Closure report can’t be filed merely because informant did not supply adequate materials for probe: SC - The Daily Guardian
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Closure report can’t be filed merely because informant did not supply adequate materials for probe: SC

The three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court, while setting aside closure reports against some accused in a murder case did not shy away from remarking that a ‘fair investigation is a necessary concomitant of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India’. The court observed that it is the statutory as well as constitutional duty of the police to investigate on receiving report of the commission of a cognizable offence

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In a recent, remarkable and righteous decision titled Amar Nath Chaubey vs Union of India [SLP (CRL.) NO. 6951 of 2018] delivered just recently on December 14, 2020 has maintained that a closure report cannot be filed merely on the ground that the investigation was not possible as the informant had not supplied adequate materials to investigate. The three-judge Bench of Apex Court headed by RF Nariman and also comprising of Justice Navin Sinha and Justice Krishna Murari while setting aside closure reports against some accused in a murder case did not shy away from remarking that, “A fair investigation is a necessary concomitant of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.” The Court observed that it is the statutory as well as constitutional duty of the police to investigate on receiving report of the commission of a cognizable offence.

To start with, the ball is set rolling in the opening para 1 of this notable judgment wherein it is observed that, “One Shri Ram Bihari Chaubey, the father of the petitioner, was shot dead at his residence in Village Shrikanthpur, Chaubepur, Varanasi in the State of Uttar Pradesh, on 04.12.2015 at around 7.15 AM. An F.I.R. No. 378/2015 under Sections 302, 147, 148 and 149, I.P.C. was registered the same day at Chobepur Police Station at 11.15 AM. Four unknown assailants were stated to have come on a motor cycle. Two of them entered the residence and shot the deceased, while the two others waited outside, after which they all escaped.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then observed in para 2 that, “The petitioner, son of the deceased, approached the Allahabad High Court complaining of the lackadaisical manner in which the police was investigating because some powerful personalities were also involved. The investigating officers were also being changed with regularity seeking a mandamus for a proper inquiry into the murder of his father including by the C.B.I. The High Court called for a progress report and also required the Chief Secretary to file his affidavit in the matter. The petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order of the High Court dated 17.05.2018 disposing the writ petition, accepting the contention of the police that the investigation would be concluded expeditiously and report will be submitted before the competent court within a period of eight weeks.”

Of course, the Bench then observes in para 3 that, “We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, for the State of Uttar Pradesh and for respondent no.5. On 29.06.2017 charge sheet was submitted against one Raju alias Nagender Singh son of late Ramji Singh, Ajay Singh and Shani Singh both sons of Narayan Singh, citing 21 witnesses. The charge sheet stated that the name of respondent no.5 had transpired during investigation as having conspired in the killing after which Section 120B I.P.C. was also added. The charge sheeted accused Raju alias Nagender Singh confessed that apart from the others named by him, respondent no. 5 in conspiracy had the murder planned and executed. The investigation was thus kept pending against Manish Singh, Dabloo Singh and respondent no.5. The police in the case diary noting dated 17.02.2017 recorded that on basis of confidential information from the police informer, that respondent no.5 had given a “supari” of Rs. Five lacs for murder of the deceased. Political rivalry existed between the deceased and respondent no.5 on account of assembly elections as also panchayat elections. It further contained noting that the real person behind the incident was respondent n. 5 based on very confidential information, having serious ramifications. The case diary noting dated 06.04.2017 records that the police party went to landmark tower to arrest Ajay Singh and Shani Singh. Respondent no.5 demanded the production of arrest warrant against the concerned persons and required the investigating officer to give in writing that the suspect was being taken for interrogation. Raju alias Nagender Singh after intensive interrogation disclosed that with co-accused Ajay Singh, he had gone to meet respondent no.5, disclosing the manner in which the murder was committed by him and his accomplices. The case diary noting dated 29.06.2017 records that investigation against Dabloo Singh and Manish Singh and respondent no.5 were in progress. Respondent no.5 vide Annexure P.5 letter no. 4/2017 wrote to the Principal Secretary that he was being falsely implicated and the matter be properly investigated, if required from the C.B.I.”

While further elaborating on the progress of the case, the Bench then elucidates in para 4 that, “The Sub-Inspector of Police submitted a progress report before the High Court on 11.10.2017 that the investigation up to that date revealed the involvement of Ajay Singh, Raju alias Nagender Singh, Shani Singh, Manish Singh, Dabloo Singh and respondent no.5 as a conspirator. Charge sheet had been submitted against Ajay Singh, Raju alias Nagender Singh and Shani Singh and investigation with regard to Dabloo Singh, Manish Singh and respondent no.5 is still pending. It further stated that raids were conducted for arresting others including respondent no.5. From the material collected during investigation it was apparent that the murder was committed due to political rivalry by hatching a conspiracy effectively with the help of respondent no.5 and that the police were trying to collect more credible materials. Another affidavit was filed on 16.05.2018 before the High Court, by one Shri Devender Chaubey, the In-charge Chief Secretary, disclosing that respondent no.5 had 24 criminal cases against him including under Section 302 IPC. In five cases final report had been filed in absence of credible evidence. In nine cases respondent no. 5 had been charge sheeted but was acquitted. Five criminal trials are still pending against respondent no.5. He had also been put behind bars under the provisions of National Security Act by order dated 11.11.1998. It concluded that the allegations against respondent no.5 were under investigation.”

To be sure, it is then revealed in para 5 that, “This Court issued notice in the present matter on 07.09.2018. On 20.01.2020, this Court directed the Director General of Police, U.P. to file an affidavit with regard to the status of the investigation vis-à-vis respondent no.5. An affidavit was filed by the D.G.P. on 22.02.2020 stating that there was no cogent evidence against respondent no.5 despite discreet efforts. Investigation of the case was therefore closed on 30.01.2019 and report submitted in the concerned court along with other police papers on 04.06.2019 with regard to accused Ajay Singh, Shani Singh, Raju alias Nagender Singh only and no further investigation was pending against any person. The trial court summoned the complainant for evidence on several dates, but the complainant had not appeared.”

Be it noted, the Bench then observes in para 6 that, “We have considered the matter. The F.I.R. was registered on 04.12.2015. Eight investigating officers have been changed. Respondent no.5 suo motu sought impleadment in the writ petition filed in the High Court. An investigation which had been kept pending since 04.12.2015 was promptly closed on 30.01.2019 after this Court had issued notice on 07.09.2018. The affidavit of the Director General of Police, U.P. not being satisfactory, on 26.10.2020 this Court required the respondents to file copy of the closure report stated to have been filed before the court concerned. The affidavit filed by the Circle Officer, Pindara, Varanasi dated 31.10.2020, pursuant to our order dated 26.10.2020 encloses the closure report dated 02.09.2018, the supervision note of the Superintendent of Police, Rural dated 17.12.2018 and the closure report dated 30.01.2019 submitted in court. We have gone through the same. It simply states that there was no concrete evidence of conspiracy against respondent no.5 and that the informant had not placed any materials before the police direct or indirect with regard to the conspiracy. As and when materials will be found against respondent no.5 in future, action would be taken as per law. No credible evidence was found against Manish Singh and Dabloo Singh.”

While slamming the police investigation and the closure report, the Bench then, more significantly, without mincing any words states upfront in para 7 that, “We are constrained to record that the investigation and the closure report are extremely casual and perfunctory in nature. The investigation and closure report do not contain any material with regard to the nature of investigation against the other accused including respondent no.5 for conspiracy to arrive at the conclusion for insufficiency of evidence against them. The closure report is based on the ipse dixit of the Investigating Officer. The supervision note of the Senior Superintendent of Police (Rural), in the circumstances leaves much to be desired. The investigation appears to be a sham, designed to conceal more than to investigate. The police has the primary duty to investigate on receiving report of the commission of a cognizable offence. This is a statutory duty under the Code of Criminal Procedure apart from being a constitutional obligation to ensure that peace is maintained in the society and the rule of law is upheld and applied. To say that further investigation was not possible as the informant had not supplied adequate materials to investigate, to our mind, is a preposterous statement, coming from the police.”

