Legal obligation in NSA detention cases must be discharged with great sense of responsibility: Orissa HC - The Daily Guardian
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Legal obligation in NSA detention cases must be discharged with great sense of responsibility: Orissa HC

This judgment leaves no room for doubt that the Orissa High Court has taken strong exception to illegal detention of petitioner detenu which is bad in law. It has therefore very rightly quashed the detention order by the state government while giving reasons for the same as stated above. The bottom line also is that the exercise of power of preventive detention has to be exercised with proper circumspection and due care and legal obligation in such cases must be discharged with great sense of responsibility.

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It is quite refreshing, rejuvenating and rejoicing to see that the Orissa High Court has just recently in a latest, landmark, laudable and learned judgment titled Sk. Mabud @ Mamud @ Madud v. State of Odisha & another in W.P. (CRL.) NO. 82 OF 2020 delivered on December 16, 2020 after hearing the case on 11 November, 2020 while quashing the order of preventive detention under the National Security Act (NSA) of one Sk Mabud, the Orissa High Court has rightly, remarkably and reasonably ruled that the legal obligations in cases related to Detention under National Security Act needs to be discharged with great sense of responsibility. The Bench of Justice SK Panigrahi and Justice Sanju Panda of Orissa High Court minced no words to say it clearly, convincingly and cogently that, “The exercise of that power of preventive detention must be with proper circumspection and due care. In a regime of constitutional governance, it requires the understanding between those who exercise power and the people over whom or in respect of whom such power is exercised.” Very rightly so!

To start with, this notable judgment authored by Justice SK Panigrahi for himself and Justice Sanju Panda sets the ball rolling by first and foremost observing in para 1 that, “The present Criminal Writ Petition has been filed by the petitioner invoking Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of detention dated 12.02.2020 passed by the District Magistrate, Balasore under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980.”

While elaborating on the facts of the case, the Bench then states in para 2 that, “Brief facts of the case are stated hereunder so as to appreciate the rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties:

(a) The petitioner was under judicial custody in the District Headquarters Jail Balasore in connection to P.S. Case No.319 dated 17.10.2019 held under Section 395 of IPC and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act. The Superintendent of Police, Balasore in his letter No.7586/1B dated 26.12.2019 addressing the District Magistrate appealed for the detention of the petitioner under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act. He contended that the present petitioner has been indulging in antisocial activities prejudicial to public order in town, Sahadevkhunta, Sadar, Industrial PS’s areas and throughout the district of Balasore and also bordering area of West Bengal since 2013. He further emphasized that the petitioner does not have any ostensible means of livelihood and only depends upon extortion, robbery and other criminal activities. Further, he contended that the people in the abovementioned regions are in a state of constant fear due to the continuous atrocious activities of this petitioner who is a dreaded criminal. The Superintendent of Police has then attached a list of 20 cases, while detailing those he has mentioned that out of 14 cognizable cases, 8 cases have been charge sheeted and the rest 6 are under investigation and will be chargesheeted soon.

(b) Acknowledging the Letter No.7586/1B, District Magistrate, Balasore ordered for detention of the petitioner on 12.02.2020 and consequently provided the grounds of detention to the petitioner on 16.02.2020. The District Magistrate has stated that there is every possibility that his release on bail will lead to the probabilities of his indulgence in more and more criminal activities. He has further stated that upon thorough perusal of materials of criminal cases registered against him, it is clear that the petitioner is a die-hard anti-social and criminal who has scanty regard for the law of the land. Hence, his detention under Section 3(2) of the NSA Act is necessary in the interest of the maintenance of public peace as well as upholding public order in the locality.

(c) The aforesaid order of detention was approved by the State Government on 20.02.2020 and subsequently based on the report of the Advisory Board, the same was confirmed on 06.04.2020 for a period of three months. Thereafter the period of detention has been extended on 06.05.2020 and 30.07.2020 pursuant to which the petitioner continues to be in detention.”

To be sure, the Bench then while stating the petitioner’s version states in para 3 that, “Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the detaining authority while presenting the report against the detenue has not disclosed the basic facts, material particulars which led to passing an order of detention. It has further not been disclosed that what is the basis and circumstances which led the District Magistrate to come to a conclusion that the detenue is terrorizing the innocent general public. Further, he has contended that the order of detention was passed on 12.02.2020 whereas the grounds of detention was served on 16.02.2020 which indicates that the order of detention was passed without considering the materials on record. It is therefore sufficient to activise this Court into examining the legality of detention.”

