Not permitting mentally challenged rape victim to undergo medical termination of unwarranted pregnancy violative of her bodily integrity, says Madhya Pradesh HC - The Daily Guardian
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Not permitting mentally challenged rape victim to undergo medical termination of unwarranted pregnancy violative of her bodily integrity, says Madhya Pradesh HC

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In a well-written, well-articulated, well-reasoned and well-substantiated judgment titled X vs State of Madhya Pradesh and others in Writ Petition No. 12155/2021 that was delivered just recently on July 14, 2021, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has recently, rightly and remarkably observed that not permitting a rape victim, suffering from severe mental problems, to undergo Medical Termination of unwarranted pregnancy would be violative of her bodily integrity which would not only aggravate her mental trauma but would also have devastating effect on her overall health including on psychological and mental aspects. This was held so while allowing medical termination of pregnancy of 23 year old rape victim survivor whose mental age was found to be that of minor, being only 6 years. It was a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh high Court comprising of Chief Justice Mohammad Rafiq and Justice Vijay Kumar Shukla who pronounced this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment.

To start with, this latest, learned, laudable and landmark judgment authored by Chief Justice Mohammad Rafiq for himself and Justice Vijay Kumar Shukla of Madhya Pradesh High Court sets the ball rolling by first and foremost observing in para 1 that, “This writ petition has been filed by praying for a direction to the respondents to allow her daughter (hereinafter referred to as “Victim-A”) to undergo medical termination of pregnancy at the State expense. The petitioner has also challenged the constitutional validity of Section 3(2)(b) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (for short “the MTP Act”) to the extent it stipulates a ceiling of 24 weeks for medical termination of pregnancy with the prayer the same be declared as ultra virus Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has also challenged the order dated 6.7.2021 passed by the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Hoshangabad in MJC-R No.207/2021 rejecting application of the petitioner for permission to terminate pregnancy of Victim-A.”

While elaborating on the facts of the case, the Bench then puts forth in para 2 that, “The petitioner is resident of Village Baagratwa, Tehsil Babai, District Hoshangabad of State of Madhya Pradesh. She belongs to Scheduled Tribe community. She is wholly illiterate, living below poverty line. She does not have any moveable or immoveable property. According to the petitioner, she and her husband work as a labourer. Her daughter Victim-A is aged about 23 years and she is mentally retarded. The petitioner and her husband left their village for Ujjain for earning livelihood by doing labour work. When they returned back after some time, the petitioner found that her daughter Victim-A was behaving in a peculiar manner. Their daughter Victim-A informed them in sign language about certain stomach pain. On making further enquiry, she learnt that one of her neighbours had committed rape upon her. She immediately took her to the doctor, who found that she was pregnant. The petitioner lodged a First Information Report with the Police Station Babai. District Hoshangabad, which has been registered for offence under Section 376(2)(1) of the IPC as Crime No.301/2021. The accused was arrested on 20.6.2021. The police got Victim-A medically examined and also obtained the medical report about her mental health. Victim-A was thereafter sent for further medical examination on 22.6.2021, upon which it was confirmed that she was carrying pregnancy of 22 weeks. The petitioner immediately filed an application under Section 3 of the MTP Act on 30.6.2021 before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Hoshangabad, seeking permission for termination of her pregnancy, who rejected the same on 2.7.2021. Since 3 rd and 4th July, 2021, being Saturday and Sunday, were holidays, the petitioner filed application under Section 3 of the MTP Act with the same prayer before the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Hoshangabad on 5.7.2021, which was registered as MJC-R No.207/2021. The same was however rejected on the very next working day i.e. 6.7.2021 under the ignorance about the latest law whereby maximum length of pregnancy under Section 3(2)(b) of the Act, which was earlier 20 weeks, was raised to 24 weeks by amendment to that effect by the Act 8 of 2021 published in the Gazette of Government of India on 25.3.2021.”

To be sure, the Bench then after observing in para 7 that, “We have given our anxious consideration to rival submissions, perused the material on record and studied the cited precedents.” then goes on to hold in para 8 that, “A perusal of the afore-quoted opinion of the Medical Board in condition no.1 indicates that the survivor is a case of severe mental retardation with behavioral problems. Mental age of the survivor is approximately 6 years. She is unable to take care of herself and therefore, obviously she will not be in a position to take care of the baby, if she delivers the one. In conclusion no.2 of the aforesaid opinion of the Medical Board, the victim-A is opined to be a single live intrauterine fetus of gestational age by USG is 25 week 5 days +/- 2 weeks with the possibility of age being either less or more by 2 weeks, which is indicated by “+/- of 2 weeks”. This is also the opinion given by the Radiologist. We have to therefore now examine whether in the facts like these, this Court would be justified in refusing to grant permission for medical termination of the pregnancy on the law available on the subject.”

It would be instructive to mention here that the Bench then points out in para 9 that, “Section 3 of the MTP Act is relevant for the purpose of deciding the present case, which reads as under:-

“Section 3. When pregnancies may be terminated by registered medical practitioners.-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), a registered medical practitioner shall not be guilty of any offence under that Code or under any other law for the time being in force, if any pregnancy is terminated by him in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (4), a pregnancy may be terminated by a registered medical practitioner,-

(a) where the length of the pregnancy does not exceed twenty weeks, if such medical practitioner is, or

(b) where the length of the pregnancy exceeds twenty weeks but does not exceed twenty-four weeks, in case of such category of woman as may be prescribed by rules made under this Act, if not less than two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith, that,-

(i) the continuance of the pregnancy would involve a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or of grave injury to her physical or mental health ; or

(ii) there is a substantial risk that if the child were born, it would suffer from any serious physical or mental abnormality.

Explanation 1.- For the purposes of Clause (a), where any pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or method used by any woman or her partner for the purpose of limiting the number of children or preventing pregnancy, the anguish caused by such pregnancy may be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman. Explanation 2.- For the purposes of Clause (a) and (b), where any pregnancy is alleged by the pregnant woman to have been caused by rape, the anguish caused by the pregnancy shall be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman.

(2-A) The norms for the registered medical practitioner whose opinion is required for termination of pregnancy at different gestational age shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made under this Act.

(2-B) The provisions of sub-section (2) relating to the length of the pregnancy shall not apply to the termination of pregnancy by the medical practitioner where such termination is necessitated by the diagnosis of any of the substantial foetal abnormalities diagnosed by a Medical Board.

(2-C) Every State Government or Union territory, as the case may be, shall by notification in the official Gazette, constitute a Board to be called a Medical Board for the purposes of this Act to exercise such powers and functions as may be prescribed by rules made under this Act.

(2-D) The Medical Board shall consist of the following, namely-

(a) a Gynaecologist;

(b) a Paediatrician

(c) a Radiologist or Sonologist; and

(d) Such other number of members as may be notified in the Official Gazette by the State Government or Union Territory, as the case may be.

(3) In determining whether the continuance of pregnancy would involve such risk of injury to the health as is mentioned in sub-section (2), account may be taken of the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable environment.

(4) (a) No pregnancy of a woman, who has not attained the age of eighteen years, or, who, having attained the age of eighteen years, is a mentally ill person, shall be terminated except with the consent in writing of her guardian.

(b) Save as otherwise provided in clause (a), no pregnancy shall be terminated except with the consent of the pregnant woman.””

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Be it noted, the Bench then found it quite strange as is mentioned in para 10 that, “It is indeed surprising that the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Hoshangabad relied on unamended Section 3 of the MTP Act rather than considering the amended provision, which has now increased the permissible outer limit for termination of pregnancy from 20 weeks to 24 weeks. This means that if the law was correctly read and applied by him, the permission of medical termination of the pregnancy could have been granted as the period of 24 weeks had yet not passed on the date the said Court was approached. Be that as may be, Section 3(2)(b), which is relevant for deciding the medical termination of pregnancy, inter alia provides that subject to the provisions of sub-section (4), a pregnancy may be terminated by a registered medical practitioner where the length of the pregnancy exceeds twenty weeks but does not exceed twenty-four weeks in case of such category of woman as may be prescribed by rules made under this Act, if not less than two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith that; (i) the continuance of the pregnancy would involve a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or of grave injury to her physical or mental health; or (ii) there is a substantial risk that if the child were born, it would suffer from any serious physical or mental abnormality. The first Explanation thereto relates to Clause (a), which provides that where any pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or method used by any woman or her partner for the purpose of limiting the number of children or preventing pregnancy, the anguish caused by such pregnancy may be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman. This Explanation may not be relevant for deciding the present case, but the second Explanation of Section 3(2) would in the facts of the present case have bearing on the interpretation of Section 3(2)(i) of the MTP Act, which stipulates that where any pregnancy is alleged by the pregnant woman to have been caused by rape, the anguish caused by the pregnancy shall be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman. (emphasis supplied).”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 11 that, “Admittedly, in the present case, the Victim-A, daughter of the petitioner, was subjected to rape and according to experts, her mental age is only 6 years and therefore, regardless of her biological age, the consent for sexual intercourse in her case would be irrelevant. The First Information Report was lodged by her mother for the offence of Section 376(2)(1) of the IPC against the accused with the Police Station Babai, District Hoshangabad in Crime No.301/2021. This therefore would bring the case of her daughter within the purview of Explanation (2) which provides that the anguish caused by the pregnancy shall be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman, who in this case is Victim-A. Moreover, what is peculiar about this case is that the Medical Board itself has opined that duration of pregnancy is variable by two weeks. The victim is unable to take care of self, her hygiene is poor, her intellectual abilities are poor, her mental age is only 6 years and therefore, obviously she will not be in a position to take care of the baby, even if she delivers it.”

As it turned out, the Bench then observes in para 12 that, “This Court is cognizant of the fact that the Victim-A is mentally retarded, and her mental age having been adjudged by the experts to be only 6 years, therefore, all the steps on her behalf could be and were in fact taken by her mother, who is her natural guardian. She immediately filed an application before the Court of JMFC, Hoshangabad on 30.6.2021 which was rejected on 2.7.2021 and thereafter, immediately on the very first next working day i.e. on 5.7.2021, she filed the application before the Third Additional Sessions Judge, who being ignorant of the amended provision, which came into effect from 25.3.2021, rejected the same under the misconception that the outer limit for grant of permission of medical termination of pregnancy was 20 weeks and not 24 weeks. Sub-section (4) of Section 3 requires consent of the guardian of a minor, or a major who is mentally ill person. The exceptions to this rule of consent have been given in Section 3(4)(a) of the MTP Act, which provides that when the pregnant woman is below eighteen years of age or is a “mentally ill” person, then consent of her guardian would have to be obtained. Since in the present case the mental age of the Victim-A was determined approximately 6 years, her pregnancy can be medically terminated with the consent of the guardian who is actually natural mother of Victim-A. The permission/consent has to be therefore necessarily assumed.”

