In a well-reasoned, well-analysed, well-articulated, well-substantiated, well-presented and well-concluded judgment titled Imran Jalal @ Bilal Ahmed @ Kota @ Saleem @ Hadi Vs State of Karnataka in Criminal Appeal No. 636 of 2021 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5183 of 2021 arising out of Diary No. 21455 of 2020) delivered just recently on July 19, 2021, the Apex Court has minced just no words to make it absolutely clear that direction to undergo other sentences after life sentence illegal. The Supreme Court Bench comprising of Justice Uday Umesh Lalit and Justice Ajay Rastogi observed that a court cannot stipulate that other sentences would begin after expiration of life sentence awarded to convict. Very rightly so!
In this case, the Trial Court had convicted the accused Imran Jalal under Sections 121 (waging or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against the Government of India), 121A (Conspiracy to commit offences punishable by Section 121), 122 (Collecting arms, etc with intention of waging war) of the Indian Penal Code, Section 5(b) of Explosive Substances Act, Sections 20, 23(1) of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and Sections 25(1A), 26(2) of Arms Act. The Trial Court had directed that the sentence of imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 5(b) of Explosive Substances Act, 1908, which is the rigorous imprisonment for 10 (ten) years, shall commence at the expiration of other sentences of imprisonments (life imprisonment) for IPC offences and other sentences under other provisions). The High Court of Karnataka had upheld the conviction and sentence awarded to the accused.
To be sure, before the Apex Court the accused-appellant contended that this direction [that the sentence of imprisonment for 10 years would commence at the expiration of other sentences of imprisonment] runs counter to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Muthuramalingam v State. While agreeing with the appellant’s contention, the Bench then accordingly modified the sentence part of the Trial Court’s order. Very rightly so!
To start with, after granting leave in para 1, the Bench of Apex Court comprising of Justice Uday Umesh Lalit and Justice Ajay Rastogi then puts forth in para 2 that, “This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 29.11.2019 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Criminal Appeal No.2066 of 2016.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 3 that, “The aforesaid appeal had challenged the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant by the Court of 55th Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge (CCH-56), Bangalore City, in Sessions Case No.1031 of 2008. The order of sentence passed by the Trial Court was as under:
“1) The accused No.1 is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and shall pay the fine of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) for the commission of offence punishable under section 121 of IPC and in default of payment of fine amount he shall further undergo the imprisonment for 2 (two) years.
2) The accused No.1 is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 10 (ten) years and shall pay the fine of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty-five thousand only) for the commission of offence punishable under section 121-A of IPC and in default of payment of fine amount he shall further undergo simple imprisonment for 1 (one) year.
3) The accused No.1 is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 10 (ten) years and shall pay the fine of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty-five thousand only) for the commission of offence punishable under Section 122 of IPC and in default of payment of fine amount he shall further undergo simple imprisonment for 1 (one) year.
4) The accused No.1 is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 (ten) years and shall pay the fine of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty-five thousand only) for the commission of offence punishable under Section 5(b) of Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and in default of payment of fine amount he shall further undergo simple imprisonment for 1 (one) year.
5) The accused No.1 is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 10 (ten) years and shall pay the fine of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty-five thousand only) for the commission of offence punishable under Section 25(1A) of Arms Act, 1959 and in default of payment of fine amount he shall further undergo simple imprisonment for 1 (one) year.
6) The accused No.1 is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 10 (ten) years and shall pay the fine of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty-five thousand only) for the commission of offence punishable under Section 26(2) of Arms Act, 1959 and in default of payment of fine amount he shall further undergo simple imprisonment for 1 (one) year.
7) The accused No.1 is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and shall pay the fine of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty-thousand only) for the commission of offence punishable under Section 20 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and in default of payment of fine amount he shall further undergo the simple imprisonment for 2 (two) years.
8) The accused No.1 is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and shall pay the fine of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) for the commission of offence punishable under Section 23(1) of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and in default of payment of fine amount he shall further undergo the simple imprisonment for 2 (two) years.
