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Advocates have right to practice before maintenance tribunals: Delhi High Court

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plea in Delhi High Court seeking repatriation of 56 pregnant nurses

In a major relief for lawyers all across the country, the Delhi High Court has just recently on April 16, 2021 in a courageous, cogent, convincing, commendable and composed judgment titled Tarun Saxena vs Union of India & Ors in W.P.(C) 4725/2021 & CM APPLs. 14574-75/2021 has declared as ultra vires Section 17 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 which bars lawyers from representing parties in matters before the Maintenance Tribunals. It must be apprised here that this commendable judgment is in line with the judgment that was notably delivered by a

Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in March 2021 stating clearly

that the provision is ultra vires of Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961.

In hindsight, it may be recalled that in a groundbreaking judgment which is also a grand victory for advocates,

the Kerala High Court had just recently on March 30, 2021 in a latest, learned, laudable and landmark judgment titled Adv KG Suresh vs The Union of India and 3 others in WP(C)No. 21946 of 2011(S) has declared as unconstitutional the bar on lawyers representing parties in matters before the Maintenance Tribunals constituted under the Maintenance Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (Maintenance Act). It

also rightly held that, “Section 17 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, is declared as ultra vires of Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961.” A two Judge Bench of Kerala High Court comprising of Chief Justice S Manikumar and Justice Shaji P Chaly pronounced this pathbreaking judgment thereby allowing a writ petition filed in 2011. This latest, learned, laudable and landmark judgment by the Delhi High Court further endorses this notable judgment of the Kerala High Court. While relying considerably on the aforesaid superb decision of the Kerala High Court, Justice Pratibha M Singh too while endorsing it lock, stock and barrel observed most convincingly that, “Since Section 17 has been declared ultra vires Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, it would obviously mean that an advocate would have the right to represent parties before the Tribunal under the Act. Ordered accordingly.”

To start with, a Single Judge Bench of the Delhi High Court comprising of Justice Pratibha M Singh who has authored this oral judgment and the hearing has been done through video conferencing as pointed in para 1, then while stating the purpose of the petition puts forth in para 2 that, “The present petition has been filed challenging order dated 26th March, 2021 passed by the ADM, Karkardooma Courts under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter, ‘Act’).”

While dwelling on the grievance of the petitioner, the Bench then observes in para 3 that, “The grievance of the Petitioner in this case is two-fold:- (i) that advocates are not being permitted to appear before the Tribunal; and (ii) that evidence is not being permitted to be led before the Tribunal.”

As we see, the Bench then brings out in para 4 that, “Insofar as the first issue is concerned, ld.

Counsel for the Petitioner relies upon the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Adv. K.G. Suresh v. Union of India & Ors. [W.P.(C) No. 21946/2011, decided on 30th March, 2021]. He submits that Section 17 of the Act has been declared to be ultra vires Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961.”

Furthermore, the Bench then observes in para 5 that, “Insofar as the second issue is concerned, the submission of ld.

Counsel for the Petitioner is that under Section 8(3) of the Act, the Tribunal has to permit the leading of evidence in support of the parties’ case and a direction in this regard may be passed.”

On the other hand, the Bench then points out in para 6 that, “Mr. Singh, ld. Counsel appearing for the Union of India, submits that under Section 8, the Tribunal follows summary procedure. Discretion is left to the Tribunal to follow the procedure in accordance with law considering the facts and circumstances of each case.”

Going ahead, the Bench then discloses in para 7 that, “Mr. Shukla, ld. Counsel points out that the order under challenge, i.e., order dated 26th March, 2021, wherein the ADM has merely directed the filing of the applications by the parties, was listed today at 02:00 pm.”