While citing the relevant case laws, the Bench then observes in para 13 that, “In Murugan Nayakkar (supra), the petitioner, who was 13 years of age, was a victim of alleged rape and sexual abuse. She preferred a writ petition for termination of her pregnancy. The Medical Board opined that termination of pregnancy at this stage or delivery at term will both have equal risk to the mother. The Supreme Court held that considering the age of the petitioner, trauma which she prima facie suffered due to sexual abuse and the agony she is going through at the present, it would be appropriate to allow termination of pregnancy. In Tapasya Umesh Pisal Vs. Union of India and others (supra), the victim, who was 24 years old, was seeking permission to undergo medical termination of the pregnancy, which had progressed to 24 weeks. The Supreme Court held that it is difficult to refuse the permission to the petitioner to undergo medical termination of pregnancy as it is certain that if the foetus is allowed to be born it would have a limited life span with serious handicaps which cannot be avoided. In Kalpana Singh vs. Government of NCT of Delhi & others (supra), the victim had pregnancy of 25 weeks and 5 days, which was permitted to be terminated medically.”

Adding more to it, the Bench then while citing a landmark case observes in para 14 that, “The Supreme Court in Suchita Srivastava and Another Vs. Chandigarh Administration reported in (2009) 9 SCC 1, held that there is no doubt that a woman’s right to make reproductive choices is also a dimension of “personal liberty” as understood under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Reproductive rights include a woman’s entitlement to carry pregnancy to its full term, to give birth and to subsequently raise children. However, in the case of pregnant women, there is also a “compelling State interest” in protecting the life of the prospective child. Therefore, the termination of a pregnancy is only permitted when the conditions specified in the applicable statute have been fulfilled. Hence the provisions of the MTP Act, 1971 can also be viewed as reasonable restrictions that have been placed on the exercise of reproductive choices. The Lordship further held that ordinarily a pregnancy can be terminated only when a medical practitioner is satisfied that a “continuance of the pregnancy would involve a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or of grave injury to her physical or mental health”. The Explanations to Section 3 however also contemplate termination of pregnancy when the same is the result of a rape or a failure of birth control methods since both of these eventualities have been equated with a “grave injury to the mental health” of a woman.”

Furthermore, the Bench then observes in para 15 that, “This Court in Writ Petition No.20961/2017-Sundarlal Vs. The State of M.P. & others, decided on 6.12.2017, was dealing with the case of minor daughter of the petitioner, who was kidnapped and a First Information Report at his instance was registered under Sections 363, 366, 376 of the IPC read with Section 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 against the accused. The police secured the custody of the minor daughter of the petitioner, who was handed over to the petitioner. On medical examination, she was found to be carrying pregnancy of about 16 weeks. The petitioner being guardian gave consent for termination of the pregnancy of his minor daughter. This Court while directing constitution of a committee of three medical practitioners to form bonafide opinion as to termination of pregnancy and retention of DNA sample of fetus and providing all medical assistance and care to the victim observed as under:-

“12. In Explanation I, the law makers made it clear that where pregnancy is alleged by victim because of rape, a presumption can be drawn that such pregnancy constitute a grave injury to the mental health of pregnant woman. In the present case, this is not in dispute that victim is a minor and petitioner is praying for termination of pregnancy because her daughter is a rape victim. This court in Hallo Bi (supra) (Hallo Bi @ Halima Vs. State of M.P. & others 2013 (1) MPHT 451) opined that we cannot force a victim of violent rape/forced sex to give birth to a child of a rapist. The anguish and the humiliation which the victim is suffering daily, will certainly cause a grave injury to her mental health. Not only this, the child will also suffer mental anguish in case the lady gives birth to a child.””

Going ahead, the Bench then observes in para 16 that, “The Rajasthan High Court in Victim (A) Vs. State of Rajasthan & others, S.B.Criminal Writ Petition No.148/2020, decided on 26.2.2020, was dealing with the case where the Medical Board had opined the age of the fetus to be 23 +/- 2 weeks. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Meera Santosh Pal & others Vs. Union of India & others (2017) 3 SCC 462, where permission was granted for termination of pregnancy of a term of 24 weeks and another judgment of the same High Court in Nisha Vaishnav Vs. State of Rajasthan S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1271/2019, decided on 29.1.2019, the High Court allowed termination of pregnancy, in view of aforesaid Explanation (2) to Section 3(2) of the MTP Act as it was a case where a minor victim was subjected to rape and held that anguish caused by such pregnancy shall be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the petitioner.”

As we see, the Bench then observes in para 17 that, “In ABC Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & others, Writ Petition (C) No.2294/2021, vide judgment dated 25.06.2021, the High Court of Chhattisgarh dealing in a case of rape victim bearing pregnancy of 14 weeks and 3 days, relying on the judgment of Supreme Court in Meera Santosh Pal (supra) permitted the termination of pregnancy, holding thus:

“8. The explanation clause of Section 3 of MTP Act takes within its ambit not only the physical injury but also to mental injury and anguish. It is obvious that if the victim is subjected to rape and if she is forced to give birth to a child in the social scenario she has to face a life time anguish apart from the fact the child who is born will also have to face disdain of the society. Under the circumstances, it is directed that the petitioner shall be entitled to Medical termination of pregnancy. In order to carry out the pregnancy State shall form a panel of expert doctors at the District Hospital Durg as early as possible. The hospital shall take due care of the petitioner’s health and provide her all medical support. It is further directed that the DNA of the child shall also be preserved considering the fact that the victim has already lodged a report under Section 373 which will eventually be required at a future date. The petitioner is directed to appear at District Hospital Durg on Wednesday i.e. 23.06.2021.””

Moving on, the Bench then brings out in para 18 that, “The Bombay High Court in X Vs. Union of India & others 2018 (2) Mh.L.J. 46, was dealing with a case of victim who was mentally retarded, deaf and dumb and her pregnancy was of 18-19 weeks. The case of the guardian before the Court, like in the present case, was that the victim was unable to take care of herself and therefore, she would not be able to take care of the fetus. The Court relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Suchita Srivastava (supra) held as under:-

“13. The crucial question here is whether permission can be granted to terminate the pregnancy of 22 weeks in this case. The victim in this case is deaf, dumb and mentally retarded; therefore, she is unable to make a choice on her own whether to terminate the pregnancy or to continue with it. She has no such intellectual capacity, therefore, her guardian should be given that right to make choice. This case is also required to be considered from the physical point of view of the victim. Victim is deaf, dumb and mentally retarded. She is unable to take any decision. In fact, she is not even aware that she has been raped and she is pregnant. It has been stated by her guardian and brother that she is not even able to take care of herself. Question therefore arises under such circumstance as to how she would take care of child to be borne? It has been stated in the medical certificate that “On Paediatrics examination, survivor has gross development delay with Down Syndrome”. If we consider “Down Syndrome”, it means “is a genetic disorder caused by the presence of all or part of a third copy of chromosome”. It is typically associated with physical growth delays, characteristic facial features and mild to moderate intellectual disability. The medical literature would show that there is no cure to the “down syndrome”. No doubt, a person with down syndrome may lead a normal life, but in the present case, when the victim is unable to take care of herself, there is every possibility that she will not be able to take care of the foetus. Though the certificate states that the risk of termination of pregnancy is within normal acceptable limits; it would be hazardous to ask her to bear the pregnancy. It is not only dangerous to her, but dangerous to the unborn child also. Apart from danger to the life of the petitioner, this Court has to take note of the psychological trauma the petitioner is undergoing as a result of carrying unwanted pregnancy. The pregnancy of the petitioner is definitely unwanted for her and it is violative of her personal liberty. Since she is unable to take decision due to intellectual disability, her guardian is taking the said decision, which is in the best interest of the victim and her survival. In the circumstances, we do not notice any impediment in permitting petitioner to terminate unwanted pregnancy.” (emphasis supplied).”

Yet while mentioning another case law, the Bench then states in para 19 that, “In Z Vs. State of Bihar and others (2018) 11 SCC 572, the Supreme Court was dealing with a case of mentally retarded rape victim, who was found to be pregnant and was also HIV positive. The issue before the High Court was whether medical termination of pregnancy should be permitted. The High Court having relied on doctrine of “parens patriae” and “compelling State interest” declined medical termination of pregnancy, which had advanced in 23-24 weeks. The Supreme Court on detailed analysis reversed the verdict of the High Court. Explanation 2 to Section 3(2)(b), which has been relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner, was at that time Explanation 1, which provided that where any pregnancy is alleged by the pregnant woman to have been caused by rape, the anguish caused by the same has to be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman. The Supreme Court held that once such a statutory presumption is provided, the same comes within the compartment of grave injury to mental health of the victim. Following observations made by the Supreme Court in paras 23 are worth quoting:-

“23. We have already anlaysed in detail the factual score and the approach of the High Court. We do not have the slightest hesitation in saying that the approach of the High Court is completely erroneous. The report submitted by the IGIMS stated that termination of pregnancy may need major surgical procedure along with subsequent consequences such as bleeding, sepsis and anesthesia hazards, but there was no opinion that the termination could not be carried out and it was risky to the life of the appellant. There should have been a query in this regard by the High Court which it did not do. That apart, the report shows that the appellant, who was a writ petitioner before the High Court, was suffering from mild mental retardation and she was on medications and her condition was stable and she would require long term psychiatry treatment. The Medical Board has not stated that she was suffering from any kind of mental illness. The appellant was thirty-five years old at that time. She was a major. She was able to allege that she had been raped and that she wanted to terminate her pregnancy. PMCH, as we find, is definitely a place where pregnancy can be terminated.””

As if this is not enough, the Bench then further adds in para 20 that, “The Division Bench of Bombay High Court in a case on its own motion in XYZ Vs. Union of India and others, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 560=(2019) 3 Bom CR 400 held that a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy is not a frivolous one. Abortion is often the only way out of a very difficult situation for a woman. An abortion is a carefully considered decision taken by a woman who fears that the welfare of the child she already has, and of other members of the household that she is obliged to care for with limited financial and other resources, may be compromised by the birth of another child. These are decisions taken by responsible women who have few other options. They are women who would ideally have preferred to prevent an unwanted pregnancy, but were unable to do so. If a woman does not want to continue with the pregnancy, then forcing her to do so represents a violation of the woman’s bodily integrity and aggravates her mental trauma which would be deleterious to her mental health. The Division Bench referred to certain international treaties concerning human rights. In that context, the Division Bench observed that the pregnancy takes place within the body of a woman and has profound effects on her health, mental well being and life. Thus, how she wants to deal with this pregnancy must be a decision she and she alone can make. The right to control her own body and fertility and motherhood choices should be left to the women alone. The basic right of a woman is the right to autonomy, which includes the right to decide whether or not to get pregnant and stay pregnant.”

