Compelling a married woman to live in her parental home amounts to cruelty, says Madhya Pradesh HC - The Daily Guardian
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Compelling a married woman to live in her parental home amounts to cruelty, says Madhya Pradesh HC

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While displaying zero tolerance towards act of cruelty against women, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has just recently on June 22, 2021 in a learned, laudable, latest and landmark judgment titled Amar Singh Vs Smt Vimla minced just no words to observe that compelling a married woman to live in her parental home after marriage amounts to cruelty and that for this reason, it cannot be said that she was living separately without reasonable reason. To ensure that women is protected from being harassed, humiliated and harangued by her husband and his relatives, it is imperative that Courts speak out firmly in favour of women where she is compelled to stay at her parental home without any cogent reason whatsoever! It must be apprised here that this significant development came from a Single Judge Bench of Justice GS Ahluwalia who was dealing with a criminal revision petition challenging the Family Court’s order directing the husband to pay Rs 7,000/- per month to wife under Section 125 CrPC.

To start with, a Single Judge Bench of Justice GS Ahluwalia of Madhya Pradesh High Court who has authored this cogent, commendable, composed and convincing judgment sets the ball rolling through video conferencing by first and foremost observing that, “This criminal revision under Section 397/401 of Cr.P.C. r/w Section 19(4) of Family Court Act has been filed against the order dated 10/10/2020 passed by Principal Judge, Family Court Guna in case MJC No.72/2018, by which the application filed by the respondent under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. has been allowed and the applicant has been directed to pay Rs.7,000/- per month from the date of the order.”

While elaborating on the facts of the case, the Bench then puts forth that, “The necessary facts for disposal of present revision in short are that, the respondent filed an application under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. on the ground that she got married to the applicant on 25/05/2013 in accordance of Hindu Rites and Rituals. Since, the applicant and her in-laws were not satisfied with the dowry, therefore, they used to beat her, harass her for demand of a four wheeler and cash amount. About seven months prior to filing of the application i.e. in the month of September, 2017, the respondent was ousted from her matrimonial house and thereafter, she is residing in her parental home. In the meanwhile, neither the applicant came to take her back nor made any efforts to look after her. The respondent is on the verge of starvation. Her father is poor and is not in position to bear her expenses and accordingly, it was prayed that for meeting out necessary expenses, the applicant be directed to pay Rs.15,000/- per month by way of maintenance amount. It was further pleaded that the applicant belongs to a rich family and is having 50 bigha of agriculture land with two tube wells. The applicant has cattles, tractor and other agriculture equipments. He has a house and accordingly, the yearly income of the applicant is Rs. 50,00,000/-.”

Furthermore, the Bench then points out that, “The applicant filed his reply to the application filed under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. He admitted that he got married to the respondent on 25/05/2013. It was claimed that since, both the parties are poor and since they were not in a position to bear the expenses of marriage and therefore, the marriage was performed in Sammelan. The marriage was performed without any dowry. The allegation of harassment due to non fulfillment of demand of four wheeler and cash amount was denied. It was also denied that the respondent was ousted from her matrimonial house about seven months prior to the filing of application. It was pleaded that for the first time the respondent had resided in her matrimonial house for a period of four days and during this period her behavior towards her in-laws was cruel. It was further pleaded that the respondent never allowed the applicant to consummate the marriage and she was continuously challenging the potency of the applicant in the society. The respondent is an expert in stitching and is also running beauty parlor and earning rupees thirty to forty thousand per month. She is maintaining her parents out of her own income that is why the parents of the respondent are not permitting her to come to her matrimonial home. It was further pleaded that in fact the parents of the respondent are insisting that the applicant should reside in the parental home of the respondent as Gharjamai. When the applicant refused to do so, then a false criminal case under Section 498-A of IPC was instituted against the applicant and his family members. Later on the applicant and his family members were acquitted. It was further denied that the applicant is having any agriculture land, house, two tube wells, tractor and agricultural equipments. He also denied that he had any cattles, it was also denied that yearly income of the applicant is Rs.50,00,000/-. It was further pleaded that the applicant is a student and is working on a part time basis in a shop from where he is getting Rs.2,000/- per month and apart from that, the applicant has no source of income. It was further pleaded that after the marriage, when the applicant went to the parental home of the respondent to take her back, then for half an hour, the respondent and her family members did not open the door and thereafter, they insisted that the respondent should be permitted to reside in her parental home for next 8 to 10 days. Accordingly, the applicant came back from the door of the parental home of the respondent. Thereafter, the applicant again went to the parental home of the respondent to take her back. However, although the respondent was 4 permitted to come back to her matrimonial home but the applicant was disrespected. Whenever the applicant informed the parents of the respondent about her cruel behavior then every time they replied that if the applicant wants to leave the respondent then he can do so but he has to pay an amount of Rs.15 to 20 Lacs. In reply several allegations were made against the respondent and her parents about cruel behavior.”

