At a practical, ground-level view, the recent reports suggesting that China is providing military and financial assistance to Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG) in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) have far-reaching consequences. These regions, which are key to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), have witnessed growing insurgency and instability. The local security forces in these areas, particularly Pakistan’s SSG, have been struggling to manage the violence and unrest from groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other armed factions.
On the ground, this assistance translates into a much-needed boost for Pakistan’s ability to conduct counter-insurgency operations. However, the bigger picture reveals complex geopolitical shifts—especially for India. This analysis will break down what these developments mean for the security dynamics in Pakistan, China, and India, with a focus on their local and immediate impacts.
CPEC Security: Ground-Level Realities
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has become the backbone of China’s interests in the region, amounting to approximately $62 billion in infrastructure investments aimed at connecting China’s western Xinjiang region to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port. On the ground in Balochistan, CPEC has brought both development and controversy. While the province holds immense natural resource potential and a critical maritime outlet at Gwadar, it is also plagued by ethnic separatism, insurgency, and political instability.
For local people, particularly the Baloch, CPEC is often viewed as a project that benefits China and Pakistan at their expense. The local insurgents, such as the BLA, regularly target CPEC infrastructure, foreign workers, and Pakistani military installations in an effort to disrupt the project. In the past few years, there have been several high-profile attacks, including the 2021 bombing targeting Chinese engineers working in Gwadar, which killed two Chinese nationals.
On the ground, these attacks are a clear indicator of the fragility of security in Balochistan. With China’s increased investment in Pakistan’s security forces, especially the SSG, Beijing aims to protect its interests in CPEC. For example, the SSG is responsible for securing key infrastructure projects, but they often lack the advanced technologies and equipment necessary to deal with sophisticated insurgent tactics. Therefore, China’s proposed support—such as drones, surveillance equipment, and advanced communication systems—aims to give Pakistan the tools needed to keep these critical routes secure.
Impact of China’s Support on the SSG: Tactical and Operational Changes
From a ground-level perspective, the SSG—Pakistan’s elite special forces—are expected to see significant improvements in their operational capacity with Chinese assistance. The SSG already operates in some of Pakistan’s most difficult terrains, including the rugged mountains of Balochistan and KP. These are areas heavily affected by insurgent activity, including the TTP in KP and the BLA in Balochistan. Both groups have been using tactics like IEDs (improvised explosive devices) and guerrilla warfare to disrupt Pakistani security forces and foreign nationals.
On the ground, this translates into a difficult operational environment for the SSG. In the absence of modern equipment, the SSG has often struggled to track insurgents or effectively neutralize threats from the air or ground. However, with Chinese assistance, the SSG is set to receive technologies such as drones (e.g., Wing Loong II), which have the ability to conduct precision strikes in remote areas, and advanced surveillance systems for monitoring and tracking insurgent movements.
At the local level, this will enhance the SSG’s capability to gather real-time intelligence and execute surgical strikes against insurgents. For example, the use of drones will allow them to patrol vast, difficult-to-reach areas without putting ground troops at risk. Additionally, Chinese support for infrastructure development will likely result in more secure military outposts and operational bases, giving the SSG a stronger presence in insurgent-dominated zones.
Insurgent and Local Reactions
The situation on the ground is not just about military strategies; it also involves the local populations and insurgent groups that have been fighting for autonomy or against what they see as foreign exploitation. In Balochistan, ethnic Baloch groups have long fought for greater control over their resources and more autonomy from Islamabad. The increasing involvement of China in CPEC has only intensified these sentiments, as many Baloch believe that their land and resources are being used for the benefit of Pakistan and China, without their consent.
On the ground, this could mean an escalation in insurgent attacks. Local populations in regions like Gwadar or Quetta, who already feel marginalized, may see China’s military support to Pakistan as a form of foreign occupation. This could lead to further radicalization and recruitment into insurgent groups like the BLA. In turn, Pakistan’s increased reliance on SSG forces—supported by China—could lead to more confrontations with local insurgents.
The TTP, operating mainly in KP, is also likely to increase its activities. Historically, the TTP has had a cross-border presence in Afghanistan, and since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, the group has regained strength. The TTP sees itself as a continuation of the broader Taliban insurgency in the region and has used the mountainous terrain of KP to conduct deadly attacks. For local civilians caught in the crossfire, the increased presence of the SSG could either stabilize or escalate tensions, depending on how the operations are conducted.
India’s Perspective: Security Implications
From India’s standpoint, the ground-level implications of this increased Sino-Pakistani military cooperation are worrying. India has long viewed Pakistan’s military collaboration with China with suspicion, and the prospect of the SSG—already one of Pakistan’s most elite units—receiving advanced military support from China is seen as a direct challenge to India’s security.
Increased Military Capabilities for Pakistan:
• For India, the enhanced capabilities of Pakistan’s military, especially in counter-insurgency operations, could create new challenges along the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir. The use of drones and surveillance systems by the SSG could be applied not just for internal operations but also for cross-border monitoring and intelligence gathering.
• On the ground, this means that Pakistan could potentially increase its monitoring and military presence along the LoC, which might heighten tensions in the disputed Kashmir region. The use of drones by Pakistan for surveillance or even targeted strikes could have significant implications for India, both in terms of border security and potential escalation.
Afghanistan and Taliban’s Role:
• India is particularly concerned about the Taliban’s growing ties with Pakistan and the possibility of the Taliban aligning with China. Afghanistan’s position as a neighbor to India has always been crucial for Indian strategic interests, especially in terms of trade routes and regional influence.
• With the Taliban back in power, there is a real fear in India that Afghanistan could become a source of destabilization. If the Taliban were to shift toward closer cooperation with India’s adversaries—Pakistan and China—it could impact India’s efforts to maintain security along its western frontier.
• On the ground in Afghanistan, this could lead to the Taliban becoming a conduit for supporting insurgent groups in Jammu and Kashmir or other regions in India. The prospect of a “proxy war” involving Taliban elements, Pakistan, and China is increasingly possible, and it would exacerbate the already volatile situation on India’s western border.
Proxy Warfare in Kashmir:
• Locally, in Kashmir, where insurgency has been simmering for decades, the possibility of Pakistan’s enhanced military capabilities being used for proxy warfare or infiltration is a significant concern. The increasing presence of highly trained, better-equipped Pakistani forces in KP and Balochistan could be used to further infiltrate militants into Indian territory.
• This would make counter-insurgency operations even more challenging for India, as Pakistan could use its enhanced technological and military capabilities, funded by China, to launch more sophisticated and well-coordinated cross-border strikes.
Conclusion: A Complex Future Ahead
On the ground, China’s support to Pakistan’s Special Services Group represents a major shift in the military capabilities of the region. For Pakistan, this means better-equipped security forces capable of securing critical infrastructure and combating insurgency more effectively. However, this shift also has major consequences for regional security, particularly for India.
For local populations in areas like Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the situation is one of increased militarization, with a higher likelihood of confrontations between insurgents and the SSG. The resulting escalation could destabilize the region further, while providing a larger strategic and military foothold for China in South Asia. India’s national security concerns are also at the forefront, with the potential for heightened border tensions and the spread of proxy warfare, especially in Kashmir. India will need to closely monitor these developments, adjust its security strategies, and bolster its own defense capabilities in response to this shifting balance of power.
”Expert Analysis by Dr. Nishakant Ojha: Eminent Specialist in Counter-Terrorism and West Asia-Middle East National Security & Strategic Affairs”