It is worth noting that the Bench then observes in para 21 that, “While dealing with Explanation 1 of Section 3(2) of the MTP Act, which after amendment is now Explanation 2, the Bombay High Court in the above case observed that this Explanation expands the concept of “grave injury to mental health” by raising a presumption that anguish caused by any pregnancy as a result of rape shall be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of a pregnant woman. In fact, the Explanation states that where pregnancy is alleged by a pregnant woman to have been caused by rape, anguish caused by such pregnancy shall be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of a pregnant woman. Therefore, for the purposes of Section 3(2) of the MTP Act, the expression “grave injury to mental health”, is used in a liberal sense by the legislature itself and further Section 3(3) of the MTP Act, in terms provides that in determining whether continuance of pregnancy would involve such risk of injury to the health as is mentioned in Section 3(2), account may be taken of the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonable foreseeable environment. Section 3(3) of the MTP Act, makes reference not merely to physical injury but also to mental injury. In fact, the aspect of a pregnant woman’s actual or reasonable foreseeable environment has greater nexus to aspect of mental health as compared to physical health, particularly in the present context. This legislative liberality when it comes to expanding the concept of the grave injury to mental health cannot evaporate no sooner the ceiling of 24 weeks prescribed in Section 3(2)(b) of the MTP Act is crossed. If the expression “life” in Section 5(1) of the MTP Act is not to be confined to mere physical existence or survival, then, permission will have to be granted under section 5(1) of the MTP Act for medical termination of pregnancy which may have exceeded 24 weeks, if the continuance of such pregnancy would involve grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman.”

Most significantly, the Bench then most commendably holds in para 22 that, “Curial question that we posed to ourselves at the beginning of this judgment still is whether this Court in the facts of the present case, would be justified in refusing to permit medical termination of pregnancy? According to Medical Board, the victim has history of delayed milestone, poor understanding, poor self-care, inabilities to speak, drooling of saliva since childhood. The Medical Board further opined that on examination, it was found that patient is unable to take care of self, her hygiene is very poor and her intellectual abilities are poor. In view of these factors, patient was opined to suffer from SEVERE MENTAL RETARDATION WITH BEHAVIORAL PROBLEMS. The Medical Board was further of the view that mental age of the victim is that of a minor, being only 6 years. According to them, she is unable to take care of herself and, therefore, she would not be able to take care of the fetus. In our considered view, in a situation like this, it would be hazardous to allow her to continue with the pregnancy till full duration. It may even be more dangerous to the unborn child too. In facts like these, this Court cannot lose sight of the psychological trauma the victim would have to undergo all this time. She being not in a position to take a decision due to her intellectual deficiency, decision of her guardian to consent for termination of unwanted pregnancy has to be accepted as a move in her best interest. Not permitting the rape victim in the present case to go in for medical termination of unwanted pregnancy would amount to compelling her to continue to bear such pregnancy for full duration and deliver the child, which would be violative of her bodily integrity, which would not only aggravate her mental trauma but would also have devastating effect on her overall health including on psychological and mental aspects. This is violative of her personal liberty, to borrow the words of the Supreme Court in Suchita Srivastava (supra), (para 22) because “a woman’s right to make reproductive choices is also a dimension of “personal liberty” as understood under Article 21 of the Constitution of India”. In the peculiar facts of the case, her personal integrity has to be respected.”

For the sake of clarity, the Bench then notes in para 23 that, “Explanation 2 to Section 3(2) of the MTP Act has expanded the scope of “grave injury to mental health” by raising a presumption that “the anguish caused by such pregnancy may be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman”. “Such pregnancy” here refers to pregnancy “alleged to have been caused by rape”. Thus, the legislature has by providing for raising such presumption rather expanded the meaning of the expression “grave injury to mental health” of the rape victim for deciding whether it would constitute a grave risk to the mental health of the pregnant woman in the meaning of Section 3(2)(i) of the MTP Act. The Court would also be entitled to reasonably visualise the environment in which the victim will have to live in immediate foreseeable future to decide the question of her mental health.”

As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 24 that, “In view of the above discussion, the present writ petition seeking permission for medical termination of pregnancy of the Victim-A, daughter of the petitioner, is allowed. She shall be produced before the Medical Superintendent, Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal by tomorrow, who is directed to ensure the medical termination of the pregnancy of Victim-A under the supervision of the experts at the earliest by taking all the precautions. The Superintendent of Police, Hoshangabad shall arrange for transportation of the Victim-A along with her parents to Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal. It is further directed that DNA sample of the fetus shall be saved for the purposes of evidence to be led by the prosecution before the Court in the criminal case of rape registered in the matter. All expenses shall be borne by the State.”

It is then stated in para 25 that, “Since this Court was persuaded to allow the writ petition on applying provisions of Section 3(2)(i) read with its Explanation-2 to the facts of the case, the question of constitutional validity of Section 3(2)(ii) was left untouched.” Finally, the Bench then states in para 26 that, “The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.”

Overall, it is a very learned, laudable and landmark judgment by a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court comprising of Chief Justice Mohammad Rafiq and Justice Vijay Kumar Shukla. It refers to latest and also relevant case laws like Z Vs. State of Bihar and others (2018) 11 SCC 572 Murugan Nayakkar Vs. Union of India & others (2017) SCC Online SC 1902 Meera Santosh Pal & others Vs. Union of India & others (2017) 3 SCC 462 Suchita Srivastava & Another Vs. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1 Tapasya Umesh Pisal Vs. Union of India & others (2008) 12 SCC 57 XYZ Vs. Union of India & others, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 560=(2019) 3 Bom CR 400 Kalpana Singh Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi & others, WP(C) No.115/2021 decided on 11.1.2021 Sundarlal Vs. The State of M.P. & others, W.P.No.20961/2017-decided on 6.12.2017 Victim (A) Vs. State of Rajasthan & others, S.B.Criminal W.P.No.148/2020, decided on 26.2.2020 ABC Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & others, W.P. (C) No.2294/2021 decided on 25.06.2021. A right decision was taken to protect the paramount interest of the mentally challenged rape victim and it was very rightly held that not permitting her to undergo medical termination of unwarranted pregnancy would be violative of her bodily integrity. Very rightly so!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate

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WHOLE POLICE STATION SHOULD BE MONITORED THROUGH CCTVS INCLUDING INTERROGATION ROOM: P&H HC

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In one of the best judgment that I have ever read, it is most heartening to learn that the Punjab and Haryana High Court in a very commendable, cogent, courageous, composed and creditworthy judgment titled Kaushal v State of Haryana and others in CRM-M-43672 of 2021 delivered on January 7, 2022 has directed that CCTVs should be installed in every part of police stations including the interrogation room as per the directions issued by the Apex Court. According to the single Judge Bench comprising of Justice Amol Rattan Singh of Punjab and Haryana High Court, the directives issued by the top court clearly state that no portion of police stations should be left uncovered by CCTVs. The court further stated that our country cannot make the excuse that our interrogations techniques are different than that of western countries and authorities cannot use methods like the third degree as a means of interrogation.

To start with, in this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by a single Judge Bench of Justice Amol Rattan Singh of Punjab and Haryana High Court, the ball is set rolling by first and foremost pointing out that, “Case heard by way of video conferencing. By this petition, the petitioner seeks a direction to respondents no.1 to 3, with a prayer that whenever the petitioner is sought to be taken for interrogation in any case, a videography be done of his leaving the jail premises till his reaching the concerned police station and during interrogation, a videography be also done.”

While continuing in the same vein, the Bench then states that, “It is further prayed that during interrogation his medical examination be also got conducted through a board of doctors or through a civil hospital, so that if any torture ‘is done to him’, then it can be revealed through the said medical examination; with a further prayer made that when he is to be taken outside jail on remand, then either his family members or his lawyer be informed of the location, with his lawyer to be permitted to be present there, where he is being taken and appropriate security be also provided so that he may not be killed in a fake encounter. It is further prayed that respondents no.1 to 3 be directed to comply with the provisions of Section 31 of the Prisons Act, 1894.”

To be sure, the Bench then discloses in the next para that, “A detailed order had been passed by this court on 03.12.2021, directing the DGPs of Punjab and Haryana to file affidavits in response to the observations made in that order, in reply to which both, the DGP, Punjab and the DGP, Haryana, have filed affidavits, both dated 06.01.2022, which are ordered to be taken on record. The affidavit earlier filed by the SSP, Chandigarh, dated 26.10.2021, which is now on the case file, is also ordered to be taken on record.”

While narrating what happens with many of the prisoners, the Bench then points out that, “Before proceeding further, what has been contended by the petitioner in paragraph 22 of the petition is again being reproduced in this order, which is as follows:- 22. That the incidents that are happening with the petitioner inside the jail and during remand are as follows:-

i) The investigating agency spits on the floor and asks the petitioner to lick it and if the petitioner refuses to do so, then he is forcible made to lick the spit of the police officers.

ii) The investigating officers urinates on the face and on the body of the petitioner after removing his clothes.

iii) The petitioner is made to be naked throughout the remand and given merciless beatings.

iv) Sharp objects are inserted in the private parts of the petitioner.

v) The petitioner is given electric shocks behind is ears and on his private parts so that he is tortured badly and even signs of said torture are not openly visible to the ld. Magistrate as well as medical officer.

vi) His legs are put in wooden logs and then pulled aside thereby causing damage to his muscle and rollers are rolled over his thighs so that the petitioner feels the worst kind of pain and still there is no visible mark of injury.

vii) The petitioner legs are tied with a rope and he is hanged with his head down and this is repeated every day while in police remand.””

As anticipated, the Bench then states that, “As regards the allegations of absolute inhuman treatment, as made in the aforesaid paragraph, as expected, the allegations have been completely denied by both the DGPs, with is also stated that no such allegation was ever made earlier by the petitioner and that therefore the petitioner has only made the allegations with mala fide intentions.”