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Going ahead, the Bench then points out that, “The respondent in support of her case examined herself. In cross-examination, she admitted that the applicant was acquitted for offence under Section 498-A of IPC. However, she denied that the marriage was performed without any dowry. She further admitted the suggestion given by the applicant that the applicant and his mother did not like the food prepared by the respondent. It was further denied that she did not allow the applicant to consummate marriage. She further denied that the applicant was detained in her parental home. She further denied that the applicant is a land less laborer. She further accepted that the marriage has not been consummated so far. She Further denied that she is doing the work of stitching or beauty parlor. She further denied that she is running a beauty parlor in the name of Sunena beauty parlor and Sunena Ladies Tailor. She further denied that she is earning Rupees 30 to 40 thousand per month. She further denied that the applicant is doing a part time job in a shop on monthly income of Rs.2,000/-. The respondent examined her father Kedari as P.W.2.”

On the contrary, the Bench then also brought out in the next para that, “The applicant examined himself in his defence and apart from alleging the allegations of cruelty by the respondent and her parents, it was claimed by the respondent that he does not have any property or land or agriculture equipments. He also denied that the respondent was ever harassed for demand of four wheeler and an amount of ten lacs. He further claimed that the marriage has not been consummated however, he denied that because of non consummation of marriage, he had started beating the respondent.”.

To put things in perspective, the Bench then after considering the version of both the sides goes on to point out that, “The Court below after considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, came to a conclusion that it cannot be said that the respondent is residing separately without any reasonable reason. It was further held that the applicant is an able bodied person and certain allegations have been made by the applicant, which have not been proved by him. It was also found that the respondent is not doing any work and she is unable to maintain herself.”

Frankly speaking, the Bench then holds in the next para that, “So far as the question of quantum of maintenance amount is concerned, it was held that according to the respondent, the applicant is having 12 bigha of land whereas his father is having 38 bighas of land. He is the only son of his parents. Kedari P.W.2 has also claimed that the applicant is having forty to fifty bigha of land.”

As against what is stated above, the Bench then brings out in the next para that, “On the contrary, it was the claim of the applicant that he is a student and is working as a part time job in a shop from where he is earning Rs.2,000/- per month.”

Interestingly enough, the Bench then envisages in the next para that, “The Court below after considering the evidence came to a conclusion that although, the respondent has failed to prove that the applicant is having any agriculture land but from the pleadings as well as evidence of the parties, it appears that the applicant belongs to a financially sound family and accordingly, he is in a position of maintaining the respondent. Accordingly, an amount of Rs.7,000/- has been awarded by way of monthly maintenance.”

As we see, the Bench then goes on to add in the next para that, “Challenging the order passed by the Court below, it is submitted by the counsel for the applicant since the applicant was acquitted for offence under Section 498-A of IPC, therefore, the Court below has committed material illegality by holding that the respondent is residing separately because of reasonable reason. It is further submitted that the respondent has failed to prove the monthly income of the applicant, therefore, the maintenance amount of Rs.7,000/- per month is on higher side. None for the respondent though served.”

It cannot be glossed over that the Bench then observes in the next para that, “It is true that the applicant has been acquitted for offence under Section 498-A of IPC. However, it is equally true that the applicant had leveled serious allegations against the respondent and her parents. However, the applicant did not file even a single document to show that he had ever lodged any report regarding the illegal confinement or mal-treatment by the respondent her parents. Leveling serious allegations and failing to prove the same, may also amount to cruelty. Undisputedly the marriage between parties could not be consummated. On one hand the applicant has claimed that the respondent is defaming him in the society by alleging that he is impotent but he did not bring any evidence on record to show that he is not impotent. Further, the applicant had leveled a false allegation that the respondent is running a beauty parlor as well as a stitching center. He did not even file the photographs of the shops.”

What’s more, the Bench then further most significantly holds in the next para that, “Under these circumstances, this Court of the considered opinion that after having leveled serious allegations against her and her parents and having failed to prove the same, it cannot be said that the respondent is residing separately without any reasonable reason. Furthermore, it is not the case of the applicant that he had ever tried to take the respondent back from her parental home. Thus, it is also clear that the applicant has deserted the respondent and he cannot take advantage of his own wrong. Further, compelling a married women to live in her parental home, is also a cruelty. Accordingly, it is held that it cannot be said that the respondent is residing separately without any reasonable reason.”