9) Except the sentence of imprisonment for the offence punishable under section 5(b) of Explosive Substances Act, 1908, which is the rigorous imprisonment for 10(ten) years, the other sentences of imprisonments, which are simple in nature, shall run concurrently. The sentence of imprisonment for the offence punishable under section 5(b) of Explosive Substances Act, 1908, which is the rigorous imprisonment for 10(ten) years, shall commence at the expiration of other sentences of imprisonments.
10) The accused No.1 is entitled for set-off, under section 428 of Cr.P.C., of the period of detention undergone during the period of trial of this case.””
As it turned out, the Bench then states in para 4 that, “The order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court having been affirmed by the High Court, the present appeal has been preferred. The notice in the matter was confined to the nature and quantum of sentence imposed upon the appellant.”
On the one hand, the Bench points out in para 6
that, “The only submission advanced by Mr. Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Advocate, on nature and quantum of sentence is that the last part of paragraph 9 of the order of sentence which observed that the sentence of imprisonment for 10 years awarded in terms of paragraph 4 of the order of sentence would commence at the expiration of other Vsentences of imprisonment is incorrect.
Taking exception to this direction, Mr. Dave submits that this direction runs counter to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Muthuramalingam v. State (2016) 8 SCC 313. Paragraphs 18 and 35 of the decision were to the following effect:
“18. The legal position is, thus, fairly well settled that
imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the life of Vthe offender unless of course the remaining sentence is commuted or remitted by the competent authority. That being so, the provisions of Section 31 under CrPC must be so interpreted as to be consistent with the basic tenet that a life sentence requires the prisoner to spend the rest of his life in prison. Any direction that requires the offender to undergo imprisonment for life twice over would be anomalous and irrational for it will disregard the fact that humans like all other living beings have but one life to live. So understood Section 31(1) would permit consecutive running of sentences only if such sentences do not happen to be life sentences. That is, in our opinion, the only way one can avoid an obvious impossibility of a prisoner serving two consecutive life sentences. … … …
35. We may, while parting, deal with yet another dimension of this case argued before us, namely, whether the court can direct life sentence and term sentences to run consecutively. That aspect was argued keeping in view the fact that the appellants have been sentenced to imprisonment for different terms apart from being awarded imprisonment for life. The trial court’s direction affirmed by the High Court is that the said term sentences shall run consecutively. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that even this part of the direction is not legally sound, for once the prisoner is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, the term sentence awarded to him must run concurrently. We do not, however, think so. The power of the court to direct the order in which sentences will run is unquestionable in view of the language employed in Section 31 CrPC. The court can, therefore, legitimately direct that the prisoner shall first undergo the term sentence before the commencement of his life sentence. Such a direction shall be perfectly legitimate and in tune with Section 31 CrPC. The converse however may not be true for if the court directs the life sentence to start first it would necessarily imply that the term sentence would run concurrently. That is because once the prisoner spends his life in jail, there is no question of his undergoing any further sentence. Whether or not the direction of the court below calls for any modification or alteration is a matter with which we are not concerned. The regular Bench hearing the appeals would be free to deal with that aspect of the matter having regard to what we have said in the foregoing paragraphs.” (Emphasis supplied).”
As against this, the Bench then states in para 7 that, “On the other hand, Mr. Shubhranshu Padhi, learned Advocate for the State has relied upon paragraph 25 of the decision, which is to the following effect:
“25. In O.M. Cherian case [O.M. Cherian v. State of Kerala, (2015) 2 SCC 501 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 123] the prisoner was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC. The courts below had in that case awarded to the convicts imprisonment for two years under Section 498-A IPC and seven years under Section 306 IPC and directed the same to run consecutively. Aggrieved by the said direction, the prisoners appealed to this Court to contend that the sentences awarded to them ought to run concurrently and not consecutively. The appeal was referred [O.M. Cherian v. State of Kerala, (2015) 2 SCC 501, 506-507 (para 5)] to a larger Bench of three Judges of this Court in the light of the decision in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of Customs [Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of Customs, (1988) 4 SCC 183 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 921]. Before the larger Bench, the prisoners relied upon Mohd. Akhtar Hussain case [Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of Customs, (1988) 4 SCC 183 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 921] and Manoj v. State of Haryana [Manoj v. State of Haryana, (2014) 2 SCC 153 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 763] to contend that since the prisoners were found guilty of more than two offences committed in the course of one incident, such sentences ought to run concurrently. This Court upon a review of the case law on the subject held that Section 31 CrPC vested the court with the power to order in its discretion that the sentences awarded shall run concurrently in case of conviction of two or more offences.
