Mere recovery of tainted currency not sufficient for conviction under prevention of Corruption Act when substantive evidence not reliable: Bombay HC - The Daily Guardian
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Mere recovery of tainted currency not sufficient for conviction under prevention of Corruption Act when substantive evidence not reliable: Bombay HC

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Bombay High Court

In a significant development, we have seen how the Bombay High Court in a remarkable, robust, rational and recent judgment titled The State of Maharashtra v Ajay Ratansingh Parmar in Criminal Appeal No. 73 of 2012 and cited in 2022 LiveLaw (Bom) 89 delivered as recently as on March 9, 2022 in exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction has reiterated that mere recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to establish the guilt of an accused under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It must be mentioned here that the single Judge Bench comprising of Justice Vinay Joshi of Bombay High Court very rightly underscores that, “The law is well settled that demand of illegal gratification is the sine quo non for constituting an offence under the P.C. Act. Mere recovery of tainted currency notes is not sufficient to convict the accused when substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The defence is to be tested on the basis of preponderance of probability and certainly not on the criteria of proof beyond all reasonable doubt.” It also must be added that the Court was dealing with a challenge to a judgment that was passed by a Special Court by which the Respondent (Original Accused) was acquitted for the offence punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption (“P.C.”) Act 1988.

To start with, the single Judge Bench comprising of Justice Vinay Joshi of Bombay High Court in this oral judgment sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The challenge in this appeal is to the judgment and order dated 29th January, 2010 in ACB Special Case No. 50 / 2006 passed by the learned Special Judge, Greater Bombay, by which the Respondent (Orig. Accused) was acquitted for the offence punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption (for short “P.C.”) Act, 1988. The Court below acquitted the accused primarily on the ground of invalid sanction and improbability about the demand and acceptance of bribe amount.”

While elaborating briefly on the facts of the prosecution case, the Bench then envisages in para 2 that, “The brief facts of the prosecution case can be stated as under: The Respondent (Orgi. Accused) was serving as an Assistant Police Inspector with MIDC Police Station, Mumbai. There was no dispute that the accused was a public servant within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the P.C. Act. On 16th February, 2005, the police have arrested a person namely Harjindersingh in connection with Crime No. 62/05 registered with MIDC Police Station. One Ranjit Tagge was the brother of arrested accused Harjindersingh. It is the prosecution case that Ranjit Tagge was acquainted with the complainant Jeevan Jadhav. Ranjit has informed the complainant about the arrest of his real brother on 17th February, 2005. The complainant along with Ranjit went to MIDC Police Station on 18th February, 2005, met the accused and inquired with him about the arrest of Harjindersingh. On 23rd February, 2005, when the complainant and Ranjit met the accused, he demanded bribe of Rs.50,000/- for facilitating Harjindersingh to be released on bail. The Accused also told that otherwise on 25th February, 2005, when the Harjindersingh will be brought to the Court of Magistrate, he would oppose for bail. The complainant and Ranjit agreed to pay the bribe amount, however, on negotiation it was reduced to the amount of Rs.15,000/-. On request, the accused agreed to accept the first installment of Rs.5000/- on the following day. Since the complainant was not willing to pay the bribe amount, he went to the office of Anti Corruption Bureau and lodged a report. ACP Wakde laid a trap by securing two panch witnesses for the said purpose. The complainant has produced ten currency notes having denomination of Rs.500/- each and its serial numbers were noted down. The police have applied anthracene powder on the currency notes. The complainant and panch witnesses were given demonstration of effect of anthracene powder. Accordingly pre-trap panchnama was prepared in presence of panchas.”

Needless to say, the Bench then states in para 5 that, “Heard the learned APP appearing for the Appellant-State and learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent (Orig. Accused) in reply.”

On the one hand, the Bench discloses in para 6 that, “The learned APP has assailed the impugned judgment on various points. It is argued that the trial Court erred in holding that the sanctioning authority was not competent to accord the sanction. She would submit that the evidence laid by the complainant is corroborated by the shadow panch (P.W.2) Sayed. The essential factors like demand and acceptance are proved and therefore urged for recording the finding of guilt.”