Going forward, it is then also noted in para 4 that, “He has further contended that the Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate have relied on stale cases as the detenue has been acquitted in quite a few of them, the same has not been brought on record. Moreover, the cases relied upon by the detaining authority are cases affecting individuals and none of them in any manner affects the tempo of life. It has also been contended that there were no particulars for the detenue to make his representation and the details for the same was also not provided. Therefore, the information being incomplete and misleading does not satisfy the requirements of law. This Court has consistently shown great anxiety for personal liberty and refused to throw out a petition merely on the ground that it does not disclose a prima facie case invalidating the order of detention. The detaining authority ought to have produced contemporaneous evidence to show that the authority had applied its mind to arrive at subjective satisfaction regarding such detention.”

Quite remarkably, after hearing both the parties, the Bench then most laudably goes on to point out in para 8 that, “Preventive detention is not to punish a person for something he has done but to prevent him from doing it. Therefore, since the detention order passed on the allegation of involvement of the detenu in a number of criminal cases without disclosing any material in the report of the Superintendent of Police or materials available before the Detaining Authority that there is likelihood of breach of public order, the detention order cannot be sustained. The detaining authority at the time of passing the order of detention as well as the State Government while confirming the same should take into consideration the nature of allegations and offences alleged in the grounds of detention to examine whether the same relates to ‘public order’ and the normal law cannot take care of such offences and that the acts of the detenu mentioned in the grounds of detention are prejudicial to maintenance of public order or they only relate to “law and order”. While interpreting the provisions this Court has pointed out in a number of cases that this Court rigidly insist that preventive detention procedure should be fair and strictly observed. The detaining authorities should exercise the privileges sparingly and “in those cases only where there is full satisfaction”.”

While citing the relevant case laws, the Bench then aptly observes in para 9 that, “The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Yumman Ongbi Lembi Liema Vs. State of Manipur 2012 (1) OLR (SC) 550, referring to the earlier decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Haradhan Saha Vs. State of West Bengal (1975) 3 SCC 198, held that the extraordinary powers of detaining an individual in contravention of the provisions of Article 22(2) of the Constitution where the grounds of detention do not disclose any material which was before the detaining authority other than the fact that there is every likelihood of the detenu being released on bail in connection with the cases in respect of which he had been arrested to support the order of detention. It is also held that preventive detention is not to punish a person for something he has done but to prevent him from doing it. Only on the apprehension of the detaining authority that after being released on bail, the petitioner-detenu will indulge in similar activities, which will be prejudicial to public order, order under the Act should not ordinarily be passed.”

While continuing further in a similar vein, the Bench then observes in para 10 that, “The Supreme Court in Alpesh Navinchandra Shah v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 2 SCC 777; State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande (2008) 3 SCC 613; and Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu (2011) 5 SCC 244, wherein the detention orders were set aside on the ground that the purpose for issuance of a detention order is to prevent the detenu from continuing his prejudicial activities for a period of one year, but not to punish him for something done in the remote past. Further, there would have to be a nexus between the detention order and the alleged offence in respect of which he was to be detained and in absence of a live link between the two, the detention order could not be defended.”

While slamming the shoddy approach of the detaining authority, the Bench did not refrain itself from observing in para 11 that, “The Detaining Authority did not apply its mind before passing the order of detention so as to take the present petitioner to be a dangerous person and that he has become a threat to the public order and on overall consideration of the facts and circumstances it does appear that the Detaining Authority has failed to strike a balance between the Constitutional and the legal obligation charged upon him before passing the detention order and the manner in which the power of detention has been exercised in this case. It does not appear to have been exercised rationally. In fact, the District Magistrate has relied on a list of 20 cases provided by the Superintendent of Police while ordering for detention. However, he has not taken into consideration that out of the 14 cognizable cases, there are 6 cases which have not yet been charge-sheeted yet including the one in which the SP is apprehensive that the petitioner may receive bail. Moreover, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that out of the 20 cases, there are a few cases where the petitioner has been acquitted, which has not been brought on record by the SP. Further, the District Magistrate has failed to establish a proper nexus between alleged offence and order of detention under the grounds of detention.”