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declared that it was difficult to lay down a straightjacket rule for
the exercise of such discretion by the courts. Whether a sentence
should run concurrently or consecutively would depend upon the nature
of the offence and the facts and circumstances of the case. All that
could be said was that the discretion has to be exercised along
judicial lines and not mechanically. Having said that, the Court
observed that if two life sentences are imposed on a convict the court
has to direct the same to run concurrently. That is because sentence
of imprisonment for life means imprisonment till the normal life of a
Be it noted, the Bench then enunciates
in para 8 that, “In the instant case, the appellant was awarded life
sentence on three counts and sentence of 10 years each on five counts,
out of which it was only the sentence in respect of the offence
punishable under Section 5(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908,
which was subject matter of the last part of the directions in
paragraph 9 of the order of sentence.”
Most significantly, the Bench then makes no bones to
make it known in para 9 that, “Paragraph 9 of the order of sentence
contemplated commencement of the sentence awarded under paragraph 4 of
the order of sentence, after the expiration of other sentences of
imprisonment. It would, therefore, mean that the sentence in paragraph
4 would begin after the expiration of other sentences including
sentence for life awarded under three counts. This stipulation would
be against the law laid down by this Court in Muthuramalingam v State
(2016) 8 SCC 313, especially paragraph 35 of the decision as quoted
Finally and far most significantly, the Bench then holds
in para 10 that, “Considering the fact situation, in our view, the
following sentence appearing in paragraph 9 of the order of sentence:
“The sentence of imprisonment for the offence punishable under section
5(b) of Explosive Substances Act, 1908, which is the rigorous
imprisonment for 10 (ten) years, shall commence at the expiration of
the other sentences of imprisonments.”
must stand deleted. Ordered accordingly.”
At the risk of repetition, it has to be said again
that all the courts starting right from the Trial Courts to the Apex
Court must always while ruling in similar such cases always remember
the sum and substance of this notable ruling that direction to undergo
other sentences after life sentence is illegal. Without mincing any
words, the Bench of Apex Court comprising of Justice Uday Umesh Lalit
and Justice Ajay Rastogi have very clearly, cogently, commendably and
convincingly held in this latest, learned, laudable and landmark
judgment that a court cannot stipulate that other sentences would
begin after expiration of life sentence awarded to convict. This must
be always adhered to in letter and spirit. The lower courts especially
err many times on this but from now onwards they must always adhere to
what has been laid down so unambiguously by the two Judge Bench of the
Apex Court in this noteworthy case!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
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Electricity connection cannot be denied only because dispute regarding ownership of land is pending: Gujarat High Court
The bench of Justice Supehia noted that the Petitioners were owners of the concerned agricultural land for which electricity was sought. However, it was observed that the electricity was denied on the ground that the Petitioners were illegally occupying Government land.
The Gujarat High Court in the case Yogesh Lakhmanbhai Chovatiya v/s PGVCL Through the Deputy Manager observed and has clarified that occupiers of a land cannot be denied electricity connection only because a dispute regarding ownership of the land is pending.
The bench comprising of Justice AS Supehia observed and referred to a division bench judgment stating that right and title and ownership or right of occupancy has no nexus with grant of electrical connection to a consumer.
In the present case, the petitioner current occupiers of the land and submitted that they were denied an electricity connection only because the land that they were occupying was in the name of the Government. However, the proceedings were initiated by the Mamlatdar against them u/s 61 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code for removal of encroachment. Further, to bolster their contention, it was relied by the petitioner on an order of the High Court and Sec 43 of the Electricity Act, 2003 which mandates the supply of electricity to any occupier or owner of premises.
The Petitioners could be said to be ‘occupier’ of the land in question and the connection could not be denied by the Respondent.