On the contrary, the Bench then reveals in para 7 that, “On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent (Orig. Accused) at the outset submitted that since inception, the prosecution case is full of doubts. The prosecution has utterly failed to establish that the sanction was accorded by the competent authority. He would submit that the accused was serving as an Assistant Police Inspector a gazetted post for which the appointing and removing authority is a Director General (D.G.) of Police. He would submit that the Police Commissioner is below the rank of D.G. and therefore the sanction is invalid. Besides that he took through the evidence of both the material witnesses. He has pointed out inconsistencies from the evidence coupled with contents of FIR. Moreover, by placing reliance on some decisions, he reiterated the settled principles for deciding the appeal against acquittal. In short, he would submit that the trial Court has rightly appreciated the prosecution case and recorded the logical and probable findings which cannot be reversed in the appeal.”

Be it noted, the Bench then observes in para 8 that, “The first point agitated is about the invalid sanction. Admittedly, the accused was serving as an Assistant Police Inspector. Undisputedly the sanction to the prosecution has been accorded by Anami Roy (P.W.3), who was Commissioner of Police. The main grievance is about the incompetency of Police Commissioner to accord sanction for the post of Assistant Police Inspector, who is a gazetted officer. Anami Roy (P.W.3) deposed about the application of mind and his competency to accord the sanction. It is the contention of accused that Director General of Police is the appointing and removing authority for his post and therefore he is the only competent authority to accord the sanction. In this regard, he relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Dilip Mahadeo Mandhare V/s. The State of Maharashtra {Cri. Appeal No.610 of 2012} decided on 25th August, 2021, wherein this Court has elaborately dealt with the competency of the Police Commissioner for according sanction to the post of Assistant Police Inspector. Ultimately it was ruled that since appointment of Assistant Police Inspector is by Director General of Police, he would be the competent authority to accord the sanction.”

To be sure, the Bench then points out in para 9 that, “With the assistance of both sides, I have gone through the relevant papers, particularly the order of promotion of accused to the post of Assistant Police Inspector. The promotion order dated 25th February, 2005 does not bear the signature of Additional Director General of Police, although his name and designation was mentioned. Notably copies of the said order were sent under the signature of Mr. A. K. Sharma, Deputy Inspector General of Police (Administration) on behalf of Director General of Police. Pertinent to note that the accused has also produced his promotion order and communication which discloses that it does not bear signature of Additional Director General of Police, but it was signed on behalf of Director General of Police. Thus, it is evident that the Police Commissioner, who is below the rank of Director General of Police not being appointing authority is not competent to accord the sanction. The trial Court has elaborately dealt the said issue. In view of the above discussion, sanction to the prosecution which is pre-requisite under Section 19(1)(c) of P.C. Act is invalid.”

Most significantly, what constitutes the nucleus of this noteworthy judgment is then encapsulated in para 10 wherein it is postulated that, “It takes me to consider the other aspect of the case which relates to the demand of bribe amount and consequential acceptance. The law is well settled that demand of illegal gratification is the sine quo non for constituting an offence under the P.C. Act. Mere recovery of tainted currency notes is not sufficient to convict the accused when substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The defence is to be tested on the basis of preponderance of probability and certainly not on the criteria of proof beyond all reasonable doubt. The accused is armed with the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. The law on the point of appreciation of evidence in the appeal against acquittal is well settled. In this regard, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent (Origi. Accused) has drawn my attention to the decision of co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of The State of Maharashtra V/s. Srirang Dagaduji Bale {Cri. Appeal No. {2021 ALL MR (Cri) 3652} wherein by referring the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court it is expressed that if two views are possible, the Appellate Court shall not interfere with the acquittal of the trial Court. Moreover unless material on record leads to an escapable conclusion of the guilt of accused, the judgment of acquittal shall not be interfered. Basically the scope of interference may arise, if the conclusions drawn by the trial Court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law.”

It cannot be lost on us that the Bench then enunciates in para 11 that, “The very foundation of the case is peculiar of its own. The complainant has nothing to do in real sense with the purpose for which bribe amount was allegedly paid. In nutshell, it is the prosecution case that in order to secure bail of one Harjindersingh or for softening the stand against arrested accused in the Court, the bribe was demanded. However, the complainant is not concerned with the arrest of accused Harjindersingh. The genesis of the episode is one Ranjit Tagge, who was brother of the arrested accused Harjindersingh. It is the prosecution case that Ranjit met the police frequently in connection with the arrest of his brother on which there was a demand. However, Ranjit whose cause was allegedly canvassed by the complainant in the capacity of friend has not been examined. Moreover, it is difficult to comprehend as to how in absence of Ranjit, the complainant went to police station for paying bribe and then to ACB office for lodging a report.”