Quite aptly, the Bench then enunciates in para 8 that, “Firstly, this Court has perused the judgment of the Kerala High Court. The operative portion of the said

judgment reads as under:-

“57. As Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 has been brought into force from 15.06.2011, Advocates enrolled under the said Act have been conferred with an absolute right thereof, to practice before all the Courts and Tribunals. By virtue of Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, coming into force, from 15.06.2011, the restriction imposed is taken away and in such circumstances, Article 19 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the freedom to practice any profession, enables the Advocates to appear before all the Courts and the Tribunals, subject to Section 34 of the Advocates Act, 1961.

In the light of the above discussion and decisions, Section 17 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, is declared as ultra vires of Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and thus, the petitioner is entitled for a declaration that he has a right to represent the parties before the

Tribunal/ Appellate Tribunal/Court, constituted under Act 56 of 2007.

Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed.””

As a corollary, the Bench then envisages in para 9 that,

“In view of the above, since Section 17 has been declared ultra vires Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, it would obviously mean that an advocate would have the right to represent parties before the Tribunal under the Act. Ordered accordingly.”

Be it noted, the Bench then enunciates in para 10 that, “Insofar as the second issue is concerned, Section 8 of the Act reads as under:-

“8. Summary procedure in case of inquiry

1. In holding any inquiry under section 5, the Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it deems fit.

2. The Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

3. Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, the Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating and deciding upon any claim for maintenance, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of any matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the

inquiry.”” Of course, the Bench then hastens to add in para 11 that, “A perusal of the above provision shows that firstly, the procedure contemplated under Section 8 is a summary procedure. Secondly, it is an ‘Inquiry’ and not an adjudication which is usually done by the Courts. An ‘Inquiry’ is to be held under Section 5 to determine the amount payable.”

It is worth noting that the Bench then mandates in para 12 that, “Under The Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules (Amendment) Rules, 2016, the steps to be taken as part of the Inquiry, include:

• Verification of the title of the property and the facts of the case as stated in the application by the concerned SDM, within 15 days from the receipt of the application.

• Submission of the report by the SDM to the Deputy Commissioner/DM for final orders, within 21 days from the receipt of the application/complaint.

• If, on receipt of the report, the Deputy Commissioner/DM is of the opinion that any child/legal heir of a senior citizen/parents is not maintaining the senior citizen/parents or is ill-treating him/her while continuing to occupy the premises of the senior citizen, show cause notice is to be issued by the DM as to why the child/legal heir should not be evicted.

• In the show cause notice, the ground on which eviction is proposed to be made should be specified so that the child/legal heir can respond appropriately.

• The show cause notice would call upon all persons who are either occupying the premises or claim interest in the premises, to provide reasons as to why they should not be evicted. Such a show cause would give at least 10 days’ time to the recipient of the notice to respond.

• As per Rule 22 (3)(2), the Deputy Commissioner/DM would consider the case put up by the noticees, including any evidence which may be produced, and after giving a hearing, pass a reasoned order on eviction.

Please read concluding on thedailyguardian.com

• Insofar as the nature of evidence is concerned, the Act or The Delhi

Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules

(Amendment) Rules, 2016, do not specify as to whether the evidence

should be oral/documentary.

The statutory scheme, as set out above, itself shows that the process

is time sensitive and is summary in nature.”

To put things in perspective, the

Bench then while citing the relevant case law observes in para 13

that, “The constitutional validity of Rule 22(3) and 22(4) of The

Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules

(Amendment) Rules, 2016, has been upheld by a Division Bench of this

Court in Aarshya Gulati (Through: next friend Mrs. Divya Gulati) &

Ors. v. GNCTD & Ors. [W.P.(C) 347/1028, decided on 30th May, 2019],

wherein the Court has observed as under:

“60. Now the question is whether the State Government could have

formulated a summary procedure for eviction. We must bear in mind the

objective for which the Parliament has enacted the Act, that is

because of withering of the joint family system, a large number of

elderly are not being looked after by their family. Consequently, many

older persons, particularly widowed women are forced to spend their

twilight years all alone and are exposed to emotional neglect and to

lack of physical and financial support which clearly reveals that

ageing has become a major social challenge and there is a need to give

more attention to the care and protection of the older persons. Though

the parents can claim maintenance under the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973, the procedure is both time consuming as well as

expensive. Hence, a need was felt to have simple, inexpensive and

speedy mechanism for parents / senior citizens to claim maintenance.