The bench of Justice Supehia noted that the Petitioners were owners of the concerned agricultural land for which electricity was sought. However, it was observed that the electricity was denied on the ground that the Petitioners were illegally occupying Government land.
Further, the bench of Justice Supehia concluded while perusing Sec 43 that the provision stipulated that the licensee shall supply electricity to those premises where the application had been filed by the owner or the occupier. Consequently, a reference was made to the order of the Division Bench of the High Court in LPA No. 91/2010 wherein it was observed:
The Court stated that such power being not vested under the law with the company and as the company cannot decide the disputed question of right and title and this court is of the view that ownership or right of occupancy has no nexus with grant of electrical connection to a consumer.
While keeping in view of the aforesaid provisions, it was directed by Justice Supehia that the Respondent-Company to supply electricity connection to the Petitioners in the premises of the property at the earliest in accordance with the list maintained by the name containing the names of the Petitioners in the list.
ANALYSIANG SECTION 194R OF THE INCOME TAX ACT
Recently, Section 194 R was inserted by the Finance Act 2022, which came into effect on July 1st, 2022. CBDT made certain recommendations via Circular 12 from the day of the addition of this section, it has become highly debatable. Before touching the issues of this section, we need to understand the legal provision of section 194 R.
In simple terms, the new section mandates a person who is responsible for providing any benefit or perquisite to a resident to deduct tax at source at 10% of the value or aggregate value of such benefit or perquisite before providing such benefit or perquisite. The benefit or perquisite may or may not be convertible into money, but it must result from such resident’s business or professional activities. As per this section, tax will be deducted by business or profession on any benefits or perquisites of a person who is residing in India. The benefit or perquisite can be in the form of cash or kind, or partially in cash and partially in kind. Tax deduction will be 10 percent if the aggregate value doesn’t exceed INR 20,000. In such a case, tax will not be deducted. Such conditions will not be applicable in If the turnover of business doesn’t exceed INR One Crore, If the turnover of the profession doesn’t exceed INR fifty lakhs, For instance, if a person is a sales agent and he exceeds the target allotted by the company and receives a new car worth INR 5, 00,000/-the value of INR 5,00,000 will be taxed under the head of Profit.
The intention of this section is to expand the scope of deducting tax on benefits or perquisites and to increase transparency in the reporting of benefits and perquisites received by an individual. Because this particular incentive is in kind rather than cash, recipients of such kinds of transactions do not include it in their income tax return. As a result, inaccurate income information is provided. Such an incentive or bonus in kind ought to ideally be reported as income under the 1961 Income-tax Act (ITA). Also, according to Section 28(iv) of the ITA, any benefit or perk received from a business or profession, whether convertible into money or not, must be reported as business income in the hands of the receiver. Now Section 194(R) gives the right to the payee to deduct the amount, whether in cash or kind, arising out of business promotion.
The terms “benefits and perquisites” are not defined under the IT act. If they receive any such perquisites or incentives, whether in cash or in kind, they must deduct TDS. In cases where the benefit is wholly in kind, the person providing such a benefit or perquisite is required to pay TDS on the value of such benefit or perquisite out of his own pocket. In this case, benefits and perquisites are determined as per the value of the purchased price and manufactured price. However, no taxes to be deducted u/s 194R on sales discount, cash discount, or rebate are allowed to customers.
In the matter of ACIT Vs Solvay Pharma India Ltd, the court held that free samples provided by the pharmaceutical company for promotion purposes would be taxable income. As such, free samples cannot be treated as a freebie. The complimentary sample of medication serves solely to demonstrate its effectiveness and to win the doctors’ confidence in the high quality of the pharmaceuticals. Again, this cannot be regarded as gifts given to doctors as they are intended to promote the company’s goods. The pharmaceutical corporation, which manufactures and markets pharmaceutical products, can only increase sales and brand recognition by hosting seminars and conferences and educating medical professionals about recent advances in therapeutics and other medical fields. Since there are daily advancements in the fields of medicine and therapy taking place throughout the globe, it is crucial for doctors to stay current in order to give accurate patient diagnosis and treatment. The main goal of these conferences and seminars is to keep doctors up to date on the most recent advancements in medicine, which is advantageous for both the pharmaceutical industry and the doctors treating patients. Free medication samples provided to doctors by pharmaceutical corporations cannot be considered freebies in light of the aforementioned value.
