shares is fulfilled by SBMPL as SBMPL holds 27.6% equity shares in SBPIL.
The fourth proviso to subsection (2) of Section 42 of the said Act would also reveal that surcharge would not be leviable in case open access is provided to a person who has established a captive generating plant for carrying the electricity to the destination of his own use and under Section 9 of the said Act, could be an individual or a body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, it is clear that the person will get benefit even an association of corporate bodies can establish a captive power plant it has been seen. The definition of “person” is wide enough to include any company or body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or artificial juridical person it should be primarily for the use of the members of such cooperative society or association is the requirement, the Bench observed while referring to the provisions of the Electricity Act.
The BPIL, the respondent contended and supported the impugned judgment that no permission is required from the Commission for supply of electricity for its own use. Thereafter the appellant Company contended that unless SBPIL consumes 51% of the aggregate electricity generated by it, it will not be entitled to get the benefit under Section 9 of the said Act, in an appeal filled before the Apex Court.
An appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity filed by the Company further The Commission held that SBPIL was entitled to supply electricity to its sister concern SBMPL and the same would qualify to be treating as own consumption and within the ambit of Section 9 read with Section 2(8) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Rule 3 of the Electricity Rules, 2005 SBPIL submitted a petition for providing open access and wheeling of power through the transmission system of the Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd (Company) for captive use by SBMPL to the Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission, the commission. A Captive Generation Plant is established by SBPIL, and is a sister concern of SBPIL Shri Bajrang Power and I spat Ltd and Shri Bajrang Metallics and Power Ltd, SBMPL.
Where the crime was committed the remission or premature release policy of the state has to be considered: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court in the case Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, Lala Vakil vs State of Gujarat observed that where the crime was committed has to be considered in the remission or premature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State.
While allowing the writ petition the court observed and contended that Once the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat, after the trial been concluded and judgment of conviction came to be passed, all further proceedings have to be 6 considered including remission or premature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred and concluded for exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court, as the case may be. The court further stated that under Section 432(7) CrPC the appropriate Government can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments.
the appropriate Government in the ordinary course would be the State of Gujarat. But the case was transferred in exceptional circumstances by this Court for limited purpose for trial and disposal to the neighboring State i.e., the State of Maharashtra by an order dated 06.08.2004. ordinarily, the trial was to be concluded in the same State and in terms of Section 432(7) CrPC as the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed in the State of Gujarat, observed by the Apex Court.
he application for premature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat, as prayed by the petitioner by judgment impugned dated 17.07.2009 As His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra. Thereafter He had filed his petition for premature release under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating that he had undergone more than 15 years 4 months of custody.
The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed and noted that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of the appropriate Government.
Adopt roster based reservation for preferential candidates as followed by JIPMER: Supreme Court directs all AIIMS institutes
The Supreme Court in the case Students Association AIIMS Bhopal And Or’s. v. AllMS and Or’s observed and directed all AIIMS Institutes to adopt roster-based reservation followed by Jawaharlal Institute of Postgraduate Medical Education and Research, Pondicherry (JIPMER) as a plea was filled in the Court seeking direction to AIIMS to have a defined criteria for arriving at seat matrix for institutional preference candidates in INI-CET examination.
the order of the Apex Court in the case AIIMS Students’ Union v. AIIMS And Or’s, would not be applicable if It emphasized that if the roster-based system is implemented the actual roster points for AIIMS would be different from JIPMER as the same would depend on the percentage of seats decided to be allocated to the preferential candidates but It stated that the reservation would be similar to the one adopted by JIPMER AIIMS New Delhi was willing to provide a roster-point based reservation for its institutional preference candidates, by way of an affidavit 20th January 2022 the Bench was apprised that pursuant to a meeting held on 28th June 2020 as prescribed the relevancy:
It shall not be too wide with the one for the general category candidate, that the margin of difference between the qualifying marks for the Institute’s candidate.
The one who has secured marks at the common entrance PG test less than the one secured by any other candidate belonging to reserved category enjoying constitutional protection such as SC, ST etc. cannot be the AIMS graduate the last student to qualify for admission.
appearing on behalf of AIIMS, Advocate, Mr. Dushyant Parashar, New Delhi was asked to get instructions from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and Jodhpur so that the Court can pass appropriate orders on the next date of hearing. As that apart from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and AIIMS, Jodhpur, all other AIIMS before the Apex Court has agreed to implement the roster-based reservation system followed by JIPMER Puducherry for their institutional preference candidates, the Court was informed at the last date of hearing.
the petition had been filed seeking direction to AIIMS to disclose how the seats for institutional preference candidates are to be allotted in the view of the same the petitioners claim that in the INI-CET examination conducted in July, 2021, only 4 seats (1.87%) in AIIMS, New Delhi were allotted to institutional preference candidates. Rivetingly, the petitioners note that no seats were allocated to any other AIIMS for admission of institutional preference candidates.
the Bench comprising of Justice L. Nageswara Rao and the justice A.S. Bopanna observed and noted that to record in the order that the roaster system would be applicable from this year. Mr. Parashar informed it that since new software is to be put in place for counselling, it might cause some delay. The bench further stated that the court will order it to apply this year but in case of delay AIMS can come later.
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