While the unexpected and untimely war between Russia and Ukraine is full-blown, the one issue which has not been discussed much in the domain of academic as well as policy-making circles is its impact on the post-Soviet space, particularly in the context of Central Asia. This issue is assuming much importance because of two paradoxical hypothetical questions. These are a) Whether taking a cue from Ukraine, the Central Asian countries will move away from Russia? b) How far China taking advantage of the weakening position of Russia in Central Asia, especially due to international sanctions and because of the ongoing war with Ukraine, will gain a stronger foothold in this region?
In this regard, it is pertinent to mention here that since the ouster of the Ashraf Ghani government in Afghanistan, after the Taliban takeover, the Central Asian countries are facing the growing threat of insecurity from the Taliban. At the same time, the recent violent incident that occurred in January 2022 in Kazakhstan has also raised questions about the political stability of Kazakhstan. Though this incident subsequently forced Russia to intervene in Kazakhstan to quell the violence on behalf of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Both these developments raised many questions regarding the nature of geopolitical realignment in Central Asia. The present geopolitical developments in the post-Soviet Eurasia is a reminder of a statement made by President Vladimir Putin in 2005 when the post-Soviet space was reeling under a spate of Colour Revolutions followed by West sponsored regime changes in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. This promoted Putin to underline that “We should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century”. If one read the statement carefully and look at the Russia-Ukraine war one pertinent question arises here is President Putin is in a process to start the reintegration of the post-Soviet space? President Putin initiated this process when the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) came up in 2015 just after the accession of Crimea into Russia in 2014. Similarly, in August 2014 President Putin created a geopolitical flutter in the post-Soviet space which send a strong signal for the reintegration of the post-Soviet space when he stated that “ The Kazakhs never had a state of their own, and he [ Noorsultan Nazarbayev ] created it. In this sense, he is a unique person on the post-Soviet space and in Kazakhstan”. This statement has also generated a lot of resentment in Kazakhstan as reported in the press in the form of hurting Kazakh national consciousness and this also frightened many in Kazakhstan whether “Russia will take over Kazakhstan after Nazarbayev”?This resentment in Kazakhstan one can understand because it shares a long and open border with Russia and there is a competing claim by both the countries over the legacy of Eurasianism along with the presence of sizable Slavic population especially in the Western part of Kazakhstan.
President Putin to strengthen the reintegration process in the post-Soviet space also outlined a doctrine called “ Greater Eurasia” in 2016 at the Plenary session of St Petersburg International Economic Forum. In that Forum he highlighted the importance of this project by stating “We are deepening our integration gradually, … and are forming a common service market incrementally. Common energy, oil and gas and financial markets will emerge by 2025.” Using this strategic logic what President Putin called “geopolitical tension” he emphasized greater cooperation in the Post-Soviet space.
In fact, in the post 2016 phase, Russia tried to expand its greater influence in Central Asia both in the geopolitical and geo-economic spheres. In this regard, Russia did its best to cultivate friendship with the new generation of leaders whether it is in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan. For instance, the Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov soon after assuming office visited Russia. Russia signed several treaties and agreements aiming at reconnecting with Central Asia. However, it is a fact that Russia despite its proactive policy of engaging with Central Asia failed to checkmate Chinese expansionism in Central Asia. One may recall here that the sanctions on Russia by the West after 2014 has also to a significant extent forced Russia to mend its ties with China.
Nevertheless, in the domain of security spheres , Russia maintained its preponderance in the space of Central Asia despite geopolitical realignment. The Afghanistan security situation put the Central Asian countries with a tender hook and increased their growing dependency on Russia. This can be evident from the spurt of military exercises Russia conducted with Central Asian countries including with reluctant Uzbekistan. In July 2021 just one month before the Taliban takeover of power in Afghanistan both Russia and Uzbekistan conducted joint military exercises. So also, under the aegis of CSTO Russia stationed its troops both in Tajikistan 201 motorised division) along with airbase in Kyrgyzstan. In addition to this, Turkmenistan which used to maintain a policy of “positive neutrality” since 1995 also to a greater extent has abandoned that policy and Ashgabat signed a “ Joint Security agreement” with Moscow in October 2020. Similarly with Kazakhstan also Russia has signed a comprehensive security agreement in 2021 .