Most significantly, what forms the cornerstone of this notable judgment is then elucidated stating that, “As regards video recording of investigation of the interrogation process, the DGP, Haryana, has stated that there is no such provision in the Cr.P.C. for conducting investigation under surveillance of CCTV cameras. The DGP, Punjab, is conspicuously silent in his affidavit on that aspect. Though, as regards installation of video cameras in all police stations, as pointed out by the learned State counsel, in the affidavit of the DIG (Law & Order), Haryana, dated 02.12.2021, it has already been stated that CCTV cameras are installed in all entry and exit gates of prisons and all police stations (which has already been noticed in the order previously passed by this court), it is to be noticed that such cameras were also installed by both the States on directions issued by the Supreme Court and this court, with Mr. Ghai again pointing today to the directions issued by the Supreme Court in the case of Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh and others (2021) 1 SCC 184, which read as follows:-

“16. The State and Union Territory Governments should ensure that CCTV cameras are installed in each and every Police Station functioning in the respective State and/or Union Territory. Further, in order to ensure that no part of a Police Station is left uncovered, it is imperative to ensure that CCTV cameras are installed at all entry and exit points; main gate of the police station; all lock-ups; all corridors; lobby/the reception area; all verandas/outhouses, Inspector’s room; Sub-Inspector’s room; areas outside the lock-up room; station hall; in front of the police station compound; outside (not inside) washrooms/toilets; Duty Officer’s room; back part of the police station etc.

17. CCTV systems that have to be installed must be equipped with night vision and must necessarily consist of audio as well as video footage. In areas in which there is either no electricity and/or internet, it shall be the duty of the States/Union Territories to provide the same as expeditiously as possible using any mode of providing electricity, including solar/wind power. The internet systems that are provided must also be systems which provide clear image resolutions and audio. Most important of all is the storage of CCTV camera footage which can be done in digital video recorders and/or network video recorders. CCTV cameras must then be installed with such recording systems so that the data that is stored thereon shall be preserved for a period of 18 months. If the recording equipment, available in the market today, does not have the capacity to keep the recording for 18 months but for a lesser period of time, it shall be mandatory for all States, Union Territories and the Central Government to purchase one which allows storage for the maximum period possible, and, in any case, not below 1 year. It is also made clear that this will be reviewed by all the States so as to purchase equipment which is able to store the data for 18 months as soon as it is commercially available in the market. The affidavit of compliance to be filed by all States and Union Territories and Central Government shall clearly indicate that the best equipment available as of date has been purchased.

18. Whenever there is information of force being used at police stations resulting in serious injury and/or custodial deaths, it is necessary that persons be free to complain for a redressal of the same. Such complaints may not only be made to the State Human Rights Commission, which is then to utilise its powers, more particularly under Sections 17 and 18 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, for redressal of such complaints, but also to Human Rights Courts, which must then be set up in each District of every State/Union Territory under Section 30 of the aforesaid Act. The Commission/Court can then immediately summon CCTV camera footage in relation to the incident for its safe keeping, which may then be made available to an investigation agency in order to further process the complaint made to it.”

To put it differently, the Bench then observes that, “Hence, with the directions issued by the Supreme Court also being to the extent that cameras be installed at not just entry and exit points and main gates of police stations, but also in all lock-ups, corridors, lobby and reception areas, verandas, out houses, rooms of officials, outside the lock-up rooms, station hall and in front of the police station compound, as also outside washrooms and toilets, the obvious implication is that no part of the police stations would be left uncovered by CCTV surveillance. Naturally therefore, any interrogation room would also be covered by such directions.”

Furthermore, the Bench then holds that, “Consequently, the DGP, Haryana, the DGP, Punjab, as also the DGP, U.T., Chandigarh, are now directed to file affidavits as to whether the aforesaid directions of the Supreme Court have been complied with or not, and if of course the matter is still being monitored by the Supreme Court, any order passed after 02.12.2020 would be brought out in the affidavits to be filed by the DGPs of both the States and the U.T., Chandigarh.”

Be it noted, the Bench then points out that, “It is to be again specifically noticed that the contention of the DGP, Haryana, to the effect that there is no such provision in the Cr.P.C. would seemingly get completely negated by the aforesaid directions given by the Supreme Court of India, with it to be highlighted by this court (which obviously would be in the knowledge of every authority), that as per Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, may pass such decree or order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any order or decree so passed would be enforceable throughout the territory of India. Further, the law declared by the Supreme Court would be binding on all courts as per Article 141.”

As a corollary, the Bench then naturally observes that, “Consequently and obviously, non-compliance of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Paramvir Singh Sainis’ case, would amount to contempt of Court and this court would, naturally, also be bound to ensure that the directions issued by the Supreme Court are actually carried out at ground level by the States and Union Territory falling within the jurisdiction of this court. Hence, the aforesaid direction to the DGPs.”

At the risk of repetition, the Bench then envisages that, “Of course, to repeat, if the Supreme Court has passed any further order after 02.12.2020, as would grant further time to the States to comply with the directions given on that date, or the order issued has been modified in any manner, such orders would be brought out very specifically in the replies to be filed by the DGPs.”

It is worth noting that the Bench then mines no words to hold that, “Further, it is directed that not just in the case of the present petitioner, but in the case of every person who is in police custody or is being taken into police custody, all provisions of the Cr.P.C., including Section 41-B, 41-C, 41-D and 54, 55 and 55-A would be meticulously followed, with compliance reports in that regard to be made a part of the report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C., as regards even medical examination necessarily to be conducted in terms of Section 55-A thereof.”

Quite ostensibly, the Bench then hastens to candidly add that, “Naturally, any non-compliance of the said statutory provision would amount to violation of the direction hereby given and any accused would have his/her remedy available to him/her in respect of violation of any such provisions and the directions given.”

Most remarkably, the Bench then is quite forthright in holding that, “It is to be again reiterated in this order, as was said in the last order, that no court is oblivious to the fact that the police faces a very uphill task in dealing with criminals, especially hardened criminals and the work done by the police force and any investigating agency is to be highly appreciated, in trying to apprehending criminals and actually apprehending them and bringing them to justice; yet, as per the constitutional scheme and the statutory provisions framed thereunder in India, not even the worst criminal can be denied a fair procedure in terms of the statutory provisions laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and any such law in force. Hence, violation of such procedure, especially leading to violation of human rights even in the case of the worst criminal, cannot be ignored by any court.”

Most forthrightly, the Bench then also underscores that, “Further it is not an excuse for us, in India, to take a plea that many other countries are far more advanced than us and therefore there can be no comparison with the methods adopted there, in interrogating accused persons here. We are the 5th or 6th largest economy in the world and therefore any such plea taken would only seem to be taken as an excuse to not actually adopt contemporary methods of investigation, including interrogation, rather than taking shortcuts by using third degrees methods etc.”

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding that, “Adjourned to 09.02.2022. To be shown in the urgent motion list.”

To sum it up, it merits no reiteration that what the Punjab and Haryana High Court has directed must be strictly implemented in letter and spirit. Of course, it must be rigorously ensured that the whole police station is monitored most effectively through CCTVs including interrogation room as directed most commendably by the High Court! No doubt, it must also be regularly ensured that no third degree method is resorted to by police under any circumstances and those who are found complicit in indulging in torture must be punished adequately and strictly so that the right message percolates among the men in uniform that they cannot take the right to life and personal liberty as guaranteed to every person as a fundamental right in India under Article 21 of the Constitution is actually rigorously implemented on the ground also where it matters the most! Let’s fervently hope so because this is exactly what forms the touchstone of this most commendable judgment!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate.

CCTV systems that have to be installed must be equipped with night vision and must necessarily consist of audio as well as video footage. In areas in which there is either no electricity and/or internet, it shall be the duty of the States/Union Territories to provide the same as expeditiously as possible using any mode of providing electricity, including solar/wind power.

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A comparative study on capital punishment in India

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India is a well emerging nation simultaneously bunches of crime percentages were expanding these days. There are heaps of regulation in India to pause and control wrongdoings, despite the fact that the wrongdoing rates are expanding in light of the fact that the disciplines are not adequate for the crimes. The discipline ought to be extreme to lessen the crime percentage. All disciplines depend on a similar rationale to give punishment for the transgressor. There are various types of discipline in India like capital discipline, life detainment, detainment etc., Capital discipline is known as the most serious type of discipline.. This paper says about the situation with the death penalty generally the world and furthermore characterizes the idea of capital offense. It additionally clarifies about the methods of capital discipline in India . This article clarifies two significant speculations connected with the death penalty, to be specific reformative hypothesis and preventive hypothesis. In this exploration the specialist additionally clarified about most extraordinary of uncommon cases. This article referenced with regards to abolitionist and retentionist nations, likewise the death penalty in old India. This article has a point by point view about the capital discipline in India and furthermore the techniques for execution in India.

INTRODUCTION

India is a country which comprise of enormous number of violations and crooks. In India all disciplines depend on the thought process to give punishment for the miscreant. There are two fundamental purposes behind monumental the discipline, one is the transgressor ought to endure and other one is forcing discipline on miscreants deters other from doing wrong. There are various types of discipline in India in light of their offense like the death penalty, detainment, life imprisonment, imprisonment with fine, ,etc. In this exploration the analyst zeroed in on the death penalty or capital punishment. The death penalty is one of the significant piece of Indian criminal equity framework. Violations bring about capital punishment are known as capital wrongdoings or capital offences. The term the death penalty is gotten from the Latin word “capitalis” signifies “with respect to head”. The term capital punishment is otherwise called capital punishment .Capital Discipline is an interaction by an individual is executed by a state for their criminal offense. Capital discipline or capital punishment implies the guilty party condemned to death by the official courtroom for a criminal offense. The death penalty which has been granted for the most terrible wrongdoings against humankind .Death punishment varies from spot to place, state to state and nation to country. There are numerous common liberties developments in India which says the death penalty is unethical. The common liberties associations are contended that death penalty influence one individual’s right. In jurisprudence, criminology and punishment, the death penalty implies a sentence of death.

Indian criminal statute depends on the blend of two hypotheses. The constitution too gave powers to president and lead representative to suspend or exonerate capital punishment. In India capital discipline is granted for the most genuine and appalling offenses. The death penalty is given for murder, robbery with murder, waging battle against the public authority and abetting mutiny,etc.,. Capital punishment is given just when the court reaches a conclusion that life detainment is lacking, in light of circumstance of the case. The Main point of this review:

To learn about the death penalty in India.

To learn about the criminological methodology of the death penalty.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN INDIA

The death penalty is a lawful capital punishment in India. India gives the death penalty for a genuine offences .In India the death penalty is granted for generally egregious and terrible offense. In India Article 21 of the Indian constitution is”security of life and individual freedom”. This article says,” No individual will be denied of his life or individual freedom besides as per technique set up by law”. This article says right to life is guaranteed to each resident in India. In India IPC gives capital punishment as a discipline for different offenses, for example, criminal conspiracy, murder, waging battle against the government, abetment of insurrection, dacoity with murder, and hostile to – psychological warfare. The Indian Constitution has arrangement for kindness of capital discipline by the President. There are 22 the death penalty is occurred in India starting around 1995. After the autonomy a there are 52 the death penalty is taken in India In “Mithu vs territory of Punjab” the Supreme Court struck down the IPC Section 303 which give obligatory capital punishment for the offenders, India casted a ballot against a United Nations General Gathering goal requiring a restriction on the demise penalty. In November 2012, India again proceed with its stance on the death penalty by casting a ballot against the UN General Assembly draft goal demand. to boycott passing penalty.

