The significance of the Taiwan Strait lies in the fact that it has quietly become one of the Indo-Pacific’s most consequential flashpoints in recent times, especially post-Hormuz episode. What was once viewed mainly as a dispute between Beijing and Taipei is now a strategic issue with consequences for trade, technology, energy security and military stability across Asia.
For India, the question is no longer whether a China Taiwan crisis matters, but how deeply and how quickly such a crisis would affect Indian interests. Provided that Taiwan sits at the centre of a network of sea lanes, supply chains, critical minerals and technological dependencies that connect East Asia and the Indian Ocean with the world, its geography matters a lot to global politics.
Therefore, any military confrontation, blockade, or even a prolonged period of coercion around Taiwan by China would certainly disturb this network from a geopolitical viewpoint. Hence, the aftereffects emerging the Taiwan Strait would not remain limited to the western Pacific. Spreading more like wildfire, they would reach the Strait of Malacca, Indian ports, Indian factories and Indian strategic planning.
Therefore, India has always traditionally approached the Taiwan question with caution. However, Indian government gives relatively less attention to this issue, prioritising its own existing border conflict with China. Given that India is gradually approaching Vision 2047, India avoids any confrontations with China at this moment.
Hence, New Delhi does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taipei and has generally avoided statements that could be interpreted as direct political support for Taiwanese independence. Yet India’s growing economic ties with Taiwan, its expanding defence cooperation with like-minded Indo-Pacific partners, and its unresolved border tensions with China have changed the context.
A crisis in the Taiwan Strait would now touch India’s economy, security and diplomatic choices in ways that were less visible a decade ago. When looked at this chokepoint with global consequences, it is seen that the Taiwan Strait is one of the busiest maritime corridors in the world. It links the East China Sea with the South China Sea and connects major economies such as Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan with markets and energy supplies further south and west.
Since China is considered the manufacturing hub of the world, its connectivity with this strait signifies its importance from a global economics point of view. A large proportion of global container traffic passes through or near this corridor, making it essential not only for regional commerce but also for global trade.
Any disruption in the strait would have an immediate effect on global shipping. Vessels may be forced to take longer routes, resulting in the rise of insurance premium of the vessels, paving the way for ports across East and Southeast Asia to face a massive congestion. Though it sounds very superficial, these are actually not minor logistical problems.
Higher transport costs would feed into the prices of goods, raw materials and components, putting massive economic pressure on the common people globally. Another dimension of concern is that the global businesses dependent on predictable delivery schedules may face delays, while governments may also come under pressure to secure essential supplies, indirectly putting so much economic pressure on consumers.
Therefore, it would not be wrong to infer that, for India, the connection is direct. A significant share of India’s trade passes through the Strait of Malacca, which links the Indian Ocean with the Pacific. Many of India’s major trading partners, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China, are located near these waters. If the Taiwan Strait becomes unsafe or unstable, the effects would travel westward through the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait, affecting Indian exports, imports and energy flows.
Since the danger does not come only from direct attacks on commercial vessels, even the fear of conflict has the potential to disrupt trade. Shipping companies may avoid certain routes, cargo owners may postpone shipments, and financial markets may react sharply. In such an environment, the cost of uncertainty can be as damaging as the physical interruption of trade itself. Therefore, India’s economic exposure to a Taiwan crisis is direct and immediate.
The country depends on imported components for several key industries, including electronics, automobiles, telecommunications, renewable energy and pharmaceuticals. Many of these inputs come from China, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. A crisis involving Taiwan would therefore affect not just one supply chain but several interconnected ones. The electronics sector would be particularly vulnerable.
India’s smartphone industry, consumer electronics manufacturing, automobile production and data-centre expansion all rely on imported chips, displays, sensors, batteries and precision components. If shipments from Taiwan or China are delayed, production lines could slow down or stop. Companies may be forced to raise prices, delay launches or look for costly alternative suppliers.
While Taiwan may not be the primary source for all these inputs, a broader regional conflict evolving around the Taiwan Strait would significantly disrupt overall maritime shipping all across East Asia, the Indo-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region. Therefore, a crisis emerging in the Taiwan Strait should not be treated as a distant geopolitical issue. For India, it is tied to the everyday functioning of industry, trade and public welfare.
A crisis would test the resilience of India’s supply chains and expose areas where diversification and domestic capacity remain insufficient. The Taiwan Strait may be geographically distant from India, but strategically it is close to the core of India’s strategic future. Its stability and instability affect the movement of goods, the availability of technology, the security of sea lanes and the credibility of an open Indo-Pacific order.
Therefore, India’s interest lies not in seeking confrontation with China, but in ensuring that coercion does not become an accepted tool for changing the regional order. Hence, it would not be wrong to argue that Taiwan is not merely a distant dispute between two sides of a strait. It is a test of whether the Indo-Pacific will remain open, connected or rules-based.
Therefore, averting coercion in the Strait of Taiwan through diplomacy and dialogue is not optional for India; it has become a strategic necessity.
*Sanjay Turi, Doctoral Candidate, School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at India Forth (Sydney) Nargish Gulapsha is an independent researcher, Himachal Pradesh University, Shimla