Nato-like: India must work towards formalising the Quad

US Deputy Secretary of State, Stephen Biegun made a significant statement recently, that the United States was trying to formalise the Quad into a Nato-like alliance. In the “natural” progress of things, the Quadrilateral dialogue—the informal strategic forum comprising the US, India, Japan and Australia—should evolve from being a mere chatroom to a meaningful strategic […]

by Joyeeta Basu - September 8, 2020, 7:21 am

US Deputy Secretary of State, Stephen Biegun made a significant statement recently, that the United States was trying to formalise the Quad into a Nato-like alliance. In the “natural” progress of things, the Quadrilateral dialogue—the informal strategic forum comprising the US, India, Japan and Australia—should evolve from being a mere chatroom to a meaningful strategic alliance. This will have reverberations not only in the Indo-Pacific, but also across the world because it will be a major step in containing China. Formed in 1949 with the signing of the Washington Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (Nato’s) “fundamental goal” was “to safeguard the Allies’ freedom and security by political and military means” in the face of threats from Soviet Russia. A “security instrument of the transatlantic community” and “expression of its common democratic values”, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty says that “an attack against one Ally is an attack against all”. This is at the core of the treaty. But in the 21st century, the “enemy” has changed and the focus has shifted—from Russia to China and from the North Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. The focus is now on countering China, which is a malign, revanchist power that the world needs to stand up to. However, any move towards any such alliance will be a political hot potato for the Indian government, with howls of protest coming from expected quarters, many of them with overlapping characteristics and interests—opposition parties; champagne socialists; those who still believe that China can be made to see sense and that a glorious Asian (India plus China) century will dawn one day; and those who say that India should be neutral and not have any pronounced tilt. In other words, the push will be towards maintaining status quo, where China will continue to violate our territorial integrity, but if we stand up to it, it will threaten us with military conflict, to resolve the possibility of which, we will meet China on Russian soil to try and make them see sense. But then the Chinese will tick us off with a terse “it’s all your fault” and then we will have to prepare for “any eventuality”—short hand for an actual military conflict. All this can be prevented if Quad takes the shape of a formal alliance, and an Indo-Pacific charter is framed, because if a rogue power such as China is worried about anything, it is about taking on the might of a united world. It will not be an exaggeration to say that China, which wants India to fight a two-front war, will cower at the possibility of several fronts opening up around it. If the Nato principle of “an attack against one Ally is an attack against all” is introduced in the Indo-Pacific, China will be forced to behave.

 It is because we recognise this that we are pursuing with the Quad, even though China, through its “proxy” Russia, has been conveying in no uncertain terms its unhappiness about India being part of this quadrilateral construct. But this has not deterred India from going ahead with its plans to host a meeting of the Quad later this year, because it recognises China as a threat. It is because China is a threat that India is coming together with Australia and Indonesia for a possible trilateral security alliance. Similarly, any Nato-like treaty for the Indo-Pacific region, comprising the Quad and the Quad Plus countries, is a “natural” outcome of the needs of the times. Once the common threat is identified by name—China obviously—the details of such a charter will have to be worked out in a manner that no partner gets the short shrift and all apprehensions, particularly about military bases and boots on the ground in conflict zones, are taken care of. India should negotiate from a position of strength, for it is a big power, but there will be give and take and India will have to accept that aspect. The Nato template will need to be upgraded, in keeping with the demands of the time, the region and the nature of the adversary. Quad should not stay a concept on the discussion table, a photo-op. Any country or lobby, or interest groups that will try to deter India from formalizing such an alliance should be ignored. However much the opposition from within the country and outside to India being a part of a Nato-like Quad, the government should display the political will to pursue the formalisation of such an alliance. The Indo-Pacific is the centre of gravity for 21st century geopolitics. Even a country such as Germany, with strong business interests with China, is talking about contributing “to shaping the international order in the Indo-Pacific”. France, which is present in the region through its overseas territories, says Indo-Pacific is at the “heart of its strategy” where it is striving for “a stable, multipolar order based on the rule of law and free movement”. Most countries have started realising that China is having too much of a free run and it is time to contain it. India needs to play a big role in this, by actively working towards the formalisation of the Quad. The time for waffling is over.