Hence, under such circumstances, for such a sales effort, the pharmaceutical company may deduct its expenses. The promotion would, however, be taxable income in the hands of the receiver, and the pharmaceutical company would need to deduct TDS on it.
Another question that pops up is that in the case of gifts and perks received on special occasions like birthdays, marriages, and festivals, under such circumstances, Section 194R will only be applied if they arise out of business or profession.
As we know, we are heading towards digitalisation. There are many social media influencers who are playing a crucial role in marketing strategy. Income received by an influencer is calculated by deducting expenditure incurred on their business. Filming costs, such as cameras, microphones, and other equipment; subscription and software licencing fees; internet and communication costs; home office costs, such as rent and utilities; office supplies; business costs, such as travel or transportation costs; and others are examples of what can be written off as a social media influencer. To illustrate how Section 194 R will be applicable in such a situation, let’s consider Nandini is a social media influencer. She received an offer from a company for product promotion in another city. She charged her fee of Rs 88,000 and the travel expense incurred by her was Rs 25,000. Here, the company will reimburse her travel expenses. So, the travel expenditure incurred by the company is covered under the benefits and perquisites provided to Nandini. Hence, TDS is to be deducted under section 194R at the rate of 10%, i.e., Rs 2500 is deductible from the fees payable to Nandini.
There is no further requirement to check whether the amount is taxable in the hands of the recipient or under which section it is taxable. The Supreme Court took the same view in the case of PILCOM vs. CIT in reference to the deduction of tax under Section 194E. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that tax is to be deducted under section 194E at a specific rate indicated therein, and there is no need to see the taxability under DTAA or the rate of taxability in the hands of the non-resident.
In the matter of ACIT Vs Solvay Pharma India Ltd, the court held that free samples provided by the pharmaceutical company for promotion purposes would be taxable income. As such, free samples cannot be treated as a freebie. The complimentary sample of medication serves solely to demonstrate its effectiveness and to win the doctors’ confidence in the high quality of the pharmaceuticals. Again, this cannot be regarded as gifts given to doctors as they are intended to promote the company’s goods. The pharmaceutical corporation, which manufactures and markets pharmaceutical products, can only increase sales and brand recognition by hosting seminars and conferences and educating medical professionals about recent advances in therapeutics and other medical fields. Since there are daily advancements in the fields of medicine and therapy taking place throughout the globe, it is crucial for doctors to stay current in order to give accurate patient diagnosis and treatment.
GUJARAT HIGH COURT: WRIT PETITION FILED AGAINST PRIVATE UNIVERSITY NOT MAINTAINABLE, REMEDY FOR ALLEGED ARBITRARY TERMINATION LIES UNDER CIVIL LAW.
The Gujarat High Court in the case Shambhavi Kumari v/s Sabarmati University & 3 other(s) observed and has declined to intervene in a writ petition seeking reinstatement with full back wages and benefits filed by an Assistant Professor against a private university, Sabarmati University.
The bench comprising of Justice Bhargav Karia observed and has clarified that the dispute regarding termination was ‘in the realm of a private contract’ and therefore, held that if on the part of the respondent, there is an alleged arbitrary action, the same would give cause to the petitioner to initiate civil action before the Civil Court but in the facts of the present case, the writ petition would not be maintainable against the private educational institution governed by the Gujarat Private Universities Act, 2009.
In the present case, the petitioner was given a three months’ notice starting August 2013, allegedly without any reason. Consequently. Earlier, an application was filled by the petitioner before the Gujarat Affiliated Colleges Service Tribunal and thereafter, withdrew the application to file the writ before the High Court.
It was contested by the respondents that the petition was not maintainable on the ground that the University was a private University and did not fall within the term ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the employment conditions of the Petitioner would not bring her services within the realm of ‘duty or public function.’
