At the Seoul defence conference, Gilbert Teodoro Jr. the Philippine defense secretary was speaking about the 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling and the need to uphold it when he was handed over a note that he claimed was sent by Chinese. The message in the note reiterated that “China neither accepts nor recognizes the arbitration ruling”. To which Teodoro’s response was unusually blunt: “because you lost” followed by the statements that China lacks “basic decency” and “shame”. China responded by accusing the Philippine secretary of “seeking attention and stirring up trouble” and warned that such actions could undermine relations between China and the Philippines and stability in the South China Sea. This seems like another heated diplomatic exchange between two nations that have a long running territorial dispute but beneath it lies a larger strategic concept of grey zone conflict.
The South China Sea dispute is often portrayed as a quarrel over tiny reefs, islands and shoals. However, strategically speaking these features are anything but significant. Mischief reef, Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal are the confrontational fronts between China and the Philippines. The 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling was initiated by the Philippines under the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), and this award was central to the conflict. The tribunal rejected China’s claim to historic rights in the South China sea as such entitlements are not permitted under UNCLOS. It also made important findings with respect to the legal status of several maritime features and China’s activities. Having said that, the Tribunal did not either determine the sovereignty of the Philippines, as territorial sovereignty was outside the scope of arbitration and this highlights one of the fundamental limitations of the international law. A legal ruling can establish rights and obligations but it cannot by itself guarantee compliance.
China rejected the award of the tribunal and still continues to maintain its claim. Hereby widening the gap between what international laws says and what strategic powers can enforce and it is in this gap, grey zone competition thrives. Grey zone conflict is basically coercive activity that occurs between ordinary diplomacy and open armed conflict in which a country instead of launching a conventional military attack tries to employ such instruments that pressurise the adversary while keeping escalation below the threshold of war. The instruments include, coast guard vessel, maritime militia, obstruction of vehicle, water canons, economic pressure, cyber operations, South China Sea conflicts, international law only determines what a state is legally entitled to claim, but what it can actually do is determined by its raw physical power. And it is this gap between law and reality where lies the space for grey zone coercion. The Philippines has increasingly used international law, transparency and external partnership to counter Chinese pressure.
Information campaigns, administrative measure and infrastructure construction. The objective is not to win a decisive battle rather to gradually change the strategic environment while ensuring that response should not trigger a major war and the South China Sea conflict demonstrates this accurately. The Philippines have repeatedly accused Chinese vessels of blocking or harassing its ships and employing coercive measures. Beijing also offers competing accounts portraying Philippine vessels and provocateurs. These competing narratives are not just public relations exercises but reality of the present strategic environment. Grey zone operations flourish in such conditions of ambiguity where neither side wants to escalate a war but every collision, patrol or maritime encounter is a contest over physical space A closely related concept to greyzone conflict is Salami Slicing, the accumulation of small strategic gains instead of one big seizure. The logic is straightforward. A major move may attract a military response rather smaller actions may appear manageable. A state may gradually move from presence, to patrols, to obstructions, to infrastructure and leading to de facto control. Each individual action may not be big enough to justify war, but collectively these small actions can fundamentally alter the status quo. Mischief reef is a perfect illustration of this strategy. What was once a low tide feature has now transformed into a large artificial island all thanks to Chinese extensive land reclamation and infrastructure building. And under international laws these physical transformations do not automatically lead to maritime entitlements but nevertheless it can alter the strategic realities surrounding it. And this highlights the central paradox of entire First, Manila keeps using the 2016 arbitration award even when Beijing does not accept it as it provides the Philippines with an important legal and diplomatic foundation. Second, Manila has emphasized a lot on transparency by publicly releasing information about maritime confrontations. The Philippines tries to make this issue wider than the China-Philippine bilateral issue and tries to turn it into an international diplomatic issue by releasing videos, photographs and public statements about small confrontations and skirmishes. Third, Manila is strengthening its security partnership with Delhi, Canberra, Tokyo and Washington. This is also strategically significant as the Philippines is a treaty ally of the US. Thus, every conflict between China and the Philippines carries an additional question of how much coercion can China use to the Philippines before US considers it an armed attack requiring response. This uncertainty is at the heart of the deterrence issue. China therefore tries to keep its actions below threshold whereas the Philippines have incentive to highlight such issues as not just isolated maritime incidents rather a sustained and planned coercion. A minor sea encounter therefore may acquire strategic significance far greater than vessels involved. And this is where India enters the story, at first instance South China Sea appears distant from India’s immediate First, Greyzone competition though requires capabilities below the threshold of war but it must be backed by credible conventional deterrent. security concerns. But actually it is not. India has its own history of similar confrontation with China along LAC, particularly during the 2020, Galwan Valley incident in Ladakh. Comparison is not very exact in terms of geography as himalayan border is a land border and south china sea is maritime and involves different legal frameworks. But here comparison finds ground in Strategic patterns. China’s approach in these two different theaters involve calibrated pressure aimed at altering the status quo while managing escalations. India’s experience of the 2020 Galwan Valley situation focuses on just one thing: that once troops, infrastructure and military deployment becomes reality, restoring to previous equilibrium becomes even more difficult. So the lesson to deal with this strategy is that “prevention is better than cure”, that preventing incremental changes may be easier than revising an established new status quo. The South China Sea issue is important to India for: One India also deals with same grey zone warfare and Two now India is growing its strategic and defence engagements with South East Asia. Philippines acquired Brahmos Supersonic Missile from India. This deal is much more than just defense export but it is expansion of India’s role as a security partner in the Indo-Pacific region. This creates an important and virtuous loop for India. China’s growing assertiveness will lead to increase in the Philippine demand for defence capability thus igniting stronger cooperation with India, Japan, Australia and US, thus leading to greater external involvement in South East Asian security hence a more networked Indo Pacific security environment.
So what are the lessons here for India, that it must learn to deal with grey zone Conflicts. Second, military strength is very important but it is not enough in dealing with a complex security environment. India requires good intelligence, persistent surveillance, accurate information, border infrastructure, diplomatic signalling, economic resilience, cyber preparedness, rapid mobilisation, effective escalation management and much more. But most important of all it must possess the ability to identify and expose attempts to alter the status quo incrementally as it is particularly this hesitation of targets that grey zone strategies exploit. If every smaller action is taken as too small to justify a response then a series of such minor incidents together might change the facts on ground and produce a major strategic shift. Thus, the challenge for India is therefore to focus on capacity building in order to distinguish between what is an isolated incident and what is a pattern for incremental coercion. And simultaneously deterrence must also be carefully calibrated. The objective should be neither passivity which may invite further pressure nor uncontrolled escalation which might turn a manageable confrontation into a military crisis. But rather it should be credible deterrence in perfect combination with controlled escalation. Thus, security in Asia is not going to be shaped by outright military triumph, but by the ability to outmaneuver rivals while not allowing ignition of war, which is precisely the core principle of grey zone warfare.
*The author is Asst. Professor, Shri Guru Gobind Singh College of Commerce, University of Delhi, PhD – Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University