Some of the above developments highlight the fact that Russia is trying to regain its lost space in Central Asia considered to be its “ soft underbelly”. This is even though China is establishing its hegemony in the Central Asian space taking advantage of the relative weakness of Russia in the so-called “heartland”.
As has been reported in the press, there is muted response from both the Central Asian government and civil society to Russia’s war with Ukraine. In this regard, it is pertinent to underline here that Central Asian political leaders are also fearing the implications of the Russia- Ukraine war in Central Asia. At the United Nations General Assembly on 2 March the Central Asian countries abstained from voting against the resolution condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine as reported. This demonstrates that the Central Asian countries have not given up their proclivity towards Russia as reported in Moscow Times dated 17 March 2022. At the societal level, however, both in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, where the traditions of Civil society, are much stronger than other Central Asian countries) as highlighted in the above newspaper report there are some kinds of murmured protests against both Russian and Ukrainian moves.
Another trend that is being reported in newspapers is that many Central Asians particularly (Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz) are being recruited to fight for the Russian army in the war against Ukraine as reported in the above-mentioned news paper. In this regard, it may be mentioned that the Central Asian economy will also suffer as a consequence in terms of remittance if the Russia-Ukraine war prolongs and if there will be an economic sanction on Russia. As per a study by Bank of Russia and World Bank in 2020, the remittance constitutes around “26. 67 per cent of GDP in Tajikistan, 31.3 per cent of Kyrgyzstan and 11. 6 per cent of Uzbekistan”. This demonstrates the importance of Russian economy to the Central Asian countries. In this regard, it may be underlined here that these figures are official only. Unofficially, as reported the Central Asian labour force sent a huge amount of money through unofficial routes. If there will be a stoppage in terms of transfer of remittance then it will put an adversarial impact on the economies of the above three countries.
Along with economic fallout what Central Asian countries will face immensely will be the societal consequences. For instance, there will be a rise in unemployment along with the proliferation of religious extremist and terrorist groups in Central Asia. It is a well-known fact that over the years some of these radicalised religious extremist groups in Central Asia like the Islamic State of Khorasan Province(ISKP) , Hizbut Tahrir, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jehad Union are posing a strong security threat to Central Asia . The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan is also having a repercussion on the security situation of Central Asia particularly in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. However, both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are also facing the heat from the Afghan security situation in recent years. Even in the January 2022 riot in Kazakhstan as reported in the press the radical Islamist groups like the Islamic Jehad Union played a prominent role in mobilizing the common people by playing religious card. In this context, the decline in socio-economic conditions of the common people along with the rise of radicalism will aggravate the non-traditional security threat to Central Asia.
The unstable socio-economic situation along with the weakening of Russian position in Central Asia will going to give China an advantageous position in Central Asia. Since China has a closer nexus with both Taliban of Afghanistan and Pakistan,( known for patrionizing religious radicals and terrorist groups) because of this reason, there is also going to be a greater danger of proliferation of religious radicalism, extremism and terrorism in Central Asia. It is in this context; Russia should be careful about China’s move in Central Asia. This is because Beijing is more interested to bring the five Central Asian stans under its sphere of influence by ousting Moscow from this region.
It is in this context there is a need for Russia to seek India’s support in Central Asia to balance China. Greater cooperation between India and Russia is the need of the hour to bring peace and stability in Central Asia.
To sum up, the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war is going to have a deeper impact in Central Asia. This is an undeniable fact that historically Central Asian geopolitical space is closely tied with Russia’s geopolitical imagination However, with the changing geopolitical reality, especially after the Russia-Ukraine war and following the imposition of sanctions it will be a difficult journey for Russia in this geopolitical space. The only option left before Russia is to enter into a dialogue with Ukraine to restore peace and stability in the Slavic geocultural space of the post-Soviet Eurasia.
The author teaches at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Views are personal.