MP HC rejects application for compounding of offences under Sections 307, 498A IPC based on compromise between parties

While sending a firm, full and final rebuff to an application for compounding of offences, the single Judge Gwalior Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in a learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Dharmpal Singh Jadon & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. & Anr. in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 56371/2021 and 2022 LiveLaw (MP) […]

by Sanjeev Sirohi - February 5, 2022, 7:11 am

While sending a firm, full and final rebuff to an application for compounding of offences, the single Judge Gwalior Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in a learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Dharmpal Singh Jadon & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. & Anr. in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 56371/2021 and 2022 LiveLaw (MP) 24 passed on February 2, 2022 dismissed an application filed for compounding of offences under Sections 307 (attempt to murder) and 498-A (Cruelty to wife) read with Section 34 of IPC, based on a compromise between the parties involved. It is in the fitness of things also because if even in heinous cases of crime such compromises are allowed then that would set a very dangerous, divisive and despicable trend of pressurizing victim by hook or crook so that a compromise is entered into between the parties. It would also tantamount to making a mockery of “justice and rule of law”.

To start with, the single Judge Bench of Justice Rajeev Kumar Shrivastava of Gwalior Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court first and foremost puts forth in para 1 that, “This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for brevity “CrPC”) has been filed for quashing the FIR registered in Crime No. 451/2016 at Police Station Maharajpura, District Gwalior for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 498-A, 34 of IPC and all other consequential proceedings arising out of it on the basis of compromise.”

As we note, the Bench then mentions in para 2 that, “Along with the petition, I.A. No. 31872/2021 & I.A. No. 31873/2021 have also been filed by the petitioners and complainant-respondents No.2 respectively for compounding the offences on the basis of compromise. The applications are duly signed by both the parties and are supported by affidavits of respective parties.”

Truth be told, the Bench then discloses in para 3 that, “In compliance of order dated 07/01/2022 passed by this Court, the factum of compromise has been verified by the Principal Registrar of this Court, who has recorded statement of complainant/ respondents No.2- Smt. Seema Jadon W/o Shri Dharmpal Singh Jadon as well as petitioners/accused, namely, Dharmpal Singh Jadon, Mahesh Singh Jadon, Smt. Krishna Devi and Smt. Sarita Jadon and has submitted a report that the parties have arrived at compromise voluntarily without any threat, inducement and coercion. The verification report further states that as per Section 320 of CrPC, the offences under Sections 307, 498-A, 34 of IPC are not compoundable.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench while mentioning about facts specifies in para 4 that, “The facts of the case, in short, are that the marriage of complainant/ respondent No.2 was solemnized on 12/07/2016 with petitioner No.1- Dharmpal Singh Jadon as per Hindu rituals and immediately after marriage, petitioners started exploiting the complainant and demanded a bike as dowry. The complainant informed about the incident to her family members, upon which her father tried to resolve the issue but remain failed. On 12/12/2016 at around 09:00 PM, mother-in-law & sister-in-law with the help of complainant’s husband dragged the complainant by making knot in her neck and also brutally beaten her with intention to kill her. Being aggrieved and left with no other option, respondent No.2 lodged the FIR against the petitioners which has been registered as Crime No. 451/2016 at Police Station Maharajpura, District Gwalior, for offences punishable under Sections 307, 498-A, 34 of IPC. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet has been filed by the Police and charges have been framed by the Court below.”

As we see, the Bench then states in para 5 that, “Thereafter, during pendency of trial, by the intervention of respectful members of the society, the petitioners and respondent No.2 have cleared bilateral doubts and respondent No.2 has expressed her desire not to continue with the case against the petitioners. Hence, this petition has been filed for quashing the aforesaid FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising out of it on the basis of compromise.”

Needless to say, the Bench then observed in para 8 that, “Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record as well as verification report submitted by Principal Registrar of this Court.”

No doubt, the Bench rightly holds in para 10 that, “The powers of High Court under Section 482 of CrPC are partly administrative and partly judicial. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka vs. Muniswami [AIR 1977 SC 1489] held that the section envisages three circumstances in which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, “to give effect to an order under CrPC, to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and to secure the ends of justice”.”

