Control and Compliance: Institutional Role of MPVPV in Afghan Islamic Emirate

On July 31, 2024, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) released a 114-page document in its official gazette, containing 35 articles. This document represents the first attempt to codify the directives of the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue, Prevention of Vice, and the Hearing of Complaints (MPVPV), outlining the responsibilities of its members.

Institutional Role of MPVPV in Afghan Islamic Emirate
by Sharanpreet Kaur - September 12, 2024, 3:20 am

On July 31, 2024, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) released a 114-page document in its official gazette, containing 35 articles. This document represents the first attempt to codify the directives of the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue, Prevention of Vice, and the Hearing of Complaints (MPVPV), outlining the responsibilities of its members. Although the directives have been in effect for the past three years, the formal codification received approval from Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada. Despite global conflicts and a waning international interest following the end of a 20-year Western presence, the Taliban’s transition from an insurgent group to a formal state apparatus and the institutionalisation of its policies remain critical developments.

Regulated and Restrained: Implications of the New Law
The new law specifies the expected conduct for Muhtasibs—inspectors or enforcers of MPVPV decrees and for the Afghan public, detailing normative behaviours to be followed. The preface of the law clarifies its purpose: to formalise MPVPV operations and define the responsibilities of those enforcing the decrees. The law is divided into four chapters: the first outlines the conditions and principles for enforcers’ actions against the public; the second describes their duties in various aspects of life; the third specifies punishments for violations; and the final chapter addresses miscellaneous issues, focusing on accountability and feedback mechanisms for enforcers.

The law empowers MPVPV officials to discipline individuals for both offences and failures to adhere to prescribed behaviours. Article 13 mandates that women cover their faces to avoid provoking others and prohibits them from wearing tight or short clothing and from speaking publicly, as these actions are deemed ‘intimate’ and inappropriate for public settings by the Taliban. Women are also restricted from making eye contact with men outside their immediate family and must be accompanied by a mahram when leaving their homes. Article 17 bans the creation and sharing of images via phones or computers, thereby restricting the dissemination of information by media outlets and organizations. This ban complements the Taliban’s ongoing restrictions on media. Additionally, the law enforces bans on music, addresses drug addiction, prohibits interaction between men and women, mandates that men wear beards, bans Western-style haircuts, and prohibits gambling, adultery, requiring attendance at congregational prayers.

On September 7, 2024, it will be three years since the formation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s interim cabinet. A significant change during this period was the dissolution of the Ministry of Women Affairs and the reestablishment of the MPVPV, now led by Mawlawi Sheikh Mohammad Khalid Hanafi. The MPVPV took over the premises of the former women’s affairs ministry, symbolically and practically dismantling women’s rights and freedoms—an effort actively pursued by the group over the past three years. The Taliban views the MPVPV as vital to maintaining the ‘Islamic system’ and considers its role as more crucial compared to other government ministries. The Ministry has played a central role in regulating social behaviour, operating on the principle that individuals should hold each other accountable by promoting virtue and preventing vice to maintain social order and prevent chaos.

Since the Taliban’s decision to ban girls from secondary schools, the volume of directives aimed at restricting and controlling women’s movements has increased significantly. Initially, some members of the group suggested that everyone’s rights would be protected, creating a narrative of a more modern, relatively moderate Taliban 2.0. However, these assurances were misleading. Despite efforts by some leaders to gain international legitimacy, a power struggle emerged between Akhundzada in Kandahar and the leaders in Kabul. Akhundzada has increasingly centralised power, reversing many of the Taliban’s initial commitments. This internal conflict and the rise of the Kandahar faction led to an expanded role for the MPVPV. By 2022, the Ministry had issued the highest number of directives, positioning itself as the primary regulator of both men’s and women’s actions in Afghanistan.

International Reactions and Internal Dynamics
In a July 2024 report, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) highlighted the growing role of the MPVPV and the prevailing ‘climate of fear’ in the country. The MPVPV now monitors public conduct and administers punishments, with its extensive role including both policy formulation and enforcement. The Ministry operates through three main components: a civilian sector that interacts with the public and provides guidance, with 10 members stationed in each district; a military sector overseeing military personnel; and a complaints sector. A separate decree issued in November 2023 established a system for registering and resolving grievances against IEA officials.

Red Lines and Analysis
Acting Vice and Virtue Minister Hanafi has declared that the enforcement of virtue laws and the promotion of Sharia, as interpreted by the Emirate, are considered non-negotiable boundaries for the Taliban. They assert that their international interactions are conducted within an ‘Islamic framework.’ Despite promises to address and resolve people’s concerns with leniency, these assurances should be viewed with scepticism. The IEA has refused to cooperate with UNAMA following its criticism. Since its inception, the MPVPV has evolved significantly. Initially understaffed, it struggled to enforce its orders. In the latest Accountability session, the Ministry reported having an authorized workforce of 7,000. However, the MPVPV’s encroachment on other ministries’ responsibilities has faced criticism. For example, the Ministry of Information and Culture has indirectly urged others to avoid interfering in media matters, asserting its role as the sole authority on media affairs. In March, when the MPVPV mandated that men in government wear a cap and maintain a beard, several Taliban members publicly objected, leading to a more flexible enforcement of the order.

During their first rule, the Department for the Enforcement of Islamic Ways and Prevention of Evils established eight articles to regulate social behaviour, similar to current laws. The department was responsible for monitoring behaviour, punishing violations, and employing informers in various sectors, including the army, hospitals, and other ministries. Their mandate also extended to hospitals and included measures against drug addiction, images and idolatry, music, and restrictions on women working outside certain sectors. The MPVPV has become a critical institution in Afghanistan’s complex history, evolving into a key component of the Emirate’s governance. Now, three years into their rule, the Emirate is better positioned to institutionalise its system across the country, despite ongoing challenges. The comprehensive nature of the new law and its detailed regulations—covering even the most mundane aspects of daily life—underscore the Taliban’s intent to exert extensive control over the population.

Sharanpreet Kaur is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at School of Social Sciences, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar. She is an alumni of  Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and has a Phd on Indo-US Nuclear and Defence Cooperation. She is the author of the book “India’s Soft Power Diplomacy: Prospects, Challenges and the Way Forward”. She writes on issues related to India’s foreign policy, global political affairs, politics of South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia.