The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed between India and Pakistan in September 1960 after nine years of World Bank-facilitated negotiations, has long been regarded as one of the few enduring examples of cooperation between two politically adversarial neighbours.
Despite surviving wars, diplomatic hostilities and recurring bilateral crises, the Treaty now faces perhaps its most consequential challenge. India’s decision to hold the agreement in abeyance following the Pahalgam terrorist attack on 22 April 2025 has reopened a fundamental question: Can a water-sharing framework negotiated more than six decades ago adequately address contemporary geopolitical, developmental and environmental realities?
New Delhi’s decision reflects its position that a Treaty founded on the principles of “friendly relations” and “good neighbourly conduct” cannot function in isolation from persistent concerns over Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism. However, the current debate extends beyond bilateral security tensions. Population growth, increasing water demand, climate change and India’s expanding clean-energy requirements have strengthened the case for reassessing the existing arrangement.
An Unequai Water-Sharing Arrangement?
The 1960 Treaty divided the six principal rivers of the Indus system into two categories. India received rights over the Eastern Rivers— Ravi, Beas and Satluj—while the Western Rivers—Indus, Jhelum and Chenab—were reserved primarily for Pakistan, with India retaining limited rights for domestic consumption, agriculture, storage and run-of-the-river hydropower generation. Under this arrangement, Pakistan receives more than 80 per cent of the Indus system’s waters, while India’s share is to certain design features but permitted the project to proceed.
Disagreements over Kishenganga and Ratle subsequently exposed deeper differences regarding the Treaty’s dispute-resolution procedures. India maintains that the objections concerning these projects constitute technical differences requiring examination by a Neutral Expert. Pakistan, however, sought proceedings before a Court of Arbitration (CoA). In August 2026, India reiterated its rejection of the CoA’s rulings, arguing that the parallel proceedings were inconsistent with the Treaty’s prescribed mechanisms. approximately 19.6 per cent.
India also agreed to contribute approximately £62.06 million towards constructing replacement irrigation infrastructure in Pakistan, enabling canals previously dependent on the Eastern Rivers to receive supplies from the Western Rivers. Although the agreement emerged from the exceptional circumstances following Partition, its provisions have increasingly attracted criticism in India.
The restrictions imposed on India’s utilisation of the Western Rivers have implications for water-stressed states such as Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan, and particularly Jammu and Kashmir, where these rivers represent considerable potential for irrigation, electricity generation and economic development.
Hydropower And persistent disputes
One of the most contentious aspects of the Treaty concerns Indian hydropower projects on the Western Rivers. Although the IWT permits run-of-the-river hydroelectric generation subject to specified conditions, Pakistan has repeatedly questioned Indian projects over spillway design, pondage, storage capacity and their socalled implications for downstream flows.
The Baglihar, Kishenganga and Ratle projects illustrate how technical disagreements have evolved into prolonged legal and diplomatic disputes. In the Baglihar case, a Neutral Expert advised modifications Importantly, India’s dissatisfaction predates the Pahalgam attack. New Delhi formally sought modifications to the Treaty in January 2023 and again in August 2024, citing changing demographic, environmental and energy requirements alongside disagreements over its implementation.
The Treaty itself provides for modification under Article XII through a duly ratified agreement between both governments. However, India’s decision to hold it in abeyance does not constitute its formal termination, a distinction that remains central to the continuing legal disagreement with Pakistan.
Jammu And Kashmir’s development Al imperative
Perhaps the strongest argument for reassessment concerns the developmental was not a central consideration in international water governance. Today, the Indus basin faces growing uncertainty arising from changing snowfall patterns, glacial retreat in some areas, extreme precipitation and increasingly unpredictable river flows.
The Himalayan, Karakoram and Hindu Kush mountain systems are critical to the basin’s hydrology. Rising temperatures and changing glacier dynamics have heightened concerns over glacial lake outburst floods, flash floods, sedimentation and long-term water availability. needs of Jammu and Kashmir.
The region possesses substantial hydropower potential, yet the Treaty’s restrictions have constrained India’s ability to fully utilise its water resources. Several major projects, including Pakal Dul, Kiru, Kwar, Ratle, Bursar, Sawalkot, Kirthai-I and II, and Dulhasti Stage-II, are at various stages of development or planning.
Together with other projects across the basin, they represent a hydropower pipeline exceeding 10 gigawatts. Greater utilisation of these resources could contribute to electricity generation, irrigation expansion, employment generation and infrastructure development.
Hydropower also has broader national significance as India expands renewableenergy capacity. Unlike solar and wind generation, hydropower can provide flexible electricity to support grid stability. Nevertheless, infrastructure development must be accompanied by rigorous environmental safeguards as the Himalayan region remains ecologically fragile, and poorly planned projects could aggravate disaster risks. India’s approach should therefore prioritise sustainable development and the legitimate aspirations of communities in Jammu and Kashmir rather than framing water utilisation primarily through a strategic lens.
Climate Change: The missing dimension
The Treaty was negotiated at a time when climate change These developments require a fundamentally different approach to river management. Any future framework must incorporate improved glacier monitoring, flood forecasting, disaster preparedness, sediment management, environmental protection and updated hydrological information sharing.
The challenge is no longer simply how much water each country receives, but how an increasingly vulnerable river system can be managed sustainably.
Pakistan’s Water Crisis And the diplomatic Battle
Pakistan has strongly opposed India’s decision to hold the Treaty in abeyance, presenting it internationally as a threat to its agriculture, livelihoods and water security. Islamabad has raised the issue at international forums, including the United Nations, while organising diplomatic initiatives to draw attention to its concerns.
Given Pakistan’s dependence on the Indus basin, its downstream vulnerabilities cannot be dismissed. However, its water insecurity also reflects domestic structural problems, including inefficient irrigation systems, inadequate storage infrastructure, groundwater depletion and inter-provincial disputes. Pakistan’s National Water Policy itself acknowledges that approximately 35 million acre-feet of water flows unused into the Arabian Sea annually.
Significant water losses also arise from seepage and inefficiencies in its irrigation networks. India therefore needs a coherent international communication strategy explaining why reassessment is necessary after more than six decades. New Delhi must distinguish its legitimate developmental and environmental priorities from Pakistan’s portrayal of the Treaty’s abeyance as a socalled attempt by India to deprive downstream populations of water.
Equally important is maintaining essential humanitarian cooperation. India continues to share critical flood-related information to Islamabad through diplomatic channels, demonstrating that reconsidering the Treaty need not mean abandoning responsibilities towards the vulnerable population.
Beyond Abeyance: A Strategy for the future
India should use the present period to comprehensively reassess its long-term water requirements, strengthen hydrological monitoring, modernise irrigation infrastructure and accelerate environmentally sustainable hydropower development. Any proposed modification must accommodate climate resilience, technological advances, disaster preparedness and the developmental needs of Jammu and Kashmir.
At the diplomatic level, New Delhi should pursue a clear position grounded in water security, sustainable development and responsible upstream management. Ultimately, abeyance by itself is not a water strategy. The more consequential question is whether India can transform the present impasse into an opportunity to develop a contemporary framework that addresses the limitations of the 1960 settlement.
The Indus Waters Treaty has demonstrated the value of institutional cooperation for more than six decades. Yet its longevity should not automatically place its provisions beyond reconsideration. A durable twenty first-century arrangement must move beyond the narrow allocation of rivers towards comprehensive basin management, reconciling national development, climate resilience, environmental sustainability and the changing realities of India Pakistan relations.
*Dr. Anchita Borthakur is a Senior Research Associate at Chintan Research Foundation (CRF)