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Dying Declaration Recorded By Police Officer Is Admissible: Allahabad HC

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It must be stated right at the outset that the Allahabad High Court as recently as on January 6, 2022 in a recent, remarkable, robust and rational judgment titled Prem Nath Yadava & Another vs State of UP in Criminal Appeal No. 1114 of 2015 upheld the life sentence of a convict in a murder case that dates back to the year 2002 while stressing that there is no prohibition that the police personnel should not record dying declaration and that such a dying declaration is also admissible in evidence. The Bench of Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Vikas Budhwar further noted that there might be certain defects in the investigation so conducted by the Investigating Officer, but the same cannot ipso facto be a ground to hold that the appellants are not guilty, as there exists ocular and documentary evidence, which proves that the appellants have committed the murder of the deceased. To put it differently, so it can be safely inferred that dying declaration recorded by a police officer is admissible in evidence if it inspires confidence.

To start with, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Justice Vikas Budhwar for a Bench of Allahabad High Court comprising of Justice Ramesh Sinha and himself puts forth in para 1 that, “This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 11.09.2015 passed by Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge Gangster Court No. 5 Sultanpur, in Gangster Case No. 379 of 2012 (State Vs. Prem Nath and Another) arising out of case crime no. 157/2002, u/s 302/34, 504, 506 IPC, and Section 3(1) of the U.P. Gangster & Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act 1986, P.S. Kotwali Dehat, District Sultanpur whereby the appellants have been convicted u/ s 302 of IPC for life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of fine one year additional imprisonment, u/s 506 IPC for 2 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- each and in default of fine one month additional imprisonment.”

While elaborating on the facts of the case, the Bench then envisages in para 2 that, “The brief facts of the case is worded in the present appeal are that the FIR was registered on 15.02.2002 at 08:10 a.m. on the basis of the information provided by the complainant Sri Haivat Ram Yadav S/o Ramaudaan alleging that on 15.02.2002 at 7 O’ clock in the morning Sri Haivat Ram along with his brother Latheru Ram had gone to the field to answer the nature’s call and when they reached the garden/field then besides the tree the appellants who are two in number being Prem Nath Yadav S/o Mahaveer Yadav and Sanjay Yadav S/o Ram Niwas were hiding who are resident of the same village where the complainant is residing. On account of old rivalry, they suddenly came out from the place where they were hiding behind the tree and hurled abuses and threatened to kill the complainant and his brother Latheru Ram S/o Ramaudaan Yadav and thereafter, they took out their country made pistol and with the intention of killing the complainant and his brother fired on account whereof the complainant lie down on the surface but the brother of the complainant being Latheru Ram sustained bullet injuries on his stomach as well as left hand and thereafter he became totally unconscious and fell down. Witnessing the said incident, the complainant started screaming for help and on that point of time Sher Bahadur S/o Bhagirathi and one Sri Mahendra Pratap S/o Ram Bahore who were coming on motorcycle came there and by that time the villagers also came at the place of occurrence and thereafter, both the accused had ran away from there while waving country made pistol in air hurling abuses and threatening to kill all of them.”

Needless to say, the Bench then states in para 3 that, “Consequent to the same, FIR was lodged being case crime no. 157/2002, u/s 504, 506, 307 IPC against the appellants in P.S. Kotwali Dehat, District Sultanpur.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then enunciates in para 4 that, “As per the records, it reveals that the time of the incident was somewhere at 7 O’ clock in the morning on 15.02.2002 and thereafter, the informant brought the deceased who was in injured condition, in his house whereat number of villagers got assembled and he waited 20-25 minutes for the police to come, however, as nobody has come, so the complainant accompanied the victim and proceeded for the police station at 07:30 in the morning in a jeep and the distance of the police station from the house of the complainant/victim was 8 kms. Thereafter, the FIR was lodged and the criminal case as referred to above was registered. It has also come on record that the victim/deceased was put to medical examination on the same day i.e. 15.02.2002 at 09:20 a.m. in the police station itself wherein the Blood Pressure was found to be not recordable, pulse found not palpable and the cause of injury was found to be fire arm injury, serious in nature. Therefore, the deceased was sent to District Hospital at Sultanpur as his condition was quite critical wherein he succumbed to the armed injuries at 09:45 a.m. As the victim died so section 302 of the IPC was also added and during the course of the investigation however, Section 3(1) of the U.P. Gangsters and AntiSocial Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 was also put to motion. S.I. Indra Prakash Singh was handed over the investigation. During the course of investigation he recorded the statement of the witness, prepared the site plans and also recorded the statement of the deceased and also got recorded the victim’s dying declaration. After the death of the victim, the inquest report was prepared and all the formalities relating to postmortem also conducted.”