It was observed that the petitioner, per contra, insisted that the University was established under the Gujarat Private Universities Act, 2009. However, Universities were established to provide quality and industry relevant higher education and for related matters and hence, it could not be said that the Universities were not performing public duty. It was directed by the State Government and pervasive control over the functioning of it as was mentioned in Sec 31-35 of Chapter VI of the Act. Reliance was placed on Janet Jeyapaul vs. SRM University and ors. where the Top Court had held that the writ petition was maintainable against the deemed university and whose functions were governed by the UGC Act, 1956.
The bench of Justice Karia, while taking stock of the contentions referred to Mukesh Bhavarlal Bhandari and ors vs. Dr. Nagesh Bhandari and ors where the Coordinate Bench of the High Court in similar circumstances had reiterated that merely because the activity of the said research institute ensures to the benefit of the Indian public, it cannot be a guiding factor to determine the character of the Institute and bring the same within the sweep of ‘public duty or public function.
It was observed that the High Court also rejected the reference to Janet Jeyapaul since in the instant case and held that in the realm of a private contract, the Petitioner termination was to be decided.
Further, it was observed that it is not necessary to go into the merits of the case with regard to the issue of show-cause notice for providing an opportunity of hearing resulting into breach of principle of natural justice and weather the action of the respondent University is unfair or not because all such disputes essentially are in the realm of private contract.
Accordingly, the bench dismissed the petition.
Gujarat HC Quashes Reinstatement Order: Industrial Dispute Act| Person Working In The Capacity Of ‘Consultant’ Cannot Be Deemed ‘Workman’
The Gujarat High Court In the case Santram Spinners Limited v/s Babubhai Magandas Patel observed and has struck down the order of the Labour Court which had held that the Respondent-workman was entitled to reinstatement along with 20% back wages in the Petitioner-institute. Thus, the High Court, after perusing, Form No. 16A which pertains to Tax Deducted at Source, concluded that the Respondent was being paid consultant fees and not a salary and the same had been ignored by the Labour Court.
The bench comprising of Justice Sandeep Bhatt noted that the Respondent had raised an industrial dispute, inter alia, claiming that he was working in the company of the Petitioner as a Technical Maintenance In-Charge while the respondent earning a salary of INR 9,000 per month. Thereafter, it was alleged by him that he was terminated orally in 1997. Consequently, the Labour Court ruled in his favour and ordered reinstatement and back wages.
It was submitted by the petitioner that the Respondent did not fall within the definition of the term ‘workman’ in Sec 2(s) since he was employed as a Maintenance Consultant, receiving consultant fees and not a salary and the respondent had failed to produce any documentary evidence such as TDS statement, appointment letter, bills to bolster his contention.
Further, it was also averred by the petitioner that the relevant documentary evidence was absent. It was stated that Form 16A was produced to show that if the Respondent was a consultant, then there was no need to deduct TDS. It was observed that the Form No. 26K was disagreed by the Labour Court, which was produced by the Company to show that the tax was deducted from fees for technical or professional services.
The bench comprising of Justice Bhatt firstly observed that the Respondent had admitted that he had no evidence with him to prove that he was working as a ‘workman’ in the Company of the Petitioner that his salary was fixed at INR 9,000 per month. It was stated by the Manager of the Company that the Respondent was rendering services as a consultant raising his Vouchers/bills regularly and being paid through cheque. As per the Bench, there was ‘ample evidence’ to prove that that the Respondent was employed as a technical consultant.
Justice Bhatt stated that it is pertinent to note that the learned Labour Court has committed gross error in holding that those documents are complicated and thus, the learned Labour Court has also erred in giving findings that since TDS is deducted by the petitioner company and therefore, the respondent is workman, who is serving in the petitioner institute and in my opinion, this finding of the learned Labour Court is against the settled proposition of law and is highly erroneous.
Therefore, the High Court affirmed that there was no evidence that the Respondent had been working for more than 240 days during the year preceding termination.
Accordingly, the High Court struck down the award of the Labour Court.