The Act also provide for protection of the life and property of the

senior citizens / parents. The “protection of property” must be

understood to mean where a senior citizen retains the property in his

name and possession for his welfare and well being.

61. So, the objective of the Act being, to provide inexpensive and

speedy procedure for the protection of life and property of the senior

citizens from the children / legal heirs, who are expected to maintain

parents / senior citizens by providing the basic amenities and

physical needs but refuse or fail to maintain / provide basic

amenities which conduct shall amount to ill-treatment and

non-maintenance and shall be a ground for parents / senior citizens to

seek eviction of children / legal heir from the property, which is the

only way for them to seek protection of their property so that, they

continue to have shelter over their head, and sustain themselves

independently without interference from their children / legal heirs.

Further, a senior citizen cannot knock the door of civil Court to

fight a legal battle to obtain the possession of the property as the

jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under Section 27 of the Act.

In this regard, we may refer to the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana

High Court in the case of Justice Shanti Sarup Dewan, Chief Justice

(Retd.) and Anr. (supra) wherein in para 37 it is held as under:

63. So, it must be held that the Act empowers the State Government to

formulate summary procedure for eviction of children / legal heir of

senior citizens, in the eventuality of ill-treatment or

non-maintenance of Sr. Citizen / Parents.

66. In the case in hand, it is seen that the Parliament has expressed

itself through the Act, the objective of which has already been

narrated above. It is seen from the objective of the Act and from

Section 22 whereby the State Government has been empowered to

prescribe “a comprehensive action plan for providing protection of

life and property of Senior Citizens”. This being so, the protection

of life and property basically pertains to law and order, which is a

State subject. Therefore, the obligation to prepare Action Plan has

been put on the State Government. So, it follows that a policy has

been determined by the Parliament for the protection of life and

property of the Senior Citizen by the District Magistrate on the basis

of Action Plan / Rules framed by the State Government. The action plan

to be prescribed is the one, which is speedy and to be implemented by

the District Magistrate, that is by an authority other than Civil

Court, as the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is barred. So, the

confirmation of such a power, even on an administrative authority, is

justified. While exercising the powers bestowed under the Act / action

plan / rules, the District Magistrate / Deputy Commissioner ceases to

be an administrative authority as understood in normal parlance (even

though there is no bar). He performs quasi-judicial functions as

different from administrative functions. Further, the rules framed by

the Government of NCT of Delhi, indicate the parameters on which the

District Magistrate / Deputy Commissioner shall act, which includes,

on an application by Senior Citizen / Parent(s) for eviction of his /

her son, daughter or legal heir from his / her property (as defined

under Section 2(f) of the Act of 2007), the District Magistrate, after

getting the title of the property verified through SDM, and on

consideration of the provisions of the Act of 2007, and forming an

opinion that the son, daughter or legal heir are ill treating him /

her by occupying their property, after following the principles of

natural justice, by giving hearing to all persons concerned, pass an

order of eviction.”

Thus, the remedy provided under the Act and the Rules is a ‘simple’,

‘inexpensive’ and ‘speedy’ remedy. The provisions have to be thus

interpreted in this context.””

Quite remarkably, the Bench then

holds in para 14 that, “In the present case, vide impugned order dated

26th March, 2021, the Tribunal has directed as under:

“Case called applicant presented HC order which says an councillor or

relative can represent applicant’s case in maintenance Tribunal, 10

minutes was given to applicant to submit application in writing.

Applicant gave an application stating that Mr. Sanjeev

Kumar is my choice to represent him in Maintenance Tribunal case.