As it turned out, the Bench then points out in para 5 that, “After concluding the investigation, the investigating officer submitted a charge sheet against the accused Prem Nath Yadav and Sanjay Yadav being the appellants. The file of the appellants was committed to the court of Session being Gangster Case No. 379 of 2012 arising out of case crime no. 157 of 2002. The learned trial court framed charges against the appellants u/s 302/34, 504, 506 IPC and Section 3(1) U.P. Gangster Act and Anti Social (Prevention) Act, 1986 accused denied the charges and claimed to trial.”

Truth be told, the Bench then discloses in para 50 that, “Addressing the issue of dying declaration in the light of law propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court as extracted hereinabove, it will reveal that the incident occurred at 7 O’ clock in the morning on 15.02.2002 and the deceased sustained two firearm injuries, one is on the stomach and the second is in the left hand. As per the prosecution case, the deceased was brought to his house and after waiting 20-25 minutes thereafter, they proceeded for the police station, which was 8 kms away from the house, in a jeep and then the FIR was lodged at 08:10 a.m. From the analysis of the statement so recorded by the prosecution witness, it has come on record that PW-7 being the Sub-Inspector Indraprakash recorded the dying declaration and according to him, the deceased named the appellants with respect to commission of the offence. Much argument has been raised from the side of the appellants that first of all, any statement recorded as a dying declaration by the police is totally unworthy and secondly, the certificate of doctor was obtained, thirdly, the deceased was not in a condition to give the statement and fourthly, no statement had been given by the deceased as dying declaration.”

Most significantly, the Bench then minces no words to hold in para 51 that, “So far as the question of dying declaration to be recorded by the police personnel is concerned, the same cannot be outrightly ruled out, as the Hon’ble Apex Court in a judgment, so extracted hereinabove, has clearly observed in categorical terms that there is no prescribed form, format or procedure for recording of dying declaration, but the only condition is that the person, who records dying declaration, is satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind, capable of making such statement irrespective of issuance of certificate of fitness by the doctor. Even otherwise, there is no prohibition that the police personnel should not record dying declaration, as the position is even otherwise that the dying declaration was recorded by a police officer is also admissible in evidence.”

No less significant is what is then laid down in para 52 that, “The Court finds from the record that the deceased was brought to the police station at 08:00-08:10 a.m. on 15.02.2022 and medico legal report was prepared at 09:20 a.m. and between 09:20 and 09:45 a.m, the dying declaration was recorded by the police personnel being PW-7, when the deceased named the appellants, who had committed the offence. The time for recording the dying declaration was too short to wait for the Magistrate to arrive or take certificate of fitness from the doctor as in the case in hand, PW-7 waited either for the doctor or for the Magistrate to arrive, then by that time, it would have been too late for recording the dying declaration. This Court has to adopt a pragmatic approach as this Court cannot travel into the mind of the person, who was recording the dying declaration, as he was the best suited person to take decision for recording the dying declaration. Nonetheless, there is nothing on record to suggest that there was any animosity of PW-7 with the appellants. There is also no cross-examination conducted by the defence on the question of dying declaration, particularly, in view of the fact that the deceased was brought to the police station at 08:00-08:10 a.m. and medico legal examination was conducted at 09:20 a.m. on the same day giving 25 minutes time to PW-7 to get the dying declaration recorded and thereafter, victim succumbed at 09:45 a.m.”