Be it noted, the Bench then also makes it clear in the next para that, “Thus, if the husband is healthy and is an able bodied person, then he is under legal obligation to support his wife. It is the claim of the applicant that he is working on a part time basis in a shop and is earning Rs.2,000/- per month. The applicant has not examined owner of the shop in support of his claim. The applicant has also not examined his father to establish that the applicant does not belongs to a financially sound family. The applicant has not filed any document to show that he is a student. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that since the applicant is a healthy and able bodied person therefore, he cannot run away from his legal obligation to support the respondent.”

While citing the relevant case law, the Bench then holds that, “So far as the question of quantum of maintenance is concerned, the Supreme Court in the case of Jasbir Kaur Sehgal v. Distt. Judge, Dehradun reported in (1997) 7 SCC 7 has held as under:-

“8. The wife has no fixed abode of residence. She says she is living in a Gurdwara with her eldest daughter for safety. On the other hand the husband has sufficient income and a house to himself. The wife has not claimed any litigation expenses in this appeal. She is aggrieved only because of the paltry amount of maintenance fixed by the courts. No set formula can be laid for fixing the amount of maintenance. It has, in the very nature of things, to depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Some scope for leverage can, however, be always there. The court has to consider the status of the parties, their respective needs, the capacity of the husband to pay having regard to his reasonable expenses for his own maintenance and of those he is obliged under the law and statutory but involuntary payments or deductions. The amount of maintenance fixed for the wife should be such as she can live in reasonable comfort considering her status and the mode of life she was used to when she lived with her husband and also that she does not feel handicapped in the prosecution of her case. At the same time, the amount so fixed cannot be excessive or extortionate. In the circumstances of the present case we fix maintenance pendente lite at the rate of Rs 5000 per month payable by the respondent-husband to the appellant-wife.””

In addition, the Bench then states in the next para that, “The Supreme Court in the case of Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai reported in (2008) 2 SCC 316 has held as under:-

“6. The object of the maintenance proceedings is not to punish a person for his past neglect, but to prevent vagrancy by compelling those who can provide support to those who are unable to support themselves and who have a moral claim to support. The phrase “unable to maintain herself” in the instant case would mean that means available to the deserted wife while she was living with her husband and would not take within itself the efforts made by the wife after desertion to survive somehow. Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice and is specially enacted to protect women and children and as noted by this Court in Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal [(1978) 4 SCC 70 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 508 : AIR 1978 SC 1807] falls within constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of India. It is meant to achieve a social purpose. The object is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife. It gives effect to fundamental rights and natural duties of a man to maintain his wife, children and parents when they are unable to maintain themselves. The aforesaid position was highlighted in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat [(2005) 3 SCC 636 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 787 : (2005) 2 Supreme 503].””

Quite significantly, the Bench then also points out that, “Thus, it is clear that the applicant has made every effort to suppress his income as well as the financial condition of his family. It is well established principle of law that a wife is entitled to enjoy the same status, which she would have enjoyed in her matrimonial house. The Wife cannot be compelled to leave the life of rectitude.”

While rejecting the contention of the counsel of the applicant that the Trial Court should not have awarded maintenance from the date of application, the Bench then while citing a recent, remarkable and relevant case law holds that, “The Supreme Court in the case of Rajnesh v. Neha reported in (2021) 2 SCC 324 has laid down guide lines for determining the quantum of maintenance and has held as under:-

“113. It has therefore become necessary to issue directions to bring about uniformity and consistency in the orders passed by all courts, by directing that maintenance be awarded from the date on which the application was made before the court concerned. The right to claim maintenance must date back to the date of filing the application, since the period during which the maintenance proceedings remained pending is not within the control of the applicant.””

As a corollary, the Bench then holds in the next para that, “Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that Court below did not commit any mistake by awarding the maintenance from the date of the application. Consequently, the order dated 10/10/2020 passed by Principal Judge, Family Court Guna in case MJC No.72/2018 is hereby affirmed.”

Finally, the Bench then holds in the last para that, “It appears that by order dated 06/02/2019, Court had below awarded an amount of Rs.3,000/- by way of interim maintenance. Accordingly, it is directed that the amount paid by the applicant by way of interim maintenance is liable to be adjust in the arrears of maintenance amount. With aforesaid observation, this petition is hereby dismissed.”