Most significantly, the Bench then minces no words to state squarely, simply and straightly in para 8 that, “The police has a statutory duty to investigate into any crime in accordance with law as provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Investigation is the exclusive privilege and prerogative of the police which cannot be interfered with. But if the police does not perform its statutory duty in accordance with law or is remiss in the performance of its duty, the court cannot abdicate its duties on the precocious plea that investigation is the exclusive prerogative of the police. Once the conscience of the court is satisfied, from the materials on record, that the police has not investigated properly or apparently is remiss in the investigation, the court has a bounden constitutional obligation to ensure that the investigation is conducted in accordance with law. If the court gives any directions for that purpose within the contours of the law, it cannot amount to interference with investigation. A fair investigation is, but a necessary concomitant of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and this Court has the bounden obligation to ensure adherence by the police.”

Briefly stated, para 9 then while citing a recent relevant case law states that, “In Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Principal Secretary and ors., (2014) 2 SCC 532, this Court observed as follows:

“24. In the criminal justice system the investigation of an offence is the domain of the police. The power to investigate into the cognizable offences by the police officer is ordinarily not impinged by any fetters. However, such power has to be exercised consistent with the statutory provisions and for legitimate purpose. The courts ordinarily do not interfere in the matters of investigation by police, particularly, when the facts and circumstances do not indicate that the investigating officer is not functioning bona fide. In very exceptional cases, however, where the court finds that the police officer has exercised his investigatory powers in breach of the statutory provision putting the personal liberty and/or the property of the citizen in jeopardy by illegal and improper use of the power or there is abuse of the investigatory power and process by the police officer or the investigation by the police is found to be not bona fide or the investigation is tainted with animosity, the court may intervene to protect the personal and/or property rights of the citizens.

26. One of the responsibilities of the police is protection of life, liberty and property of citizens. The investigation of offences is one of the important duties the police has to perform. The aim of investigation is ultimately to search for truth and bring the offender to book.

xxx xxx xxx

39. … In the rare and compelling circumstances referred to above, the superior courts may monitor an investigation to ensure that the investigating agency conducts the investigation in a free, fair and time-bound manner without any external interference.””

It is worth paying attention here that para 10 then discloses that, “The trial is stated to have commenced against the charge sheeted accused, and the informant summoned to give evidence. In the facts of the case, we direct that further trial shall remain stayed. The closure reports dated 02.09.2018, 17.12.2018 culminating in the report dated 30.01.2019 are partly set aside insofar as the non-charge sheeted accused are concerned only. Those already charge sheeted, calls for no interference.”

Now it is time to deal with concluding paras. Para 11 states that, “We hereby appoint Shri Satyarth Anirudh Pankaj, I.P.S. as the senior officer, State of Uttar Pradesh to carry out further investigation in the matter through a team of competent officers to be selected by him of his own choice. The State shall ensure the availability of such officers. The investigation must be concluded within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, unless extension is required, and the final report be placed before this Court. The Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh shall do the needful.” The last para 12 then stipulates that, “List immediately after two months for further orders.”

In a nutshell, this latest, landmark, learned and laudable judgment leaves no room for doubt that closure report cannot be filed merely because informant did not supply adequate materials to investigate. The police must always follows this useful directive whenever it is confronted with such situations in future! It will in doing so certainly benefit its ownself as also the investigation process which has to be taken always to its logical conclusion by ensuring that the guilty is not spared and the innocent is not convicted or harassed in any manner! This is exactly what the Supreme Court also desires so by this commendable judgment as is clearly manifested also in it! Very rightly so!

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Legally Speaking

MP HIGH COURT SEEKS DGP’S REPLY: DOES POLICE’S FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE FULL CRIMINAL ANTECEDENTS OF ACCUSED AMOUNTS TO MISCONDUCT, INTERFERENCE WITH JUSTICE?

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The Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case Kuldeep Dohare Versus the State of Madhya Pradesh observed, recently the Gwalior bench directed the Director General of Police, State of Madhya Pradesh to file an affidavit explaining as to whether non-communication of criminal antecedents of an Applicant or Accused to the Court is a minor misconduct or if it amounts to interference with the criminal justice dispensation system. Before the next date of hearing, the affidavit is to be filled.

The bench comprising of Justice G.S. Ahluwalia observed and remarked that the court was frequently finding that the police authorities were not sending the complete criminal antecedents, in spite of the circular issued by Police Headquarters.