Equally significant is what is then postulated in para 53 that, “Dying declaration cannot be merely discarded on the ground that the same has been recorded by police personnel or certificate of fitness was not obtained. The court below has thoroughly examined each and every aspect of the matter and thereafter proceeded to record the clear cut finding convicting the appellants. Even otherwise, it has come on record that the deceased sustained gunshot injuries and further the fact that there is no clinching evidence adduced by the appellants to hold otherwise.”

While citing the relevant case law, the Bench then states in para 57 that, “In the case of C. Muniappan & Ors. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2010 (9) SCC 567, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Paragraph no. 55 has observed as under :-

“55. There may be highly defective investigation in a case. However, it is to be examined as to whether there is any lapse by the I.O. and whether due to such lapse any benefit should be given to the accused. The law on this issue is well settled that the defect in the investigation by itself cannot be a ground for acquittal. If primacy is given to such designed or negligent investigations or to the omissions or lapses by perfunctory investigation, the faith and confidence of the people in the criminal justice administration would be eroded. Where there has been negligence on the part of the investigating agency or omissions, etc. which resulted in defective investigation, there is a legal obligation on the part of the court to examine the prosecution evidence de hors such lapses, carefully, to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not and to what extent it is reliable and as to whether such lapses affected the object of finding out the truth. Therefore, the investigation is not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial. The conclusion of the trial in the case cannot be allowed to depend solely on the probity of investigation. (Vide Chandra Kanth Lakshmi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 220; Karnel Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1995) 5 SCC 518; Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1998 SC 1850; Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1999 SC 644; State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy, AIR 2000 SC 185; Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh, AIR 2003 SC 1164; Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2002 SC 1051; and Ram Bali v. State of U.P., AIR 2004 SC 2329).””

Notably, the Bench then stipulates in para 58 that, “Analysing the factual and legal position as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court while applying the same on the facts of the case, this Court finds that there might be certain defects in the investigation so conducted by the Investigating Officer, but the same cannot ipso facto be a ground to hold that the appellants are not guilty, as even otherwise, there exists ocular and documentary evidence, which proves that the appellants have committed the said offence. Notably, there exists dying declaration of the deceased, statement of PW-1 (complainant) as well as the relevant fact that the appellants could not produce any evidence to show that they are entitled to the benefit of alibi and other crucial fact that the motive stood proved, as it also acted as a catalyst for commission of the crime.”

Furthermore, the Bench then holds in para 59 that, “We are of the opinion that the finding and the conclusion recorded by the trial court are based on correct appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from error.”

As a corollary, the Bench then directs in para 60 that, “Accordingly, the present appeal fails and is dismissed and the judgment and order dated 11.9.2015 passed by Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge Gangster Court No. 5 Sultanpur, in Gangster Case No. 379 of 2012 (State Vs. Prem Nath and Another) arising out of case crime no. 157/2002, u/s 302/34, 504, 506 IPC, and Section 3(1) of the U.P. Gangster & Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act 1986, P.S. Kotwali Dehat, District Sultanpur, whereby the appellants have been convicted u/s 302 of IPC for life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of fine one year additional imprisonment, u/s 506 IPC for 2 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- each and in default of fine one month additional imprisonment is confirmed.”

For clarity, the Bench then mentions in para 61 that, “The appellants shall undergo and serve the remaining sentence awarded by the trial court concerned.”

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 62 that, “Let a copy of this order along with original record be transmitted to the trial court concerned for necessary information and its compliance.”

In sum, the Allahabad High Court has made it as clear as daylight that there is no prohibition on dying declaration being recorded by a police officer. Not just this, such dying declaration is also admissible as evidence. Acting on such dying declaration, we thus see that Allahabad High Court upholds life sentence in a murder case.

Truth be told, the Bench then discloses in para 50 that, “Addressing the issue of dying declaration in the light of law propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court as extracted hereinabove, it will reveal that the incident occurred at 7 O’ clock in the morning on 15.02.2002 and the deceased sustained two firearm injuries, one is on the stomach and the second is in the left hand.