Tribunal allowed applicant’s choice Mr. Sanjeev Kumar

to represent the case. Mr. Sanjeev Kumar was allowed to submit his

application in writing within 10 days, whatever applicant wants to

record as evidence. Respondent No.1 Mrs. Vinita Saxena wanted she had

already submitted an application. She was advised to submit her

submission to tribunal once again.

Respondent Ms. Taruna Saxena submitted that she

was not allowed to enter the house to haste after her father

applicant.

All applicant and respondent were advised to submit

application to Tribunal before 6th April, 2021. The next hearing of

case would be heard on 16th April, 2021, 1400 hrs.”

From the above, it is clear that the Tribunal has allowed the parties

to submit applications specifying as to what evidence they wish to

lead. The procedure being summary in nature, there is no doubt that

the Tribunal is vested with the power to exercise discretion upon the

facts and circumstances of each case. In a particular case, if the

Tribunal is of the opinion that the attendance of the witnesses and

proving of documents is required, it has the power under Section 8(2)

of the Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on record and

enforcing attendance of witnesses. This, however, would not mean that

in every case, the Tribunal would have to record oral evidence or take

on record documentary evidence. The nature of the proceedings itself

being summary, the discretion vests with the Tribunal to adopt the

procedure as may be suitable to the facts and circumstances of each

case. Moreover, even if lawyers are allowed to represent the

litigants, the summary procedure cannot be permitted to be converted

into a long-drawn trial and adjudication, so as to defeat the very

purpose of the legislation itself.”

To be sure, the Bench then points out

in para 15 that, “In the present case, the Tribunal has allowed

parties to file their applications in respect of any evidence which

they wish to record. The said applications would thus be considered in

accordance with law, in terms of the provisions of the Maintenance and

Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and the Rules made

thereunder.”

Finally, the Bench then holds in para 16

that, “With these observations, the present petition, along with all

pending applications, is disposed of.”

In a nutshell, this latest, learned,

laudable and landmark judgment by a Single Judge Bench of the Delhi

High Court comprising of Justice Pratibha M Singh has declared as

ultra vires Section 17 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and

Senior Citizens Act, 2007 which bars lawyers from representing parties

in matters before the Maintenance Tribunals. In other words, lawyers

are fully entitled to represent parties in matters before the

Maintenance Tribunals. Very rightly so!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

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Legally Speaking

MP HIGH COURT SEEKS DGP’S REPLY: DOES POLICE’S FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE FULL CRIMINAL ANTECEDENTS OF ACCUSED AMOUNTS TO MISCONDUCT, INTERFERENCE WITH JUSTICE?

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The Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case Kuldeep Dohare Versus the State of Madhya Pradesh observed, recently the Gwalior bench directed the Director General of Police, State of Madhya Pradesh to file an affidavit explaining as to whether non-communication of criminal antecedents of an Applicant or Accused to the Court is a minor misconduct or if it amounts to interference with the criminal justice dispensation system. Before the next date of hearing, the affidavit is to be filled.

The bench comprising of Justice G.S. Ahluwalia observed and remarked that the court was frequently finding that the police authorities were not sending the complete criminal antecedents, in spite of the circular issued by Police Headquarters.

It was observed that the police authorities did not send the criminal antecedents of the applicant. Furthermore, it is clear that it is a clear attempt to facilitate the applicant to obtain bail by projecting that he has no criminal antecedents. The issue raised is weather the conduct of police officers can be said to be a minor negligence or it is an interference with the criminal justice dispensation system?

In the present case, the court was dealing with a bail application moved by the accused applicant for offences punishable under section 307, Section 149, section 148, section 147, section 506, section 294, section 201. On an earlier hearing, the court had observed that even though the case diary did not reflect any criminal antecedents on the part of the Applicant. The impugned order passed by the lower court rejecting his bail application mentioned otherwise.

It was observed that a reply was sought by the court from the Superintendent of Police, District Bhind as to why the important information with regard to the criminal antecedents of the Applicant were withheld by the respective SHO. The SP informed the Court on the subsequent hearing that the SHO concerned as well as the Investigating Officer in the case were found guilty of misconduct and were fined with Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 5,000, respectively.