Significantly, the Bench then waxes eloquent to observe in para 12 that, “In Yumman Ongbi Lembi Leima v. State of Manipur and Ors. (2012) 2 SCC 176, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that-

“Para 15. …personal liberty of an individual is the most precious and prized right guaranteed under the Constitution in Part III thereof. The State has been granted the power to curb such rights under criminal laws as also under the laws of preventive detention, which, therefore, are required to be exercised with due caution as well as upon a proper appreciation of the facts as to whether such acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the security of the State and its citizens, or seek to disturb public law and order, warranting the issuance of such an order.””

No less significant is what is then stated in para 13 that, “The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh Vs. State of Manipur (2012) 7 SCC 181, held that three cumulative and additive nature of requirements are to be satisfied to pass the order of detention; they are:

“Para 9.(i) The authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was actually in custody;

(ii) There was reliable material before the said authority on the basis of which it could have reason to believe that there was real possibility of his release on bail and being released he would probably indulge in activities, which are prejudicial to public order;

(iii) Necessity to prevent him for which detention order was required.”

In Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu through Secretary to Govt. and Anr. (2011) 5 SCC 244, where the Supreme Court quashed the order of detention, while dealing with the issue held:

“Para 8. A perusal of the above statement in para 4 of the grounds of detention shows that no details have been given about the alleged similar cases in which bail was allegedly granted by the concerned court. Neither the date of the alleged bail orders has been mentioned therein, nor the bail application number, nor whether the bail orders were passed in respect of the co-accused on the same case, nor whether the bail orders were passed in respect of other co-accused in cases on the same footing as the case of the accused.”

Most significantly, the Bench then says with clarity, confidence and cogently in para 14 that, “Preventive detention is an exception to the normal procedure and is sanctioned and authorized for very limited purpose under Article 22(3)(b) with good deal of safeguards. The exercise of that power of preventive detention must be with proper circumspection and due care. In a regime of constitutional governance, it requires the understanding between those who exercise power and the people over whom or in respect of whom such power is exercised. The legal obligation in this type of case, need to be discharged with great sense of responsibility even if the satisfaction to be derived is a subjective satisfaction such subjective satisfaction has to be based on objective facts. If the objective facts are missing for the purpose of coming to subjective satisfaction, in absence of objective facts the satisfaction leading to an order without due and proper application of mind will render the order unsustainable. In view of the above legal position, this Court has expected from the detaining authority that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority should be based on objective facts.”

In the context of this case, the Bench then holds in para 15 that, “Similarly, in the instant case, the details of the alleged bail application have not been provided in the order of detention, ground of detention or in the application of the Superintendent of Police, Balasore. Further, no details have been given about the alleged similar cases in which bail was allegedly granted by the concerned Court. The only mention regarding bail is in the letter dated 26.12.2019 by the Superintendent of Police, Balasore wherein he had reported that it has come to his knowledge that the petitioner has arranged for his bail. However, this statement is entirely ambiguous and this Court cannot rely on the same. Considering the above submissions, we are of the view that this Court should not allow the petitioner detenue to be kept in custody on the basis of order of detention which is illegal, bad in law hence amounts to illegal custody of the petitioner detenue.”

Finally, it is then held in the last para 16 that, “In view of what is discussed hereinabove, this Writ Petition deserves to be allowed and accordingly it is allowed. Consequently, the order of detention approved by the State Government on 20.02.2020 is quashed. However, we make it clear that this will not affect the criminal cases pending against the petitioner.”

In a nutshell, this leading judgment leaves no room for doubt that the Orissa High Court has taken strong exception to illegal detention of petitioner detenu which is bad in law. It has therefore very rightly quashed the detention order by the State Government while giving reasons for the same as stated above. The bottomline also is that the exercise of power of preventive detention has to be exercised with proper circumspection and due care and legal obligation in such cases must be discharged with great sense of responsibility. There can certainly be no denying or disputing it!