It cannot be also glossed over that the Bench then brings out in para 11 that, “The very foundation of the case is peculiar of its own. The complainant has nothing to do in real sense with the purpose for which bribe amount was allegedly paid. In nutshell, it is the prosecution case that in order to secure bail of one Harjindersingh or for softening the stand against arrested accused in the Court, the bribe was demanded. However, the complainant is not concerned with the arrest of accused Harjindersingh. The genesis of the episode is one Ranjit Tagge, who was brother of the arrested accused Harjindersingh. It is the prosecution case that Ranjit met the police frequently in connection with the arrest of his brother on which there was a demand. However, Ranjit whose cause was allegedly canvassed by the complainant in the capacity of friend has not been examined. Moreover, it is difficult to comprehend as to how in absence of Ranjit, the complainant went to police station for paying bribe and then to ACB office for lodging a report.”

It is worth noting that the Bench then states in para 12 that, “As per the complaint (Exhibit – 11), initially the complainant and Ranjit Tagge visited to the MIDC Police Station on 18th February, 2005 and met the accused. Thereafter, both of them visited Andheri Court for the purpose of remand of Harjindersingh. The complainant stated that when he along with Ranjit met the accused on 17th February, 2005, there was alleged illegal demand. However, the FIR does not support the said evidence. The dates of the complainant’s visit to the police station and meeting with the accused are inconsistent. On the other hand, the accused has produced certified copies of police diary to show that, at the relevant time from 18th February, 2005 to 23rd February, 2005 he was not at police station. The complainant’s version is inconsistent with the contains of FIR.”

Most remarkably, the Bench then hastens to add in para 13 that, “On the point of actual demand, the evidence of the complainant and shadow panch witness Sayed is inconsistent. Both of them differently stated about the demand and acceptance of money. It is the complainant’s evidence that at the relevant time, he took tainted currency notes from his left chest pocket and gave to the accused. The currency notes were accepted by the accused in his right hand and kept on the car’s dash board, whilst shadow panch witness Sayed stated that the accused has opened car’s dash board by his left hand and asked the complainant to keep the amount inside. The complainant asked the accused to count the money on which the currency notes were counted. He deposed that the accused accepted currency notes by his left hand and kept in the dash board. Thus, on material aspect also the evidence of both them is inconsistent. Though shadow witness has deposed the minute happenings in detail, for sound reasons, the trial Court has expressed that he is tutored one, therefore, he has successfully described the minute details.

Quite forthrightly, the Bench then holds in para 14 that, “The conjoint reading of the evidence of the complainant and shadow witness coupled with the FIR shows that there are material inconsistencies. The reasonable doubt is created about the initial demand raised by the accused. The learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent (Orgi. Accused) would submit that mere recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to establish the guilt. In this regard, he relied on the decision in the case of i) Suraj Mal V/s. State (Delhi Administration) {(1979) 4 SCC 725}, ii) Panalal Damodar Rathi V/s. State of Maharashtra {(1979) 4 SCC 526}, iii) Laxman s/o. Nanabhau Bangar & Anr. V/s. The State of Maharashtra {2019 ALL MR (Cri) 2523}. Neither police have verified the demand nor recorded conversation of demand. The complainant’s interested words on the said point are not reliable.”

Of course, the Bench then while adding more to it then points out in para 15 that, “Having regard to the inconsistencies of the evidence it becomes difficult to rely unless corroborated by independent circumstances. Particularly the real aggrieved person i.e. Ranjit was not examined nor it is explained as to why the complainant took lead in the issue that too in absence of Ranjit Tagge. The trial Court after considering all these inconsistencies recorded a finding of acquittal giving rise to the double presumption leaning in favour of the accused.”

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 16 that, “The view taken by the trial Court is probable which cannot be said to be illegal or improper or contrary to the provisions of law. The order of acquittal needs no interference, hence, the appeal stands dismissed.”

In conclusion, the Bombay High Court in its wisdom has rightly held that mere recovery of tainted currency is not sufficient for conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act when substantive evidence is not reliable. No doubt, Justice Vinay Joshi has cited relevant case laws to push forward ably what he has held in this leading case. There is certainly no bona fide reason to not agree with what he has held in this notable judgment so eloquently, elegantly and effectively!