In essence, this brief, brilliant, balanced and bold judgment by a Single Judge Bench of Justice GS Ahluwalia of Madhya Pradesh High Court leaves no room of doubt that compelling a married woman to live in her parental home amounts to cruelty. It is the bounden duty of the husband to keep his wife with her. If the husband compels a married women to live in her parental home then he is guilty of cruelty and shall be accordingly held liable!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

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GAUHATI HIGH COURT QUASHES NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION AGAINST GRAM PANCHAYAT PRESIDENT CITING PARTICIPATION OF MEMBER DISQUALIFIED FOR HAVING THREE CHILDREN

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The Gauhati High Court in the case Jugitawali Pawe v State of Assam and 15 ors observed and quashed a resolution expressing no-confidence in the petitioner – the President of a Gram Panchayat, as a result of which she as removed from office. It was stated that it is as per the citing no compliance with Assam Panchayat Act, 1994, reading with Rule 62 of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995.

It was preferred by the petitioner to the materials available on record to argue that one of the members of the Gaon Panchayat, the respondent. The respondent voted against the petitioner and had given birth to her third child the previous year. Moreover, by virtue of Section 111(2)(a) of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994, reading with Rule 62 of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995, the petitioner stood automatically disqualified on the date of voting. Following, which her vote was taken by passing No-confidence motion.

It was prayed by the petitioner in the plea for setting aside the impugned resolution and for issuance of a direction to restore his client back in the office. Thereafter, to initiate fresh proceedings, liberty should be granted to the respondent, following the due process.

It was agreed by the Counsel representing for the respondent that the said member of the panchayat had been disqualified but retained on the ground that the disqualification would have no bearing on the petitioner’s case, as the impugned resolution was passed before the declaration of petitioner disqualification.

In the present case, It was noticed by Justice Suman Shyam the member had voted against the petitioner and without her vote. The petitioner would not have been ousted from office. Justice Shyam also found no dispute about the fact that the member had incurred disqualification under the law prior the date of adoption of the impugned resolution. Justice Shyam found it unnecessary to delve into other aspects of the matter which includes the procedural formalities for declaring the member a disqualified candidate.

It is observed that the impugned resolution was declared to be vitiated and liable to be set aside. Further, the Court restored the petitioner to the office of the President of the Bongalmara Gaon Panchayat with immediate effect and it was stated by the court that the order will not stand in the way should the authorities or any member of the Gaon Panchayat propose a fresh motion of “no-confidence” against the petitioner and the due process of law needs to be followed.

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Halt DDA’s demolition action against jhuggis in Nizamuddin’s Gyaspur area, orders Delhi High Court

As per the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015 and the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board, the residents who can establish their residence prior to 01.01.2015 are eligible for rehabilitation under the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015.

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plea in Delhi High Court seeking repatriation of 56 pregnant nurses

The Delhi High Court in the case Manoj Gupta & Ors. v. DDA & Ors observed and has ordered status quo on the Delhi Development Authority’s proposal to demolish jhuggi clusters in city’s Gyaspur area in Hazrat Nizamuddin. The vacation bench comprising of Justice Neena Bansal Krishna observed in the petition filled by the residents and the court granted an interim relief.

It was ordered by the court status quo till July 11, the next date of hearing.

The bench orally remarked that a ten-day delay in demolition won’t make a difference but if today it is demolished and later, we come to know that they were entitled, who’s going to… the bench will consider it on July 11, 2022 but in the Meanwhile, some protections are entitled them. Adding this, Status quo be maintained. If since 1995, they have been there, heavens won’t come down if for 10 more days they are protected.

In the plea the petitioner stated that the T-Huts settlement in the area, which was stated by the authorities to vacate. It has been in existence for almost two decades and compromise of 32 jhuggis or households.

In the plea it was alleged that the bulldozers have been parked around the camp and a DDA official has orally asked them to vacate the area and it is noted that till date no proper notice have been sent to them nor has DDA conducted any survey of the area.

Furthermore, the DDA did not provide any alternate arrangement for their rehabilitation which resulted in extreme distress among the residents.

Moreover, it was admitted by the petitioner that the land in question belongs to DDA and they may seek that status-quo to be maintained at the site. It was urged that the residents should not be physically dispose or evicted from the demolition site until the survey is conducted and rehabilitation is provided to the residents as per the DUSIB policy of 2015.

As per the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015 and the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board. The residents who can establish their residence prior to 01.01.2015 are eligible for rehabilitation under the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015.