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GAUHATI HIGH COURT QUASHES NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION AGAINST GRAM PANCHAYAT PRESIDENT CITING PARTICIPATION OF MEMBER DISQUALIFIED FOR HAVING THREE CHILDREN

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The Gauhati High Court in the case Jugitawali Pawe v State of Assam and 15 ors observed and quashed a resolution expressing no-confidence in the petitioner – the President of a Gram Panchayat, as a result of which she as removed from office. It was stated that it is as per the citing no compliance with Assam Panchayat Act, 1994, reading with Rule 62 of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995.

It was preferred by the petitioner to the materials available on record to argue that one of the members of the Gaon Panchayat, the respondent. The respondent voted against the petitioner and had given birth to her third child the previous year. Moreover, by virtue of Section 111(2)(a) of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994, reading with Rule 62 of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995, the petitioner stood automatically disqualified on the date of voting. Following, which her vote was taken by passing No-confidence motion.

It was prayed by the petitioner in the plea for setting aside the impugned resolution and for issuance of a direction to restore his client back in the office. Thereafter, to initiate fresh proceedings, liberty should be granted to the respondent, following the due process.

It was agreed by the Counsel representing for the respondent that the said member of the panchayat had been disqualified but retained on the ground that the disqualification would have no bearing on the petitioner’s case, as the impugned resolution was passed before the declaration of petitioner disqualification.

In the present case, It was noticed by Justice Suman Shyam the member had voted against the petitioner and without her vote. The petitioner would not have been ousted from office. Justice Shyam also found no dispute about the fact that the member had incurred disqualification under the law prior the date of adoption of the impugned resolution. Justice Shyam found it unnecessary to delve into other aspects of the matter which includes the procedural formalities for declaring the member a disqualified candidate.

It is observed that the impugned resolution was declared to be vitiated and liable to be set aside. Further, the Court restored the petitioner to the office of the President of the Bongalmara Gaon Panchayat with immediate effect and it was stated by the court that the order will not stand in the way should the authorities or any member of the Gaon Panchayat propose a fresh motion of “no-confidence” against the petitioner and the due process of law needs to be followed.

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Halt DDA’s demolition action against jhuggis in Nizamuddin’s Gyaspur area, orders Delhi High Court

As per the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015 and the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board, the residents who can establish their residence prior to 01.01.2015 are eligible for rehabilitation under the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015.

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plea in Delhi High Court seeking repatriation of 56 pregnant nurses

The Delhi High Court in the case Manoj Gupta & Ors. v. DDA & Ors observed and has ordered status quo on the Delhi Development Authority’s proposal to demolish jhuggi clusters in city’s Gyaspur area in Hazrat Nizamuddin. The vacation bench comprising of Justice Neena Bansal Krishna observed in the petition filled by the residents and the court granted an interim relief.

It was ordered by the court status quo till July 11, the next date of hearing.

The bench orally remarked that a ten-day delay in demolition won’t make a difference but if today it is demolished and later, we come to know that they were entitled, who’s going to… the bench will consider it on July 11, 2022 but in the Meanwhile, some protections are entitled them. Adding this, Status quo be maintained. If since 1995, they have been there, heavens won’t come down if for 10 more days they are protected.

In the plea the petitioner stated that the T-Huts settlement in the area, which was stated by the authorities to vacate. It has been in existence for almost two decades and compromise of 32 jhuggis or households.

In the plea it was alleged that the bulldozers have been parked around the camp and a DDA official has orally asked them to vacate the area and it is noted that till date no proper notice have been sent to them nor has DDA conducted any survey of the area.

Furthermore, the DDA did not provide any alternate arrangement for their rehabilitation which resulted in extreme distress among the residents.

Moreover, it was admitted by the petitioner that the land in question belongs to DDA and they may seek that status-quo to be maintained at the site. It was urged that the residents should not be physically dispose or evicted from the demolition site until the survey is conducted and rehabilitation is provided to the residents as per the DUSIB policy of 2015.

As per the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015 and the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board. The residents who can establish their residence prior to 01.01.2015 are eligible for rehabilitation under the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015.

It is observed that in the case Ajay Maken v. Union of India, Reliance is placed on the Supreme Court decision and the High Court decision in the case Sudama Singh & Ors. v. Government of Delhi & Anr, it was held in the case that that removal of jhuggis without ensuring relocation would amount of gross violation of Fundamental Rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Further, it was held that the agencies conducting the demolitions ought to conduct survey before undertaking any demolition.

It is submitted that these observations would apply across the board, in the entire NCT of Delhi.