The law is well settled that demand of illegal gratification is the sine quo non for constituting an offence under the P.C. Act. Mere recovery of tainted currency notes is not sufficient to convict the accused when substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The defence is to be tested on the basis of preponderance of probability and certainly not on the criteria of proof beyond all reasonable doubt. The accused is armed with the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. The law on the point of appreciation of evidence in the appeal against acquittal is well settled. In this regard, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent (Origi.

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A PLEA IN SUPREME COURT CHALLENGES THE CHANGED NEET-SS 2022 EXAM PATTERN

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The Supreme Court in the case Dr Richa Verma v. National Board of Examination observed the changed examination pattern which would now be comprising of 150 questions from the general i.e., the basic component of the primary feeder broad specialty subject and from all sub- specialty/systems/component of that primary feeder broad specialty subject. A plea filled in the Supreme Court by MD Radiation Oncologists and MD Anaesthesiologists NEET SS 2022 aspirant.

the petitioners have sought issuance of directions to restrain the NBE from excluding / MD Radiotherapy from the eligible feeder specialties for the super specialty course of DM Medical Oncology for NEET SS 2022 and have further sought for restoring the scheme/pattern for the exam further the petitioner deleting the MD Radiation Oncology, against this backdrop.

On 05.10.2021 the Central Government had told the Court that the revised pattern will be implemented only from next year and it may be noted that over the eleventh-hour changes brought to the NEET-SS 2021 pattern after facing the harsh criticism from the Supreme Court.

The petition further states that they will have to compete with candidates who have 100% questions from their postgraduate syllabus/ broad specialty as the new examination scheme is making some candidates write a paper which has no questions from their postgraduate broad specialty.

particularly in favor of MD Medicine in so far as the choice of options is far greater vis-a-vis the choices available to either MD Radiation Oncology or MD Anaesthesia, the pattern is not just a waste of time and effort for all those who have prepared for Critical Care but also grossly biased against few broad specialties and of the other four post-graduate branches there will be no questions from broad specialties.

This is complete waste of time, resources and effort put by the candidates who have been preparing for a super speciality subject for years as it is arbitrarily, illogical, highly partial and unreasonable, while terming the change in pattern, the contentions made by the petitioner.

the new pattern was forcing all the candidates from the broad specialties to write a single paper which will have 100% questions from General Medicine, stated by the petitioner. Furthermore, contending that the erstwhile pattern had a paper with 40% mixed questions from all the broad specialties and 60% questions from Critical Care (i.e., the super-specialty subject) which had ensured a level playing field.

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THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 482 OF THE CRPC CANNOT BE QUASHED MERELY ON THE GROUND THAT NO USEFUL PURPOSE WILL BE SERVED: SUPREME COURT

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The Supreme Court in the case Satish Kumar Jatav vs State of Uttar Pradesh observed that while by prolonging the proceedings of the case, the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed. As when a clear case is made for the offence alleged on the ground that no useful purpose will be served.

under Sections 307, 504, 506 of the IPC and 9 Section 3(10)(15) of the Act, the serious allegations for the offences were made and while considering the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and quashing the criminal proceedings for the aforesaid offences, the High Court ought to have been more cautious and circumspect. on how the order passed by the learned Magistrate summoning the accused was wrong and/or erroneous, has not at all being allowed by the High Court. the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and has quashed the criminal proceedings is deprecated in the manner in which the High Court has disposed of further the High Court has observed in the proceedings of the case that no useful purpose will be served. The aforesaid cannot be a good ground and/or a ground at all to quash the criminal proceedings when a clear case was made out for the offences alleged, appeared while quashing the criminal proceedings by the High Court even for the impugned order passed, the bench overserved while allowing the appeal.

The application under Section 482 Cr.P.C The manner in which the High Court has disposed and quashed the criminal proceedings is not appreciated at all Furthermore the Court has emphasized that the High Court must pass a speaking and reasoned order in such matters. The same has been set aside by the High Court in a most cursory and casual manner.

The allegations made against the accused persons and even on the legality and validity of the order passed by the Magistrate summoning the accused, has not been discussed by the High Court the Court noted.

The appellant contended that there are no reasons whatsoever have been assigned while quashing the criminal proceedings and further the appellant contended that there is no independent application of mind by the High Court. The respondent defended the impugned order, on the other hand before the Apex Court.

the Allahabad High Court quashed the criminal proceedings merely opining that “that no useful purpose shall be served by prolonging the proceedings of the case, while allowing the petition filled by the accused challenging this order and the offences punishable under Sections 307, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(10)(15) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, the accused to face the trial the Magistrate summoned the accused in the present case.