GUJARAT HIGH COURT QUASHES REINSTATEMENT ORDER: PERSON WORKING IN SUPERVISORY CAPACITY CANNOT RISE “INDUSTRAIL DISPUTE”
The Gujarat High Court in the case Gujarat Insecticides Ltd. & 1 other(s) v/s Presiding Officer & 2 others observed and has reiterated that a person working in “supervisory” capacity cannot raise an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
The bench comprising of Justice AY Kogje observed and further made it clear that while deciding whether such person is a workman or not, the Labour Court ought to carefully consider the evidence placed on record and there is no exhaustive list of work to differentiate between the management employee and the Workman.
In the present case, the Petitioner Company averred that the Respondent was working in the non-workman category and engaged in the ‘supervisory category’ and was drawing salary of more than INR 1600. Therefore, the dispute was not an industrial dispute within Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947.
It was insisted by the Respondent that he had worked with the company as a Maintenance Engineer and the duties assigned to him were of the nature of a workman’s duties as per the ID Act. The respondent was wrongly terminated by way of termination and without any procedure established by law and as such, was entitled back wages.
It was observed that the high court took into consideration the Respondent’s appointment letter and witness depositions regarding the nature of work performed by him to conclude that the Respondent in Grade-9 was indeed discharging duty of Maintenance Engineer. It was also specified by the depositions that the hierarchical grading in the petitioner-company as per which, the employees above Grade-7 were of the Management Cadre.
The High Court observed that the Labour Court has completely disregarded this evidence, which according to this Court is most relevant for the purpose of deciding the status of workman and the Labour Court has proceeded that the petitioner-company ought to have produced evidence in the nature of whether the respondent-workman has sanctioned any leave, sanctioned any overtime or prepared any gate passes for employees to go home or has made any ordered or Appointment dismissal. Thus, when the Labour Court, instead of referring to this evidence already on record to establish the nature of work of the respondent and has decided to chase the evidence which is not on record and then on the basis that such evidence not being on record, it was concluded that in the definition of workman, the workman will be covered, this is where, in the opinion of the Court, perversity has crept in.
Accordingly, the bench quashed the impugned order. Therefore, seeing the passage of time, it was held by the High Court that the allowances paid u/s 17B of the Act should not be recovered by the Petitioner company.
COURT CALLS FOR SENSITIZATION OF POLICE: DELHI RIOTS SITE PLANS PREPARED CASUALLY, S.65B CERTIFICATE NOT FILLED FOR DIGITALLY SOURCED EVIDENCE
The Court while dealing with a case related to 2020 Delhi riots, a city Court has called for sensitisation of investigating officers (IOs) on making the photos obtained from digital sources as admissible in evidence by filing a certificate under section 65B of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
The bench comprising of Additional Sessions Judge Pulastya Pramachala observed and thus ordered that whenever, photographs are filed from digital sources it is needless to say that a certificate under Section 65-B of I.E. Act, is must to make those photographs admissible for the purpose of evidence. However, all the IOs are required to be sensitized this respect as well and it is high time to control the casual and callous approach of any IO.
It was also observed that court expressed displeasure over “casually prepared site plans” by stating that preparation of the same were not even expected in cases triable by the Metropolitan Magistrates.
Adding to it, the Judge stated that unfortunately this kind of site plan has been filed in such a serious case involving session triable case. Moreover, from the documents filed on the record, the court find that certain photographs have been placed, but without any certificate under Section 65-B of Indian Evidence Act.
In the present case, the court was dealing with an FIR registered on the complaint of one Salim Khan wherein it was stated by him that his spare parts and barber shop shop was looted and was put on fire during riots.
It was admitted by one of the accused Dharmender that his involvement in the matter and he, with other co-accused was seen carrying the carton of Rooh Afzah from the warehouse of a complainant in another FIR.
The Court stated that a serious re-look over the quality of evidence/documents place on the record in the case, is required by senior officer with all serious attention.
Further, the court added that in this case the ld. DCP (North East) is requested to go through the records and to submit his report, if the prosecution is to be carried on, on the basis of other materials and same site plan as placed on the record.
As in future, the Special Public Prosecutor undertook to be much careful.
Accordingly, the Court listed the matter for further hearing on August 17.
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