The Court observed that since the problem was stemming from different police stations. However, the DGP should file his reply regarding the prevailing situation-

Since in different police station, this situation is prevailing. Therefore, an affidavit is directed to be filled by the DGP, State of Madhya Pradesh as to whether non- communication of criminal antecedents of an applicant is a minor misconduct or it amounts to interfere with the criminal antecedents of justice dispensation system.

Accordingly, the affidavit needs to be filled within a period of 1 week, the matter would be heard next on 08.07.2022.

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HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH: SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT APPLIES TO ARBITRATION REFERENCE UNDER NATIONAL HIGHWAY ACT, 1956

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The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case Ghanshyam Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors observed and stated that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to reference to arbitration under the National Highways Act, 1956.

The Division Bench comprising of Justice Ravi Malimath and Justice Purushiandra Kumar Kaurav observed and reiterated that since no limitation is provided under Section 3G (5) of the National Highways Act. The bench stated that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to such proceedings.

Therefore, the court held that the limitation period for filing an appeal against the decision of the competent authority before the arbitrator from the date of expiry of 90 days is three years from the decision of the competent authority.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The petitioner, Mr. Ghanshyam Gupta was the landowner of the land which was acquired by the Respondent, Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation. Thereafter, the competent authority determined the quantum of compensation payable to the petitioner and passed an award to that effect on 30.07.2015.

The petitioner being dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation determined by the competent authority. On 04.12.2019, an appeal was filled by the petitioner before the arbitrator. The appeal was dismissed by the arbitrator as time-barred filed after the expiry of three years limitation period.

the petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court, Aggrieved by the decision of the arbitrator.

Contentions Raised by the Parties:

It is stated that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to arbitration reference under Section 3G (5) of the National Highways Act, 1956.

It was observed that the petitioner was unaware of the availability of the remedy of appeal against the decision of the competent authority, the petitioner only after consulting his lawyer, that the petitioner came to know that he could seek enhancement. Further, there is a valid ground to condone the delay.

The submissions of the petitioner were countered by the Respondent on the following grounds:

Though, in the absence of a period of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 3G (5) of the Act of 1956, it was construed that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act would stand applicable.

It was stated that Article 137 provides for 3 years period, and the petitioner filed the appeal after a delay of 4 years.

COURT ANALYSIS:

The court observed and stated that since no limitation is provided under Section 3G (5) of the National Highways Act, the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act would apply to such proceedings.

Therefore, the court held that the limitation period for filing an appeal against the decision of the competent authority before the arbitrator from the date of expiry of 90 days is three years from the decision of the competent authority.

The court observed that there is nothing in the National Highways Act that excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to reference to arbitration under the National Highways Act, 1956 and the arbitrator has the power to condone the delay against the award, in filing an appeal by the competent authority.

The court noted that the petitioner was not aware that an appeal could be filed against the decision of the Competent Authority and it is only after consulting his lawyer that the petitioner came aware of any such right, therefore, there is sufficient reason to condone the delay.

Accordingly, the application was allowed by the court and the court directed the arbitrator to decide the case of the petitioner on merit.

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KERALA HIGH COURT APPOINTS AMICUS CURIAE IN SARITHA NAIR’S PLEA; IS A STATEMENT RECORDED U/S 164 CRPC A PUBLIC DOCUMENT?

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The Kerala High Court in the case Saritha S. Nair v. Union of India & Anr observed and appointed an amicus curia to assist the court to decide the legal question of whether a statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC is a public document.

The bench comprising of Justice Kauser Edappagath appointed the amicus curiae, in the petition filled by Saritha S. Nair, the prime accused in the infamous solar panel scam seeking a direction to provide her with copies of the Section 164 statement given by Swapna Suresh, the accused in the gold smuggling case.