Advocates Vrinda Bhandari, Shiyaz Razaq, Kaoliangpou Kamei, Jepi Y Chisho and Paul Kumar Kalai, represented the petitioner.

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TELANGANA HIGH COURT: PLACE OF RESIDENCE OF THE ARBITRATOR WOULD NOT BE THE SEAT OF ARBITRATION

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The High Court of Telangana in the case M/s S. Square Infra v. Garneni Chalapathi Rao observed and held that the place of residence of the arbitrator would not determine the seat of arbitration.

The Single bench comprising of Justice P. Sree Sudha observed and held that merely because an arbitrator residing in Hyderabad has been appointed, it does not mean that only the Courts at Hyderabad would have the jurisdiction to decide all the matters arising out of arbitration agreement.

Facts of the Case:

In the present case, after the dispute arouse between the parties, the respondent sent a letter to the petitioner for nomination an arbitrator who is residing in Hyderabad. To its said notice, petitioner replied and declined the appointment of the arbitrator for the reason that there was no dispute which required the appointment of an arbitrator.

A suit was filled by the respondent before the VII Additional District Judge Sangareddy, seeking for relief of permanent injunction. An application was filled by the petitioner under Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act and the parties referred to the arbitration.

An application was filled by the respondent under section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act before the Principal District Judge, Sangareddy, Subsequently, an application was filled by the petitioner for transferring the application from the Court at Sangareddy to Court at Hyderabad.

Contentions made by Parties:

On the following grounds, the petitioner sought the transfer of application.

An arbitrator residing in Hyderabad was nominated to respondent. However, only the courts in Hyderabad would have the jurisdiction to decide all the matters arising out of the arbitration.

It was stated that the nomination of an arbitrator residing in Hyderabad amounted to designating Hyderabad as the Seat of Arbitration.

On the following grounds, the respondent countered the submissions of the petitioner:

An application was filled by the petitioner under Section 8 of the A&C Act before the Court at Sangareddy. However, in terms of Section 42 of the A&C Act, only the court at Sangareddy would have the jurisdiction to decide all the matters arising out of arbitration.

Court Analysis:

The Court held that the seat of arbitration would not be decide by the place of residence of the arbitrator.

The argument of the petitioner was rejected by the court that since the respondent had initially nominated an arbitrator residing in Hyderabad, the Hyderabad Court would have the jurisdiction.

The court stated that merely because a party has nominated an arbitrator who resides in Hyderabad, the same would not designate Hyderabad as the Seat of arbitration in absence of any designation of the seat under the arbitration agreement.

It was further stated by the court that the application filled by the petitioner filled under Section 8 application before the Court at Sangareddy consequent to which the parties were referred to arbitration. Therefore, the Court would have the jurisdiction, in terms of Section 42 of the A&C Act.

The Transfer petition was dismissed by the Court.

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DELHI HIGH COURT REMANDS IN THE MATTER BACK TO ASSESSING OFFICER AFTER SETTING ASIDE: JUST 3 DAYS’ TIME GRANTED TO RESPOND TO THE INCOME TAX NOTICE

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plea in Delhi High Court seeking repatriation of 56 pregnant nurses

The Delhi High Court in the case Shubham Thakral Vs ITO, the Delhi bench comprising of Justice Manmohan and Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora observed and remanded the matter back to the assessing officer as just 3 days’ time was granted to respond to the income tax notice.

In the present case, the petitioner/assessee assailed the notice under Section 148A (b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the order passed under Section 148A (d) for the Assessment Year 2018–19.

It was contended by the assessee that only three days’ time was granted to the assessee to respond, as against the mandatory statutory period of at least seven days. However, despite of the fact that the annexure attached to the notice gave the petitioner eight days to respond, the e-filing submission portal was closed earlier, in violation of Section 148A (b) of the Income Tax Act.

Furthermore, the petitioner relied on the decision of Delhi High Court, in the case of Shri Sai Co-operative Thrift and Credit Society Ltd versus ITO, the Delhi High Court in the case held that under Section 148A (b), a minimum time of seven days has to be granted to the assessee to file its reply to the show cause notice.