It was observed that the police authorities did not send the criminal antecedents of the applicant. Furthermore, it is clear that it is a clear attempt to facilitate the applicant to obtain bail by projecting that he has no criminal antecedents. The issue raised is weather the conduct of police officers can be said to be a minor negligence or it is an interference with the criminal justice dispensation system?

In the present case, the court was dealing with a bail application moved by the accused applicant for offences punishable under section 307, Section 149, section 148, section 147, section 506, section 294, section 201. On an earlier hearing, the court had observed that even though the case diary did not reflect any criminal antecedents on the part of the Applicant. The impugned order passed by the lower court rejecting his bail application mentioned otherwise.

It was observed that a reply was sought by the court from the Superintendent of Police, District Bhind as to why the important information with regard to the criminal antecedents of the Applicant were withheld by the respective SHO. The SP informed the Court on the subsequent hearing that the SHO concerned as well as the Investigating Officer in the case were found guilty of misconduct and were fined with Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 5,000, respectively.

The Court observed that since the problem was stemming from different police stations. However, the DGP should file his reply regarding the prevailing situation-

Since in different police station, this situation is prevailing. Therefore, an affidavit is directed to be filled by the DGP, State of Madhya Pradesh as to whether non- communication of criminal antecedents of an applicant is a minor misconduct or it amounts to interfere with the criminal antecedents of justice dispensation system.

Accordingly, the affidavit needs to be filled within a period of 1 week, the matter would be heard next on 08.07.2022.

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HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH: SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT APPLIES TO ARBITRATION REFERENCE UNDER NATIONAL HIGHWAY ACT, 1956

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The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case Ghanshyam Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors observed and stated that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to reference to arbitration under the National Highways Act, 1956.

The Division Bench comprising of Justice Ravi Malimath and Justice Purushiandra Kumar Kaurav observed and reiterated that since no limitation is provided under Section 3G (5) of the National Highways Act. The bench stated that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to such proceedings.

Therefore, the court held that the limitation period for filing an appeal against the decision of the competent authority before the arbitrator from the date of expiry of 90 days is three years from the decision of the competent authority.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The petitioner, Mr. Ghanshyam Gupta was the landowner of the land which was acquired by the Respondent, Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation. Thereafter, the competent authority determined the quantum of compensation payable to the petitioner and passed an award to that effect on 30.07.2015.

The petitioner being dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation determined by the competent authority. On 04.12.2019, an appeal was filled by the petitioner before the arbitrator. The appeal was dismissed by the arbitrator as time-barred filed after the expiry of three years limitation period.

the petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court, Aggrieved by the decision of the arbitrator.

Contentions Raised by the Parties:

It is stated that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to arbitration reference under Section 3G (5) of the National Highways Act, 1956.

It was observed that the petitioner was unaware of the availability of the remedy of appeal against the decision of the competent authority, the petitioner only after consulting his lawyer, that the petitioner came to know that he could seek enhancement. Further, there is a valid ground to condone the delay.

The submissions of the petitioner were countered by the Respondent on the following grounds:

Though, in the absence of a period of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 3G (5) of the Act of 1956, it was construed that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act would stand applicable.

It was stated that Article 137 provides for 3 years period, and the petitioner filed the appeal after a delay of 4 years.

COURT ANALYSIS:

The court observed and stated that since no limitation is provided under Section 3G (5) of the National Highways Act, the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act would apply to such proceedings.

Therefore, the court held that the limitation period for filing an appeal against the decision of the competent authority before the arbitrator from the date of expiry of 90 days is three years from the decision of the competent authority.

The court observed that there is nothing in the National Highways Act that excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to reference to arbitration under the National Highways Act, 1956 and the arbitrator has the power to condone the delay against the award, in filing an appeal by the competent authority.

The court noted that the petitioner was not aware that an appeal could be filed against the decision of the Competent Authority and it is only after consulting his lawyer that the petitioner came aware of any such right, therefore, there is sufficient reason to condone the delay.

Accordingly, the application was allowed by the court and the court directed the arbitrator to decide the case of the petitioner on merit.