The court appointed Advocate K.K. Dheerendrakrishnan, as the amicus curiae in the case.

In the present case, it was observed that Saritha Nair is accused of having duped several influential people to the tune of 70 lakhs, by offering to install solar power units for them or by making them business partners and by receiving advance payments for the same.

Moreover, Swapna Suresh is accused of smuggling 30 kilograms of gold through diplomatic cargo dispatched to UAE Consulate at Thiruvananthapuram.

It was observed that when the petition came up for hearing, the counsel appearing for the petitioner, Advocate B.A Aloor appearing that the statement given by Swapna was a public document and therefore the petitioner was entitled to get a copy.

Further, Nair approached the Court apprehending that certain allegation may have been brought on record against her in the statement given by Suresh. It was prayed by Nair, that the c court allow her plea, directing the production of certified copies of the said document to her, failing which she would sustain an irreparable injury, the hardship and as well as physical and mental agony.

It was observed that the Nair had had initially moved the Principal District and Sessions Court of Ernakulam, with the same request, but this was denied. The court noted and adjourned the matter to July 11, while on a petition filed by the accuse, Saritha S. Nair in the solar scam cases, for seeking a directive to provide a copy of the statement given by Swapna Suresh, accused in the diplomatic gold smuggling case before a subordinate court.

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Supreme Court issues notice in an SLP; can section 156 (3) CRPC be invoked after failing to get desired relief in a civil suit?

It was observed that before the Calcutta High Court, it was contended by the accused that the allegations made in the application under Section 156(3) CrPC fails to make out any offence against them. Further, it was submitted that a frustrated unsuccessful litigant before the Civil Court has approached the Criminal Court and the Criminal Investigation.

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The Supreme Court in the case Usha Chakraborty vs State of West Bengal observed and issued a notice in a Special Leave Petition filled, raising an issue whether in a dispute essentially in a dispute of civil nature that can a person, after having failed to get the desired relief from a civil suit, invoke Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure?

In the present case, an FIR was registered against the accused under Sections 323, Section 384, Section 406, Section 423, Section 467, Section 468, Section 420 and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 following an order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC.

It was observed that before the Calcutta High Court, it was contended by the accused that the allegations made in the application under Section 156(3) CrPC fails to make out any offence against them. Further, it was submitted that a frustrated unsuccessful litigant before the Civil Court has approached the Criminal Court and the Criminal Investigation, which has commenced, is for the purposes of throttling them. The petition was dismissed by the High Court observing that the materials which have already been collected by the Investigating Agency, prima facie, make out a case for investigation. The issue raised before the court was weather the same would make out an offence after the investigation is concluded is absolutely at the end of the investigation to be analysed.

Therefore, challenging this order, one of the accused approached the Apex Court. However, It was submitted that the dispute is essentially of civil nature, for which the applicant in Section 156(3) CrPC petition filed a civil suit but having failed to get the desired relief, he invoked Section 156(3) CrPC.

The bench comprising of Justice Surya Kant and the Justice JB Pardiwala, while issuing notice also stayed further proceedings in FIR lodged against the accused.

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Legally Speaking

GAUHATI HIGH COURT QUASHES NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION AGAINST GRAM PANCHAYAT PRESIDENT CITING PARTICIPATION OF MEMBER DISQUALIFIED FOR HAVING THREE CHILDREN

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The Gauhati High Court in the case Jugitawali Pawe v State of Assam and 15 ors observed and quashed a resolution expressing no-confidence in the petitioner – the President of a Gram Panchayat, as a result of which she as removed from office. It was stated that it is as per the citing no compliance with Assam Panchayat Act, 1994, reading with Rule 62 of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995.

It was preferred by the petitioner to the materials available on record to argue that one of the members of the Gaon Panchayat, the respondent. The respondent voted against the petitioner and had given birth to her third child the previous year. Moreover, by virtue of Section 111(2)(a) of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994, reading with Rule 62 of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995, the petitioner stood automatically disqualified on the date of voting. Following, which her vote was taken by passing No-confidence motion.