In sum, the Allahabad High Court has made it as clear as daylight that there is no prohibition on dying declaration being recorded by a police officer. Not just this, such dying declaration is also admissible as evidence. Acting on such dying declaration, we thus see that Allahabad High Court upholds life sentence in a murder case.

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AN ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE BODIES CAN ESTABLISH A CAPTIVE POWER PLANT PRIMARILY FOR THEIR OWN USE UNDER THE ELECTRICITY ACT: SUPREME COURT

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The Supreme Court in the case Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd. vs Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission observed that a captive power plant primarily for their own use can be established by an association of corporate bodies.

The requirement would be that the consumption of SBIPL and SBMPL together should not be less than 51% of the power generated. Admittedly, the joint consumption by SBIPL and SBMPL is more than 51% and under the provisions of the said Act, the use of electricity by it would be for captive use only even an association of corporate bodies can establish a power plant. Since SBMPL holds 27.6% of the ownership, the requirement of not less than 26% of shares is fulfilled by SBMPL as SBMPL holds 27.6% equity shares in SBPIL.

The fourth proviso to sub­section (2) of Section 42 of the said Act would also reveal that surcharge would not be leviable in case open access is provided to a person who has established a captive generating plant for carrying the electricity to the destination of his own use and under Section 9 of the said Act, could be an individual or a body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, it is clear that the person will get benefit even an association of corporate bodies can establish a captive power plant it has been seen. The definition of “person” is wide enough to include any company or body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or artificial juridical person it should be primarily for the use of the members of such co­operative society or association is the requirement, the Bench observed while referring to the provisions of the Electricity Act.

The BPIL, the respondent contended and supported the impugned judgment that no permission is required from the Commission for supply of electricity for its own use. Thereafter the appellant Company contended that unless SBPIL consumes 51% of the aggregate electricity generated by it, it will not be entitled to get the benefit under Section 9 of the said Act, in an appeal filled before the Apex Court.

An appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity filed by the Company further The Commission held that SBPIL was entitled to supply electricity to its sister concern SBMPL and the same would qualify to be treating as own consumption and within the ambit of Section 9 read with Section 2(8) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Rule 3 of the Electricity Rules, 2005 SBPIL submitted a petition for providing open access and wheeling of power through the transmission system of the Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd (Company) for captive use by SBMPL to the Chhattisgarh State Electricity Regulatory Commission, the commission. A Captive Generation Plant is established by SBPIL, and is a sister concern of SBPIL Shri Bajrang Power and I spat Ltd and Shri Bajrang Metallics and Power Ltd, SBMPL.

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Where the crime was committed the remission or premature release policy of the state has to be considered: Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court in the case Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, Lala Vakil vs State of Gujarat observed that where the crime was committed has to be considered in the remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State.

While allowing the writ petition the court observed and contended that Once the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat, after the trial been concluded and judgment of conviction came to be passed, all further proceedings have to be 6 considered including remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred and concluded for exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court, as the case may be. The court further stated that under Section 432(7) CrPC the appropriate Government can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments.

the appropriate Government in the ordinary course would be the State of Gujarat. But the case was transferred in exceptional circumstances by this Court for limited purpose for trial and disposal to the neighboring State i.e., the State of Maharashtra by an order dated 06.08.2004. ordinarily, the trial was to be concluded in the same State and in terms of Section 432(7) CrPC as the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed in the State of Gujarat, observed by the Apex Court.

he application for pre­mature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat, as prayed by the petitioner by judgment impugned dated 17.07.2009 As His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra. Thereafter He had filed his petition for pre­mature release under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating that he had undergone more than 15 years 4 months of custody.

The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed and noted that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of the appropriate Government.