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KERALA HIGH COURT APPOINTS AMICUS CURIAE IN SARITHA NAIR’S PLEA; IS A STATEMENT RECORDED U/S 164 CRPC A PUBLIC DOCUMENT?

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The Kerala High Court in the case Saritha S. Nair v. Union of India & Anr observed and appointed an amicus curia to assist the court to decide the legal question of whether a statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC is a public document.

The bench comprising of Justice Kauser Edappagath appointed the amicus curiae, in the petition filled by Saritha S. Nair, the prime accused in the infamous solar panel scam seeking a direction to provide her with copies of the Section 164 statement given by Swapna Suresh, the accused in the gold smuggling case.

The court appointed Advocate K.K. Dheerendrakrishnan, as the amicus curiae in the case.

In the present case, it was observed that Saritha Nair is accused of having duped several influential people to the tune of 70 lakhs, by offering to install solar power units for them or by making them business partners and by receiving advance payments for the same.

Moreover, Swapna Suresh is accused of smuggling 30 kilograms of gold through diplomatic cargo dispatched to UAE Consulate at Thiruvananthapuram.

It was observed that when the petition came up for hearing, the counsel appearing for the petitioner, Advocate B.A Aloor appearing that the statement given by Swapna was a public document and therefore the petitioner was entitled to get a copy.

Further, Nair approached the Court apprehending that certain allegation may have been brought on record against her in the statement given by Suresh. It was prayed by Nair, that the c court allow her plea, directing the production of certified copies of the said document to her, failing which she would sustain an irreparable injury, the hardship and as well as physical and mental agony.

It was observed that the Nair had had initially moved the Principal District and Sessions Court of Ernakulam, with the same request, but this was denied. The court noted and adjourned the matter to July 11, while on a petition filed by the accuse, Saritha S. Nair in the solar scam cases, for seeking a directive to provide a copy of the statement given by Swapna Suresh, accused in the diplomatic gold smuggling case before a subordinate court.

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Supreme Court issues notice in an SLP; can section 156 (3) CRPC be invoked after failing to get desired relief in a civil suit?

It was observed that before the Calcutta High Court, it was contended by the accused that the allegations made in the application under Section 156(3) CrPC fails to make out any offence against them. Further, it was submitted that a frustrated unsuccessful litigant before the Civil Court has approached the Criminal Court and the Criminal Investigation.

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The Supreme Court in the case Usha Chakraborty vs State of West Bengal observed and issued a notice in a Special Leave Petition filled, raising an issue whether in a dispute essentially in a dispute of civil nature that can a person, after having failed to get the desired relief from a civil suit, invoke Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure?

In the present case, an FIR was registered against the accused under Sections 323, Section 384, Section 406, Section 423, Section 467, Section 468, Section 420 and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 following an order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC.

It was observed that before the Calcutta High Court, it was contended by the accused that the allegations made in the application under Section 156(3) CrPC fails to make out any offence against them. Further, it was submitted that a frustrated unsuccessful litigant before the Civil Court has approached the Criminal Court and the Criminal Investigation, which has commenced, is for the purposes of throttling them. The petition was dismissed by the High Court observing that the materials which have already been collected by the Investigating Agency, prima facie, make out a case for investigation. The issue raised before the court was weather the same would make out an offence after the investigation is concluded is absolutely at the end of the investigation to be analysed.

Therefore, challenging this order, one of the accused approached the Apex Court. However, It was submitted that the dispute is essentially of civil nature, for which the applicant in Section 156(3) CrPC petition filed a civil suit but having failed to get the desired relief, he invoked Section 156(3) CrPC.

The bench comprising of Justice Surya Kant and the Justice JB Pardiwala, while issuing notice also stayed further proceedings in FIR lodged against the accused.

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GAUHATI HIGH COURT QUASHES NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION AGAINST GRAM PANCHAYAT PRESIDENT CITING PARTICIPATION OF MEMBER DISQUALIFIED FOR HAVING THREE CHILDREN

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The Gauhati High Court in the case Jugitawali Pawe v State of Assam and 15 ors observed and quashed a resolution expressing no-confidence in the petitioner – the President of a Gram Panchayat, as a result of which she as removed from office. It was stated that it is as per the citing no compliance with Assam Panchayat Act, 1994, reading with Rule 62 of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995.