CASE LAWS

MITHU VS STATE OF PUNJAB ( 1983)

In this case the Supreme Court struck down Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code, which provided for mandatory death sentence for offenders.

BACHAN SINGH VS STATE OF PUNJAB

In this case the Supreme Court says that capital punishment was given only to the rarest of rare Cases

JAGMOHAN VS STATE OF UP

This was the first case dealing with the question of constitutional validity of capital punishmentin India.

METHODS OF EXECUTION IN INDIA

In India the capital punishment is executed by hanging or shooting.

HANGING

All capital punishment in India is implemented by hanging. After independence , In Mahatma

Gandhi case Godse was the first person to be executed by capital punishment in India. The SC

of India suggested capital punishment must be given only to the rarest of rare cases in India .

EXECUTION

In India the Army Act and Air Force Act also provide implementation of capital punishment in India In Air Force Act, 1950, section 34 allows the court martial to thrust the death sentence for the unlawful act mentioned in section 34(a) to (o) of The Air Force Act, 1950. In Indian the government mostly used hanging method to execute capital punishment.

CRIMINOLOGICAL APPROCH OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT-:

There are two types of theories of punishment in capital punishment are-:(1)- Reformative theory

(2)- Preventive Theory

REFORMATIVE THEORY

“tit for tat turn the entire world blind” by Mahatma Gandhi. This line is the pushed of reformative hypothesis of discipline. All speculations depend on the guideline to offender. The primary goal of every one of these hypothesis is to change the sentenced individual through individual treatment. The principle point of the reformative hypothesis is to instruct or change the wrongdoer without anyone else. A guilty party is discipline for his own benefit. This hypothesis has been upheld from different sides. Reformative hypothesis support criminal science. Criminal science says each wrongdoing as phenomenon, a gentle type of madness. criminal human sciences ,criminal social science and therapy upholds Reformative hypothesis. This hypothesis intends to address the criminal personalities into a decent way and they can lead a day to day existence like typical resident. This hypothesis condemn all sort of corporal punishment.

PREVENTIVE THEORY

The principle point of this preventive hypothesis is to get the wrongdoer far from the general public. As per preventive hypothesis the fundamental point of discipline is to set a model for other people and keep them from crimes. In this hypothesis the guilty parties are rebuffed with death punishment, life detainment. Preventive hypothesis was upheld by numerous law reformers on the grounds that preventive hypothesis has adapting Penal law. On numerous reformers view the preventive hypothesis has a genuine impact on guilty parties. The primary reason for preventive hypothesis is to make strides that blamed individual doesn’t rehash the wrongdoing after satisfaction in Punishment. This hypothesis clarifies that capital discipline as a most extreme type of discipline due to its disadvantage impact. A man has ended the existence of another man. So he is dependable to be denied of his life. In India they follows preventive hypothesis.

CONCLUSION

In India, the death penalty has been Practiced since old occasions. Numerous nations nullified capital punishment11. At the point when we check out our public wrongdoing insights capital punishment has not ended up being obstacle for doing offense, the wrongdoings rates increment as it were. We need to change our laws particularly for capital punishment in India. Our laws should change and the discipline ought to be so afflictions and it ought to be a model for individuals around him, about his unlawful demonstrations. There is a discipline more terrible than capital punishment. Make the wrongdoer nonstop conversation about the death penalty and the thorough life in jail is more awful than capital discipline. Every constantly the wrongdoer should feel for his offense.

The death penalty isn’t viable to lessen violations in Society.

Henceforth invalid theory demonstrated.

Indian criminal statute depends on the blend of two hypotheses. The constitution too gave powers to president and lead representative to suspend or exonerate capital punishment. In India capital discipline is granted for the most genuine and appalling offenses. The death penalty is given for murder, robbery with murder, waging battle against the public authority and abetting mutiny,etc.,. Capital punishment is given just when the court reaches a conclusion that life detainment is lacking, in light of circumstance of the case.

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AN OVERVIEW OF TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT IN INDIA

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Brand name recognizes the proprietor of the item. Under any approved understanding of item, a brand name can be utilized, an illustration of brand names products names are, iPod and a major Macintosh. Organization logos like the Golden Arches at McDonald’s and McDonald’s “I’m Lovin’ it. Brand names as Mcdonald Apple’s, and Dolce and Gabbana.

The use of the brand name by unapproved implies or unlawful means by delivering it in exchanging is known as brand name robbery. Assuming there is an encroachment of brand name, the proprietor of the enrolled brand name can make a lawful move and for an unregistered brand name, the main choice passes off. Numerous nations like the United States, Canada and a lot more likewise, acknowledge the brand name strategies, so they additionally gave the right to the expert of item to make the move for the security of their brand name A typical idea of a brand name is that the proprietor of an enlisted brand name has a more legitimate appropriate for assurance than the proprietor of unregistered brand name.

The idea of use of the non-actual brand name the Supreme Court held on account of Hardie exchanging Ltd. v. Addison paint and synthetic substances Ltd. The Supreme Court gave a more extensive translation on the utilization of a brand name that it very well may be non-physical and that there were no grounds to confine the client to use on the items or to the offer of the products bearing the brand name.

ENCROACHMENT OF BRAND NAME

An enrolled brand name is encroached by an individual who not being an enlisted owner or an individual utilizing via allowed use over the span of exchange, an imprint which is indistinguishable with or misleading like the brand name corresponding to labor and products in regard of which the brand name is enrolled. After encroachment, the proprietor of the brand name can go for common judicial actions against a the enlisted party brand name. Essentially, Trademark encroachment implies the unapproved utilization of a brand name on in regards to items and advantages in a way that will create turmoil, troublesome, about the dealer or possibly benefits.

THE TRADEMARKS ACT

The Trademarks Act, 1999 (hereinafter alluded to as the Act) is the regulation that secures brand names in India. The Act sets out the guidelines managing enlistment, insurance and punishments against encroachment in regards to brand names. Brand names are given the situation with protected innovation across the globe. There are numerous associations, both worldwide and public, that undertaking to ensure scholarly properties like brand names.

In India, the association that arrangements with the security of brand names are the Indian Patent Office regulated by the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks. In straightforward words, brand name encroachment is the unapproved utilization of an imprint that is indistinguishable or misleading like an enlisted brand name. The term beguilingly comparable here implies that when a normal purchaser takes a gander at the imprint, it is probably going to confound him/her of the beginning of the labor and products.

TRADEMARK LAW IN INDIA

Before 1940 there was no law on brand names in India. Various issues of encroachment of enlisted and unregistered brand name emerged which were settled under Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and enrollment was mediated under the Indian Registration Act,1908. To conquer these hardships, the Indian Trademark law was implemented in 1940. After the requirement of the brand name law, interest for assurance of brand names expanded as there was significant development in exchange and business. The Trademark law was supplanted with the Trademark and Merchandise Act, 1958. It gives better assurance of brand name and forestalls abuse or deceitful utilization of imprints on stock. The Act gives enrollment of the brand name with the goal that the proprietor of the brand name might get a legitimate appropriate for its elite use. This past Act got supplanted with the Trademark Act, 1999 by the public authority of India by consenting it with TRIPS (Trade-related parts of protected innovation freedoms) commitment suggested by the World Trade Organization. The point of the Trademark Act is to give assurance to the clients of brand name and direct the conditions on the property and furthermore give lawful solutions for the execution of brand name freedoms.

The Trademark Act, 1999 gives the right to the police to catch in occurrences of infringement of the brand name. The Act gives a total definition for the term encroachment which is oftentimes utilized. In Trademark Act, it gives disciplines and punishments to the wrongdoers. It likewise builds the time term of enlistment and furthermore enrollment of a modern brand name.

DESGINATION OF TRADEMARK

Trademark is assigned by:

• ™ (™ is utilized for an unregistered trademark .it is utilized to advance or brand products)

• ( utilized for an unregistered help mark. it is utilized to advance or brand administrations).

• R (letter R is encircled by a circle and utilized for enrolled brand name).

USES OF TRADEMARK

Brand name recognizes the proprietor of the item. Under any approved understanding of item, a brand name can be utilized, an illustration of brand names products names are, iPod and a major macintosh. Organization logos like the Golden Arches at McDonald’s and McDonald’s “I’m lovin’ it. Brand names as mcdonald Apple’s, and Dolce and Gabbana.

The use of the brand name by unapproved implies or unlawful means by delivering it in exchanging is known as brand name robbery. Assuming there is an encroachment of brand name, the proprietor of the enrolled brand name can make a lawful move and for an unregistered brand name, the main choice passes off. Numerous nations like the United States, Canada and a lot more likewise, acknowledge the brand name strategies, so they additionally gave the right to the expert of item to make the move for the security of their brand name A typical idea of a brand name is that the proprietor of an enlisted brand name has a more legitimate appropriate for assurance than the proprietor of unregistered brand name.

The idea of use of the non-actual brand name the Supreme Court held on account of Hardie exchanging Ltd. v. Addison paint and synthetic substances Ltd. The Supreme Court gave a more extensive translation on the utilization of a brand name that it very well may be non-physical and that there were no grounds to confine the client to use on the items or to the offer of the products bearing the brand name.

ENCROACHMENT OF BRAND NAME

An enrolled brand name is encroached by an individual who not being an enlisted owner or an individual utilizing via allowed use over the span of exchange, an imprint which is indistinguishable with or misleading like the brand name corresponding to labor and products in regard of which the brand name is enrolled. After encroachment, the proprietor of the brand name can go for common judicial actions against a the enlisted party brand name. Essentially, Trademark encroachment implies the unapproved utilization of a brand name on in regards to items and advantages in a way that will create turmoil, troublesome, about the dealer or possibly benefits.

INFRINGEMENT OF TRADEMARK

The development of the web is additionally prompting an extension of improper brand name encroachment charges. Likely, an organization will attest brand name encroachment each time it sees one among its brand names on a web-based page of a Third party. For instance, a person who fosters a site online that talks about her mastery with Microsoft programming could utilize Microsoft’s brand names to counsel careful product without the concern of encroachment .Notwithstanding, she predominantly would never again be equipped to involve the imprints in this sort of means as to plan watchers of her web page to feel that she is partnered with Microsoft or that Microsoft is someway supporting her net page. The honor could easiest be broke down after perceiving how the imprints are truly utilized on the encroachment of brand name on the web.