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Adopt roster based reservation for preferential candidates as followed by JIPMER: Supreme Court directs all AIIMS institutes

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The Supreme Court in the case Students Association AIIMS Bhopal And Or’s. v. AllMS and Or’s observed and directed all AIIMS Institutes to adopt roster-based reservation followed by Jawaharlal Institute of Postgraduate Medical Education and Research, Pondicherry (JIPMER) as a plea was filled in the Court seeking direction to AIIMS to have a defined criteria for arriving at seat matrix for institutional preference candidates in INI-CET examination.

the order of the Apex Court in the case AIIMS Students’ Union v. AIIMS And Or’s, would not be applicable if It emphasized that if the roster-based system is implemented the actual roster points for AIIMS would be different from JIPMER as the same would depend on the percentage of seats decided to be allocated to the preferential candidates but It stated that the reservation would be similar to the one adopted by JIPMER AIIMS New Delhi was willing to provide a roster-point based reservation for its institutional preference candidates, by way of an affidavit 20th January 2022 the Bench was apprised that pursuant to a meeting held on 28th June 2020 as prescribed the relevancy:

It shall not be too wide with the one for the general category candidate, that the margin of difference between the qualifying marks for the Institute’s candidate.

The one who has secured marks at the common entrance PG test less than the one secured by any other candidate belonging to reserved category enjoying constitutional protection such as SC, ST etc. cannot be the AIMS graduate the last student to qualify for admission.

appearing on behalf of AIIMS, Advocate, Mr. Dushyant Parashar, New Delhi was asked to get instructions from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and Jodhpur so that the Court can pass appropriate orders on the next date of hearing. As that apart from AIIMS, Bhubaneswar and AIIMS, Jodhpur, all other AIIMS before the Apex Court has agreed to implement the roster-based reservation system followed by JIPMER Puducherry for their institutional preference candidates, the Court was informed at the last date of hearing.

the petition had been filed seeking direction to AIIMS to disclose how the seats for institutional preference candidates are to be allotted in the view of the same the petitioners claim that in the INI-CET examination conducted in July, 2021, only 4 seats (1.87%) in AIIMS, New Delhi were allotted to institutional preference candidates. Rivetingly, the petitioners note that no seats were allocated to any other AIIMS for admission of institutional preference candidates.

the Bench comprising of Justice L. Nageswara Rao and the justice A.S. Bopanna observed and noted that to record in the order that the roaster system would be applicable from this year. Mr. Parashar informed it that since new software is to be put in place for counselling, it might cause some delay. The bench further stated that the court will order it to apply this year but in case of delay AIMS can come later.

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‘The crime committed has to be considered in the remission or premature policy of the state’

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The Supreme Court in the case Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, Lala Vakil vs State of Gujarat observed that where the crime was committed has to be considered in the remission which is applicable in the State and the pre­mature release in terms of the policy

The Court noted while hearing the writ petition that in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred and concluded for exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court once the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat, after the trial been concluded and judgment of conviction came to be passed, all further proceedings have to be 6 considered including remission or pre­mature release, as the case may be, in the instance case. under Section 432(7) CrPC, there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments, can be either the Central or the State Government of the appropriate government.

in terms of Section 432(7) CrPC, the trial was to be concluded in the same State and ordinarily in the State of Gujrat the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed. by an order 06.08.2004., the case was transferred in exceptional circumstances by this Court for limited purpose for trial and disposal to the neighbouring State i.e., the State of Maharashtra, observed by the bench of Apex Court.

As mentioned by the petitioner in the plea that by judgment impugned dated 17.07.2019., the application for pre­mature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat and His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra. under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the petition was filled by the petitioner for premature release further the petitioner stated that that he had undergone under the custody of more than 15 years 4 months.

Section 302, 376(2) (e) (g) and reading it with Section 149 IPC, Shah was found guilty for the offence, the offence committed by him in the State of Gujrat.

The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of that appropriate government.

The bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and the justice Vikram Nath observed that under Section 432(7) CrPC can be either the Central or the State Government but there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments of that appropriate government.