It is observed that in the case Ajay Maken v. Union of India, Reliance is placed on the Supreme Court decision and the High Court decision in the case Sudama Singh & Ors. v. Government of Delhi & Anr, it was held in the case that that removal of jhuggis without ensuring relocation would amount of gross violation of Fundamental Rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Further, it was held that the agencies conducting the demolitions ought to conduct survey before undertaking any demolition.

It is submitted that these observations would apply across the board, in the entire NCT of Delhi.

Advocates Vrinda Bhandari, Shiyaz Razaq, Kaoliangpou Kamei, Jepi Y Chisho and Paul Kumar Kalai, represented the petitioner.

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TELANGANA HIGH COURT: PLACE OF RESIDENCE OF THE ARBITRATOR WOULD NOT BE THE SEAT OF ARBITRATION

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The High Court of Telangana in the case M/s S. Square Infra v. Garneni Chalapathi Rao observed and held that the place of residence of the arbitrator would not determine the seat of arbitration.

The Single bench comprising of Justice P. Sree Sudha observed and held that merely because an arbitrator residing in Hyderabad has been appointed, it does not mean that only the Courts at Hyderabad would have the jurisdiction to decide all the matters arising out of arbitration agreement.

Facts of the Case:

In the present case, after the dispute arouse between the parties, the respondent sent a letter to the petitioner for nomination an arbitrator who is residing in Hyderabad. To its said notice, petitioner replied and declined the appointment of the arbitrator for the reason that there was no dispute which required the appointment of an arbitrator.

A suit was filled by the respondent before the VII Additional District Judge Sangareddy, seeking for relief of permanent injunction. An application was filled by the petitioner under Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act and the parties referred to the arbitration.

An application was filled by the respondent under section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act before the Principal District Judge, Sangareddy, Subsequently, an application was filled by the petitioner for transferring the application from the Court at Sangareddy to Court at Hyderabad.

Contentions made by Parties:

On the following grounds, the petitioner sought the transfer of application.

An arbitrator residing in Hyderabad was nominated to respondent. However, only the courts in Hyderabad would have the jurisdiction to decide all the matters arising out of the arbitration.

It was stated that the nomination of an arbitrator residing in Hyderabad amounted to designating Hyderabad as the Seat of Arbitration.

On the following grounds, the respondent countered the submissions of the petitioner:

An application was filled by the petitioner under Section 8 of the A&C Act before the Court at Sangareddy. However, in terms of Section 42 of the A&C Act, only the court at Sangareddy would have the jurisdiction to decide all the matters arising out of arbitration.

Court Analysis:

The Court held that the seat of arbitration would not be decide by the place of residence of the arbitrator.

The argument of the petitioner was rejected by the court that since the respondent had initially nominated an arbitrator residing in Hyderabad, the Hyderabad Court would have the jurisdiction.

The court stated that merely because a party has nominated an arbitrator who resides in Hyderabad, the same would not designate Hyderabad as the Seat of arbitration in absence of any designation of the seat under the arbitration agreement.

It was further stated by the court that the application filled by the petitioner filled under Section 8 application before the Court at Sangareddy consequent to which the parties were referred to arbitration. Therefore, the Court would have the jurisdiction, in terms of Section 42 of the A&C Act.

The Transfer petition was dismissed by the Court.

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DELHI HIGH COURT REMANDS IN THE MATTER BACK TO ASSESSING OFFICER AFTER SETTING ASIDE: JUST 3 DAYS’ TIME GRANTED TO RESPOND TO THE INCOME TAX NOTICE

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plea in Delhi High Court seeking repatriation of 56 pregnant nurses

The Delhi High Court in the case Shubham Thakral Vs ITO, the Delhi bench comprising of Justice Manmohan and Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora observed and remanded the matter back to the assessing officer as just 3 days’ time was granted to respond to the income tax notice.

In the present case, the petitioner/assessee assailed the notice under Section 148A (b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the order passed under Section 148A (d) for the Assessment Year 2018–19.

It was contended by the assessee that only three days’ time was granted to the assessee to respond, as against the mandatory statutory period of at least seven days. However, despite of the fact that the annexure attached to the notice gave the petitioner eight days to respond, the e-filing submission portal was closed earlier, in violation of Section 148A (b) of the Income Tax Act.

Furthermore, the petitioner relied on the decision of Delhi High Court, in the case of Shri Sai Co-operative Thrift and Credit Society Ltd versus ITO, the Delhi High Court in the case held that under Section 148A (b), a minimum time of seven days has to be granted to the assessee to file its reply to the show cause notice.