The bench comprising of Justice MR Shah and the justice BV Nagarathna observed and reiterated under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that a High Court must pass a speaking and reasoned order while disposing petitions.

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Nexus between accused’s negligence and victim’s death has to be established under Section 304A IPC: Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court in the case Nanjundappa vs State of Karnataka observed that would not apply to a criminal case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu.

when there is no report of a technical expert to corroborate the prosecution story as The Appellants therefore are entitled to be given the benefit of doubt furthermore It is even more unbelievable that Appellant no. 2 came in contact with the same voltage and managed to get away with a few abrasions.

when such current passed through the Television set, it did not blast and melt the wiring of the entire house and the court further added that it sounds completely preposterous that a telephone wire carried 11KV current without melting on contact.

While evaluating such evidence the jury should bear in mind that inference of guilt should be the only reasonable inference from the facts as In case of circumstantial evidence, there is a risk of jumping to conclusions in haste However the conviction of the accused persons seems wholly unjustified against the weight of the evidence adduced, in the present case. The Court also referred to the case of Syad Akbar Vs. State of Karnataka in which this Court proceeded on the basis that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a criminal case as its applicability in an action for injury by negligence is well known, observed by the court in the present case.

The court noted that there is no eye witness to say conclusively that the Appellants were in fact executing the work at the place alleged and further the court notice that no report or even inspection was conducted by a technical expert to assess the veracity of the averments made by the complainants to suggest that it was due to the alleged acts of the Appellants that the incident took place. the allegations against the Appellants are highly technical in nature, notice by the court on perusing the evidence on record.

On 21th November 2003 at 1.00p.m. the deceased was watching TV in his house. Noticing a sudden sound in the TV, the deceased got up to separate the dish wire, the TV connection wire and the telephone wire, which were entwined together, he felt an electric shock and his right hand was burnt and as a result of this shock he succumbed to death at that point of time it was found that the said incident took place because of the negligent act on the part of the accused, the supervisor (an employee in the telephone department ) and daily wage worker employed by him, as it was found out in the investigation. under Section 304A read with Section 34 IPC was upheld by the Karnataka High Court, the appellant is convicted.

the bench comprising of CJI NV Ramana, Justice Krishna Murari and the justice Hima Kohli observed under Section 304A of Indian Penal Code for causing death by negligence, while acquitting two persons that prosecution has to firstly prove negligence and then establish direct nexus between negligence of the accused and the death of the victim, for bringing home the guilt of the accused.

The Court also referred to the case of Syad Akbar Vs. State of Karnataka in which this Court proceeded on the basis that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a criminal case as its applicability in an action for injury by negligence is well known, observed by the court in the present case.

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AN ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE BODIES CAN ESTABLISH A CAPTIVE POWER PLANT PRIMARILY FOR THEIR OWN USE UNDER THE ELECTRICITY ACT: SUPREME COURT

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The Supreme Court in the case Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd. vs Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission observed that a captive power plant primarily for their own use can be established by an association of corporate bodies.

The requirement would be that the consumption of SBIPL and SBMPL together should not be less than 51% of the power generated. Admittedly, the joint consumption by SBIPL and SBMPL is more than 51% and under the provisions of the said Act, the use of electricity by it would be for captive use only even an association of corporate bodies can establish a power plant. Since SBMPL holds 27.6% of the ownership, the requirement of not less than 26% of shares is fulfilled by SBMPL as SBMPL holds 27.6% equity shares in SBPIL.

The fourth proviso to sub­section (2) of Section 42 of the said Act would also reveal that surcharge would not be leviable in case open access is provided to a person who has established a captive generating plant for carrying the electricity to the destination of his own use and under Section 9 of the said Act, could be an individual or a body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, it is clear that the person will get benefit even an association of corporate bodies can establish a captive power plant it has been seen. The definition of “person” is wide enough to include any company or body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or artificial juridical person it should be primarily for the use of the members of such co­operative society or association is the requirement, the Bench observed while referring to the provisions of the Electricity Act.

The BPIL, the respondent contended and supported the impugned judgment that no permission is required from the Commission for supply of electricity for its own use. Thereafter the appellant Company contended that unless SBPIL consumes 51% of the aggregate electricity generated by it, it will not be entitled to get the benefit under Section 9 of the said Act, in an appeal filled before the Apex Court.

An appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity filed by the Company further The Commission held that SBPIL was entitled to supply electricity to its sister concern SBMPL and the same would qualify to be treating as own consumption and within the ambit of Section 9 read with Section 2(8) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Rule 3 of the Electricity Rules, 2005 SBPIL submitted a petition for providing open access and wheeling of power through the transmission system of the Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd (Company) for captive use by SBMPL to the Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission, the commission. A Captive Generation Plant is established by SBPIL, and is a sister concern of SBPIL Shri Bajrang Power and I spat Ltd and Shri Bajrang Metallics and Power Ltd, SBMPL.

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Where the crime was committed the remission or premature release policy of the state has to be considered: Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court in the case Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, Lala Vakil vs State of Gujarat observed that where the crime was committed has to be considered in the remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State.

While allowing the writ petition the court observed and contended that Once the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat, after the trial been concluded and judgment of conviction came to be passed, all further proceedings have to be 6 considered including remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred and concluded for exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court, as the case may be. The court further stated that under Section 432(7) CrPC the appropriate Government can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments.

the appropriate Government in the ordinary course would be the State of Gujarat. But the case was transferred in exceptional circumstances by this Court for limited purpose for trial and disposal to the neighboring State i.e., the State of Maharashtra by an order dated 06.08.2004. ordinarily, the trial was to be concluded in the same State and in terms of Section 432(7) CrPC as the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed in the State of Gujarat, observed by the Apex Court.

he application for pre­mature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat, as prayed by the petitioner by judgment impugned dated 17.07.2009 As His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra. Thereafter He had filed his petition for pre­mature release under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating that he had undergone more than 15 years 4 months of custody.

The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed and noted that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of the appropriate Government.

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Adopt roster based reservation for preferential candidates as followed by JIPMER: Supreme Court directs all AIIMS institutes

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The Supreme Court in the case Students Association AIIMS Bhopal And Or’s. v. AllMS and Or’s observed and directed all AIIMS Institutes to adopt roster-based reservation followed by Jawaharlal Institute of Postgraduate Medical Education and Research, Pondicherry (JIPMER) as a plea was filled in the Court seeking direction to AIIMS to have a defined criteria for arriving at seat matrix for institutional preference candidates in INI-CET examination.

the order of the Apex Court in the case AIIMS Students’ Union v. AIIMS And Or’s, would not be applicable if It emphasized that if the roster-based system is implemented the actual roster points for AIIMS would be different from JIPMER as the same would depend on the percentage of seats decided to be allocated to the preferential candidates but It stated that the reservation would be similar to the one adopted by JIPMER AIIMS New Delhi was willing to provide a roster-point based reservation for its institutional preference candidates, by way of an affidavit 20th January 2022 the Bench was apprised that pursuant to a meeting held on 28th June 2020 as prescribed the relevancy:

It shall not be too wide with the one for the general category candidate, that the margin of difference between the qualifying marks for the Institute’s candidate.

The one who has secured marks at the common entrance PG test less than the one secured by any other candidate belonging to reserved category enjoying constitutional protection such as SC, ST etc. cannot be the AIMS graduate the last student to qualify for admission.

appearing on behalf of AIIMS, Advocate, Mr. Dushyant Parashar, New Delhi was asked to get instructions from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and Jodhpur so that the Court can pass appropriate orders on the next date of hearing. As that apart from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and AIIMS, Jodhpur, all other AIIMS before the Apex Court has agreed to implement the roster-based reservation system followed by JIPMER Puducherry for their institutional preference candidates, the Court was informed at the last date of hearing.

the petition had been filed seeking direction to AIIMS to disclose how the seats for institutional preference candidates are to be allotted in the view of the same the petitioners claim that in the INI-CET examination conducted in July, 2021, only 4 seats (1.87%) in AIIMS, New Delhi were allotted to institutional preference candidates. Rivetingly, the petitioners note that no seats were allocated to any other AIIMS for admission of institutional preference candidates.

the Bench comprising of Justice L. Nageswara Rao and the justice A.S. Bopanna observed and noted that to record in the order that the roaster system would be applicable from this year. Mr. Parashar informed it that since new software is to be put in place for counselling, it might cause some delay. The bench further stated that the court will order it to apply this year but in case of delay AIMS can come later.

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