CASE LAW ON INFRINGEMENT

Hearst organization Vs Dalal road verbal trade Ltd.

The court held that a brand name is encroached when a person throughout exchange utilizes an imprint which is same with or beguilingly like the brand name as far as the products in regard of which the brand name is enrolled. Utilization of the imprint by utilizing such man or lady should be in a way which is bound to be taken as getting utilized as a brand name.

ACCORDING TO TRADEMARK ACT, A MARK WILL BE REGARDED TO BE INFRINGED MARK IF:

1. It is found copy of whole enlisted mark with a couple of augmentations and adjustments,

2. The encroached mark is used throughout exchange,

3. The usage of the encroached mark is printed or normal portrayal of the imprint in promotion. Any oral use of the brand name isn’t encroachment.

4. The imprint used by the other person which nearly appears as though the quality of the enlisted proprietor as is likely going to misdirect or create turmoil and according to merchandise in regard of which it is enrolled.

PROTECTION AGAINST INFRINGEMENT OF TRADE MARK:

Under section 29 of the Trade mark Act, 1999, the use of an exchange mark by a person who not being enrolled proprietor of the exchange mark or an enlisted customer thereof which is unclear with, or misleadingly like an enrolled brand name adds up to the encroachment of brand name and the enlisted proprietor can take action or gain alleviation in regard of encroachment of brand name.

For a situation Supreme Court has held that in an activity for encroachment assuming the two imprints are undefined, by then the encroachment made out, in any case for the situation the Court needs to take a gander at the two denotes, the level of likeness by phonetic, visual or in the fundamental ides as introduced to the enlisted proprietor, whether or not the fundamental elements of the sign of the enrolled owner is viewed as utilized by other individual the Court might close the matter.

IN AN ACTIVITY FOR ENCROACHMENT OF TRADE MARK :

1. The outraged party should be the enlisted owner of a brand name

2. The respondent should use an imprint misleadingly comparative with the outraged party’s imprint.

3. The usage should be comparing to the products in respect of which the outraged party’s imprints is enrolled,

4. The usage by the respondent should not be unintentional anyway throughout the span of exchange.

LATEST UPDATES ON TRADEMARK LAW – 1ST AUGUST TO 8TH AUGUST ,2021 –

INDIAN TRADEMARK UPDATES

Samsung India faces temporary Injunction in trademark infringement suit- In a new choice by the City Civil Court at Bengaluru, innovation monster Samsung India, alongside its specialist organization Story Experiences Pvt. Ltd., have been briefly limited from utilizing the expression “Attendant”. The suit was initiated by Dipali Sikand, the organizer of Lesconcierges Services Pvt. Ltd. furthermore Club Concierge Services (India) Pvt. Ltd., who guaranteed that she was the first individual to present attendant services in Quite a while, and who had enlisted the brand name “Attendant” under classes 35, 39, 41, 43, and 45. It was stated by Sikand that she was giving attendant services to Samsung India, nonetheless, after the expiry of her underlying commitment with the tech monster, Story Experiences was named to give the previously mentioned administrations to Samsung India. Story Experiences along these lines started sharing flyers and handouts bearing the expression “Attendant” to planned customers, which prompted Sikand documenting this case, asserting encroachment of her brand name privileges. The City Civil Court at Bangalore in this way allowed a brief directive against Samsung India and Story Experiences Pvt. Ltd. until the finish of the suit

Before 1940 there was no law on brand names in India. Various issues of encroachment of enlisted and unregistered brand name emerged which were settled under Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and enrollment was mediated under the Indian Registration Act,1908. To conquer these hardships, the Indian Trademark law was implemented in 1940. After the requirement of the brand name law, interest for assurance of brand names expanded as there was significant development in exchange and business. The Trademark law was supplanted with the Trademark and Merchandise Act, 1958.

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ARTICLE 21 AND EUTHANASIA

Shubham Kashyap

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INTRODUCTION:

The word Euthanasia originated from Greek origins “eu” that denotes “well” or “good” in addition to “Thanatos” which denotes “death”, so in essence Euthanasia signifies good death.

It basically indicates a deliberate termination of someone’s life by someone else at the clear request of the individual who wants to die. In practice, it involves the action of killing an individual who is ill and not curable out of care and compassion for that individual’s agony. Some even call it ‘mercy killing’. Merriam Webster defines Euthanasia as the action of killing or letting a hopelessly ill individual die in a comparatively pain free method for merciful intentions. Black’s Law Dictionary has a similar definition stating it to be the action of killing or causing death of an individual suffering from an ailment that isn’t curable, specially an agonizing one for merciful aims. Right to die has continually been a contentious subject globally. Article 21 of the Indian constitution states that “no individual should be deprived of life or personal freedom except in accordance with legally prescribed procedures”. The term liberty is the appreciation and attainment of choice and the attributes that go with that choice and the word life denotes the aim to have the same in a dignified way. Both of these are intertwined. Liberty permits people the space to reflect and perform without constraint and life deprived of liberty would be a pointless existence. Courts have included different aspects to

Right to life like right to have a respectable existence, right to food, to get adequately educated, to have a clean environment, to get adequate shelter, privacy and numerous different rights to allow people to enjoy a better and a more fruitful life.

ANALYSIS OF

ARTICLE 21

This generous dealing of Article 21 by the courts could be owed to the judiciary’s appreciation of the principle that constitutional provisions should be interpreted not in a limited sense but in a broad and liberal way. Benches have continually held that when understanding the correct implication and substance of right to life, the court must try to expand the scope of the fundamental right and not weaken its content.In Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, 1978 AIR 597, justice Bhagwati, in an attempt to make Article 21more meaningful, stated that “Courts should try to expand the scope and range of fundamental rights instead of attenuating their implication and substance by means of juridical construction”. This is why numerous of rights have been included in Article 21. In Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator, the Supreme court made huge development when it contended that Article 21 doesn’t amount to simply ‘animal existence’ but to something more than just that. It comprises of living with human dignity. In Shantisar builders v Narayanan Khimalal Totame, the Supreme Court distinguished between the shelter that humans require and those that animals require. They stated that animals require just the minimum bodily security but humans require a habitation that permits them to grow in all facets be it mentally or physically. So, it isn’t just right to survival but living a complete quality life of dignity and value. The Supreme Court has claimed article 21 to be ‘heart of fundamental rights’ and has consequently allowed very broad boundaries with widest conceivable understandings to this article and correctly so. It has evolved into a basis for many essential rights and procedural protections. It can be contended that at the very least, every individual has a right to live with modicum amount of dignity and where the existing condition drops beneath that point, the individual should be permitted to terminate such agonizing existence. There is no legislation in India that provides for Euthanasia, so people relied on the constitution to provide relief with the question being, ‘whether Right of Life under article 21 accommodates a Right to die?’.

ANALYSIS OF INDIAN LEGAL JURISPRUDENCE ON EUTHANASIA

This issue first arose in the case of State of Maharashtra v Maruty Sripati Dubal. The court here held that Right to Life included Right to die and held Section 309 of IPC that made attempt to suicide a crime as unconstitutional. 29 The court reasoned those fundamental rights have both positive and negative facets. It also distinguished between suicide and euthanasia saying that the former includes the act done by the individual himself whereas the latter meant the act done by an intervening party. As opposed to this, in Chenna Jagdeshwar v Sate of AP, the court stated that right to die isn’t secured under article 21. In P. Rathinam v Union of India, the court followed Maruty Dubal case’s reasoning and stated that article 21 included the right not to lead a coerced life that is damaging, unfavorable and detested by someone. It also held attempt to suicide as not punishable by calling the provision against this as ‘ultra-viruses. This was a drastic approach and it could not last long. The court in Gian Kaur v State of Punjab while overruling this judgment, stated that Right to Life doesn’t incorporate the Right to die a death that isn’t natural and held suicide to be a criminal offence. They held s.309 of IPC that makes attempted suicide an offence to be constitutional. They reasoned that Article 21 is a natural right whereas the right to end one’s life by committing suicide would be unnatural.36 The court stated that dignity rights under the same only exist till the ‘natural’ termination of life. They distinguished Euthanasia from suicide and asserted that the former involves ending an individual’s life who is already fatally ill or in a PVS. They stated that in euthanasia, the course of dying has already begun and it merely accelerates this process of natural death and isn’t causing an unnatural termination. They therefore held that right to die a dignified death of a patient whose ‘life is ebbing out’ may come within the preview of right to a dignified life. So, in Gian Kaur, the court already acknowledged right to a dignified death specially for incurably ill patients, but they did not exactly rule on euthanasia be it active or passive. They just primarily focused on the legitimacy of anti-suicide laws. So, this issue was again brought up in Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v Union of India. Runa Shanbaug was a nurse who was a victim of sexual assault, after which she wasn’t in the condition to feel anything anymore. The ruthless incident rendered her visionless, deaf, paralyzed and in a vegetative condition for 42 years. A petition was brought before the Supreme Court for her euthanasia. The court passed a ground-breaking judgement legalizing passive euthanasia. The court held that in cases were the natural progression of death had already initiated or the patient was in a permanent vegetative state, then it wouldn’t be an offense to passively quicken demise by refusal of medical support. 43 Here the court instead of dealing with right to die, dealt with whether there is a compulsion to lengthen life when the sufferer was fatally ill. It laid down the following checks and safeguards that need to be adhered to so that this aid isn’t abused, specially forbidding third party from being involved in the decision-making.

1-The decision to not continue with aids that lengthen the patient’s life must be undertaken by their lawful guardians, their partner, someone who is close to them,

2- The approval of the high court is mandatory as relatives might give approval to get inheritance benefits.

3- Two judges of the high court will take the call after taking assistance from a panel of three medical experts. The English case of Airedale has been one of the major cases that facilitated the benches to consider passive euthanasia in Indian framework. 48The aforementioned legal delivery had also been undertaken by the court in Airedale case cogitating the High Court to be ‘parens patriae’ and personally examining every case for securing the paramount interest of the individual given euthanasia like a rational and reliable parent.

In Common Cause v Union of India, the Constitutional Court performed an arduous undertaking of pronouncing Right to die with dignity as a fundamental right and a vital component of right to live a life of dignity as enshrined in Article 21. It arranged extensive system for protecting the dignity of fatally ill individuals and those in PVS with no prospect of recovery and in this course, it 1- legalized advance medical directives (AMD) and health attorneys and 2- put forth rules to give force to passive euthanasia. This is now the current law with respect to euthanasia till a legislature is made on the same. This court also scrutinized some discrepancies in the Aruna Shanbaug case. The constitutional court in Common Cause increased the extent of Euthanasia allowed in Aruna case by attaching the concept of living will, where individuals can leave written guidelines on the type of health care they could be administered with, in the occasion of them being in a unresponsive and incurably ill state .It is important to remember that only passive euthanasia has been allowed yet that involves withholding life-lengthening procedures voluntarily, when the patient requests this or when he leaves a living will behind that provides for this or, involuntarily when the patient isn’t in a conscious state and this decision is taken by his family, doctors, close affiliations with the approval of the high court. Active euthanasia is different as it involves positive action of using lethal drugs to cause deliberate demise of the individual through direct interference and this isn’t permitted. The Jurisprudence across the globe has grown on passive euthanasia and it has managed to get moral and legitimate approval more or less. This can’t be said for active euthanasia as there still exists some hesitation and doubt about it.

CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF DIGNITY AND PRIVACY THAT PLAY A ROLE HERE

According to prof Upendra Baxi, dignity means respect for a person built on the value of liberty and power to construct choices and a decent social system would be where dignity is respected by allowing settings to exercise uncontrolled and informed choices. Even though the term ‘dignity’ isn’t defined anywhere in the constitution or statutes, by analysing the views taken by courts, we can see the how intrinsic it is for Article 21. To deny an individual of his dignity at the conclusion of his life would deny him of meaningful existence. A subsistence that holds meaning would include individual’s right of self-determination and independence to choose their healthcare procedure. Respect for a person, particularly their right to decide how they must live their life amounts to self-autonomy or right of self-governance. It is the right against non-intervention by people that offers a competent individual that is in his majority, the right to decide things that concern his being and body, exclusive of other’s control or meddling. Individual’s right of self-rule and autonomy include their choice to whether and to whatever degree they are prepared to submit themselves to health treatments, deciding between alternate procedures or in that regard, deciding for no procedure at all, which according to their comprehension is in consonance with their personal desires and principles. 61 Nevertheless, a critical issue is yet to be addressed of whether right to die as a part of article 21 is absolute or it would be controlled by reasonable constraints. Considering this right involves the choice vis-à-vis terminating one’s life, the circumstances that accompany the meaning of ‘dignity’ need to be lucidly articulated. Without explicit reference of reasonable constraints influencing this right, the noble intent of the constitutional court advancing this judgement may prove ineffective.

In KS Puttaswammy v Union of India, the Constitutional Court that included nine justices held privacy to be a fundamental segment of right to life that also recognizes a person’s right to refuse health treatments that prolong lifespan. Here, Justice Chelameshwar stated that “force feeding of particular individuals by the Government raises alarms for privacy. A person’s right to deny healthcare that prolongs his existence or ends the same is a liberty that comes within the preview of privacy”. Article 21 guarantees privacy rights and in cases where individuals are in PVS or are bed ridden, unconscious to an extent where they are unable to eat own their own, switch clothes or even utilize the lavatory, whether or not their privacy rights are being met is something to reflect on. These are things that no one would normally like to rely on others for.

EUTHANASIA IN THE NETHERLANDS

Netherlands was the first European state that allowed euthanasia by introducing the statute ‘termination of life on request and assisted suicide act” in 2002. 69 This legislation permitted euthanasia in extremely rare and extraordinary circumstances.70 There, killing someone on their request or with their permission is illegal but this statue makes an exemption for doctors who perform euthanasia provided they meet the following factors:

1-If there isn’t any possibility for the patient’s condition to improve and they are in insufferable agony, 2-The patient themselves, voluntarily opt for this without any encouragement from others and this request should be persistent over a period,

3- The patient makes an informed decision with comprehensive information of his alternatives,

4-This issue must be discussed with other free doctors for confirming everything,

5-euthenesia must take place with proper process by competent doctors, and

6- patient must be minimum twelve years of age.

CONCLUSION

Low educational and legal knowledge being the reality of many people in India, there could be a chance of misuse of living wills by greed-stricken heirs and this should be appropriately attended by the parliament for the paramount usage of the novel right added in the binder of fundamental rights. Lack of sufficient and affordable healthcare and monetary limitations on middle class families may force them to opt for passive euthanasia or make living wills hastily out of compulsion. Therefore, mere allowing passive euthanasia by the benches isn’t enough till the parliament appropriately aids the matter by giving the required attention to health facilities and insurance, specially for economically backwards individuals. Appreciating the right of dying with dignity for terminal patients and persons in a PVS is only part of the picture, and the issue of how this right would be construed with respect to individuals wanting to die due to other serious reasons like agedness, indigence, dearth of prospects etc. to die with respect still remains. The apex court has only recognized this right to dignified death in terms of right to withdraw or deny life prolonging treatments for the aforementioned categories, so how this right should be construed with respect to patients who have terminal illnesses that hamper their life adversely but haven’t made them dependent on some life supporting machine is something to deliberate on. For instance, individuals permanently paralyzed from neck down, individuals with severe case of dementia that leaves them in a disoriented state, not recognizing themselves or their loved ones etc. These individuals aren’t dependent on life prolonging systems that they can withdraw but nevertheless they have to permanently depend on others for basic needs and their dignity, privacy, autonomy and quality of life can be said to be obstructed by their degenerated circumstances. To cause death in these situations, a positive action would be needed. This may have the capacity to unlock floodgates for Mandamus Writs before constitutional benches. In my opinion, active euthanasia, although very restrictively and only in extraordinary and rare instances, should also be included in right to dignified death under art 21. For this, heavy safeguards and riders are needed so that this right isn’t abused. This is also keeping in mind the broad frame the courts have given to ‘life’ under art21, to signify more than ‘animal survival’, to include a life of dignity, quality, good physical and psychological wellbeing. India’s legal situation shouldn’t be reviewed in isolation. We have drawn our constitution from the charters of diverse states and benches have frequently referred to several international decisions. Netherland’s statue with respect to Euthanasia should be examined and appreciated in Indian context and used to broaden euthanasia framework in India. Death is as essential is life in certain situations. Death shouldn’t be seen as negative or disappointing when the individual is going through unbearable agony from an ailment that isn’t curable for an alarmingly long time. Humane and proficient dealing for the dying is necessary.

Low educational and legal knowledge being the reality of many people in India, there could be a chance of misuse of living wills by greed-stricken heirs and this should be appropriately attended by Parliament for the paramount usage of the novel right added in the binder of fundamental rights. Lack of sufficient and affordable healthcare and monetary limitations on middle class families may force them to opt for passive euthanasia or make living wills hastily out of compulsion.

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Section 482 CrPC plea maintainable to quash proceedings which are Ex Facie bad for want of sanction: Allahabad HC

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While dispelling all misgivings and question marks raise over whether Section 482 CrPC plea is maintainable or not to quash proceedings which are ex facie bad for want of sanction, the Allahabad High Court has in a learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Mahendra Pal Singh Lekhpal And Another v. State of U.P. and Another in Application U/S 482 No. – 15266 of 2007 delivered as recently as on January 10, 2022 observed that an application under Section 482 CrPC is maintainable to quash the proceedings, which are ex facie bad for want of sanction as required under Section 197 of CrPC (Prosecution of Judges and public servants). In holding so, the Bench of Justice Chandra Kumar Rai has set aside a summoning order passed by the Judicial Magistrate Farrukhabad against a Lekhpal (applicant number 1) and a Kanoongo (applicant number 2) in the Consolidation department (both public servants) without obtaining necessary sanction as provided under Section 197 of CrPC. Very rightly so!

To start with, this noteworthy judgment authored by a single Judge Bench of Justice Chandra Kumar Rai sets the ball rolling by first and foremost observing in para 1 that, “The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed to quash the summoning order dated 14.03.for demarcation.2007 passed by Judicial Magistrate IIIrd, Room No.12 Farrukhabad in complaint case No.28 of 2006 (Siya Ram Vs. Mahendra Pal and others).”

While elaborating on the facts of the case, the Bench then envisages in para 2 that, “The brief facts of the case are that applicant No.1 is a Lekhpal in the Consolidation department and applicant No.2 is a Kanoongo in the Consolidation department and both are the public servants. During consolidation proceedings, a joint plot was allotted to opposite party No.2 and one Ram Singh. Opposite party No.2 filed an application on 28.08.2006 before Settlement Officer of Consolidation for making measurement of plot No. 372. The Settlement of Consolidation Officer by order dated 29.08.2006 directed the Consolidation Officer to make measurement in accordance with law.”

While continuing in the same vein, the Bench then enunciates in para 3 that, “In pursuance of the order of Settlement Officer of Consolidation dated 29.08.2006, necessary reports were submitted by Consolidation authorities and applicant Nos. 1 and 2 on 15.11.2006 conducted measurement of disputed plots with the help of local police and submitted their report before the Assistant Consolidation Officer. The report dated 15.11.2006 has been annexed as Annexure No.2 to the affidavit accompanying with the present application, in which it is mentioned that measurement has been taken place taking due care of the crop standing in the disputed plot. Opposite party No.2 filed a complaint on 27.11.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, Farrukhabad with the allegation that applicant Nos.1 and 2 have illegally made measurements of the plot, in which crops were standing and there was an order dated 15.11.2006 to stop the measurement,2 the2 copy of the complaint has been annexed as Annexure No.3 and order dated 15.11.2006 has been annexed as Annexure No.4 to the affidavit. The Judicial Magistrate IIIrd, Room No.12, Farrukhabad by order dated 14.03.2007 summoned the applicant under Section 427 IPC, without considering the facts that applicants are public servant and they were discharging their official duties.”

As we see, the Bench then points out in para 4 that, “This case was listed on 10th July, 2007 and following order was passed on that date:

“Heard the learned counsel for the applicants and the learned A.G.A.

It is contended by the learned counsel for the applicants are the lekhpal and Kanoono respectively. They have made measurement of the land on the basis of the order passed by the C.O. concerned. They have discharged their duties and the allegations against them are false and frivolous.

Issue notice to O.P. No.2 returnable within four weeks.

In view of the facts and circumstances, further proceedings of complaint case No.28 of 2006 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, III Room No.12 Farrukhabad, shall remain stayed till the next date of listing. List after four weeks”

Be it noted, the Bench then makes no bones about the irrefutable fact which it states in para 11 that, “There is no dispute about the fact that applicants are public servants and further they were discharging their official duties, as such the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicants that private complaint against the public servant for want of sanction would vitiate criminal proceeding has got substance.”

Needless to say, the Bench then stipulates in para 13 that, “The object of sanction for prosecution whether under Section 197 of the code of criminal procedure is to protect a public servant discharging official duties and functions from harassment by initiation of frivolous criminal proceeding.”