It was prayed by the petitioner in the plea for setting aside the impugned resolution and for issuance of a direction to restore his client back in the office. Thereafter, to initiate fresh proceedings, liberty should be granted to the respondent, following the due process.

It was agreed by the Counsel representing for the respondent that the said member of the panchayat had been disqualified but retained on the ground that the disqualification would have no bearing on the petitioner’s case, as the impugned resolution was passed before the declaration of petitioner disqualification.

In the present case, It was noticed by Justice Suman Shyam the member had voted against the petitioner and without her vote. The petitioner would not have been ousted from office. Justice Shyam also found no dispute about the fact that the member had incurred disqualification under the law prior the date of adoption of the impugned resolution. Justice Shyam found it unnecessary to delve into other aspects of the matter which includes the procedural formalities for declaring the member a disqualified candidate.

It is observed that the impugned resolution was declared to be vitiated and liable to be set aside. Further, the Court restored the petitioner to the office of the President of the Bongalmara Gaon Panchayat with immediate effect and it was stated by the court that the order will not stand in the way should the authorities or any member of the Gaon Panchayat propose a fresh motion of “no-confidence” against the petitioner and the due process of law needs to be followed.

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Halt DDA’s demolition action against jhuggis in Nizamuddin’s Gyaspur area, orders Delhi High Court

As per the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015 and the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board, the residents who can establish their residence prior to 01.01.2015 are eligible for rehabilitation under the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015.

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plea in Delhi High Court seeking repatriation of 56 pregnant nurses

The Delhi High Court in the case Manoj Gupta & Ors. v. DDA & Ors observed and has ordered status quo on the Delhi Development Authority’s proposal to demolish jhuggi clusters in city’s Gyaspur area in Hazrat Nizamuddin. The vacation bench comprising of Justice Neena Bansal Krishna observed in the petition filled by the residents and the court granted an interim relief.

It was ordered by the court status quo till July 11, the next date of hearing.

The bench orally remarked that a ten-day delay in demolition won’t make a difference but if today it is demolished and later, we come to know that they were entitled, who’s going to… the bench will consider it on July 11, 2022 but in the Meanwhile, some protections are entitled them. Adding this, Status quo be maintained. If since 1995, they have been there, heavens won’t come down if for 10 more days they are protected.

In the plea the petitioner stated that the T-Huts settlement in the area, which was stated by the authorities to vacate. It has been in existence for almost two decades and compromise of 32 jhuggis or households.

In the plea it was alleged that the bulldozers have been parked around the camp and a DDA official has orally asked them to vacate the area and it is noted that till date no proper notice have been sent to them nor has DDA conducted any survey of the area.

Furthermore, the DDA did not provide any alternate arrangement for their rehabilitation which resulted in extreme distress among the residents.

Moreover, it was admitted by the petitioner that the land in question belongs to DDA and they may seek that status-quo to be maintained at the site. It was urged that the residents should not be physically dispose or evicted from the demolition site until the survey is conducted and rehabilitation is provided to the residents as per the DUSIB policy of 2015.

As per the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015 and the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board. The residents who can establish their residence prior to 01.01.2015 are eligible for rehabilitation under the JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015.

It is observed that in the case Ajay Maken v. Union of India, Reliance is placed on the Supreme Court decision and the High Court decision in the case Sudama Singh & Ors. v. Government of Delhi & Anr, it was held in the case that that removal of jhuggis without ensuring relocation would amount of gross violation of Fundamental Rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Further, it was held that the agencies conducting the demolitions ought to conduct survey before undertaking any demolition.

It is submitted that these observations would apply across the board, in the entire NCT of Delhi.

Advocates Vrinda Bhandari, Shiyaz Razaq, Kaoliangpou Kamei, Jepi Y Chisho and Paul Kumar Kalai, represented the petitioner.

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