Be it noted, the Bench forthrightly points out in para 11 that, “The jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is discretionary. The Court may depend upon the facts of a given case. Court can always take note of any miscarriage of justice and prevent the same by exercising its powers under Section 482 of CrPC. It is true that their powers are neither limited nor curtailed by any other provisions of the Code. However, such inherent powers are to be exercised sparingly and with caution.”

For clarity’s sake, the Bench states in para 12 that, “It is also settled law that the inherent power under Section 482 of CrPC has to be exercised for the ends of the justice and should not be arbitrarily exercised to cut short the normal process of a criminal trial.”

While citing relevant case law, the Bench aptly mentions in para 13 that, “In the case of State of M.P. Vs. Manish [(2015) 8 SCC 307], the Hon’ble Apex Court has specifically observed and held that, when it comes to the question of compounding an offence under Sections 307 and 34 IPC, by no stretch of imagination, it can be held to be an offence between the private parties simpliciter. It is observed that such offences will have a serious impact on the society at large. It is further observed that where the accused are facing trial under Sections 307 read with Section 34 IPC, as the offences are definitely against the society, accused will have to necessarily face trial and come out unscathed by demonstrating their innocence.”

In yet another relevant case law, the Bench then adds in para 14 that, “In State of M.P. Vs. Deepak [(2014) 10 SCC 285] the Hon’ble Apex Court has had an occasion to consider whether the High Court can quash the FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings, in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction and Hon’ble Apex Court on the aforesaid point has specifically observed that as offence under Section 307 IPC is non-compoundable as well as offence under Section 307 is not a private dispute between the parties inter se, but is a crime against the society, quashing of the proceedings on the basis of a compromise is not permissible.”

On a similar vein, the Bench then adds in para 15 that, “Similar is the view taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a recent decision in the cases of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Kalyan Singh in Criminal Appeal No.14/2019 decided on 4.1.2019 and State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Dhruv Gurjar in Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013 decided on 22.02.2019.”

Without mincing any words, the Bench then hastens to add in para 16 that, “The Hon’ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab [(2014) 6 SCC 466] has held that the offence under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed that the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed. Its further corroboration with the medical evidence or other evidence is to be seen, which will be possible during the trial only.”

Most significantly, the Bench then while leaving no room for doubt forthrightly underscores in para 17 stipulating that, “The power conferred under Section 482 of CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of CrPC can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves but such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.”

Equally significant is what is then held in para 18 that, “So far as the present case is concerned, the allegations are serious in nature wherein mother-in-law & sister-in-law with the help of complainant’s husband dragged the complainant by making knot in her neck and also brutally beaten her with intention to kill her.

Please read concluding on thedailyguardian.com

Therefore, considering the aforesaid facts & circumstances of the case along with gravity of the offence and the conduct of the accused persons, it would not be appropriate to quash the FIR for the offences under Sections 307, 498-A, 34 of IPC only on the basis of settlement between the accused persons and the complainant.”

As a corollary, the Bench then rules in para 19 that, “In view of the above discussion, I.A. No. 31872/2021 and I.A. No.31873/2021 cannot be allowed as the offences under Sections 307, 498-A, 34 of IPC are non-compoundable under Section 320 of Cr.P.C. Resultantly, the applications are rejected.”

What’s more, the Bench then also holds in para 20 that, “Consequently, in the light of dismissal of I.A. No. 31872/2021 and I.A. No.31873/2021, this petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR and other consequential proceedings, is also dismissed.”

Finally, the Bench then holds in para 21 that, “Accordingly, the trial Court is directed to continue the trial against the petitioners for the offences under Sections 307, 498-A, 34 of IPC, in accordance with law. Let a copy of this order be sent to the trial Court concerned for information and necessary compliance.”

In conclusion, the Gwalior Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court has very rightly rejected the application for compounding of offences under Section 307 and Section 498A IPC based on compromise between the parties. Not even an iota of doubt has been left by Justice Rajeev Kumar Shrivastava that in heinous cases of crimes there can be no compounding of offences on ground of compromise between parties. We have discussed relevant case laws also as aforesaid. So no doubt persist anymore on the moot question of whether offences of serious nature can be compounded based on compromise between the parties.