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Seeking reduction of qualifying the percentile for admission in ayurveda course: A plea in Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court in the Case Amit Kumar v UOI & Or’s observed in Ayurveda course in view of large number of vacancies and for seeking reduction of qualifying percentile for admission, an ayurveda aspirant who appeared in NEET 2021 has approached the Court.

the court had observed that lowering the minimum marks and reducing the percentile for admission to first year BDS Course would not amount to lowing the standards of Education and further the Court directed to lower the percentile mark by 10 percentiles for admission in first year of BDS Course for academic year 2020-2021, with regards to substantive the contentions made by the petitioner by referring the judgement passed in the case in Harshit Agarwal & Or’s v Union of India.

the percentile may also be reduced for Ayurveda programme enabling the Petitioner to take admissions then If percentile is being reduced/considered for reduction for BDS course was further stated by the petitioner in the plea, while referring to an order dated 04.29.2022. Thereafter the top Court had asked Centre to consider lowering the percentile for BDS Courses.

Seeking the Centre’s response in a plea by filing a counter affidavit, noted by the Top Court specifying the above-mentioned information:

after deducting the admission granted for MBBS Courses (BDS Courses), the total number of Candidates.

in All India Quota and State Quota, the totals number of vacant seats.

in government colleges on one hand & private/deemed colleges on the other hand, the number of seats which are remaining.

the petition was filed through AOR Neeraj Shekhar and for the petitioner Advocate Shivam Singh appeared.

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Bank case rejected by Supreme Court against farmer

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The Supreme Court in the case Bank of Maharashtra & Or’s v Mohanlal Patidar observed an order given by the High Courts of directing the bank the OTS proposal given by a farmer who had availed a loan from the bank, the court further pulled up the Bank of Maharashtra for challenging the order.

The Bank shall complete remaining formalities and provide all consequential benefits flowing therefrom to the petitioners, the court further stated that it is needless to emphasize The OTS proposal given by the petitioners in both the cases shall be accepted by the Bank and ‘sanction letters’ be issued forthwith, the court allowed the petitioner plea.

The petitioner not only promptly challenged the said order, it is noteworthy that petitioner never acceded to the unilateral decision dated 25th August 2021 and even otherwise the letter dated 25th August 2021 is held to be illegal by us, clause-7 of policy cannot take away the fruits of OTS benefits, within two months from the date of issuance of order dated 22th September 2021, the petitioner filled the instant petition and further the court directed we are unable to give stamp of approval to the impugned orders and action of the Bank, observed by the bench comprising of Justice Sujoy Paul and the justice Dwarka Dhish Bansal while setting aside the impugned orders of the bank.

In an order dated 03.09.2021 it was stated and it showed that the petitioner was required to pay minimum 10% of the OTS amount within stipulated time and that he had deposited Rs.35,00,000/- out of Rs.36,50,000/- within the stipulated time, it was argued before the court by the counsel.

As full and final settlement of the dues, he will be required to deposit Rs.50.50 lakhs as he was informed by the Asset Recovery Branch of the Bank.

Whole law comes into place when a matter of farmers come as the down payment were also accepted and it was further stated by the bench in an oral remark You don’t file cases against the ones who loot 1000s of crores.

The respondent had obtained a loan and intended to pay it in terms of a One Time Settlement which was quantified as Rs 3650000/-. in furtherance thereof the respondent had deposited Rs 35,00,000 with the bank, in the above-mentioned matter.

The bank had miserably failed to accept the same and on the contrary, decided to enhance the compromise amount to Rs.50.50 lakhs unilaterally which was contrary to the OTS scheme, contended by the counsel further the counsel stated that the bank had miserably failed to accept the same and on the contrary, decided to enhance the compromise amount to Rs.50.50 lakhs unilaterally which was contrary to the OTS scheme.

The bench comprising of Justice DY Chandrachud and the justice Surya Kant observed and remarked while dismissing the plea assailing Madhya Pradesh High Court’s order dated 02.21.2022 Such a litigation in Supreme Court will spoil the families of farmers financially, Go after bigger fish.

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