It was preferred by the petitioner to the materials available on record to argue that one of the members of the Gaon Panchayat, the respondent. The respondent voted against the petitioner and had given birth to her third child the previous year. Moreover, by virtue of Section 111(2)(a) of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994, reading with Rule 62 of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995, the petitioner stood automatically disqualified on the date of voting. Following, which her vote was taken by passing No-confidence motion.

It was prayed by the petitioner in the plea for setting aside the impugned resolution and for issuance of a direction to restore his client back in the office. Thereafter, to initiate fresh proceedings, liberty should be granted to the respondent, following the due process.

It was agreed by the Counsel representing for the respondent that the said member of the panchayat had been disqualified but retained on the ground that the disqualification would have no bearing on the petitioner’s case, as the impugned resolution was passed before the declaration of petitioner disqualification.

In the present case, It was noticed by Justice Suman Shyam the member had voted against the petitioner and without her vote. The petitioner would not have been ousted from office. Justice Shyam also found no dispute about the fact that the member had incurred disqualification under the law prior the date of adoption of the impugned resolution. Justice Shyam found it unnecessary to delve into other aspects of the matter which includes the procedural formalities for declaring the member a disqualified candidate.

It is observed that the impugned resolution was declared to be vitiated and liable to be set aside. Further, the Court restored the petitioner to the office of the President of the Bongalmara Gaon Panchayat with immediate effect and it was stated by the court that the order will not stand in the way should the authorities or any member of the Gaon Panchayat propose a fresh motion of “no-confidence” against the petitioner and the due process of law needs to be followed.

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Halt DDA’s demolition action against jhuggis in Nizamuddin’s Gyaspur area, orders Delhi High Court

As per the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015 and the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board, the residents who can establish their residence prior to 01.01.2015 are eligible for rehabilitation under the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015.

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plea in Delhi High Court seeking repatriation of 56 pregnant nurses

The Delhi High Court in the case Manoj Gupta & Ors. v. DDA & Ors observed and has ordered status quo on the Delhi Development Authority’s proposal to demolish jhuggi clusters in city’s Gyaspur area in Hazrat Nizamuddin. The vacation bench comprising of Justice Neena Bansal Krishna observed in the petition filled by the residents and the court granted an interim relief.

It was ordered by the court status quo till July 11, the next date of hearing.

The bench orally remarked that a ten-day delay in demolition won’t make a difference but if today it is demolished and later, we come to know that they were entitled, who’s going to… the bench will consider it on July 11, 2022 but in the Meanwhile, some protections are entitled them. Adding this, Status quo be maintained. If since 1995, they have been there, heavens won’t come down if for 10 more days they are protected.

In the plea the petitioner stated that the T-Huts settlement in the area, which was stated by the authorities to vacate. It has been in existence for almost two decades and compromise of 32 jhuggis or households.

In the plea it was alleged that the bulldozers have been parked around the camp and a DDA official has orally asked them to vacate the area and it is noted that till date no proper notice have been sent to them nor has DDA conducted any survey of the area.

Furthermore, the DDA did not provide any alternate arrangement for their rehabilitation which resulted in extreme distress among the residents.

Moreover, it was admitted by the petitioner that the land in question belongs to DDA and they may seek that status-quo to be maintained at the site. It was urged that the residents should not be physically dispose or evicted from the demolition site until the survey is conducted and rehabilitation is provided to the residents as per the DUSIB policy of 2015.

As per the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015 and the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board. The residents who can establish their residence prior to 01.01.2015 are eligible for rehabilitation under the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015.

It is observed that in the case Ajay Maken v. Union of India, Reliance is placed on the Supreme Court decision and the High Court decision in the case Sudama Singh & Ors. v. Government of Delhi & Anr, it was held in the case that that removal of jhuggis without ensuring relocation would amount of gross violation of Fundamental Rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Further, it was held that the agencies conducting the demolitions ought to conduct survey before undertaking any demolition.

It is submitted that these observations would apply across the board, in the entire NCT of Delhi.

Advocates Vrinda Bhandari, Shiyaz Razaq, Kaoliangpou Kamei, Jepi Y Chisho and Paul Kumar Kalai, represented the petitioner.

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