No objections were raised by the department/respondent to the matter being returned to the Assessing Officer for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. Accordingly, the court set aside the order passed under Section 148A (d) for the Assessment Year 2018-19. The Assessing officer was directed by the court to pass a fresh reasoned order in accordance with the law after considering the reply of the petitioner, which was directed to be filed within a week.

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ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT: ADVOCATES SHOULDN’T ADVISE CLIENTS TO REAGITATE MATTERS IF THERE IS NO ERROR APPARENT ON FACE OF RECORD

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The Allahabad High Court in the case Malhan and 17 Others Vs. State Of U.P. And Another observed and stated that an advocate should be given such a piece of advice when there is no error apparent on the face of the record nor was there any reason why the matter be re-agitated it was finally decided.

The bench comprising of Justice Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker and Justice Vivek Varma observed while dealing with the civil review application wherein the bench observed the concerned advised his client to make a chance by filling the instant review application after a period of six year.

In the present case, a civil review petition was filled along with the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963., the application was filled for seeking condonation of delay in filling the application, the application was filled with a delay of six years i.e., 1900 days.

It was stated by the applicant that the review application could not be filled due to the blockage of public transportation on account of the COVID-19 guidelines.

Moreover, the court observed that the appeals were disposed of by the Apex Court in the year 2016 and only in 2020-2021, the pandemic struck India and furthermore, it cannot be said that due to the COVID guidelines the public transportation was blocked and however, the applicant could not come to Allahabad Court to file review.

Further, it was stated that the court asked the counsel for the review applicants to explain the delay in filling the review application, to which the council gave a strange reply that the counsel had advised the clients that they must take a chance by filling this review application after a period of six years.

Following this, the Court observed:

The court noted that an advocate should not give such an advice when there is no error apparent on the face of record nor was there any other reason that when the matter was finally decided, why the matter be re-agitated.

It was stated that the court has no reason to condone the delay of six years as the same was not explained as to why this review application is filed after such an inordinate delay.

The Court opined that the lapse in approaching the court within the time is understandable but a total inaction for long period of delay without any explanation whatsoever and that too in absence of showing any sincere attempt on the part of suiter, this would add to his negligence and the relevant factor going against him.

The court observed that careless and reckless is shown by the review applicant in approaching the court and due to the condemnation of delay in the application with a token cost of Rs.10,000/, the court dismissed the application.

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SUPREME COURT CRITICISES HIGH COURT: POSTING ANTICIPATORY BAIL PLEA AFTER TWO MONTHS CAN’T BE APPRECIATED

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The Supreme Court in the case Sanjay versus The State (NCT of Delhi) & ANR observed and stated that in the case where personal liberty is involved, the court is expected to pass orders at the earliest while taking into account the merits of the matter in one way or other. Further, the top court observed that posting of an application for anticipatory bail after a couple of months cannot be appreciated by the court.

The bench comprising of Justice C. T. Ravikumar and the Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia was hearing a June 2 SLP against the Delhi High Court in a petition filed under section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for seeking anticipatory bail in a 2022 FIR, a notice is issued. It was stated that the learned APP for the state is present and accepts the notice and seeks time to file status report. The High Court in the impugned order stated that Let the status report be filed by the state prior to the next date with an advance copy to the learned counsel for the petitioner. The matter is to be list on 31.08.2022.

It was noted by the bench comprising of Justice Ravikumar and the Justice Dhulia that in the captioned Special Leave Petition, the grievance of the petitioner is that the application for anticipatory bail moved by the petitioner, being Crl. M.A. No. 11480 of 2022 in Bail Application No. 1751 of 2022 without granting any interim protection, was posted to 31.08.2022. on 24.05.2022, the bail application was moved on.

However, the bench asserted that the bench is of the considered view that in a matter involving personal liberty, the Court is expected to to pass orders at the earliest while taking into account the merits of the matter in one way or other.

It was declared by the bench that at any rate posting an application for anticipatory bail after a couple of months cannot be appreciated by the court.

Further, the bench requested to the High Court to dispose off the application for anticipatory bail on its own merits and in accordance with law expeditiously, preferably within a period of three weeks after reopening of the Court. Adding to it, the bench stated that if the main application could not be disposed off, for any reason, within the stipulated time, relief sought for in the interlocutory and on and on its own merits, the application shall be considered.

While disposing of the SLP, the bench directed in its order that we grant interim protection from arrest to the petitioner herein, Till such time.

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