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The Human Security Act and Philippine journalism
By Danilo Araña Arao
Philippine Human Rights Reporting Project
Posted by Bulatlat
(1st of 4 parts)
The Human Security Act (HSA) came into force only recently and yet already various national and international groups have denounced the law and called for its repeal. Why so? Why is the law not being given the chance to work? This paper seeks to analyze the weaknesses of the HSA as written and how it directly affects the practice of journalism.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law Republic Act (RA) No.
9372 or the Human Security Act of 2007 last March 6 and it took effect
four months later on July 15.
During the March 6 signing ceremony, President Macapagal-Arroyo said
that the HSA was an "institutional landmark of the 13th Congress" and
would help the authorities to prosecute the ‘war on terror.'
"Now that we have more legal teeth in this fight, we shall continue to
sharpen the intelligence and operational capabilities of the Armed
Forces and Police, modernize and further professionalize them, and
broaden the domestic and international alliance that will give us the
edge to win and prevail," she said.
The 35-page Human Security Act (HSA) states clearly that "(i)t is
declared a policy of the State to protect life, liberty, and property
from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous
to the national security of the country and to the welfare of the
people, and to make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people,
against humanity, and against the law of nations" (Section 2, paragraph
1).
A person is said to commit the crime of ‘terrorism' if he or she
engages in piracy in general and mutiny in the high seas or in the
Philippine waters; rebellion or insurrection; coup d'etat, including
acts committed by private persons; murder; kidnapping and serious
illegal detention; and crimes involving destruction.
Section 3 seeks to qualify acts that are to be considered acts of
‘terrorism'. To earn the label ‘terrorist crime,' acts should result in
"a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand."
The HSA explicitly states that journalists and their sources will not
be subjected to "surveillance, interception and recording of
communications" (Section 3, Paragraph 2) However, Raul Gonzales,
secretary of the Department of Justice, was quoted in July as saying
essentially that while existing law forbade the tapping of phones of
journalists, the HSA supersedes everything else.
"If you are a journalist, you are free from wiretapping because the law
says that journalists and their sources of information cannot be
subjected to wiretapping. The fact that your source is a terrorist does
not make you a terrorist per se. But if the journalist is now a
suspect, then he can be wiretapped. You have first to be a suspect," he
said.
The opposition to the HSA mainly rests on the law's broad definition of
who is a terrorist. The so-called "condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic" among the people that may result from the
identified crimes is so broad that anything and everything can be
interpreted as such.
This prompted Caloocan Bishop Deogracias Yñiguez to brand the law as
dangerous. "The anti-terror law will lead to greater tumult, especially
when used to deal with those who do not agree with government's
thinking."
What proves to be questionable is not only the law's broad definition
of terrorism, but, more importantly, the proscription of terrorist
organizations. The full text of Section 17 reads:
"Any organization, association, or group of persons organized for the
purpose of engaging in terrorism, or which, although not organized for
that purpose, actually uses the acts to terrorize mentioned in this Act
or to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear
and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give
in to an unlawful demand shall, upon application of the Department of
Justice before a competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and
opportunity to be heard given to the organization, association, or
group of persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed
organizations, association, or group of persons by the said Regional
Trial Court." (Italics mine)
Clearly, even legal organizations can be branded terrorists if, in the
conduct of their activities, they create "widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic" among people. The inclusion of the seemingly harmless
word "or" can make Section 17 susceptible to the interpretation that
the acts do not necessarily have to be crimes identified in Section 3
(such as possession of explosives or piracy), but other acts that
result in fear and panic with the end-view of coercing government to
give in to an unlawful demand.
The danger also lies in the fact that under Section. 19, mere suspicion
of being involved in acts of terrorism, whether real or imagined, could
result in detention. The first sentence of Section. 19 states:
"In the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may
not be detained for more than three days without the written approval
of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights
Commission or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the
Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of
the arrest."
What then are the parameters for determining an imminent terrorist
attack and how is this proven? While the three-day maximum detention
requires a written approval from the authorities, why are suspects
being subjected to it? One should not take consolation from the fact
that the Macapagal-Arroyo administration initially proposed a 30-day
maximum detention and that it is now reduced to three days. This is not
an issue of numbers, but the fundamental principle of people being
detained on mere suspicion of involvement in a terrorist attack that is
yet to happen, if at all.
Under the HSA, it also becomes possible for a person's right to travel
to be restricted. He or she may also be subjected to house arrest and
be held incommunicado. The full text of Section 26 states:
In case where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person charged
with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is
entitled to bail and is granted the same, the court, upon application
by the prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused to
within the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is
pending, in the interest of national security and public safety,
consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. Travel
outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization of the
court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of his
bail, which shall then be forfeited as provided under the Rules of
Court.
He/she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or her usual place of residence.
While under house arrest, he or she may not use telephones, cell
phones, e-mails, computers, the internet or other means of
communications with people outside the residence until otherwise
ordered by the court.
The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal
of the accused or of the dismissal of the case filed against him or
earlier upon the discretion of the court on motion of the prosecutor or
of the accused. (To be continued)
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