No objections were raised by the department/respondent to the matter being returned to the Assessing Officer for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. Accordingly, the court set aside the order passed under Section 148A (d) for the Assessment Year 2018-19. The Assessing officer was directed by the court to pass a fresh reasoned order in accordance with the law after considering the reply of the petitioner, which was directed to be filed within a week.

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ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT: ADVOCATES SHOULDN’T ADVISE CLIENTS TO REAGITATE MATTERS IF THERE IS NO ERROR APPARENT ON FACE OF RECORD

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The Allahabad High Court in the case Malhan and 17 Others Vs. State Of U.P. And Another observed and stated that an advocate should be given such a piece of advice when there is no error apparent on the face of the record nor was there any reason why the matter be re-agitated it was finally decided.

The bench comprising of Justice Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker and Justice Vivek Varma observed while dealing with the civil review application wherein the bench observed the concerned advised his client to make a chance by filling the instant review application after a period of six year.

In the present case, a civil review petition was filled along with the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963., the application was filled for seeking condonation of delay in filling the application, the application was filled with a delay of six years i.e., 1900 days.

It was stated by the applicant that the review application could not be filled due to the blockage of public transportation on account of the COVID-19 guidelines.

Moreover, the court observed that the appeals were disposed of by the Apex Court in the year 2016 and only in 2020-2021, the pandemic struck India and furthermore, it cannot be said that due to the COVID guidelines the public transportation was blocked and however, the applicant could not come to Allahabad Court to file review.

Further, it was stated that the court asked the counsel for the review applicants to explain the delay in filling the review application, to which the council gave a strange reply that the counsel had advised the clients that they must take a chance by filling this review application after a period of six years.

Following this, the Court observed:

The court noted that an advocate should not give such an advice when there is no error apparent on the face of record nor was there any other reason that when the matter was finally decided, why the matter be re-agitated.

It was stated that the court has no reason to condone the delay of six years as the same was not explained as to why this review application is filed after such an inordinate delay.

The Court opined that the lapse in approaching the court within the time is understandable but a total inaction for long period of delay without any explanation whatsoever and that too in absence of showing any sincere attempt on the part of suiter, this would add to his negligence and the relevant factor going against him.

The court observed that careless and reckless is shown by the review applicant in approaching the court and due to the condemnation of delay in the application with a token cost of Rs.10,000/, the court dismissed the application.

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SUPREME COURT CRITICISES HIGH COURT: POSTING ANTICIPATORY BAIL PLEA AFTER TWO MONTHS CAN’T BE APPRECIATED

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The Supreme Court in the case Sanjay versus The State (NCT of Delhi) & ANR observed and stated that in the case where personal liberty is involved, the court is expected to pass orders at the earliest while taking into account the merits of the matter in one way or other. Further, the top court observed that posting of an application for anticipatory bail after a couple of months cannot be appreciated by the court.

The bench comprising of Justice C. T. Ravikumar and the Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia was hearing a June 2 SLP against the Delhi High Court in a petition filed under section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for seeking anticipatory bail in a 2022 FIR, a notice is issued. It was stated that the learned APP for the state is present and accepts the notice and seeks time to file status report. The High Court in the impugned order stated that Let the status report be filed by the state prior to the next date with an advance copy to the learned counsel for the petitioner. The matter is to be list on 31.08.2022.

It was noted by the bench comprising of Justice Ravikumar and the Justice Dhulia that in the captioned Special Leave Petition, the grievance of the petitioner is that the application for anticipatory bail moved by the petitioner, being Crl. M.A. No. 11480 of 2022 in Bail Application No. 1751 of 2022 without granting any interim protection, was posted to 31.08.2022. on 24.05.2022, the bail application was moved on.

However, the bench asserted that the bench is of the considered view that in a matter involving personal liberty, the Court is expected to to pass orders at the earliest while taking into account the merits of the matter in one way or other.

It was declared by the bench that at any rate posting an application for anticipatory bail after a couple of months cannot be appreciated by the court.

Further, the bench requested to the High Court to dispose off the application for anticipatory bail on its own merits and in accordance with law expeditiously, preferably within a period of three weeks after reopening of the Court. Adding to it, the bench stated that if the main application could not be disposed off, for any reason, within the stipulated time, relief sought for in the interlocutory and on and on its own merits, the application shall be considered.

While disposing of the SLP, the bench directed in its order that we grant interim protection from arrest to the petitioner herein, Till such time.

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