While citing the relevant case law, the Bench then mentions in para 14 that, “The Hon’ble Supreme court in a case of Matajog Dubey vs. H. C. Bhari AIR 1956 SC 44 has held:

“…..Public servants have to be protected from harassment in the discharge of official duties while ordinary citizens not so engaged do not require this safeguard…………There is no question of any discrimination between one person and another in the matter of taking proceedings against a public servant for an act done or purporting to be done by thhe public servant in the discharge of his official duties. No one can take such proceedings without such sanction…..”.”

While citing yet another relevant case law, the Bench then states in para 15 that, “In Pukhraj vs. State of Rajasthan and another (1973 2 SCC 701), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held:

“2…..While the law is well settled the difficulty really arises in applying the law to the facts of any particular case. The intention behind the section is to prevent public servants from being unnecessarily harassed. The section is not restricted only to cases of anything purported to be done in good faith, for a person, who ostensibly acts in execution of his duty still purports so to act, although he may have a dishonest intention. Nor is it confined to cases where the act, which constitutes the offence, is the official duty of the official concerned. Such an interpretation would involve a contradiction in terms, because an offence can never be an official duty. The offence should have been committed when an act is done in the execution of duty or when an act purports to be done in execution of duty. The test appears to be not that the offence is capable of being committed only by a public servant and not by anyone else, but that it is committed by a public servant in an act cone or purporting to be done in the execution of duty The section cannot be confined to only such acts as are one by a public servant directly in pursuance of his public officer, though in excess of the duty or under a mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty. Nor need the act constituting the offence be so inseparably connected with the official duty as to form part and parcel of the same transaction.

Read conclusion on www.thedaily guardian.com

What is necessary is that the offence must be in respect of an act done or purported to be done in the discharge of an official duty.

It does not apply to acts done purely in a private capacity by a public servant. Expressions such as the ‘capacity in which the act is performed’, ‘cloak of offence’ and ‘professed exercise of the office’ may not always be appropriate to describe or delimit the scope of section. An act merely because it was done negligently does not cease to be one done or purporting to be done in execution of a duty…..”.”

It is worth noting that the Bench then candidly observes in para 16 that, “Every offence committed by different officer does not attract section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The protection given under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code has its’ limitation. The protection is available only when alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty, an offence committed outside the scope of the duty of the public servant would certainly not require sanction. If in doing official duty public officer if committed any mistake or has been summoned in excess of duty even then the sanction of the Government as provided under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code is mandatory.”

It is quite noteworthy that the Bench then elucidates in para 18 noting that, “On the point of stage at which trial court has to examine sanction question Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.T. Virupakshappa Vs. C. Subash, AIR 2015 12 SCC 231 has held that High court had erred in not setting aside an order of trial court taking cognizance of a complaint in exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.”

More significantly, the Bench then hastens to add in para 19 holding that, “The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain reported in [2020 (113) ACC and 904] has held that if the sanction as provided under Section 197 of Criminal Procedure Code has not been taken, the order taking cognizance by the Magistrate will be illegal and the High Court should exercise the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceeding which was bad for want of sanction.”

Most significantly, the Bench then minces no words to state succinctly in para 20 that, “On the basis of law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court as mentioned above, it is well settled that an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is maintainable to quash the proceedings, which are ex facie bad for want of sanction. If, on the face of complaint, the act alleged appears to have a reasonable relationship with official duty power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would have to be exercised to quash the proceedings to prevent abuse of process of Court.”

Finally and far most significantly, the Bench then concludes by holding elegantly, eloquently and effectively in para 21 that, “In view of the facts and circumstances stated above, I am of the view that learned Magistrate has illegally taken cognizance of the offence summoning the applicants under section 427 IPC, which is ex facie bad for want of sanction. The application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed. The summoning order dated 14.03.2007 passed by the Judicial Magistrate IIIrd Room No.12 Farrukhabad in complaint case No.28 of 2006 is set aside and complaint is also quashed for want of sanction in exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No order as to costs.”

In conclusion, this notable judgment by a single Judge Bench of Justice Chandra Kumar Rai of Allahabad High Court leaves not even an iota of doubt to make it crystal clear that Section 482 plea is maintainable to quash proceedings which are ex facie bad for want of sanction. All the courts must abide and adhere by what the Allahabad High Court has held so explicitly in this leading case and act accordingly as directed in this leading case! No denying or disputing it!

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Impact of arbitral disputes in the insolvency regime in India

Eshna Kumar

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In India, insolvency has become a preferred mode for creditors to enforce theirrights under a contract and/or a statute. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 recognises these rights primarily for two types of creditors, financial and operational.

On admission of an application filed by any such creditor, the corporate insolvency resolution process commences. An order of initiation of the process declares the corporate to be insolvent against the world at large. Thus, such a judgment passed under the insolvency jurisdiction is a judgment in rem.

Under the Code, rights for a financial creditor become enforceable only on the existence of a default (Section 7 of the Code). However, for an operational creditor, in addition to the existence of default (Section 8 of the Code read with Section 9 of

the Code), non-existence of pre-existing dispute (Section 9 of the Code) is also to

be demonstrated.

Pendency of arbitral proceedings have a direct impact on the satisfaction of these tests. This article attempts to surface the extent of impact of such arbitration proceedings/disputes on the insolvency jurisdiction.

The impact of arbitral proceedings concerning determination of dispute under the

Code is quite clear. Dispute is defined under Section 5(6) of the Code to include a suit or arbitration proceeding relating to (a) existence of the amount of debt; (b) quality of goods or services; (c) breach of a representation or warranty. The Supreme Court in the case of Mobilox Innovation v. Kirusa Software, (2018) 1 SCC 353 while interpreting this provision has also recognised that pendency of arbitral proceedings with regar to the aforementioned or any other related ground amount to dispute under the Code. (See paragraph 54)

Default is non-payment of a whole or part of debt which has become due and payable. With regard to the impact of arbitral proceedings concerning ascertainment of default, the issue to be considered is whether determination of default (a) right in rem i.e. rights that bind the world large (b) right in personam i.e. inter-se rights (c) subordinate rights i.e. in personam rights subordinate to rights in rem. This is of relevance as rights in personam and subordinate rights are held to be arbitrable disputes as against pure rights in rem. These heads of rights were recognized by the Supreme Court in the case of Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd, (2011) 5 SCC 532 in relation to arbitrability of intellectual property disputes (See paragraphs 37, 38)

2 The Supreme Court in the case of Kotak Venture v Indus Biotech Private Limited, [Arb P (Civil) 48 of 2019 with Civil Appeal No. 1070 of 2021 decided on 26/03/2021] has held that mere filing of the petition and its pendency before admission, cannot be construed a proceeding in rem and the same can be considered as a proceeding in rem only once the Adjudicating Authority recorded a finding of default and admitted a petition under the Code. Thus, one can safely conclude that determination of default is not a right in rem as it relates to the creditor(s) who have approached theAdjudicating Authority.

As a result, existence of dispute and ascertainment of default under the Code is an arbitral dispute and in my view would be in the nature of a subordinate right.

The law during the earlier days seems to have been that pendency of arbitral proceedings does not impact the initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process in a proceeding initiated by a financial creditor. In this regard, reference is made to the judgment of Adjudicating Authority, Delhi in the case of Reliance

Commercial Finance Limited v. Ved Cellulose Limited, (IB)156(PB)/2017; State Bank of India v. Sukam Power Limited, (IB)540(PB)/2017; (IB)1049/KB/2018; Shalby v. Dr. Pranav Shah (IA 285/17 in CP(IB) 123 of 2017).

However, then came the case of Indus Biotech Private Limited v Kotak India Venture Fund-I [IA No.3597/2019 in CP (IB) No.3077/2019] passed by Adjudicating

Authority, Mumbai. The application under Section 7 of the Code filed by Kotak

India Venture Fund-I was basis non-payment of Rs.367,08,56,503.00p by Indus Biotech Private Limited on account of invocation of right of redemption by Kotak Group under the share subscription agreement. Due to non-compliances by Indus

Biotech, it proposed to convert the Optionally Convertible Redeemable Preference

Shares invested by the Kotak Group into equity shares. The dispute centred around (a) the valuation of the Kotak’s Optionally Convertible Redeemable Preference Shares; (b) the right of the Kotak to redeem such Optionally Convertible

Redeemable Preference Shares when it had participated in the process to convert its

Optionally Convertible Redeemable Preference Shares into equity shares of the Indus Biotech; and (c) fixing of the Qualified Initial Public Offering date. Indus in this case preferred an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act to refer the disputes to arbitration. The Adjudicating Authority, Mumbai while observing that the disputes raised were important determinates for ascertaining existence of default, it held that it was not satisfied that a default had occurred. Additionally, the Adjudicating Authority held 3 that “… … The invocation of arbitration in a case like this seems to be justified.” (See paragraph 5.14) The Adjudicating Authority, Mumbai while allowing the application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and dismissing the application under Section 7 of the Code also held that the Code mandates the Adjudicating Authority to ascertain and record satisfaction as to the occurrence of default before admitting the application. (See paragraphs 5.12, 5.13, 5.15, 5.16)

The judgment of Adjudicating Authority, Mumbai was challenged before the Honourable Supreme Court. Connected with it was an arbitration petition seeking appointment of an arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes that have arisen between Indus Biotech and the Kotak Group.

The Honourable Supreme Court upheld the decision of Adjudicating Authority,

Mumbai. With regard to the effect of filing of an application for reference of disputes under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act in a proceeding of insolvency initiated by a financial creditor under Section 7 of the Code, the Honourable Supreme Court observed that an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act would be maintainable in a situation where the petition under Section 7 of the Code is yet to be admitted. However, in a case where the application under Section 7 has already been admitted an application to refer disputes to arbitration would not be maintainable. Additionally, it was observed that in such a case, the Adjudicating Authority would be duty bound to first decide the application under Section 7 of the Code by recording a satisfaction with regard to there being default or not, even if the application under Section 8 of Act, 1996 is kept along for consideration. (See paragraph 27)

Thus, in the author’s view the Indus Biotech Case recognised the pendency of arbitral disputes impacting the existence of default in an application under Section 7 of the Code. It also recognised the maintainability of an application under Section 8 of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act where an application under Section 7 of the Code is pending admission.

To conclude, (i) arbitral disputes impact applications under Section 7 and Section 9 of the Code; (ii) determination of default under the Code and existence of dispute under the Code are not in rem rights and are subordinate rights (iii) determinates of existence of default under the Code are arbitral disputes (iv) application under 4 Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are maintainable prior to admission of an application under Section 7 of the Code.Ms. Eshna Kumar is an Advocate with commercial litigation before the Supreme Court of India, High Court of Delhi, National Company Law Tribunal, National Company Law Appellate Tribunal and other tribunals primarily relating to commercial matters. She regularly appears before various arbitral tribunals.

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